

# Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918

*Interim Report by*

Lieut.-General Sir A. W. Currie  
G.C.M.G., K.C.B.  
Commanding Canadian Corps.

Issued by the  
Department of Militia and Defence  
Ottawa, Canada



Canadian Corps Operations  
During the Year 1918.



# Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918

*Interim Report by*

Lieut.-General Sir A. W. Currie  
G.C.M.G., K.C.B.  
Commanding Canadian Corps.

Issued by the  
Department of Militia and Defence  
Ottawa, Canada



Interim Report by Lieut.-General Sir A. W. Currie,  
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., on the Operations of the  
Canadian Corps during the Year 1918.

PART I.

1st Period. January 1 to March 21.

**Disposition.**—After the Battle of Passchendale the Canadian Corps returned to the Vimy Sector and settled down to the routine of trench warfare—the front held on January 1 extended from Acheville to Loos (both inclusive), a total length of approximately 13,000 yards.

In order to allow the Divisions to absorb more quickly the fresh drafts newly received and to make rapid headway with the training of the officers and N.C.O.'s, it was my intention to hold the Corps front during the winter with two Divisions in the line and to keep two Divisions resting and training in reserve.

The pressure of circumstances and the large amount of defensive work to be done caused me to deviate from the original intention, and the normal dispositions adopted throughout the winter were as follows:—

In the line—Two Divisions on a two-Brigade front,  
and one Division on a one-Brigade front.

In reserve—Training and resting, one Division.

In this way the four Canadian Divisions had each approximately one month out of the line, and in addition they had the opportunity of doing a certain amount of training by Brigades when in the line.

The table hereunder gives the disposition of the Divisions of the Canadian Corps at various dates, the sections are shown on Sketch No. 1:—

Date	SECTIONS IN THE LINE.						IN RESERVE. Training Area.
	HILL 70.	ST. EMILE.	LENS.	AVION.	MERICOURT.	ACHEVILLE.	
1918.							
Jan. 1	3rd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	—	{ Auchel. 1st Cdn. Div. Norrent Fontes. 2nd Cdn. Div.
Jan. 23	1st Cdn. Div.	1st Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	2nd Cdn. Div.	2nd Cdn. Div.	—	{ Auchel. 3rd Cdn. Div.
Feb. 21	1st Cdn. Div.	1st Cdn. Div.	2nd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	—	{ Bruay. 4th Cdn. Div.
Mar. 14	1st Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	—	{ Auchel. 2nd Cdn. Div.
Mar. 24	4th Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	3rd Cdn. Div.	{ Chateau de la Haie. 1st Cdn. Div. Fort George. 2nd Cdn. Div.

**Organization.**—With the disappearance of the Russian front it was easily foreseen that the Germans would be able to turn the bulk of their forces against the Allies on the Western front, and that their resources in men and material would be such that our power of resistance would be severely tried.

In order to prepare for the coming test, and with the lessons of previous fighting fresh in my mind, it was resolved that every effort should be made to bring the Corps to the highest possible fighting efficiency.

This I undertook to do in consultation with the Divisional Commanders, and the heads of the various arms, services and branches, by eliminating, as far as was in my power, everything which was not conducive to efficiency in administration, training or fighting.

Lessons from previous fighting had shown that certain branches of the service should be strengthened and reorganized. The Engineers and Machine Guns in particular were not able to accomplish their tasks in battle without drawing heavily on the Infantry for additional personnel—the more severe the battle, the more severe were the losses suffered by the Infantry, and at the same time the more men required by the Engineers and Machine Guns.

This diversion of the fighting strength of the Infantry to meet the needs of the Engineers and of the Machine Guns, and the interference for the same reason with the training or resting of Infantry Battalions when out of the line, was most unsatisfactory.

I submitted, therefore, proposals which were designed to give sufficient personnel to these services, and which would stop the drain on the Infantry.

At this time the British Army was undergoing far-reaching alterations in its organization. The situation as regards manpower appeared to be such that, in order to maintain in the field the same number of Divisions, it was necessary to reorganize the Infantry Brigade from a four-battalion basis to a three-battalion basis. Other changes of less importance were also taking place.

Although the situation of the Canadians regarding reinforcements appeared to be satisfactory so long as the number of Divisions in the field was not increased, a proposal was made to adopt an organisation similar to the British, that is, to reduce the number of Battalions in the Canadian Infantry Brigades from four to three.

Concurrently with this change, it was proposed to increase the number of Canadian Divisions in the field from four to six.

I did not think that this proposal was warranted by our experience in the field, and I was quite certain that, owing to the severity of the losses suffered in modern battles, the manpower of Canada was not sufficient to meet the increased exposure to casualties consequent on the increased number of Canadian Divisions in the field.

I represented very strongly my views to the Minister, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, and, on further consideration, it was decided to drop this project, and to accept instead my counter-proposal, viz., to increase the establishment of the Canadian Infantry Battalion by 100 all ranks, to proceed with the reorganisation of the Engineer and Machine Gun Services, and to grant the various amendments suggested to establishments of other Arms and Branches.

I am glad to be able to say that my proposals regarding the reorganization of Engineer Services, Machine Guns, etc., as well as the increase in strength of the Infantry Battalions, received the favourable consideration and support of the Commander-in-Chief.

**Defences.**—It will be recalled that the ground held by the Canadian Corps throughout this period had been captured by the Canadians in the Battle of Vimy and subsequent actions, and held by them practically since its capture, except for a short interval during the Battle of Passchendaele. The area had been considerably improved during this time, and a very complete system of trench railways, roads, and water supply were in operation. Very comprehensive defences had been planned and partially executed.

Behind Vimy Ridge\* “lay the northern collieries of France and certain tactical features which cover our lateral communication. Here . . . little or no ground could be given up . . .” (See Sketch No. 2.)

A comparatively shallow advance beyond the Vimy Ridge would have stopped the operation of the collieries, paralysing the production of war material in France, as well as inflicting very severe hardship on the already sorely tried population. In conjunction with the shortage of shipping which practically forbade an increase in the importation of coal from England, the loss of the northern collieries might have definitely crippled

---

\*Extract from C.-in-C.'s Despatch, 8th July, 1918.

France. On the other hand, a deep penetration at that point, by bringing the Amiens-Bethune railway and main road under fire, would have placed the British Army in a critical position, by threatening to cut it in two and by depriving it of vital lateral communication.

The tactical and strategical results to be gained by a moderate success at that point were so far reaching in effect that, notwithstanding the natural difficulties confronting an attack on that sector, it was fully expected that the German offensive would be directed against this, the central part of the British Front.

The French knew well the value of the ground here. To recapture it in 1915 they had engaged in the most savage fighting of the war and sacrificed the flower of their regular army.

Although the British Front had later been extended to the south, and Vimy Ridge had become the centre sector of the British Army, the French always manifested the deepest interest in this sector, and it was often visited by their Generals and other officers of high rank.

With the prospect of a German Offensive now confronting us, I ordered that the defences should be revised, to take advantage of the lessons recently learned and to embody the latest methods. Moreover, instructions had been issued by the First Army defining the policy of defence to be adopted and the methods to be followed.

The completion of the revised Corps defences and the execution of the new Army programme resulted in the organisation of a very deep defended area, consisting of successive defensive systems, roughly parallel to the general line of the Front and linked together by switch lines sited to protect both flanks.

Each defensive system was designed to protect definite topographical features, the loss of any one of which would considerably handicap the defence by uncovering our artillery.

As planned, the main framework of the defence in depth was based upon Machine Gun positions, protected by belts of wire entanglement so placed, in relation to the field of fire of the Machine Guns, that they were enfiladed over their entire length. The whole area was compartmented in such a way that the loss of ground at any one point could be localised and would not cause a forced retirement from adjoining areas. (See Photo-Map No. 3.)

Machine Gun emplacements of the Champagne type were constructed, and dug-out accommodation for the Machine-Gun Detachments was provided in the deep tunnels of these emplacements.

This framework was completed as rapidly as possible by trenches and by defended localities organised for all-round defence.

A great many dug-outs were made to accommodate the garrisons of these localities, and for Dressing Stations and Battle Headquarters. Advantage was taken of the possibility of utilising the subways tunnelled in 1916-17 for the attack on Vimy Ridge, and in addition steps were taken to create an obstacle on the southern flank of Vimy Ridge by the construction of dams to enable the Valley of the Scarpe to be flooded as required. Trial inundations were made to ensure the smooth working of these arrangements.

A great deal of care was given to the distribution of the artillery in relation to the policy of defence. Three systems of Battery positions were built so as to distribute the guns in depth and sited so as to cover the ground to the north-east, east, and south, in case the flanks of the Corps should be turned. These Batteries were protected with barbed wire entanglements and Machine Gun positions against a sudden penetration of the enemy, and they were designed to become the natural rallying points of our Infantry in this eventuality.

Successive lines of retirements were also prepared, battery positions were selected, organised, and marked, cross-country tracks were opened up, and observation posts, echeloned in depth, were located and wired in.

On Vimy Ridge alone, seventy-two new battery positions were built and stacked with ammunition: these positions could be used either for the distribution of the Corps Artillery in depth, or as positions which reinforcing Artillery could immediately take up in the event of a heavy attack.

The greatest energy, enthusiasm, and skill was employed in the prosecution of the work by all concerned, and I am greatly indebted to Major-General P. de B. Radcliffe, then B.G., G.S., for his untiring and devoted efforts.

The weather being much finer during the months of January, February, and March than is generally the case, very good

progress was made, and the following defensive works were completed in rear of the main front line defensive system:—

250 miles of trench.

300 miles of barbed wire entanglements.

200 tunnelled Machine Gun emplacements.

In addition to the above, existing trench systems, dug-outs, gun positions and Machine Gun emplacements were strengthened and repaired. Each trench system was plentifully marked with signboards and many open Machine Gun positions were sited and marked.

Machine Gun positions, defended localities and certain portions of trenches were stored with several days' supply of ammunition, food, and water for the use of the garrisons.

The importance attached by the French to the Vimy Ridge sector was further emphasised by the visit of General Roques, formerly Minister of War, and at that moment attached to the Cabinet of the Minister of War.

Having thoroughly inspected the defences of the Canadian Corps, he expressed himself as satisfied that every effort had been made to secure the Vimy Ridge against any surprise attack.

**Activity.**—The front held remained comparatively quiet during January and, except for minor patrolling encounters and occasional shoots, nothing beyond the usual activity ever prevailing on a Front held by this Corps occurred.

In the months of February and March little or no work was being done by the enemy on his actual defences, but roads and disused trench railways were being repaired. In the rear areas his ammunition and Engineer supply dumps were increasing in number and size, while fresh Battery positions were appearing almost daily. Furthermore, hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft guns were very active in preventing reconnaissance by our aeroplanes.

Early in March it was considered that the enemy's Front opposite us was ready for offensive operations. No concentration of troops had been observed, but the numerous towns and villages in close proximity to the Front provided extensive accommodation and made it possible for him to conceal such concentrations. Conditions so favourable to the Germans required relentless vigilance on the part of the Corps Intelligence Organisation, as we were dependent on the efficiency of this branch of the service for timely warning against surprise attacks.

In addition to the preparations above mentioned, the enemy assumed early in February a very aggressive attitude, raiding our lines very frequently, using for the purpose specially trained storm troops. His destructive shoots and intense gas shelling were also of frequent occurrence.

I decided to quell this activity, and numerous counter-raids, retaliation shoots and gas projections, especially in the Lens Sector, soon had the desired effect.

Prisoners captured in our raids stated that all their Divisions had been brought up to strength and were undergoing hard training in the tactics of semi-open warfare. They stated, or left it to be understood, that the forthcoming German attacks were based on a very deep initial penetration and the rapid exploitation of success. No indications were given as to the points at which attacks would be launched, but they stated that every one of their sectors was prepared and practically ready. It was also definitely established that the enemy reserve divisions were kept near railways, ready to be moved quickly to the parts of the Front selected for the coming drive.

#### **Second Period. 21st March—7th May.**

**Battle of Amiens.**—In the early morning of March 21 the enemy launched a violent attack on the fronts of the Fifth and Third British Armies.

It was soon evident that the opening stages of the battle were going in favour of the Germans, and that, notwithstanding the strenuous resistance offered, our defences were being over-run, more particularly the southern portion of the British line on the front of the Fifth Army.

The Canadian Corps was not directly involved in the battle and my dispositions on that date were as follows:—

3rd Canadian Division—(Maj.-Gen. L. J. Lipsett), in the line, Mericourt-Avion Sections.

4th Canadian Division—(Maj.-Gen. Sir D. Watson), in the line, Lens-St. Emile Sections.

1st Canadian Division—(Maj.-Gen. Sir A. C. Macdonell), in the line, Hill 70 Section.

2nd Canadian Division—(Maj.-Gen. Sir H. E. Burstall), resting, Auchel Area.

At 3.50 p.m. on the 21st, First Army ordered Canadian Corps to take over the front of the 62nd Division (left Division

of XIII. Corps) in the Acheville Sector, the relief to begin on the night 21st-22nd and to be completed on the night 23rd-24th.

The 2nd Canadian Division was warned immediately for this relief, but at 4.04 p.m. First Army ordered Canadian Corps to keep one complete Division in Army Reserve. The warning order to the 2nd Canadian Division was, therefore, cancelled.

The 3rd Canadian Division was then ordered to extend its frontage and relieve the 62nd Division in the Acheville-Arleux Sector.

A little later, a further order arrived from First Army instructing Canadian Corps to be prepared to relieve the 56th Division (right Division of XIII. Corps), and in accordance with this the 2nd Canadian Division was warned by wire at 7.40 p.m. In the evening this order was cancelled.

On the 22nd, at 9.00 p.m., I ordered the relief of the 1st Canadian Division, then holding the Hill 70 Sector, by the 4th Canadian Division, so as to have a reserve in hand.

During the same night, 22nd-23rd, at 11.00 p.m., following a telephonic conversation with General Headquarters, the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, then in the line on the Vimy Sector, was withdrawn and ordered to be prepared to move south to the Fifth Army area.

On confirmation of the order by telephone through the regular channels, this Unit left Verdrel at 5.30 a.m. on the 23rd to report to the Fifth Army. By midnight all batteries were in action on a 35 mile front east of Amiens, having travelled over 100 miles during the day.

“The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade (Lt.-Col. W. K. Walker), under orders of the Fifth and later of the Fourth Army, was ordered to fight a rearguard action to delay the advance of the enemy and to fill dangerous gaps on the Army fronts. For 19 days that Unit was continuously in action North and South of the Somme, fighting against overwhelming odds. Using to the utmost its great mobility, it fought over 200 square miles of territory. (See Sketch No. 4.) It is difficult to appraise to its correct extent the influence, material and moral, that the 40 machine guns of that Unit had in the events which were then taking place. The losses suffered amounted to about 75 per cent. of the trench strength of the Unit, and to keep it in being

throughout the fighting, I authorised its reinforcement by personnel of the Infantry branch of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps."

On the 23rd, at 10.50 a.m., the 2nd Canadian Division was ordered to concentrate at once west of Arras in the Mont St. Eloi area, and having carried this out, passed into General Headquarters Reserve. The 1st Canadian Division, in process of relief by the 4th Canadian Division, passed therefore into Army Reserve in compliance with the First Army order of the 21st, referred to above.

The relief was completed on the 24th, and my dispositions were then as follows:—

In the line—on a total front of 17,000 yards:—

3rd Canadian Division, Acheville-Mericourt-Avion Sections.

4th Canadian Division, Lens-St. Emile-Hill 70 Sections.

In Army Reserve—1st Canadian Division, Chateau de la Haie area.

In General Headquarters Reserve—2nd Canadian Division, Mont St. Eloi area.

On the night of the 25th-26th, at 12.40 a.m., I was ordered to extend my front to the north, and preparations were made accordingly to relieve the 11th and 46th Divisions with the 1st Canadian Division. The intention was to concentrate an Army Corps on the southern flank of the First Army for action on the northern flank of the German attack, which was still progressing rapidly.

This order was, however, cancelled at 10.20 p.m. on the 26th, and instead the following dispositions were substituted, with effect from the night 27th-28th:—

- (a) The 3rd Canadian Division in the line to come under orders of the G.O.C. XIII. Corps at noon, March 27.
- (b) The 1st Canadian Division to move to the area to be vacated by the 2nd Canadian Division, west of a line Maroeuil-Carency, and to pass into General Headquarters Reserve.
- (c) The 4th Canadian Division to be relieved by the 46th Division (I. Corps) and pass into General Headquarters Reserve.
- (d) Canadian Corps Headquarters to pass into General Headquarters Reserve.

Meanwhile, under instructions from First Army, the 2nd Canadian Division was ordered by telephone at 3.30 p.m., 26th, to move as soon as possible to the area Pommier-Bienvillers-Bailleulval, with Headquarters at Basseux. On completion of the move, the 2nd Canadian Division would cease to be in General Headquarters Reserve and be transferred to the Third Army. Accordingly, during the night 26th-27th the 2nd Canadian Division moved by bus and march route to the Basseux area.

On the 27th, at 4.05 p.m., the 1st Canadian Division was ordered to move to Couturelle area.

Both these Divisions were transferred from General Headquarters Reserve to the Third Army.

"The 1st Canadian Division was moved by buses to Couturelle area, embussing at about midnight, 27th-28th. At dawn, March 28th, the enemy struck heavily astride the River Scarpe, and the 1st Canadian Division was ordered at 10.30 a.m. to retain the buses by which they had moved south and to move back to the Arras-Dainville area at once, coming there under orders of the XVII. Corps.

This move was very difficult because some buses had already been sent back to the Park, many Units were still en route to the Couturelle area, and the mounted Units and transport were in column on the road Hauteville-Saulty-Couturelle. The Division, however, extricated itself, and on the night of the 28th, under the orders of the XVII. Corps, placed two Battalions in the forward area in support of the 46th Infantry Brigade, 15th Division. At daybreak on the 29th, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade moved to support the 15th Division, and during the night 29th-30th, 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade relieved the 46th Infantry Brigade in the Telegraph Hill Sector, that brigade front being transferred from the 15th Division to the 1st Canadian Division on March 30th."

"The 2nd Canadian Division passed under orders of the VI. Corps on March 28th, and moved forward in support of the 3rd (British) Division in the Neuville Vitasse Sector. On the night of March 29th-30th, it relieved the 3rd (British) Division in the line, and

on the night of March 31-1 April extended its front southwards by relieving the left battalion of the Guards' Division.

The front held by the 2nd Canadian Division extended from south of the Cojeul River, east of Boisieux St. Marc, to the southern slopes of Telegraph Hill (where it joined with the 1st Canadian Division), a total length of about 6,000 yards. The 2nd Canadian Division held this front for an uninterrupted period of 92 days, during which time it repulsed a series of local attacks and carried out no less than 27 raids, capturing three officers, 101 other ranks, 22 machine guns, two trench mortars, and inflicting severe casualties on the enemy. The aggressive attitude adopted by this Division at such a critical time and under adverse conditions had a most excellent effect on our troops, and it certainly reduced to the lowest point the fighting value of two German Divisions, namely, the 26th Reserve Division and the 185th Division. The 2nd Canadian Division returned under the orders of the Canadian Corps on July 1.

In compliance with First Army Orders, I had handed over command of the 3rd Canadian Division in the line to the XIII. Corps at 12 noon, March 27th.

The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had been placed under orders of the Third Army.

Thus, under the pressure of circumstances, the four Canadian Divisions were to be removed from my command, placed in two different Armies (Third and First), and under command of three different Corps (VI., XVII. and XIII.).

This disposition of the Canadian troops was not satisfactory, and on receipt of the orders above referred to I made strong representation to First Army, and offered suggestions which to my mind would reconcile my claims (from the standpoint of Canadian policy) with the tactical and administrative requirements of the moment.

**Battle of Arras.**—The Germans launched a very heavy attack at dawn on the 28th from Gayrelle to Puisieux, and were successfully repulsed by the 3rd, 15th, 4th and 56th

British Divisions. The attack was renewed in the afternoon, north of the Scarpe, on the front of the 56th Division, but did not there meet with greater success. A certain amount of ground had, however, been captured by the enemy.

The troops of the Canadian Corps were not directly engaged in this fighting.

The renewed attack on the 56th Division had considerably lowered its power of resistance. German prisoners captured in the morning were insistent that the attack would be renewed again on the 29th, by storm troops which had been held in reserve for the purpose of capturing the Vimy Ridge by attacking it from the South. It was most urgent that the 56th Division should be supported without delay.

I received instructions from the First Army at 8.15 a.m., March 28th, to the effect that the 4th Canadian Division, then holding the Lens-St. Emile-Hill 70 Sector, would be relieved on the night of the 28th-29th by the 46th British Division, I. Corps, and would in turn relieve the 56th British Division in the Oppy-Gavrelle Sector.

On the completion of this relief the Canadian Corps would relieve the XIII. Corps, and I would assume command of the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions.

In the meantime, all the battalions which the 4th Canadian Division could spare were to be sent at once by the quickest way to the support of the 56th Division.

The 4th Canadian Division, therefore, immediately organised a Composite Brigade, under Brigadier-General V. W. Odlum, consisting of the three reserve battalions of the 10th, 11th and 12th Brigades, and the support battalions of the 11th and 12th Brigades. This Composite Brigade was moved in haste by light railway and lorry to the vicinity of Mont St. Eloi, from whence it marched into reserve positions during daylight on the 28th.

On the night of the 28th-29th the Units of the 56th Division which had been most heavily engaged were relieved by these five Canadian battalions, which came under orders of the 3rd Canadian Division.

It was not until about 10.00 p.m. on the night of the 28th-29th that the leading troops of the 46th Division arrived and began to relieve the 4th Canadian Division.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, Units of the 4th Canadian Division were moved, as the relief progressed.

by lorry and light railway to Neuville St. Vaast, and marched quickly into the line to relieve elements of the 56th Division.

Due to the energy shown by the G.O.C., 4th Canadian Division (Maj.-Gen. Sir D. Watson), and his staff, and to the initiative and discipline of his troops, this difficult three-cornered relief, under the menace of an impending attack, was quickly and smoothly carried out.

On the morning of the 29th, at 8.00 a.m., the G.O.C., 4th Canadian Division, handed over command of the Lens-St. Emile-Hill 70 Sector to the G.O.C., 46th Division, I. Corps, and the I. Corps took over this sector from the Canadian Corps at 8.30 a.m. on the same day.

At 6.45 a.m. on March 30th, the relief of the 56th Division by the 4th Canadian Division having been completed, the command of the XIII. Corps front passed to Canadian Corps.

This was the first result of my representations regarding the removal of the Canadian Troops from the control of the Canadian Corps.

The situation of the Canadian Divisions at noon, March 30th, was as follows (See Sketch No. 5) :—

**Third Army.**

Under VI. Corps—2nd Canadian Division: Neuville Vitasse Sector.

Under XVII. Corps—1st Canadian Division: Telegraph Hill Sector.

**First Army.**

Under Canadian Corps—3rd Canadian Division: Acheville-Mericourt-Avion Sector.

Under Canadian Corps—4th Canadian Division: Gavrelle-Oppy Sector.

In furtherance of those of my suggestions which had been accepted, it was arranged that the 1st Canadian Division should relieve the 4th British Division astride the Scarpe on the 7th-8th April, and come under orders of Canadian Corps; the Army boundaries being altered so as to include the sector taken over by the 1st Canadian Division in the First Army front.

In the meantime, on the night 28th-29th, owing to operations astride the River Scarpe, the front line system had been abandoned under orders of the XIII. Corps and the troops withdrawn to the Blue Line in front of the Bailleul-Willerval-Chaudiere-Hirondelle Line, as far north as the Mericourt Sector.

This Blue Line was originally sited and constructed as an intermediate position, and consisted in most parts of a single trench none too plentifully supplied with dug-outs. This meant that until a support line was dug and made continuous the troops had to be kept in strength in the front line, subject to heavy casualties from hostile shelling and to probable annihilation in case of an organized attack.

Any advance beyond the Blue Line on the 4th Canadian Division front would have brought the Germans within assaulting distance of the weakest part of the Vimy Ridge, and the severity of the shelling seemed to indicate that a renewal of their attacks was probable.

I therefore directed that every effort should be made to give more depth to our new front line system by pushing forward a line of outposts and by digging a continuous support line, as well as by constructing reserve lines at certain points of greater tactical importance. Switch lines facing south were also sited and dug or improved.

Every available man was mustered for this vital work, and the need of properly organised Engineer Services was very keenly felt.

To increase the depth of our defences, Machine Gun Detachments were extemporised by borrowing men from the Machine Gun Battalions, who had then completed their organisation on an eight-battery basis. Some 50 extra machine guns were secured from Ordnance and other sources, and also a number of extra Lewis guns.

Personnel from the Canadian Light Horse and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were organised in Lewis and Hotchkiss Gun Detachments and sent forward to man the defences in Vimy and Willerval localities, under orders of the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions.

The Machine Gun Companies of the 5th Canadian Division had arrived in France on March 25th, and in view of the extreme urgency of the situation the personnel and armament had been moved by lorries, sent specially by Canadian Corps, from Le Havre to Verdrel, where they were in Corps Reserve.

Their horse transport having now arrived, these Machine Gun Companies (17th, 18th, and 19th) were moved to the Vimy Ridge and allotted definite positions of defence on March 30th.

The relief of the 4th British Division by the 1st Canadian Division was completed at 7.00 p.m., April 8th, and at that hour

I took command of this additional sector astride the River Scarpe.

The Front held by the Canadian Corps on April 8th, 1918, was approximately 16,000 yards in length. It will be remembered that the 2nd Canadian Division under the VI. Corps (Third Army) was holding 6,000 yards of front, making a total of 22,000 yards of front held by Canadian troops. (See Sketch No. 6.)

**Battle of the Lys.**—On April 9th the Germans attacked on the Lys Front between La Bassee and Armentieres. Making rapid progress, they crossed the Lys River on the 10th, and on the following days advanced west of Merville-Bailleul. They were well held at Givenchy by the 55th Division and their attack made no progress southwards.

The Canadian Corps was not involved in this fighting, but it now found itself in a deep salient, following with anxiety the development of the Battle of the Lys.

Orders had been issued (9-4-18) for the 2nd Canadian Division to be relieved from the line on the VI. Corps front and to then come into Canadian Corps Reserve in the Chateau de la Haie Area. These orders were now cancelled.

The Battle of the Lys added a new burden to the already sorely tried British Army, and it was imperative that troops should at once be made available to stop the German advance.

On the 10th, at 8.40 p.m., I received orders from First Army to extend my front by taking over from the I. Corps the line held by the 46th Division (Lens-St. Emile-Hill 70 sector), the relief to be commenced on April 11th and to be completed as soon as possible. This relief was completed on the night of the 12th-13th by the 3rd Canadian Division; concurrently with it, the inter-Divisional boundaries were readjusted and the Artillery redistributed to meet as well as possible the new conditions.

The Front held by the three Divisions then in the Canadian Corps had a length of approximately 29,000 yards; and of necessity the line was held very thinly and without much depth.

To deceive the enemy regarding our dispositions and intentions, we adopted a very aggressive attitude. The Artillery constantly harassed the enemy's forward and rear areas and our Infantry penetrated his line at many points

with strong fighting patrols and bold raiding parties. Gas was also projected on numerous occasions.

This activity on the immediate flank of the Lys salient greatly preturbed the enemy, who gave many indications of nervous uncertainty.

The situation was critical, and extensive steps were taken at once to increase the ability of the Canadian Corps to withstand hostile attacks.

The success of the German offensives emphasised the need of greater depth for defensive dispositions, which depend very largely on the stopping power of the machine gun. Unfortunately the number of machine guns with a Division was inadequate to give the required depth of defence on a front exceeding 4,000 yards in length. Each of my Divisions was now holding a front approximately 10,000 yards in length, and the extemporised Machine Gun Detachments formed previously, added to the Machine Gun Companies of the 5th Canadian Division, in my opinion were far from sufficient for the task.

I decided, therefore, to add a third Company of four Batteries to each Battalion of the C.M.G. Corps, thus bringing up to 96 the number of machine guns in each Canadian Division. This entailed an increase in personnel of approximately 50 per cent. of the strength of each Machine Gun Battalion.

These Companies were formed provisionally on April 12th by withdrawing 50 men from each Infantry Battalion. Of these men a portion was sent to the Machine Gun Battalion to be combined with the trained personnel, so that each machine gun crew would include at least four trained gunners. The remainder of the Infantry personnel withdrawn as above stated was sent to a special Machine Gun Depot, formed for the purpose, and there underwent an abridged but intensive course of training. Thus an immediate supply of reinforcements was ensured. Twenty three-ton lorries had been borrowed from General Headquarters to supply a modicum of transport to the new Units, and on April 13th some of the new Machine Gun Batteries were already in the line at critical points.

Sufficient troops were not now available to garrison the local defences of Vimy Ridge, or to reinforce parts of the front if the enemy was successful in effecting a deep penetration.

Two special Brigades were therefore organised as under:

**The Hughes Brigade.**—Commanded by Lieut.-Colonel H. T. Hughes, and composed of:—

“A” Battalion—185th, 176th, 250th Tunnelling Companies R.E., and 2nd, 4th, and 5th Army Troops Companies C.E.

“B” Battalion—1st Canadian Divisional Wing.

“C” Battalion—4th Canadian Divisional Wing.

Approximate strength—Officers, 184; Other Ranks, 4,050.

**McPhail’s Brigade.**—Commanded by Lieut.-Col. A. McPhail, and composed of:—

“D” Battalion—(5th Canadian Division Engineers, Pioneer Reinforcements).

(1st Tunnelling Company C.E. and Third Army Troops Company C.E.)

“E” Battalion—2nd Canadian Divisional Wing.

“F” Battalion—3rd Canadian Divisional Wing.

Approximate strength—Officers, 148; Other Ranks, 4,628.

Proper staffs were organised for these Brigades and several alternative plans of engagement providing for different contingencies were prepared and practised.

In addition to these measures, each Division organised its own “last resort” Reserves, consisting of the personnel of the Infantry Battalions left at transport lines, transport personnel and Divisional Headquarters.

All these Units were given a refresher course in musketry and drill and they were detailed to defend definite localities.

Two Companies of the 11th Tank Battalion (24 Tanks) were placed at the disposal of the Canadian Corps on April 13th. These Tanks had officers, drivers, and armament, but no other personnel. A sufficient number of trained Lewis gunners were found from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisional Wings, and the C.F.A. supplied the required number of gunners.

The Tanks were then distributed at the critical points in the Corps area, namely:—

Behind the St. Catherine switch at intervals of about 300 yards, facing south—18 Tanks.

In the gap between the Souchez River and Bois-en-Hache, facing east—three Tanks.

On the Ridge line behind Angres, facing east—three Tanks.

It was intended that these Tanks should form points of resistance to check any forward flow of hostile forces and so give time to our Infantry to re-form in case they should be forced back. In any event the Tanks were to remain in action for 12 hours after coming in contact with the enemy and thus gain the time so essential in a crisis.

The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, now returned from the Amiens battle, was held as a mobile reserve at one hour's notice.

Bridges, railways, roads and pumping stations were prepared for demolition, to be blown up as a last resort.

Every contingency was prepared for down to the minutest detail, and nothing could be more inspiring than to witness the extraordinary spirit displayed by everybody in their untiring labour and ceaseless vigilance.

Extended almost to the breaking point, in danger of being annihilated by overwhelming attacks, the Corps confidently awaited the result. All ranks of the Corps were unanimous in their ardent resolve to hold to the last every inch of the ground entrusted to their keeping.

It was for them a matter of great pride that their Front was substantially the only part of the British line which had not budged, and one and all felt that it could not budge so long as they were alive.

Eventually, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisions were relieved in their sectors by the 15th, 51st, 52nd, 20th and 24th British Divisions. The relief started on May 1 and was completed on the 7th.

As the relief progressed, the Canadian Corps handed over command of the Avion-Lens-St. Emile-Hill 70 sectors to the XVIII. Corps and the balance of the front to the XVII. Corps.

The length of front held by the Canadian Corps at the various stages of the German offensive has been given previously, but it is here recalled that from April 10th until relieved the Corps held a line exceeding 29,000 yards in length; the 2nd Canadian Division, then with the VI. Corps, was holding 6,000 yards of front, making a total length of 35,000 yards of front held by the four Canadian Divisions.

The total length of the line held by the British Army between the Oise and the sea was approximately 100 miles, therefore the Canadian Troops were holding approximately one-fifth of the total front.

Without wishing to draw from this fact any exaggerated conclusion, it is pointed out that although the Canadian Corps did not, during this period, have to repulse any German attacks on its front, it nevertheless played a part worthy of its strength during that period.

### 3rd Period. May 7 to July 15.

The depth to which the enemy had penetrated in the Somme and the Lys Valleys had created a situation of extreme gravity with regard to the maintenance of communication.

It was known that notwithstanding the heavy losses suffered by the Germans they still enjoyed a sufficient superiority of forces to retain the initiative, and a renewal of their attacks on the line between the Oise and the sea was possible.

In prevision of these expected attacks, reserves comprising British and French Divisions were assembled behind the threatened front.

**Tactical Dispositions.**—On completion of the relief on May 7th, with the exception of the 2nd Canadian Division which was still in the line in the Third Army area, the Canadian Corps was placed in the General Headquarters Reserve in the First Army area and disposed as follows:—

Headquarters	.. ..	Pernes, and later Bryas.
1st Canadian Division	..	Le Cauroy Area.
3rd Canadian Division	..	St. Hilaire Area.
4th Canadian Division	..	Monchy-Breton Area.

Under instructions received from First Army, one Infantry Brigade and one Machine Gun Company from each Canadian Division were billeted well forward in support of the Corps in the line as follows:—

- |     |                      |    |                          |         |
|-----|----------------------|----|--------------------------|---------|
| (a) | One Infantry Brigade | .. | Anzin Area.              | Support |
|     | One M.G. Company     | .. | XVII. Corps.             |         |
| (b) | One Infantry Brigade | .. | Chateau de la Haie Area. |         |
|     | One M.G. Company     | .. | Support XVIII. Corps.    |         |
| (c) | One Infantry Brigade | .. | Ham en Artois Area.      |         |
|     | One M.G. Company     | .. | Support XI. Corps.       |         |

These Brigades were kept under one hour's notice from 5.00 a.m. to 7.00 a.m. daily and under four hours' notice during the remainder of the day. The remainder of the Canadian Corps was under four hours' notice.

Reconnaissances of the front which the Corps would have to support in case of an attack were ordered and carried out by Staff and Regimental Officers.

The Brigades billeted forward were relieved from time to time under Divisional arrangements.

On May 23rd the 74th British Division, newly arrived in France from Palestine, came under Canadian Corps for administration and training.

It was then necessary to rearrange the areas amongst the Divisions in the Corps to make room for the 74th Division and to equalise the training facilities.

With the exception of these moves, the disposition of the Canadian Corps remained substantially the same until June 25th, 1918.

**Organisation.**—The reorganisation of most branches had been delayed by the considerable efforts of the preceding months, by the shortage of transport and materiel consequent on the great demands made by the reorganisation of British Units, and by the simultaneous requirements of the American Army, which was, in part, being equipped from British stores. In some cases also the necessary authority had not yet been obtained.

On May 24th, 1918, it was decided to proceed with the reorganisation of the Canadian Engineers, for which authority had been obtained on March 21st, 1918, but which had not been begun earlier for the reasons mentioned above.

This reorganisation was effected by the expansion of the three Field Companies then with each Division into one Engineer Brigade, consisting of three Engineer Battalions and a Pontoon Bridging and Transport Unit. The additional personnel required was furnished by the absorption into the new Units of the following:—107th, 2nd, 123rd, 124th Canadian Pioneer Battalions, 1st and 2nd Tunnelling Companies, C.E. and the three Field Companies of the 5th Canadian Division Engineers.

Motor transport was included in the establishment, and later a Canadian Engineer Motor Transport Company was formed.

The amount of work involved was considerable, nevertheless all the Units were substantially completed and made cohesive before the end of July.

Adequate staffs able to deal with the larger scope of activity of the new organisation were provided for the G.O.C., Canadian Engineers, and for the Engineer Brigades.

Authority was also received and immediately acted upon for the formation of A.A. Searchlight Companies, C.E. This had been asked for in view of the increase in hostile night bombing, which, in addition to causing casualties, interfered greatly with the resting of the men.

The reorganisation of the Tramways Company, C.E., was also completed.

Application had been made early in the year for authority to form a Field Survey Company to assist in counter-battery work, and in the collection of intelligence; this Unit to consist of an Artillery Flash-spotting Section and a Section of Intelligence Observers.

The personnel had been selected and trained during the winter. Final approval having now been obtained, this Field Survey Company was definitely organised and placed for the time being under the G.O.C., C.E., for administration, and under the Counter Battery Staff Officer and Intelligence Branch for operations.

The addition of a Third Company to the Battalions, Canadian Machine Gun Corps, was authorised on May 7th, 1918, and the organisation, which was already well under way, was rapidly completed with the exception of the transport of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., which transport did not become available until August.

The reorganisation of the Motor Branch, Canadian M.G. Corps, having been approved on June 3rd, 1918, two Motor Machine Gun Brigades, of 40 guns each, were formed by absorbing the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Units already existing and the 17th, 18th, and 19th Machine Gun Companies of the 5th Canadian Division. A Canadian M.G. Corps M.T. Company was also formed for the administration and maintenance of the Motor Transport.

**Reinforcements.**—While the reorganisation of the various arms and services was being carried out, the machinery both to receive, train, and despatch reinforcements from England

and to deal with returned casualties, was also being revised and improved.

The following organisation was finally put into force:—



The number of reinforcements maintained was increased so as to meet the increased establishments, and at the same time great attention was paid to the training of those reinforcements by the specially selected officers placed on the staffs of all Units of the C.C.R.C.

The provision of a Staging Camp enabled reinforcements to be handled quickly without moving the C.C.R.C., no matter where the Canadian Corps was engaged.

The areas where the Reinforcement Camp Wings and Schools of the Canadian Corps were established were now congested with troops and within range of shell-fire since the advance of the Germans in the Lys Valley. These Units not being mobile, and the eventual movements of the Canadian Corps being rather uncertain, all Divisional Wings, Reinforcement Camps, and Schools were removed from the Corps area and concentrated in the Aubin St. Vaast area, where suitable Camps were constructed by our Engineers.

**Training.**—As soon as the Corps was out of the line intensive training in open warfare offensive tactics was begun.

General Staff, General Headquarters, were publishing from time to time translations of captured German documents bearing on the latest tactics, and supplemented these by "Notes on Recent Fighting," dealing with the lessons of the fighting then in progress, both from the point of view of offence and defence. These documents were carefully studied and, to a large extent, inspired our training.

Detailed instructions were issued by Canadian Corps at various times precisising the methods of Employment of

Artillery, Engineers, and Machine Guns in combination with the tactics of the Infantry.

The laying down of a definite Corps tactical doctrine was necessary by reason of the different organisation, the greater strength, and the particular methods which characterised the Canadian Corps.

It was not possible to forecast the length of time the Canadian Corps would be out of the line, and under these circumstances it was decided that combined training by Brigades should be given precedence to familiarise the Commanders and Staffs with the handling of troops in open warfare, and so give the different Arms and Services an opportunity of practising co-operation and mutual support.

Concurrently with this Tactical Training, the closest attention was paid to individual training, particularly to musketry in all its phases.

In the early part of June, in view of the good progress made, I directed that all Commanders should now concentrate on the training of smaller Units, especially the Platoon.

Many tactical schemes were carried out during May, June, and July, each emphasising some definite lesson, more particularly how to overpower resistance in an area defended by machine guns in depth by using covering fire and smoke grenades; how Batteries of Machine Guns should co-operate in assisting Infantry to get forward; and how sections of Field Artillery could best carry out an advance in close support of attacking Infantry.

During this period means were devised for making Stokes guns and 6 in. Newton T.M.'s more mobile, and special mountings were designed, manufactured and tested. The calibration of field guns was also carefully carried out, and experiments made on the use of High Explosive for barrages.

Preparations were being made in the meanwhile to recapture Merville and part of the Lys salient. This operation, for the purpose of maintaining secrecy, was always referred to as Delta.

The preparations for the projected "Delta" attack exercised a most vivifying influence on the training of the Canadian Corps; it familiarised all Arms and Services with the difficulties, both administrative and tactical, inherent to a surprise attack intended to penetrate suddenly to a great depth.

**Relief of 2nd Canadian Division.**—The 2nd Canadian Division had been in the line since March 30th, and I was most anxious that it should be relieved.

I had made representations to this effect from time to time, but the situation was such that no troops were available for this relief.

On June 24th it was arranged, however, that the 3rd Canadian Division would be transferred to the Third Army area from General Headquarters Reserve and would relieve the 2nd Canadian Division in the line. On completion of relief, the 2nd Canadian Division would come under Canadian Corps in General Headquarters Reserve, First Army area.

This relief was carried out and completed on the morning of July 1st, at which date the disposition of the Canadian Corps was as follows:—

<b>In General Headquarters Reserve.</b>	<b>First Army Area.</b>
Headquarters Canadian Corps ..	Bryas.
1st Canadian Division .. ..	Monchy-Breton Area.
2nd Canadian Division .. ..	Le Cauroy Area.
4th Canadian Division .. ..	Auchel Area.
74th British Division .. ..	St. Hilaire Area.

<b>In the Line. Under VI. Corps.</b>	<b>Third Army Area.</b>
3rd Canadian Division .. ..	Headquarters, Basseux.

**Dominion Day.**—Since the arrival of the Canadians in France the celebration of Dominion Day had always been made the event of the year, but never before had it been so brilliant as on July 1, 1918.

The sporting events were keenly contested, and nothing could have been finer than to see the thousands of clean-limbed, healthy, sun-burned young Canadian soldiers who congregated for this occasion.

The Duke of Connaught, the Prime Minister of Canada, and a number of other distinguished Canadian visitors, together with a large concourse of British officers from the neighbouring formations, were interested spectators.

In addition to the Corps sports, the Divisions had arranged various entertainments, and these were greatly appreciated by the men.

**Back to the Line.**—On July 6th the Canadian Corps was warned to be prepared to relieve the XVII. Corps in the line. It was released from General Headquarters Reserve on July 10th.

and the relief was carried out, being completed at 10.00 a.m., July 15th, when I assumed command of the XVII. Corps front.

Disposition at that time was as follows:—

Headquarters Canadian Corps . . Duisans (First Army Area)  
 2nd Canadian Division, in the line Telegraph Hill Section.  
 1st Canadian Division, in the line Feuchy-Fampoux Section.  
 4th Canadian Division, in the line Gavrelle-Oppy Section.

**Under VI. Corps.**

**Third Army Area.**

3rd Canadian Division, in the line Neuville-Vitasse Section.

**General Situation.**—The Germans had not attacked again on the north-east portion of the Western Front, but they had secured considerable success elsewhere, and the general situation was still very threatening. (See Sketch No. 7.)

On May 27th they had struck a very heavy blow between Reims and Soissons and advanced rapidly on the following days as far south as the Marne, capturing Soissons and Chateau-Thierry.

Again on June 9th they had struck between Soissons and Montdidier and captured the Massif of Lassigny. This attack had met with only partial success and very severe losses had been inflicted on the Germans.

On July 15th two other powerful attacks were launched as part of the same plan; the one east of Reims in the direction of Chalons, and the other south-west of Reims in the direction of Epernay. All news received during the day indicated that the Germans were being repulsed east of Reims with overwhelming losses, and although they had succeeded in crossing the Marne south-west of Reims, the situation appeared to be well in hand and the Germans were suffering heavily.

Everywhere on the Allied Front minor enterprises of ever-increasing magnitude seemed to indicate that the time of passive resistance was definitely past.

**4th Period. July 15 to November 11.**

The relief of the XVII. Corps by the Canadian Corps on July 15th, after the Corps' long period of rest and training, with the attendant movement and activity, made the enemy alert and anxious as to our intentions on this front. He was successful in securing identifications at various points of our line, which he penetrated by raiding.

As it was desired to keep him fully occupied on our front, the Artillery activity was increased and our Infantry engaged in vigorous patrolling and raiding.

This change of attitude confirmed the enemy in the opinion he had already formed, that an attack on this front was impending. Prisoners belonging to different Units which we captured in various parts of our front made repeated statements to that effect, and also disclosed the fact that two additional Divisions had been brought into the line.

On the night 18th-19th the Telegraph Hill front held by the 2nd Canadian Division was taken over by the 1st Canadian Division, and the former came into General Headquarters Reserve at 12 hours' notice in the Le Cauroy Area. On the same night the 4th Canadian Division extended their line, taking over the left Brigade front of the 1st Canadian Division. The reason given for this sudden readjustment was that an attack on the Second Army was impending.

On the afternoon of the 20th, Major-General J. H. Davidson, General Staff, Operations, General Headquarters, called at Corps Headquarters and explained that the Commander-in-Chief was considering a scheme submitted by the G.O.C. Fourth Army for freeing the Amiens-Paris Railway. He stated that the Commander-in-Chief proposed to use the Canadian Corps in this operation if the scheme was approved. It was the intention to effect a surprise, and therefore absolute secrecy was required.

On the following day, July 21st, I attended a conference at Fourth Army Headquarters, where the operations contemplated were discussed. The Fourth Army Commander dwelt upon the importance of secrecy, and said that the only persons outside those at the conference to whom it was permitted to mention the coming operations were the General Officers Commanding R.A., Australian and Canadian Corps, the Counter-Battery Staff Officers, Canadian and Australian Corps, the Major-General, General Staff (O.a.), the Brigadier-General, General Staff (O.a.), G.H.Q. and the G.O.C. Tank Corps.

The officers present at the conference were:—

**From Fourth Army Headquarters—**

The Army Commander	General Sir H. S. Rawlinson.
Major-General G.S. . .	Major-General A. A. Montgomery.
G.O.C., R.A. . . . .	Major-General C. E. D. Budworth.
G.S.O. 1 Operations . .	Lieut.-Colonel R. M. Luckock.

**From Canadian Corps Headquarters.**

The G.O.C. . . . Lieut.-General Sir A. W. Currie.  
 B.G., G.S. . . . Brig.-General N. W. Webber.

**From Australian Corps Headquarters—**

The G.O.C. . . . Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash.  
 B.G., G.S. . . . Brig.-General T. A. Blamey.

**From Tank Corps Headquarters—**

G.S.O. 1 . . . . Lieut.-Colonel J. F. C. Fuller.

The operation as outlined at the conference was of limited scope, and was designed to relieve the pressure on Amiens and free the Amiens-Paris railway line, thus improving the situation at the junction of the French and British Armies. A large number of Tanks were to be made available for this operation.

The methods for maintaining secrecy and misleading the enemy were discussed. I pointed out that I had been considering a scheme for the capture of Orange Hill, and it was agreed that it would help materially to deceive **everybody** if preparations for this scheme were still continued.

It was decided that the Australian Corps would arrange a series of demonstrations of co-operation between Tanks and Infantry at their training school near Flixecourt, and that during the following week the Canadian Corps would send parties of officers each day to watch these demonstrations. The Brigadier-General General Staff, the General Officer, Commanding, R.A., and the Counter Battery Staff Officer, would meanwhile be enabled to carry out a reconnaissance of the probable front of attack of the Canadian Corps.

The following day a conference of Divisional Commanders and members of the Corps Staff was held at Canadian Corps Headquarters, where the outline of the scheme for the capture of Orange Hill was explained, and the Divisional Commanders and Heads of branches and services concerned were asked to make all preparations for this attack as quickly as possible. It was stated that Tanks would be available for this operation and that it was therefore essential that all concerned should familiarise themselves with the combined tactics of Infantry and Tanks. I explained that demonstrations had been arranged with the Australians, and that it was my wish that the greatest possible number of officers should witness them.

In the meantime, the enemy was to be harassed on the whole Canadian Corps front by Artillery and Machine Gun fire, and numerous raids were to be carried out to procure positive identifications.

Further conferences were held from time to time at the Fourth Army Headquarters, where plans were made for the necessary reliefs and moves, and the question of the maintenance of secrecy further emphasised.

On July 26th the Fourth Army Commander stated that the plans originally put forward, and which had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, had been modified by Marshal Foch, in that the First French Army would now co-operate with the Fourth British Army and be responsible for the right flank of the attack.

On the 27th the general boundaries and the objectives for the first day were fixed, and movements of the Canadian Corps and Tank Units were arranged. It was decided notably that Units were to leave their areas without knowing their destinations, and that it would be given out freely that the Canadian Corps was moving to the Ypres front, where the Second Army expected a German attack.

With the view to deceiving the enemy, two Battalions of the Canadian Corps were to be put in the line in the Kimmel area, and two Canadian Casualty Clearing Stations were to be moved to the Second Army area. Wireless and Power Buzzer Sections were to be despatched to the Kimmel Sector, and messages were to be sent worded so as to permit the enemy to decipher the identity of the senders.

Meanwhile the Canadian Divisions were busy preparing their scheme of attack on Orange Hill, and numerous Tanks were ostentatiously assembled in the vicinity of St. Pol.

A readjustment of boundaries between Divisions was made during the night July 23rd-24th, when the 1st Canadian Division relieved the Left Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division in the Neuville Vitasse Sector, which Sector came under the Canadian Corps (First Army). The remainder of the front held by the 3rd Canadian Division was taken over by the 59th British Division, and on completion of these reliefs, on July 27th, the 3rd Canadian Division returned under Canadian Corps, and was held in General Headquarters Reserve in the Hermaville area.

On July 29th the XVII. Corps was ordered by First Army to relieve the Canadian Corps in the line during the night July 31st-August 1st, and August 1st-2nd, reliefs to be completed by daylight on August 2nd, the Command of the Can-

adian Corps front to pass to the General Officer Commanding XVII. Corps at 10.00 a.m., July 30th, at which hour all Units and formations then in the Canadian Corps area were to come under the command of the XVII. Corps. This Army order stated plainly that the Canadian Corps would be prepared to moved to Second Army, which, as indicated above, was then holding the northern section of the British front.

The 27th Canadian Infantry Battalion and the 4th C.M.R. Battalion respectively, from the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions were moved by strategical train to Second Army area where they were placed in the line. They did not rejoin their Divisions until August 6th.

On this day, July 29th, the Canadian Divisional Commanders were personally informed of the operations which were to take place on the Fourth Army front, and they were instructed not to discuss the operations with any of their subordinate Commanders.

On July 30th Canadian Corps Headquarters handed over to the XVII. Corps at 10.00 a.m., leaving a liaison officer to keep in touch with the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions, which were still in the line.

The Canadian Corps Headquarters moved the same day to Molliens Vidame, and the transfer of the Canadian Corps from First Army area to Fourth Army area began. (See Sketch No. 8.)

When this move was well under way, and in order to continue to deceive our troops as to their eventual employment, a letter issued by First Army was repeated to all Canadian Divisions and communicated by them to their formations and Units, stating that the Canadian Corps was being transferred to the Fourth Army area, where it would be held in General Headquarters Reserve and be prepared in case of attack to:—

1. Move south at short notice to assist the French on the Rhiems-Soissons front.
2. Support either the First French Army or the Fourth British Army.

This move, beginning on July 30th, was completed on August 7th-8th, and was carried out in three main phases as follows:—

1. Move from the line to embussing or entraining areas (west of Arras).

2. Move from the embussing and entraining areas to the concentration area (south-west of Amiens, a distance of approximately 40 miles).
3. Approach march to battle assembly positions.

These moves were carried out by strategical train, buses and route marches with the utmost secrecy, the entraining and detraining taking place during the hours of darkness.

The entire move to the concentration area was carried out without serious hitch. The dismounted personnel had no marching of any great length, and all ranks arrived fresh and in excellent spirits. Owing to the short space of time available to transport troops and get them into the concentration area, it was necessary for Divisions to entrain the Infantry first so as to ensure their having a rest before starting on the march of approach. The area of concentration was well wooded, and it was possible to conceal the movements then in progress.

All moves forward of the Corps concentration area towards the battle assembly positions were carried out during the hours of darkness, and no movement of troops in formed bodies was permitted by day east of a north and south line through Molliens Vidame.

The approach march was especially difficult, the nights were very dark, the country new and most of the roads very narrow. In the case of the 1st Canadian Division especially, the moves were very hard on the transport sections. Owing to the speed necessary to enable the troops to get into position in time, the greater part of the approach march was accomplished in one jump by the use of buses. This necessitated a forced march of upwards of 30 kilometres for all horse transport before rejoining their Units in the concentration area. This was particularly trying for the Train Companies, who throughout the march had to carry on with their normal supply duties. All these moves had to be carried out during the hours of darkness, a severe handicap, as the nights were very short at this time of the year.

**Administrative Arrangements.**—While the moves of the Canadian Divisions were in progress the Administrative Branches of the Corps were facing a most difficult problem. The battle area to be taken over had just passed from the French to the Australians, and none of the organisations necessary for British troops existed, part of the scheme to ensure secrecy being that nothing should be done in the area which might arouse the suspicion of the enemy.

The D.A. and Q.M.G. of the Canadian Corps (Brig.-General G. J. Farmer) had received no information regarding the actual operation until July 29th.

The difficulties attending the accumulation of all kinds of ammunition required for the operation in such a short space of time were very great. The nearest Army dump from which we could draw ammunition was so far away that lorries could not make more than one trip a day. The advanced refilling points had not been selected, and the dumping of ammunition at these points did not really begin until August 3rd. There was a great shortage of lorries, a considerable number of the heavy Artillery Brigades arriving only two or three days before the attack. When the lorries of these Brigades became available, there was not sufficient petrol to keep all of them in operation.

In addition, all forward traffic was restricted to two main channels, the Amiens-Roye Road and the Amiens-Villers Brettoneux Road. The congestion on the latter was increased by reason of its being used in common with the Australian Corps.

There were no dumps of trench ammunition in the area, and, notwithstanding all efforts made by our Administrative Branches in that direction, the supply of small arms ammunition and bombs was not quite adequate. As a matter of fact, some Units, failing to obtain British hand-grenades in time, used French grenades gathered at the French dumps.

The lack of adequate preparations to receive the large number of horses resulting from the great concentration of Artillery caused endless columns of horses to block the roads in the vicinity of the watering points.

Fortunately, the weather was unfavourable for flying, being cloudy and misty till August 6, and the abnormal traffic on roads resulting from these conditions remained undetected by the Germans.

With a view to drowning the noise of the Tank Engines, large bombing 'planes flew over the area while the Tanks moved forward into positions from their lying-up places.

All sorts of expedients were resorted to, and in the main the difficulties encountered were overcome, thanks to the energy, discipline, training and untiring efforts of all concerned.

**General Situation.**—The general situation had now undergone very material changes.

A sudden stroke at the appropriate time had definitely crippled the plans for further offensive action which the Germans had formed.

The Allied counter-offensive of July 18th, on the Soissons-Chateau Thierry front, following the breakdown of the German attacks of July 15th east and west of Rheims, left a large portion of the German Army badly involved in a deep salient, and on July 26th, having lost all hope of extricating their troops in any other way, the German Higher Command ordered a retirement on that part of the Front to the line of the Aisne River.

This had the immediate local effect of considerably shortening the Allied front and relieving the pressure on Paris.

By this time the Germans had learned that they could not win, and so they began to follow a defensive policy. (This is revealed by their retirements on the Avre and the Ancre, where, in an endeavour to obtain better defensive positions, they abandoned positions favourable to the resumption of offensive operations.)

The magnitude of the German forces engaged on the Rheims-Soissons front, suffering as they were from the miscarriage of their offensive and from the effects of the Allied counter-stroke, was such that it affected adversely the general situation of their reserves, and created a condition favourable to further attacks by our forces elsewhere.

The first step towards the exploitation of these favourable conditions was the enlargement by Marshal Foch of the operations against the salient of the Somme.

The operation east of Amiens which, as originally conceived, was of a purely local character, was given a much larger scope, namely, the reduction of the entire salient created by the successful German offensive on March 21st and following days.

Just as the reduction of the salient of the Marne had been determined primarily by the successful Allied counter-attack of July 18th, the reduction of the salient of the Somme was determined primarily by the deep and sudden penetration effected by our attack of August 8th.

**General Scheme of Attack.**—The outline of the operations of August 8th had now been definitely fixed and was substantially as follows:—

The front of attack was to extend from Moreuil to Ville sur Ancre on a front of approximately 20,000 yards. The dispositions of the troops participating in the attack were as follows:—

- (a) On the right from Moreuil to Thennes (inclusive)—  
The First French Army under orders of Commander-in-Chief, British Army.
- (b) In the centre from Thennes (exclusive) to the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway—The Canadian Corps.
- (c) On the left from the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway to the Somme—The Australian Corps.
- (d) The left flank of the Australian Corps was covered by the III. (British) Corps attacking in the direction of Morlancourt.

The object of the attack was to push forward in the direction of the line Roye-Chaulnes with the least possible delay, thrusting the enemy back in the general direction of Ham, and so facilitating the operations of the French on the front between Montdidier and Noyon.

### THE CANADIAN CORPS FRONT.

The **Battle Front** of the Canadian Corps extended from a point about 800 yards south of Hourges to the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway. It crossed the River Luce about 800 yards north-east of Hourges, and remaining well west of Hangard passed through the western portion of Hangard Wood. The total length exceeded 8,500 yards in a straight line.

The **right boundary** was along the road Hourges-Villers-aux-Erables for a distance of about 2,600 yards, then east of Bertin Wood (inclusive), thence along the Amiens-Roye Road, inclusive to the Canadian Corps, in liaison with the First French Army.

The **left boundary** was along the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway, inclusive to Canadian Corps, in liaison with the Australian Corps.

The objectives for the first day were:—

- i. The Green Line, just east of the line Hamon Wood—Courcelles—Marcelcave—Lamotte-en-Santerre.

- ii. The Red Line, just east of Mezieres—White House—Camp Vermont Farm—and the high ground east of Guillaucourt.
- iii. The Blue Dotted Line, comprising the outer defences of Amiens, which ran east of the line Hangest-en-Santerre—Le Quesnel—Caix—Harbonnieres.

This Blue Dotted Line was not meant to be a final objective, and the Cavalry was to exploit beyond it should the opportunity occur.

The average depth of penetration necessary to capture the Blue Dotted Line approximated to 14,000 yards.

**The Ground.**—The greater part of our forward area consisted of bare slopes exposed to enemy observation from the high ground south of the River Luce and east of Hourges; the trenches were very rudimentary.

On the right the River Luce and the marshes, varying on that portion of the front from 200 to 300 yards wide, created an obstacle impassable to troops. Here the only practicable access to the jumping-off line was by the bridge and the road from Domart to Hourges—a narrow defile about 200 yards long. This was commanded absolutely from the high ground immediately to the east, and more particularly from Dodo Wood and Moreuil Wood.

These conditions rendered the assembly of troops prior to the attack very difficult, while the siting of the forward field batteries was not an easy task.

Some distance west of the front line a small number of woods, villages and sunken roads afforded a certain amount of cover from view. Gentelles Wood in particular was used very extensively for the assembly of Tanks as well as troops.

**Opposite our front** the ground consisted of a rolling plateau cut diagonally by the deep valley of the River Luce. This river flows almost due west through a strip of wooded marsh land some 300 yards wide, from which the sides of the valley rise steeply. Numerous ravines running generally north and south cut deep into the plateau, the ground between these ravines forming, as it were, tactical features difficult of access and more or less inter-supporting. Woods and copses are scattered over the area, and many compact and well-built villages surrounded by gardens and orchards formed conspicuous landmarks. The remainder was open, unfenced farm land, partly covered with fields of standing grain.

The hostile defences consisted chiefly of unconnected elements of trenches, and a vast number of machine gun posts scattered here and there, forming a fairly loose but very deep pattern.

**The Troops.**—In addition to the four Canadian Divisions, the following troops were placed under Canadian Corps for the operation:—

5th Squadron, R.A.F.

4th Tank Brigade.

3rd Cavalry Division.

A mobile force was organised consisting of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, and a section of 6-in. Newton Mortars mounted on motor lorries. This force was named the Canadian Independent Force, placed under the command of Brigadier-General R. Brutinel, and given the task of co-operating with the Cavalry in the neighbourhood of the Amiens-Roye Road, covering the right flank of our right division and maintaining liaison with the French.

I was notified that two British Divisions were held in Army Reserve, and could be made available in the event of certain situations developing.

The total Artillery at my disposal amounted to 17 Brigades of Field Artillery and nine Brigades of Heavy Artillery, plus four additional batteries of long-range guns.

**The enemy troops** were believed to consist of 24 battalions (less than three divisions) in the forward area and about six battalions in support, the latter belonging to Divisions on the French front, but known to be situated within the area we were to attack. It was believed that the enemy had four Divisions in reserve immediately available, and that two of these were west of the Hindenburg Line.

**The Scheme of Attack.**—The general scheme of attack was to overrun rapidly the enemy's forward area to a depth of about 3,600 yards under cover of a dense artillery barrage which would begin at zero hour; then without halting to seize the Red Line, relying on the help of the Tanks to overcome the machine gun defences. At that moment the Cavalry was to pass through the Infantry and seize the area as far as the Blue Dotted Line, supported on its right flank by the Canadian

Independent Force. The Cavalry was to be followed as quickly as possible by the 4th Canadian Division passing through the 3rd Canadian Division on the right, and by Reserve Brigades of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions in the centre and on the left. Every effort was to be made to exploit success wherever it occurred. Special arrangements had been made to support the attack beyond the Green Line as long as possible with Heavy Artillery, and sections of Field Artillery were detailed to advance in close support of the attacking Infantry.

The attack had been synchronised with the Australians, who were to jump off at the same hour as the Canadian Corps. The First French Army was to submit the Bois de Moreuil to a 45-minute bombardment before developing Infantry action, but the General Officer Commanding had agreed that the bombardment should only begin at zero hour.

The Canadian Corps being, as it were, the spearhead of the attack, the movements of other formations were to be synchronised with ours.

At 10.00 a.m. on the morning of August 5th I took over command of the battle front, then held by the 4th Australian Division. During the hours of darkness on the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th the attacking Canadian troops relieved the Australian troops, with the exception of those holding the outpost line, who remained in position until the night 7th-8th.

**Dispositions.**—The dispositions of the Canadian Corps on the morning of the 8th at zero hour were as follows:—

On the right—the 3rd Canadian Division, in liaison with the French.

In the centre—the 1st Canadian Division.

On the left—the 2nd Canadian Division, in liaison with the Australians.

In Reserve—behind the 3rd Canadian Division—the 4th Canadian Division.

Each of these Divisions had their allotment of Tanks. East of the Noye River, the 3rd Cavalry Division. Behind Gentelles Wood, the Canadian Independent Force.

**The Battle.**—At 4.20 a.m., August 8th, the initial assault was delivered on the entire Army front of attack, and the First French Army opened their bombardment.

The attack made satisfactory progress from the outset on the whole front. (See Sketch No. 9.)

East of Hourges, opposite the 3rd Canadian Division, the high ground which dominated our front and a portion of the French front had been seized quickly by the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General D. M. Ormond), and the way was opened for the Canadian Independent Force and the 4th Canadian Division.

The very complete arrangements made by the 3rd Canadian Division to keep the bridge open, and to repair the road quickly, allowed the reserves to go forward without delay. The heavy task of the Engineers was remarkably well carried out.

By the afternoon the Canadian Corps had gained all its objectives, with the exception of a few hundred yards on the right in the vicinity of Le Quesnel, where stiff resistance was offered by unexpected reserves, but this was made good the following morning. The day's operations, in which the four Canadian Divisions took part, represented a maximum penetration of the enemy's defences of over eight miles, and included the capture of the following villages:—Hangard, Demuin, Beaucourt, Aubercourt, Courcelles, Ignaucourt, Cayeux, Caix, Marcelcave, Wiencourt, l'Equipee, and Guillaucourt. In addition to these, the Canadian Independent Force assisted the French in the capture of Mezieres, which was holding up their advance.

The surprise had been complete and overwhelming. The prisoners stated that they had no idea that an attack was impending, and captured documents did not indicate that any of our preparations had been detected. The noise of our Tanks going to the final position of assembly had been heard by some men and reported, but no deduction appears to have been made regarding this. An officer stated that the Canadians were believed to be on the Kemmel front.

On the following day, the 9th, the advance was continued with the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions in the line, the 4th Canadian Division being held in Corps Reserve. Substantial progress was made, and by evening the average depth of our advance was about four miles, with a maximum of 6½ miles at some points. The following additional villages were captured:—Le Quesnel, Folies, Bouchoir, Beaufort, Warvillers, Rouvroy, Vrely, Meharicourt and Rosieres.

The Infantry and Tanks of the 3rd Canadian Division and the Canadian Independent Force co-operated with the French in the capture of Arvillers.

During the day the enemy's resistance stiffened considerably, and whatever gains were made resulted from heavy Infantry fighting against fresh troops, with only a few Tanks available for support.

This advance had brought our troops into the area of the trenches and defences occupied prior to the Somme operations in 1916. These trenches, while not in a good state of repair, were, nevertheless, protected by a considerable amount of wire, and lent themselves readily to a very stubborn machine gun defence.

The attack was continued on the morning of the 10th, with the 3rd Canadian Division on the right and the 4th Canadian Division on the left, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions being held in Corps Reserve. After the 3rd Canadian Division had taken the village of Le Quesnoy-en-Santerre, the 32nd Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on the night 9th-10th, and had been ordered to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division, passed through it and advanced the line somewhat further through the old British trenches west of Parvillers and Damery. The 4th Canadian Division during the day succeeded, after very hard fighting, in occupying Fouques-court, Maucourt, Chilly and Hallu.

During the night 10th-11th a strong enemy counter-attack developed against a part of the front of the 4th Canadian Division east of Hallu.

This counter-attack was beaten off, but owing to general conditions the line at that point was slightly withdrawn to the railway embankment immediately to the west of Hallu. Subsequent upon this slight withdrawal, and with a view to reducing the existing salient forward of Chilly, the line was further withdrawn to the eastern outskirts of that village.

On the 11th, at 9.30 a.m., the 32nd Division launched an attack against Damery, but was not successful. The 4th Canadian Division improved their line by advancing it locally to reduce the Chilly salient, which was still very pronounced.

During the night 11th-12th the 32nd Division and 4th Canadian Division were relieved by the 3rd and 2nd Canadian Divisions respectively.

It now became increasingly apparent that strong enemy reserves had been sent forward to stem our advance. Six fresh Divisions and a large number of light and heavy batteries had been brought in, and were fighting hard in a strongly entrenched defensive position.

I considered that it was inadvisable to try to progress mainly by Infantry fighting, and recommended that the operations should be slackened to give time to organise a set piece attack on a broad front.

I further suggested that rather than expose the Canadian Corps to losses without adequate results it should be withdrawn from this front, rested for a few days, and used to make another surprise attack in the direction of Bapaume.

Plans to organise a set piece attack to take place on August 15th or 16th, and having for its objective the Roye-Liencourt-Omicourt Road, were prepared. This operation was to be carried out in conjunction with the French and the Australian Corps.

The 12th, 13th and 14th were characterised chiefly by patrol encounters and local trench fighting. The 3rd Canadian Division cleared the network of trenches between Fouquescourt and Parvillers, and advanced the line as far as the northern and western edge of Parvillers and Damery. These two villages were captured in the evening of the 15th, and were held in spite of heavy counter-attacks. Bois de Damery was also taken, and this enabled the French to capture the important position known as Bois-en-Z.

On the nights 15th, 16th, and 16th-17th the 1st Canadian Division relieved the 3rd Canadian Division, the latter being withdrawn to Corps Reserve.

Progress was made during the 16th-17th, the enemy being driven out of Fransart by the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General R. Rennie) of the 2nd Canadian Division, and out of La Chavatte by the 1st Canadian Division, our line on the right being advanced in co-operation with the French.

The relief of the 2nd Canadian Division by the 4th Canadian Division was carried out on the nights 15th-16th and 16th-17th, the former being withdrawn to Corps Reserve on the 17th.

The operation, which had been projected for August 16th, had been postponed, and it had been decided to transfer the Canadian Corps back to the First Army, the move to begin by strategical trains on the 19th.

The 18th was quiet along the front, but on the 19th the 4th Canadian Division carried out a minor operation near Chilly, which greatly improved our line in that neighbourhood. Four hostile counter-attacks to recover the newly-won ground were beaten off during the night.

On the 19th, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions started their move to First Army, and on the night 19th-20th the relief of the 1st Canadian Division by the French commenced.

This relief was completed on the 22nd, and the 1st Canadian Division was placed in Corps Reserve.

On the 22nd I handed over command of the Canadian Corps front, and of the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions, 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, the 8th Army Brigade, C.F.A., and the C.C.H.A., to the G.O.C., Australian Corps, and my Headquarters moved north to Hautecloque, opening there at 10.00 a.m. on the same day.

Between August 8th and 22nd the Canadian Corps fought against 15 German Divisions: of these 10 were directly engaged and thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost every one of their battalions; the five other Divisions, fighting astride our flanks, were only partially engaged by us.

In the same period the Canadian Corps captured 9,131 prisoners, 190 guns of all calibres, and more than 1,000 machine guns and trench mortars.

The greatest depth penetrated approximated to 14 miles, and an area of over 67 square miles containing 27 towns and villages had been liberated.

The casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps in the 14 days' heavy fighting amounted to—

	<i>Officers.</i>	<i>Other Ranks.</i>
Killed .. ..	126	1,688
Missing .. ..	9	436
Wounded .. ..	444	8,659
Total .. ..	579	10,783

Considering the number of German Divisions engaged, and the results achieved, the casualties were very light.

Following the deep advance effected on August 8th and 9th, the French Third Army attacked at 4.20 a.m. on the 10th astride the Paris-Roye Road and advanced rapidly in the general direction of Roye. The French First Army extended the front of attack, and capturing Montdidier pushed on also in the general direction of Roye.

On the 20th the front of attack was further extended west of Soissons in the direction of Noyon.

The battle was now in full swing on the centre and southern parts of the Somme salient. North of the Somme the British Third Army made some local attacks on the 21st, and on the 24th attacked heavily on a broad front in the direction of Bapaume.

On the whole Somme salient the Germans were retiring slowly, fighting a stubborn rearguard action, actively pressed everywhere by the Allied Armies. (See Sketch No. 9a.)

**Transfer to First Army Area.**—The transfer of the Canadian Corps to the First Army area was effected without serious difficulty and in a very short time.

As already stated, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions entrained and embussed in the Boves area on the nights 19th-20th and 20th-21st August respectively. They detrained and debussed on the 20th and 21st in the Bouquemaison area, whence they proceeded by route march to the Etruin and Hermaville areas.

Passing under the XVII. Corps the 2nd Canadian Division relieved, on the nights 22nd-23rd and 23rd-24th part of the 15th Division in the line in the Neuville Vitasse-Telegraph Hill sector, the G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division assuming command of that front at 9.30 p.m., August 23rd.

Headquarters, Canadian Corps, moved from Hautecloque to Noyelle Vion on the 23rd, and on 12 noon that day I assumed command of the XVII. Corps front, extending from Neuville Vitasse to Gavrelle, the 15th and 51st (British) Divisions coming under my orders.

On the night 23rd-24th the 3rd Canadian Division relieved the balance of the 15th Division in the line from the Arras-Cambrai Road to the Scarpe River, immediately on the left of the 2nd Canadian Division; the command of this centre sector passing to the G.O.C. 3rd Canadian Division on August 24th at 10.00 a.m.

On the 25th the 1st Canadian Division detrained at Tincques, Savy, and Aubigny, returning under the Canadian Corps, and the 4th Canadian Division rejoined the Corps on the 28th, having been relieved in the line on the Amiens front on the 25th by the 34th and 35th French Divisions.

**General Situation.**—In sympathy with the severe reverses suffered on the Marne, and consequent upon the actions now fully developed in the Somme salient, signs were not wanting that the enemy was preparing to evacuate the salient of the

Lys. This evacuation began under pressure of the First Army on August 25th.

All these attacks and their results, direct or indirect, enabled the Allies to recover the ground they had lost in the course of the German offensive operations.

The recapture of that ground was, however, of secondary importance as compared to the moral results of these successive victories.

The German Armies had been impressed in the course of these operations by the superiority of our generalship and of our organisation, and by the great determination of our troops and subordinate commanders.

The Hindenburg System, however, was intact, and the enemy Higher Command hoped and believed that behind this powerfully organised area the German Armies might be collected and reorganised. (See Sketch No. 10.)

Fighting the most determined rearguard action in the Somme salient, they expected that our armies would be tired and depleted by the time they reached the forward area of the Hindenburg System.

The Battle of Cambrai, now about to be begun, shattered their hopes. By breaking through the Drocourt-Queant Line, itself but a part of the Hindenburg System, the Canadian Corps carried the operations forward to ground that had been in the hands of the Germans since 1914.

This advance constituted a direct threat on the rear of the German Armies north and south of Cambrai.

Dominated at all times, paralysed by the swift and bold strokes on vital points of their line and by the relentless pressure applied everywhere, the German Higher Command was unable to take adequate steps to localise and stop our advance. After the Drocourt-Queant Line was broken, the retreat of the enemy became more accelerated, and our attacks met everywhere with less and less organised and determined resistance.

The moral effect of the most bitter and relentless fighting which led to the capture of Cambrai was tremendous. The Germans had at last learned and understood that they were beaten.

#### ARRAS-CAMBRAI OPERATIONS.

**The Task.**—On August 22nd I received the details of the operations contemplated on the First Army Front. The plan was substantially the following:—

The Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was to attack eastwards astride the Arras-Cambrai Road, and by forcing its way through the Drocourt-Queant line south of the Scarpe to break the hinge of the Hindenburg System and prevent the possibility of the enemy rallying behind this powerfully organised defended area.

These operations were to be carried out in conjunction with the operation of the Third Army then in progress. This attack had been fixed for the next Sunday, August 25th. It was represented that this gave barely 48 hours to concentrate the necessary Artillery, part of which was still in the Fourth Army area, and that, furthermore, the Canadian Corps had sentimental objections to attacking on the Sabbath Day. It was then agreed that the attack should take place on Monday the 26th.

On the evening of the 22nd I held a conference of Divisional Commanders at Corps Headquarters (Hauteclouque), and outlined the projected operation and my plans for carrying it out.

In addition to a detailed knowledge of the ground, which we had held before, we were particularly benefited by all the reconnaissances and plans made for the capture of Orange Hill during the period of simulated activity at the end of July. The excellence of trench railways, rear communications, and administrative arrangements in the area were also of great value, and enabled the Canadian Corps to undertake to begin, with only three days' notice, the hardest battle in its history.

Reinforcements had come up, and although all Units were not up to strength, they were all in fighting condition.

The efficiency of the organisation peculiar to the Canadian Corps, and the soundness of the tactical doctrine practised, had been proved and confirmed.

Flushed with the great victory they had just won, and fortified by the experience acquired, all ranks were ready for the coming task.

**The Ground.**—The ground to be attacked lent itself peculiarly to defence, being composed of a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed natural lines of defence of very great strength. These natural positions, often mutually supporting, had been abundantly fortified. Their organisation was the last word in military engineering, and represented years of intensive and systematic labour. Barbed wire entanglements were formidable, machine gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been provided for the protection of the garrison.

The four main systems of defence consisted of the following lines:—

- i. The old German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux.
- ii. The Fresnes-Rouvroy line.
- iii. The Drocourt-Queant line.
- iv. The Canal du Nord line.

These, with their subsidiary switches and strong points, as well as the less organised but by no means weak intermediate lines of trenches, made the series of positions to be attacked without doubt one of the strongest defensively on the Western Front.

Broad glacis, studded with machine gun nests, defended the immediate approaches to these lines, and this necessitated in each case heavy fighting to gain a suitable jumping-off line before assaulting the main position.

In addition to these systems, and as a preliminary to the attack on the old German system east of Monchy-le-Preux, it was necessary to capture the very well organised British defences which had been lost in the fighting of March, 1918.

These defences were intact to a depth of about 5,500 yards, and were dominated by the heights of Monchy-le-Preux, from which the Germans were enjoying superior observation.

Throughout these operations there could not be any element of surprise, other than that afforded by the selection of the actual hour of the assaults. The positions to be attacked formed the pivot of the movements of the German Army to the south, and the security of the Armies to the north depended also on these positions being retained. There was consequently little doubt that the enemy was alert, and had made every disposition to repulse the expected attacks. Therefore the plan necessitated provision for very hard and continuous fighting, the main stress being laid on the continuity of the operations.

To carry this out, I decided to do the fighting with two Divisions in the line, each on a one-Brigade front, thus enabling both Divisions to carry on the battle for three successive days; the two other Divisions were to be kept in Corps Reserve, resting and refitting after each relief. The severity of the fighting did not, however, allow this plan to be adhered to, and on many occasions the Divisions had to fight with two Brigades in the front line. It was understood that British Divisions from

Army Reserve would be made available as soon as additional troops were required.

To maintain the utmost vigour throughout the operation, the Divisions were directed to keep their support and reserve Brigades close up, ready to push on as soon as the leading troops were expended.

As the protection of the left flank of the attack could not at the outset be dissociated from the operations of the Canadian Corps, the 51st (Highland) Division in the Gavrelle sector remained under my orders.

The initial attack on the 26th was to be launched by the 2nd Canadian Division on the right and the 3rd Canadian Division on the left.

The XVII. Corps was on our immediate right, they being the left Corps of the Third Army.

On the night of the 24th-25th the 2nd Canadian Division, in conformity with operations carried out by the Third Army on its right flank, advanced the outpost line on the outskirts of Neuville Vitasse, later capturing the sugar refinery and some elements of trenches south of that village.

That same night the 51st (Highland) Division, north of the Scarpe, advanced the outpost line opposite Greenland Hill without meeting much opposition.

The objectives for the attack of the 26th were indicated as follows:—

**The 2nd Canadian Division** was to capture Chapel Hill, then work south through the old British support system and join up with the British troops on the right on the northern end of the Wancourt spur, thus encircling the enemy troops in the forward area towards Neuville Vitasse. They were at the same time to push forward and capture the southern end of Monchy-le-Preux Heights.

**The 3rd Canadian Division** was to capture Orange Hill, then Monchy-le-Preux. The success of the advance was to be exploited as far east as possible.

The 51st (Highland) Division, north of the Scarpe, was to cover the left flank of the 3rd Canadian Division by advancing towards Mount Pleasant and Rœux.

After mature consideration, zero hour, which had been originally set at 4.50 a.m., was changed to 3.00 a.m. in order to

take advantage of the restricted visibility produced by moonlight and so to effect a surprise; the attacking troops would thus pass through the enemy's forward machine gun defences by infiltration, and be in a position to assault at dawn his line of resistance on the eastern slopes of Orange Hill.

The initial assault was to be supported by 17 Brigades of Field and nine Brigades of Heavy Artillery, in addition to the long range guns of the Army Heavy Artillery. (Throughout the Arras-Cambrai operations the Artillery allotted to the Canadian Corps was at all times adequate, varying at times in accordance with the tasks assigned. In the operation against the Drocourt-Queant line the attack was supported by 20 Brigades of Field and 12 Brigades of Heavy Artillery.)

**Troops attached to the Corps.**—The following were attached to the Canadian Corps for the operations:—

5th Squadron, R.A.F.

3rd Brigade, Tank Corps.

As a result of lessons learned during the Amiens operations, it was laid down, as a general principle, that Tanks should follow rather than precede the Infantry. The 3rd Tank Brigade was asked to supply, if possible, nine Tanks to each attacking Division each day, and the necessity of exercising the greatest economy in their employment was impressed on Divisional Commanders.

**The Attack—1st Phase.**—On August 26th, at 3.00 a.m., the attack was launched under the usual Artillery and Machine Gun barrages. It made good progress, the village of Monchyle-Preux being entered early in the day, after a very brilliant encircling attack carried out by the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General D. C. Draper). The trenches immediately to the east of Monchyle-le-Preux were found to be heavily held, and were not cleared until about 11 a.m. by the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General H. Dyer). (See Sketch No. 11.)

Guemappe was captured by 4 p.m. and Wancourt Tower and the top of Heninel Ridge were in our hands at 10.40 p.m. The defenders of the latter feature fought hard, but eventually succumbed to a determined attack delivered by the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General A. H. Bell), under cover of an extemporised barrage fired by the Canadian Divisional Artillery (Brigadier-General H. A. Panet). During the night this Brigade captured, in addition, Egret Trench, thus

securing a good jumping-off line for the operation of the following day.

The situation along the Arras-Cambrai Road was at one time obscure, following a change in the Inter-Divisional Boundary ordered when the attack was in progress. A gap occurred for a few hours, but it was filled as soon as discovered, by the Canadian Independent Force.

The enemy fought strenuously and several counter-attacks were repulsed at various stages of the fighting, three German Divisions being identified during the day and more than 2,000 prisoners captured, together with a few guns and many machine guns.

North of the Scarpe, the 51st (Highland) Division had pushed forward east of the Chemical Works and Gavrelle without meeting serious opposition.

The Canadian Engineers had been actively employed, and all the roads in the forward area were cleared and repaired, thus establishing good communications.

The light railways, which up to this date had been delivering an average of 1,800 tons daily, were pushed forward, closely following up the advance.

The attack was renewed at 4.55 a.m. on August 27th by the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions, in the face of increased opposition, under a uniformly good initial barrage.

The 2nd Canadian Division pushed doggedly forward through the old German trench system, where very stiff hand-to-hand fighting took place, and crossed the Sensee River, after capturing the villages of Cherisy and Vis-en-Artois.

The 3rd Canadian Division encountered very heavy opposition, but succeeded in capturing Bois-du-Vert, Bois-du-Sart, and reaching the western outskirts of Haucourt, Remy, Boiry-Notre-Dame and Pelves.

The enemy throughout the day pushed a large number of reinforcements forward, bringing up Machine Gun Units in motor lorries in the face of our accurate Field and Heavy Artillery fire. Hostile Field Batteries in the open, firing over open sights, showed remarkable tenacity, several remaining in action until the personnel had been destroyed by our machine gun fire.

Our casualties were heavy, especially on the 2nd Canadian Division front, and after discussing the situation with the G.O.C., 2nd Canadian Division, and taking into consideration the uncertainty of the situation on the right flank of this

Division, the operations were, after 5.45 p.m., restricted to the consolidation of the line then reached east of the Sensee River.

North of the Scarpe, the 51st (Highland) Division had pushed forward and gained a footing on Greenland Hill, but were forced to withdraw slightly by a heavy German counter-attack.

During the night August 27th-28th the 8th Division (VIII. Corps) took over the northern half of the 51st Division front.

As the enemy was still holding Plouvain and the high ground north of the Scarpe, the 3rd Canadian Division had been compelled to refuse its left flank, and the front now held by this Division was increased from about 3,700 yards to about 6,000 yards.

It was intended to continue the battle on the 28th, with the 1st Canadian Division on the right and the 4th (British) Division, then coming under my command, on the left; the latter Division, however, was unable to reach the battle position in time. As it was undesirable at this stage to employ a fresh Division alongside a Division which had already been engaged, the orders issued were cancelled and the battle was continued by the Divisions then in the line.

At 9.00 a.m. on the 28th the 3rd Canadian Division resumed the attack, followed at 12:30 p.m. by the 2nd Canadian Division. The objective for the day was the capture of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the possession of which was vital to the success of our further operations.

On the left, the 3rd Canadian Division had pushed forward, captured the Fresnes-Rouvroy line from the Sensee River to north of Boiry-Notre-Dame, and had secured that village, Jigsaw Wood and entered Pelves. They had, however, been unable to clear the village of Haucourt.

On the front of the 2nd Canadian Division the fighting was most severe. The wire in front of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line was found to be almost intact, and although at some points the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General T. L. Tremblay) had succeeded in penetrating the line, the first objective could not be secured, except one short length on the extreme right. Subjected to heavy machine gun fire from both flanks as well as frontally, the attacking troops had suffered heavy casualties, which they had borne with the utmost fortitude.

At nightfall the general line of the 2nd Canadian Division was little in advance of the line held the night before, although a few small parties of stubborn men were still as far forward as the wire of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line.

Enemy reinforcements were seen dribbling forward all day long.

**2nd Phase.**—During the days succeeding the capture of Monchy-le-Preux the enemy's resistance had been steadily increasing, and it became clear that the Drocourt-Queant line would be very stubbornly defended.

On the 28th instructions had been received fixing tentatively September 1st as the date on which the Drocourt-Queant line was to be attacked by the Canadian Corps, in conjunction with the XVII. Corps. The intention was to capture also the Canal du Nord line in the same operation.

It was therefore essential to secure, before that date, a good jumping-off line roughly parallel to, and approximately 600 yards west of, the Drocourt-Queant line.

This was indeed a very difficult task, entailing the capture of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, of the Vis-en-Artois Switch, and of a number of defended localities of very great strength, notably the Crow's Nest, Upton Wood, and St. Servin's Farm.

The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions were now exhausted, and during the night the 28th-29th they were relieved by the 1st Canadian Division on the right, the 4th (British) Division (which had been placed under my orders on the night 26th-27th) on the left, and Brutinel's Brigade (formerly the Canadian Independent Force) on the extreme left flank.

The Heavy Artillery from now on concentrated on the cutting of the broad belts of wire in front of the Drocourt-Queant line, and the Engineers prepared the bridging material required for the crossings of the Sensee River and the Canal du Nord.

During the day (August 29th) our line had been considerably improved by minor operations. Brutinel's Brigade had pushed forward on their front and captured Bench Farm and Victoria Copse, north of Boiry-Notre-Dame. The 4th (British) Division, in the face of strong opposition, had advanced their line in the vicinity of Haucourt and Remy. North of the Scarpe the 51st Division had captured the crest of Greenland Hill.

The command of the 51st Divisional front now passed to the G.O.C. XXII. Corps; and during the night August 29th-30th

the 11th Division, which had been transferred to the Canadian Corps from I. Corps, relieved Brutinel's Brigade in the line, the command of that Division also passing to the G.O.C. XXII. Corps on completion of the relief.

This shortened the line considerably and relieved me of the anxiety caused by the length and vulnerability of the northern flank.

On the 30th, following the reported capture of Hendecourt by the 57th Division, the 1st Canadian Division attacked the Vis-en-Artois Switch, Upton Wood, and the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of the Vis-en-Artois Switch. The attack, a daring manœuvre organised and carried out by the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General W. A. Greisbach), under cover of very ingenious barrages arranged by the C.R.A., 1st Canadian Division (Brigadier-General H. C. Thacker), was eminently successful, all objectives being captured and the entire garrison either killed or taken prisoner. Heavy counter-attacks by fresh troops were repulsed during the afternoon and following night.

On the 31st the remainder of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line south of the Arras-Cambrai Road, including Océan Work, was captured by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General F. O. W. Loomis).

In the meantime, the 4th (British) Division had doggedly pushed ahead, crossing the valley of the Sensee River and capturing the villages of Haucourt, Remy, and Eterpigny. This advance was over very difficult, thickly wooded country, and the fighting was very heavy, particularly in the vicinity of St. Servin's Farm, which, after changing hands several times, remained in possession of the enemy until September 2nd.

On the night August 31st-September 1st the 4th Canadian Division came into the line on a one-Brigade front between the 1st Canadian Division and 4th (British) Division.

The G.O.C. 4th (British) Division having now reported that he considered his Division unable successfully to attack the Drocourt-Queant line on the front allotted to him, in view of the losses suffered in the preliminary fighting for the jumping-off line, I decided that the 4th Canadian Division would extend their front and take over 1,000 yards additional frontage from the 4th (British) Division. This necessitated a change of plan on the part of the 4th Canadian Division, who a few hours before zero had to place an additional Brigade in the line for

the initial assault. Accordingly, the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General J. H. McBrien) carried out the attack on the right and the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General R. J. F. Hayter) on the left Divisional front, having first advanced the line to conform with the 1st Canadian Division.

It was necessary to postpone the attack on the Drocourt-Queant line until September 2nd on account of the additional wire cutting which was still required, and the day of September 1st was employed in minor operations to improve the jumping off line for the major operation.

The important strong point known as the Crow's Nest was captured by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

During the afternoon and evening of September 1st the enemy delivered violent counter-attacks, directed against the junction of the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions. Two fresh Divisions and two Divisions already in the line were identified in the course of this heavy fighting. Our troops were forced back slightly twice, but the ground was each time regained and finally held. The hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of the crest of the spur at this point really continued until zero hour the next day, the troops attacking the Drocourt-Queant line as they moved forward taking over the fight from the troops then holding the line.

At 5.00 a.m., September 2nd, the major operation against the Drocourt-Queant line was launched. Preceded by a dense barrage, and assisted by Tanks, the Infantry pushed forward rapidly, and the Drocourt-Queant line (the first objective) and its support line (the second objective) including the village of Dury were captured according to programme. With the capture of the second objective the Field Artillery barrage was shot out, and the attack further east had to be carried forward without its assistance. The enemy's resistance, free of the demoralising effect of our barrage, stiffened considerably, the open country being swept continually by intense machine gun fire. In addition, the Tanks soon became casualties from enemy guns firing point blank, and the advance on the left and centre was held up.

Brutinel's Brigade, reinforced by a Regiment of Cavalry (10th Royal Hussars) and armoured cars, endeavoured to pass through to capture the Marquion Bridge on the Canal du Nord. Wire, trenches, and sunken roads, however, confined the

movements of the force to the Arras-Cambrai Road; and this was rendered impassable by machine gun fire and by batteries firing over open sights.

On the right, however, the 1st Canadian Division pushed forward despite very heavy machine gun and direct artillery fire, and captured the villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, the Bois de Bouche and Bois de Loison to the east of Cagnicourt.

“Taking advantage of the breach thus made by the Canadian Divisions, a Brigade of the 63rd (Naval) Division, XVII. Corps, which had followed the attack behind the right Brigade of our right Division, now turned south and advanced in the direction of Queant.”

Further progress made by the 1st Canadian Division in the afternoon resulted in the capture of the heavily wired Buissy Switch line as far south as the outskirts of Buissy; this largely outflanked the enemy still holding out in front of the 4th Canadian Division, and compelled their retirement during the night behind the Canal du Nord.

Although the crossings of the Canal du Nord had not been captured, the result of the day's fighting was most gratifying. The Canadian Corps had pierced the Drocourt-Queant line on its whole front of attack, and the exploitation of our success by the XVII. Corps on the right had further widened the breach and made possible the capture of a large stretch of territory to the south.

To stem our advance, and hold the Drocourt-Queant line, the enemy had concentrated eight fresh Divisions directly opposite the Canadian Corps, but the unparalleled striking power of our Battalions and the individual bravery of our men had smashed all resistance.

The number of unwounded prisoners captured exceeded 5,000, and we had identified every Unit of the seven Infantry Divisions and the one Cavalry Division engaged.

Our Infantry had penetrated the enemy's defences to a depth exceeding 6,000 yards.

In prevision of the attack on the Canal du Nord taking place the same day, the Engineers had rapidly prepared the bridges and roads, advanced the light railways, and pushed forward the personnel and all material necessary for future construction.

During the night of September 2nd-3rd the 4th (British) Division, by a minor operation, captured the village of Etaing without serious opposition.

At dawn our Infantry pushed forward strong patrols, and meeting very slight resistance from the enemy contact patrols established a line just west of the Canal along the Corps front, freeing the villages of Buissy, Baralle, Saudemont, Rumau-court, Ecourt St. Quentin, and Lecluse. A certain number of French civilians were liberated during this advance.

The enemy had blown up all the bridges on the previous night, and was holding a commanding position on the eastern bank of the Canal with a large number of machine guns. His Artillery was very active, more especially from the north, and it was impossible to send bodies of troops by daylight over the long and bare slopes bordered by the Canal.

Our left flank was now very exposed to Artillery fire from the north, and the nature of the ground we were holding, the strength of the obstacle in front of the Corps, and the resolute attitude of the enemy, forbade any attempt to further exploit our success.

It was necessary to prepare minutely the details of the operations required to attack successfully the Canal du Nord line. Accordingly, no further attempts were made at this time.

In the night of September 3rd-4th the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions relieved the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions respectively, and the 4th (British) Division was relieved by the 1st (British) Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on September 1st and had been concentrated after that date in the Monchy-le-Preux, Vis-en-Artois, Guemappe area.

**3rd Phase.**—The left flank of the Corps was again very long, and in accordance with the policy adopted the 1st (British) Division was transferred in the line from the Canadian Corps to the XXII. Corps. I handed over command of that sector—extending from Palluel (exclusive) to Etaing (inclusive), and facing north—to the G.O.C. XXII. Corps at midnight, September 4th-5th.

The enemy had flooded the valley of the Sensee River and all the bridges had been destroyed. Our Engineers were very actively engaged in an effort to lower these floods and wrest the control from the enemy.

On the right flank the XVII. Corps was engaged in heavy fighting in and around Mœuvres, and all their attempts to cross the Canal du Nord at that point had been repulsed.

A thorough reconnaissance of our front had shown that the frontal attack of the Canal du Nord line was impossible, the eastern bank of the Canal was strongly wired and was generally much higher than the western bank.

The whole of our forward area was under direct observation from Oisy-le-Verger and the high ground on the northern flank, and any movement by day was quickly engaged by hostile artillery.

No battery positions within a range sufficient to carry on the preparation of the attack, or to support it, were available, and any attempt to bring guns forward of the general line Villers-lez-Cagnicourt-Buissy was severely punished; the battery positions south and west of this general line were subjected to intense gas shelling every night.

The Canal du Nord was in itself a serious obstacle. It was under construction at the outbreak of the war and had not been completed. Generally speaking, it followed the valley of the River Agache, but not the actual bed of the river. The average width was about 100 feet and it was flooded as far south as the lock, 800 yards south-west of Sains-lez-Marquion, just north of the Corps southern boundary. South of this and to the right of the Corps front the Canal was dry, and its bottom was at the natural ground level, the sides of the Canal consisting of high earth and brick banks.

The attack of the Canal du Nord could not, therefore, be undertaken singly by the Canadian Corps, but had to be part of a larger scheme.

This required considerable time to arrange, and until September 27th no changes developed on the Corps front.

The obstacles which had stopped our advance also made our positions very strong defensively, and advantage was taken of this fact to rest and refit the Divisions. As much of the Corps Artillery as could be spared was withdrawn from the line to rest the men and horses.

The line was held very thinly, but active patrolling at nights and sniping were kept up. A complete programme of harassing fire by Artillery and Machine Guns was also put in force nightly. The Corps Heavy Artillery (Brigadier-General R. H. Massie) carried out wire-cutting, counter-battery shoots and gas concentrations daily, in preparation for the eventual operations.

Light railways, roads, bridges and water-points were constructed right up to the forward area, and the bridging material which would be required for the Canal du Nord was accumulated well forward. Ammunition dumps were established at suitable places.

Detailed reconnaissances of the Canal and trenches were carried out by aeroplane, and also by daring patrols, and all available documents regarding the Canal construction were gathered with a view to preparing the plans for the future attack.

On September 13th Major-General (then Brigadier-General) F. O. W. Loomis took over command of the 3rd Canadian Division from Major-General L. J. Lipsett, who went to command the 4th (British) Division; the former was succeeded in command of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade by Brigadier-General (then Lieut.-Colonel) R. P. Clark.

**The Task.**—On September 15th I received the details of a large operation to be carried out later in the month by the Third and Fourth Armies, in which the Canadian Corps was to co-operate by crossing the Canal, and by capturing Bourlon Wood and the high ground to the north-east of it, to protect the left flank of the attack.

The XXII. Corps on the left was to take over the front held by the Canadian Corps to a point 1,200 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road, and the Canadian Corps was to take over part of the front held by the XVII. Corps (Third Army) as far as Mœuvres (exclusive), which was to be the Canadian Corps right boundary for the attack.

“By this side-slip to the south the right of the Canadian Corps was to be placed opposite a dry portion of the Canal du Nord on a front of about 2,500 yards. The Germans were then holding in strength a strip of ground on the west side of the canal, and every effort made by the XVII. Corps to clear this ground and reach the Canal banks had been repulsed.”

On September 22nd the task of the Corps was enlarged so as to include, in addition to the objectives already mentioned, the capture of the bridge over the Canal-de-l'Escaut, north of Cambrai, and the high ground overlooking the Sensee Valley. The right boundary was not altered. To assist in carrying out the above additional task, the 11th Division and the 7th Tank Battalion were placed under my orders.

The date of this operation was definitely fixed for September 27th, 1918, at dawn.

It was decided that the 4th and 1st Canadian Divisions would carry out the initial attack, capture the villages of Bourlon and Marquion respectively, and immediately thereafter seize Bourlon Wood and bring the line up to the high ground north of Bourlon Wood and east of Bois-de-Cocret and Dartford Wood.

At this stage the 3rd Canadian Division would pass through the right of the 4th Canadian Division and advance from a line east of Bourlon Wood in an easterly direction towards Neuville-St. Remy, in liaison with the XVII. Corps.

The 11th Division was to come up on the left of the 1st Canadian Division and advance in a north-easterly direction towards Epinoy and Oisy le Verger. The 4th Canadian Division on the right centre was to advance towards Blecourt and the 1st Canadian Division on the left centre was to advance in the direction of Abancourt.

This attack was fraught with difficulties. On the Corps battle-front of 6,400 yards the Canal du Nord was impassable on the northern 3,800 yards. The Corps had, therefore, to cross the Canal du Nord on a front of 2,600 yards, and to expand later fanwise in a north-easterly direction to a front exceeding 15,000 yards. This intricate manœuvre called for most skilful leadership on the part of the commanders, and the highest state of discipline on the part of the troops.

The assembly of the attacking troops in an extremely congested area known by the enemy to be the only one available was very dangerous, especially in view of the alertness of the enemy. A concentrated bombardment of this area prior to zero, particularly if gas was employed, was a dreaded possibility which could seriously affect the whole of the operation and possibly cause its total failure.

To meet such an eventuality careful arrangements were made by the counter-battery staff officer to bring to bear a specially heavy neutralising fire on hostile batteries at any moment during the crucial period of preparation. These arrangements were to be put into effect, in any case, at zero hour, to neutralise the hostile defensive barrage on the front of attack.

With the exception of the 2nd Canadian Division which was now holding the entire front, and would be in Corps

Reserve at the time of the attack, every resource of the Canadian Corps was to be crowded into that narrow space.

The provision of an effective Artillery barrage presented considerable difficulty owing to the depth of the attack and its general direction. On the 4th Canadian Division front particularly, the depth to the initial objective was such that the batteries were compelled to move forward into captured ground and continue firing the barrage from these new positions. Provision was made for the advance of a number of batteries with their Echelons to the Canal line and beyond whilst the attack was in progress.

A large number of Machine Gun batteries were detailed to supply the initial barrage and, later, to advance in support of the Infantry.

Provisions were also made for Engineer Units to move forward immediately following the assaulting troops, to effect immediate repair to the roads and crossings of the Canal in order to enable the Artillery to move up in support of the Infantry.

The greatest precautions had been taken to ensure secrecy, and camouflage had been used extensively to prevent detection of the preparations of all kinds that were in progress.

Further to conceal our intentions, it was decided that no preliminary fighting to secure a jumping-off line would take place, and that the Germans would be left in possession of their positions west of the Canal until the hour of the attack. It was also hoped that, by letting the Germans retain this ground, their defensive barrage would remain well west of the Canal instead of being placed on the Canal itself, where the banks offered a serious obstacle and reduced very considerably the rate of advance of the assaulting troops.

On our right the XVII. Corps was to advance and capture Fontaine-Notre-Dame, in conjunction with the capture of Bourlon Wood by the 4th Canadian Division.

On the night September 25th-26th the XVII. Corps on the left took over the front as far as south as the Arras-Cambrai Road, and arranged to extend the Artillery and Machine Gun barrage to their front so as to deceive the enemy regarding actual flanks of the attack.

The 4th and 1st Canadian Divisions went into the line on their respective battle fronts.

The 2nd Canadian Division, on completion of the relief, passed into Corps Reserve.

During the night September 26th-27th all final adjustments and moves were made, and everything was ready before zero hour.

This was for everybody a night full of anxiety, but apart from the usual harassing fire and night bombing nothing untoward happened.

**The Attack.**—At 5.20 a.m., September 27th, the attack was successfully launched, and in spite of all obstacles went well from the first.

The barrage was uniformly good, and the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisional Artilleries, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General J. S. Stewart and Brigadier-General W. B. M. King, were successful in advancing into captured ground, and continued the barrage as planned.

Early in the afternoon the First Phase of the attack was substantially over, and the readjustments of the fronts preparatory to the Second Phase were under way.

On the extreme right, however, the XVII. Corps had failed to keep pace with our advance, and our right flank, submitted to severe enfilade Machine Gun fire from the vicinity of Anneux, had to be refused for a considerable distance to retain touch with the left of the XVII. Corps; therefore, the encircling movement which was to have given us Bourslon Wood could not be developed.

Fully alive to the gravity of the situation which would be created on the flank of the Third Army by the failure to capture and hold Bourslon Wood, the 4th Canadian Division attacked from the north side of the Wood and captured all the high ground, pushing patrols as far as Fontaine-Notre-Dame.

“It is recalled here that Bourslon Wood, which is 110 metres high, dominates the ground as far south as Flequieres and Havrincourt; and that its loss after very heavy fighting in November, 1917, during the first battle of Cambrai, caused eventually the withdrawal of the Third Army from a large portion of the ground they had won by their surprise attack.”

A severe counter-attack launched from the direction of Raillencourt, against the left of the 4th Canadian Division, was repulsed in the afternoon with heavy losses to the enemy.

Owing to the situation on our right flank, already explained, the 3rd Canadian Division could not be engaged this day. The 1st Canadian Division and the 11th (British) Division, however, made substantial gains after the commencement of the Second Phase, the former capturing Haynecourt and crossing the Douai-Cambrai Road, and the latter pushing on and taking Epinoy and Oisy-le-Verger by evening.

The attack was continued on the 28th. The 3rd Canadian Division captured Fontaine-Notre-Dame (one of the XVII. Corps objectives), and, penetrating the Marcoing line, reached the western outskirts of St. Olle. The 4th Canadian Division captured Raillencourt and Saily, and the 11th (British) Division established posts in Aubencheul-au-Bac and occupied the Bois-de-Quesnoy. The 1st Canadian Division, in view of their advance of the previous day which had produced a considerable salient, did not push forward.

Heavy fighting characterised the 29th. The 3rd Canadian Division, the 4th Canadian Division, and the 1st Canadian Division all made progress in the face of severe opposition. The 3rd Canadian Division pushed the line forward to the junction of the Arras and Bapaume Road, the western outskirts of Neuville St. Remy and the Douai-Cambrai Road. They also cleared the Marquion line from the Bapaume-Cambrai Road southwards towards the Canal de l'Escaut. These trenches were in the XVII. Corps area, but it was difficult for our attack to progress leaving on its flank and rear this strongly held position. The 4th Canadian Division captured Sancourt, crossed the Douai-Cambrai Railway and entered Blecourt, but later withdrew to the line of the railway in the face of a heavy counter-attack. The necessity for this withdrawal was accentuated by the situation on the left. The 11th Division, in spite of two attempts, had been unable to occupy the high ground north-east of Epinoy. This had interfered materially with the progress of the 1st Canadian Division, and had prevented their holding positions gained early in the day in the neighbourhood of Abancourt Station, the relinquishment of which, in turn, endangered the flank of the 4th Canadian Division.

The operation of the 30th was planned in two phases. In the first, the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions were to push forward across the high ground between the Canal de l'Escaut and the Blecourt-Bantigny Ravine, when Brutinel's Brigade was to pass through them and secure bridge-heads at Ramillies

and Esuars. The second phase, to take place on the success of the first, provided for the seizing of the high ground overlooking the Sensee Rivier by the 1st Canadian Division and 11th (British) Division. The attack commenced well, and the villages of Tilloy and Blecourt were captured by the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions respectively. A heavy counter-attack, however, against the 4th Canadian Division and the left flank of the 3rd Canadian Division, assisted by exceptionally severe enfilade fire from the high ground to the north of the Blecourt-Bantigny Ravine, forced the line on the left back to the eastern outskirts of Sancourt. The second phase of the attack was not carried out, and the net gains for the day were the capture of Tilloy and some progress made on the right of the 3rd Canadian Division from Neuville St. Remy south. Prisoners taken during the day testified to the supreme importance, in the eyes of the enemy, of the positions held by him and the necessity that they be held at all costs.

The tremendous exertions and considerable casualties consequent upon the four days' almost continuous fighting had made heavy inroads on the freshness and efficiency of all arms, and it was questionable whether an immediate decision could be forced in the face of the heavy concentration of troops which our successful and, from the enemy's standpoint, dangerous advance, had drawn against us. On the other hand, it was known that the enemy had suffered severely, and it was quite possible that matters had reached a stage where he no longer considered the retention of this position worth the severe losses both in men and moral consequent upon a continuance of the defence. It was therefore decided that the assault would be continued on October 1st, the four Divisions in line attacking simultaneously under a heavy barrage, coordinated by the G.O.C., R.A. During the night the XXII. Corps took over a portion of the front held by the 11th Division, the 56th Division becoming responsible for the defence of the relieved front at 6.00 a.m., October 1st.

The attack made excellent progress in the early stages, and the troops reached the general line Canal de l'Escaut (east of Neuville St. Remy)-Morenchies Wood-Cuvillers-Bantigny (all inclusive).

The decision of the enemy to resist to the last quickly manifested itself. About 10.00 a.m. heavy counter-attacks developed up the Bantigny Ravine from the direction of Pailencourt. These, supplemented by enfilade fire from the high

ground just south of Abancourt, which still remained in the enemy's hands, due to a certain extent to the inability of the 11th Division on the left to make progress, were sufficient to press back our advanced troops. Pockets of the enemy in Blecourt and Bantigny continued to give trouble, and our line was ultimately forced by greatly superior numbers out of Cuvillers, Bantigny and Blecourt.

To continue to throw tired troops against such opposition, without giving them an opportunity to refit and recuperate, was obviously inviting a serious failure, and I accordingly decided to break off the engagement. The five days' fighting had yielded practical gains of a very valuable nature, as well as 7,059 prisoners and 205 guns.

We had gone through the last organised system of defences on our front, and our advance constituted a direct threat on the rear of the troops immediately to the north of our left flank, and their withdrawal had now begun.

Although the ground gained on the 1st was not extensive, the effects of the battle and of the previous four days' fighting were far-reaching, and made possible the subsequent advances of October and November, in so far as the Divisions engaged against the Canadian Corps drew heavily on the enemy's reserves, which had now been greatly reduced.

It is worthy of note that the enemy employed six Divisions to reinforce the four Divisions already in the line, making a total of ten Divisions engaged since September 27th by the Canadian Corps. In addition to their 10 Divisional Artilleries and large number of heavy guns, these German Divisions had been reinforced by 13 Marksmen Machine Gun Companies.

In the same period only three additional Divisions and one Regiment were employed by the Germans to reinforce the front from Honnecourt to Cambrai, a front of approximately 18,000 yards in length.

This comparison of employment of reserves showed clearly that the enemy was greatly perturbed by the success of our advance, and the serious threat it offered especially to his northern defences.

Throughout this phase very heavy calls had been made on the Corps Artillery (Major-General E. W. B. Morrison) and the Canadian Engineers.

With the exception of the advances of the 1st Canadian and 11th (British) Divisions in the second stage of the attack

of September 27th, all operations carried out during the five days took place under cover of Artillery barrages. The amount of ammunition fired was exceptionally large, and it was only by the most strenuous efforts on the part of all ranks of the Artillery that the supply could be made to keep pace with the expenditure.

The success in this respect was to a large extent due to the exertion and skill displayed by the Canadian Engineers (Major-General W. B. Lindsay) in every branch of their activities, notably in bridge-building and repair of roads. The enemy had set a large number of Tank mines and "booby traps," and in one sector alone the Engineers removed over 200 Tank mines, thus greatly facilitating the operation in progress.

**4th Phase.**—The 2nd Canadian Division had been in close support throughout the day, and during the night October 1st-2nd relieved the 4th Canadian Division and parts of the 3rd and 1st Canadian Divisions in the line from the railway south of Tilloy to Blecourt inclusive. On relief, the 4th Canadian Division came into Corps Reserve in bivouacs in the Inchy-Queant area.

The relief considerably thinned out the Infantry, and in anticipation of possible counter-attacks a large number of Machine Gun Batteries were placed in the line.

October 2nd passed without any substantial change in the situation. The enemy's Artillery was very active throughout the day, and at 6.15 p.m. he delivered a determined counter-attack, with a force estimated at about a Battalion strong, against the ridge N.E. of Tilloy, on the 2nd Canadian Division front. This counter-attack was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

During the night October 2nd-3rd the 11th Division extended its frontage to the right as far as Blecourt (inclusive), relieving the remainder of the 1st Canadian Division, who came into Corps Reserve west of the Canal on completion of the relief.

The dispositions of the Canadian Corps at noon, October 3rd, were as follows:—

In the line—3rd Canadian Division on the right on a one-Brigade front, from the Arras-Cambrai railway to the Cambrai-Douai railway south of Tilloy; the 2nd Canadian Division in the centre, on a two-Brigade front, extending to the northern outskirts of Blecourt, and the 11th Division

on the left, continuing the line to a point 1,000 yards south of Aubencheul-au-Bac.

In Corps Reserve—the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions. The latter was moved to billets in the Haute Avesnes-Arras area on the night of October 7th-8th, to give more opportunity to rest and refit.

The period from October 3rd to 8th passed without any material changes on the Corps front. An enemy counter-attack was beaten off by the 2nd Canadian Division opposite Bantigny on the morning of October 4th, and the 11th Division considerably improved the line on the northern flank by successful minor operations on October 5th and 6th.

Many patrol encounters took place, in which some prisoners were captured, and our Artillery and Machine Guns kept the enemy under continual harassing fire day and night. In addition, our Heavy Artillery carried out a daily programme of gas concentrations and counter-battery shoots.

Orders were received on October 3rd for the relief of the Corps by the XXII. Corps. Concurrently with this relief, and as it progressed, the Canadian Corps was to take over the front of the XXII. Corps.

Plans for further operations having been formulated to take place on the Third Army front, the Canadian Corps was ordered on October 5th to co-operate by forcing the crossings of the Canal de l'Escaut, north of Cambrai, and the relief contemplated was, therefore, postponed.

The Third Army had been successful in crossing the Canal de l'Escaut south of Cambrai between Crevecœur and Proville. The operation now contemplated had for object the capture of Cambrai by envelopment. This was to be carried out in two phases.

In the first phase the XVII. Corps was to capture Awoingt by attacking from the south, the Canadian Corps was to co-operate by an Artillery demonstration. In the second phase the Canadian Corps was to cross the Canal de l'Escaut and, advancing rapidly, capture Escaudœuvres, joining hands with the XVII. Corps north-east of Cambrai.

The positions occupied by the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions were not favourable for an attack by day; the 3rd Canadian Division was in front of Cambrai, and house-to-house fighting was out of the question; the 2nd Canadian Division was separated from the Canal by glacis-like slopes, devoid of

cover, and on which the enemy had good observation from the numerous houses on the east side of the Canal as well as from the high ground east of Escaudœuvres. In addition Morenchies, Point d'Aire, Ramillies, and the villages to the north were strongly held by the enemy.

In spite of the difficulties of a night operation it was decided that the 2nd Canadian Division would attack by night, and attempt to seize the bridges before they were blown up by the enemy.

The 3rd Canadian Division was to cover the right of the 2nd Canadian Division by capturing the railway embankment, and entering Cambrai as soon as possible to prevent any action of the enemy against the right flank of the 2nd Canadian Division, which, under the best circumstances, was bound to be in the air for some time after the crossing of the Canal.

Brutinel's Brigade was to cross the Canal as soon as possible, and extend the gains of the 2nd Canadian Division by seizing the high ground east of Thun St. Martin. Ten Brigades of Field Artillery were available for the operation.

**The Attack.**—At 4.30 a.m., October 8th, the Third Army attacked, and at the same hour an artillery demonstration was carried out on the Canadian Corps front.

The XVII. Corps on the right did not reach Awoingt, but in the evening they were ordered to continue their advance on the morning of October 9th to capture this town; concurrently with this advance the Canadian Corps was to secure the crossings of the Canal de l'Escaut.

In spite of the darkness of a rainy night the assembly was completed, and the attack was launched successfully at 1.30 a.m., October 9th. Rapid progress was made, and at 2.25 a.m. the 2nd Canadian Division had captured Ramillies and established posts on the Canal there, and patrols were pushing out to the north-east. On the right the Infantry, assisted by a party of Engineers, rushed the crossings at Pont d'Aire, and, after sharp fighting, captured the bridge intact, with the exception of the western spillway, which had been partially destroyed. Two cork bridges were thrown across, and by 3.35 a.m. our Infantry were well established on the eastern side of the Canal. The 3rd Canadian Division had cleared the railway, and their patrols were pushing into Cambrai, while the Engineers were commencing work on the bridges.

By 8.00 a.m. the 2nd Canadian Division had captured Escaudœuvres, and had established a line on the high ground immediately to the north and east. Detachments of the 3rd Canadian Division had by this time completely cleared Cambrai of the enemy, and troops of the Third Army could be seen coming up towards it from the south.

Cambrai was to be deliberately set on fire by the enemy. Hugh fires were burning in the Square when our patrols went through, and many others broke out in all parts of the city. Piles of inflammable material were found ready for the torch, but the enemy was unable to carry out his intention owing to our unexpected attack and rapid progress. A party of one officer and a few men, which had been left with instructions to set fire to Cambrai, was discovered and dealt with before it could do any further damage. The fires were successfully checked by a large detachment of Canadian Engineers, who entered the city with the patrols. A considerable number of road mines, "booby traps," etc., were also located and removed.

An air reconnaissance at dawn indicated that the enemy had withdrawn from the area between the Canal de l'Escaut and the Canal de la Sensee, and that all bridges over the latter had been destroyed.

Brutinel's Brigade, passing through the Infantry of the 2nd Canadian Division, seized the high ground at Croix St. Hubert and pushed Cavalry patrols into Thun Levecque.

The 2nd Canadian Division east of the Canal progressed towards the north and occupied Thun Levecque, Thun St. Martin, Blecourt, Cuvillers, and Bantigny, and the 11th Division occupied Abancourt and reached the outskirts of Paillencourt.

The 3rd Canadian Division was withdrawn at 7.10 p.m. when the 24th Division (XVII. Corps) passed through and joined up with the 2nd Canadian Division, and Cambrai and our positions to the east were taken over or occupied by the XVII. Corps.

The 3rd Canadian Division was moved on the following day to bivouacs in the Inchy-Queant area to rest and refit after 12 days of battle.

The attack was continued at 6.00 a.m., October 11th, by the 2nd Canadian and 11th (British) Divisions, and good progress was made. The 2nd Canadian Division captured Naves, and by nightfall reached a point one and-a-half miles north-east

on the Cambrai-Salzoir Road. From there our line ran westwards to the Canal de l'Escaut, exclusive of Iwuy, where we were held up by machine gun fire.

In this attack Brutinel's Brigade operated along the Cambrai-Salzoir Road, but finding the Bridge over the Erclin River destroyed could not get their cars further forward.

"This Bridge, although on the outpost line under heavy fire, was immediately replaced by the Engineers, a covering party being supplied by Brutinel's Brigade."

Machine gun crews from the cars went forward on foot, however, and materially assisted the Infantry advancing at this point, and the Corps Cavalry, by a brilliant charge, helped in the capture of the ground east of the Rieux-Iwuy Road.

On the left, the 11th Division cleared the enemy from the area between the Canal de l'Escaut and the Sensee Canal, captured Paillencourt and Estrun, and reached the outskirts of Hem-Lenglet, which they occupied during the night.

The 49th and 51st Divisions were released from Army Reserve and transferred to the Canadian Corps on October 10. During the night 10th-11th the former relieved that part of the 2nd Canadian Division east of Iwuy, and the 51st (Highland) Division moved to the Escaudœuvres area.

At 9.00 a.m., October 11th, the Canadian Corps resumed the attack with the 49th Division on the right and the 2nd Canadian Division on the left. The enemy laid down a heavy Artillery barrage and both Divisions encountered stiff opposition. After fierce fighting, however, our attack made good progress, the 49th Division gaining the high ground east of Iwuy, and the 2nd Canadian Division capturing Iwuy and the high ground to the north.

About 10.30 a.m. the enemy delivered a heavy counter-attack under an artillery barrage and supported by seven Tanks, from the direction of Avesnes-le-Sec, against the 49th and 2nd Canadian Divisions. Our line was forced back slightly at first, but six of the Tanks were knocked out by our Artillery, the assaulting Infantry dispersed by our machine gun and rifle fire, and the attack repulsed.

Meanwhile, on October 7th-8th, the 1st Canadian Division had relieved the 4th (British) Division (XXII. Corps) on the frontage between Palluel and the Scarpe River, and passed under the command of the G.O.C., XXII. Corps.

At 5.00 p.m., October 11th, I handed over command of the Corps front (less the 11th Divisional sector) to the G.O.C., XXII. Corps, and the 2nd Canadian and the 49th and 51st Divisions were transferred to the XXII. Corps.

At the same hour I assumed command of the former XXII. Corps front, and the 56th and the 1st Canadian Divisions were transferred in the line to the Canadian Corps.

During the night of October 11th-12th the 2nd Canadian Division was relieved in the line east of the Iwuy-Denain railway by the 51st (Highland) Division, and on completion of the relief I assumed command of the remainder of the 2nd Canadian Divisional front, extending from the Iwuy-Denain railway exclusive, to the Canal de l'Escaut.

The battle of Arras-Cambrai, so fruitful in results, was now closed. Since August 26th the Canadian Corps had advanced 23 miles, fighting for every foot of ground and overcoming the most bitter resistance.

In that period the Canadian Corps engaged and defeated decisively 31 German Divisions, reinforced by numerous Marksmen Machine Gun Companies. These Divisions were met in strongly fortified positions and under conditions most favourable to the defence.

In this battle 18,585 prisoners were captured by us, together with 371 guns, 1,923 Machine Guns and many Trench Mortars.

Over 116 square miles of French soil, containing 54 towns and villages, and including the city of Cambrai, were liberated.

The severity of the fighting and the heroism of our troops may be gathered from the casualties suffered between August 22nd and October 11th, which are as follows—

	<i>Officers.</i>	<i>Other Ranks.</i>
Killed .. ..	296	4,071
Missing .. ..	18	1,912
Wounded .. ..	1,230	23,279
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total .. ..	1,544	29,262
	<hr/>	<hr/>

Considering the great number of German Divisions engaged and the tremendous artillery and machine gun fire power at their disposal, the comparative lightness of our casualties testified to the excellence of the precautions taken by Divisional, Brigade, and Regimental Officers to minimise the loss of life, having ever in mind the performance of their duty and the accomplishment of their heavy task.

**General Situation.**—While the Canadian Corps was tenaciously fighting to break through the hinge of the Hindenburg system of defence, the Third and Fourth British Armies were pushing forward through the devastated areas in the Somme, meeting everywhere strong and determined rearguards. The outer defences of the Hindenburg line were captured by them on September 18th and 19th, and a good position secured for the assault of the main defences.

The storming of the Canal du Nord line, which brought the Canadian Corps definitely behind the areas organised for defence, was immediately followed by the capture of the main Hindenburg line on the fronts of the Third and Fourth Armies, and on October 8th and 10th the Canal de l'Escaut was crossed north of Cambrai. Cambrai was seized and the German rearguards pushed back in open country to the Selle River.

The Germans were falling back everywhere; they had now evacuated completely the Lys salient and a portion of the ground east and south of Lens, but they were still holding a line west of Lille-Douai and along the Canal de la Sensee.

The Canadian Corps, although tired and depleted in numbers, began to push forward as soon as it had taken over the new front on the Canal de la Sensee south of Douai. On October 14th the Second Army, in conjunction with the Belgian Armies and French Detachments, attacked the northern part of the salient and precipitated the German retreat.

### OPERATIONS—DOUAI—MONS.

**The Battle Front.**—The new front of the Canadian Corps (at 5.00 p.m., October 11th) extended from Iwuy-Denain Railway, north of Iwuy, to the Canal de l'Escaut at Estrun, thence following the southern bank of the Canal de la Sensee to Palluel, thence crossing the Sensee River at Hamel to the Scarpe River east of Vitry. The front was held by the 2nd Canadian Division from the right to the Canal de l'Escaut—the 11th Division from Estrun (inclusive) to Aubencheul-au-Bac (exclusive)—the 56th Division from Aubencheul-au-Bac (inclusive) to Palleul (inclusive), and the 1st Canadian Division from Palluel (exclusive) to the western boundary. (See Sketch No. 12.)

The fronts of the 11th and 56th Divisions were then stationary, but on the Front of the 1st Canadian Division

crossings had been forced over the Sensee and Trinquis Rivers that morning, and the enemy was retiring, closely followed by battle patrols of the 1st Canadian Division.

"The 1st Canadian Division had relieved the 4th British Division in the line along the south side of the valleys of the Sensee and Trinquis Rivers, from Palluel exclusive to the Scarpe, during the nights October 5th-6th and 6th-7th, coming under orders of the XXII. Corps.

The front had been a quiet one, the river valleys having been flooded by the enemy to an average width of from 300 to 400 yards, and the bridges destroyed.

On the morning of October 8th the Division carried out a 'Chinese attack' with a view to ascertaining the enemy's probable action if attacked. Under cover of the barrage, patrols succeeded in enlarging the small bridge-head across the river at Sailly-en-Ostrevent, capturing 24 prisoners and two machine guns.

The enemy was expected to withdraw shortly, and this barrage was repeated daily at dawn with the object of harassing the enemy and testing his strength. At 3.00 a.m., October 10th, battle patrols were pushed out by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General G. S. Tuxford) from the bridge-head at Sailly, and after capturing the village they entered the Drocourt-Queant line to the north-east. Thirty prisoners and six machine guns were sent back from Sailly at daylight; a strong enemy counter-attack (estimated at two battalions) overran the force in the Drocourt-Queant line and recaptured Sailly, driving our line back to the line previously held.

On October 11th, in conjunction with an attack on the left by the 8th Division, our troops forced their way over the narrow crossings of the Sensee and Trinquis Rivers in the face of considerable machine gun fire and pushed northwards and eastwards, meeting only resistance from isolated machine gun nests. The performance of the first patrols in forcing their way across the narrow causeways, all stoutly defended by machine guns, was a splendid achievement."

By the night of October 11th the 1st Canadian Division, on the left, had reached the line Hamel-Estrees-Noyelles (all inclusive), and at dawn, October 12th, pushed forward, clearing Arlex and reaching the west bank of the Canal from Palluel to the Scarpe.

On October 12th the line remained stationary between the Canal du Nord and the Canal de l'Escaut. East of the Canal de l'Escaut the 2nd Canadian Division attacked at noon in conjunction with the XXII. Corps on the right and captured Hordain. Attempts to push forward to Basseville were, however, stopped by machine gun fire. The restricted area and the inundated condition of the ground prevented further progress on this front until the troops on the right could get forward.

It was apparent from many indications that the enemy was preparing to carry out a withdrawal on a large scale. Prisoners reported the evacuation of civilians and the removal or destruction of all stores, also that roads and railways had been prepared for demolition. These statements were confirmed by our observers, who reported numerous and frequent explosions and fires behind the enemy's lines.

On the Canadian Corps' front, the Divisions in the line were confronted by the Canal de la Sensee, and this in its flooded condition was a serious obstacle, the few crossings possible being narrow and easily defended. Orders were issued, however, that a policy of aggressive patrolling should be adopted to detect at the earliest moment any retirement, and that all preparations should be made for an immediate and rapid pursuit.

Our patrols were most daring during the next few days, but no weak spot was to be found along the enemy front, our attempts at crossing the Canal being stopped by heavy machine gun and rifle fire.

During the night October 12th-13th the 2nd Canadian Division extended its left to Aubencheul-au-Bac exclusive, relieving the 11th Division in the line, with the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General G. E. McCuaig) on the right, and the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General A. Ross) on the left. At this stage the G.O.C. 56th Division represented that his troops were too weak and tired to carry out the vigorous pursuit required in case of an enemy withdrawal. The 4th Canadian Division was, therefore, ordered to relieve the 56th Division by the morning of October

16th, and in the meantime to place one Brigade at the disposal of the G.O.C. 56th Division to be used in following up the enemy. On October 13th the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which had been resting in Arras, was accordingly moved up to Marquion, and came into reserve under the 56th Division.

During the early morning of October 13th the 56th Division crossed the Canal and succeeded in establishing a bridge-head at Aubigny-au-Bac, capturing the village with 201 prisoners. At 10.00 p.m. the following night, however, an enemy counter-attack in strength caused our withdrawal from the village, but the bridge-head was retained.

The relief of the 56th Division by the 4th Canadian Division was carried out on the nights October 14th-15th and 15th-16th without incident, and the former moved back to rest in the Arras-Haute Avesnes-Marœuil area, coming into Army Reserve.

Patrols of the 1st Canadian Division succeeded in crossing the Canal near Ferin, on its left Brigade front, during the early morning of October 14th, but meeting strong resistance, the parties withdrew, taking with them some prisoners and machine guns.

**The Advance.**—Test barrages were carried out on the Corps' front each morning to ascertain the enemy's strength and attitude, and on October 17th the enemy was found extremely quiet and did not retaliate to our Artillery fire on the front of the 1st Canadian Division. Patrols were, therefore, sent out on that front and succeeded in crossing the Canal in several places, meeting only slight opposition. Stronger patrols followed and made good progress.

On the front of the 4th Canadian Division, however, all attempts to cross the Canal were still met by machine gun fire. After the 1st Canadian Division had secured crossings, a Battalion of the 4th Canadian Division was sent up to take advantage of these crossings and, working down the east side of the Canal, cleared the enemy on the 4th Canadian Division front, and enabled the advance to commence there.

Further to the right, at Hem Lenglet, the 2nd Canadian Division succeeded in crossing the Canal later in the day, and patrols were pushed on in the direction of Wasnes-au-Bac.

Only enemy rearguards were encountered during the day, and the opposition was nowhere heavy, although more organised and stubborn on the right opposite the 2nd Canadian Division.

By 6.00 a.m., October 18th, practically all the Infantry of the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions and several Battalions of the 2nd Canadian Division were across the Canal, and the following towns had been liberated:—Ferin, Courchelettes, Goeulzin, Le Racquet, Villers-au-Tertre, Cantin, Roucourt, Brunemont, Aubigny-au-Bac, Fechain, Fressain, Bugnicourt, and Hem Lenglet.

During that day two armoured cars, one squadron of the Canadian Light Horse, and one Company of Canadian Corps Cyclists from Brutinel's Brigade, were attached to each of the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions to assist in the pursuit of the enemy. These troops rendered valuable service to the Divisions to which they were attached, although the enemy's very complete road destruction prevented the armoured cars from operating to their full extent.

Throughout the advance now begun a great amount of work was thrown upon the Engineers, and their resources in men and material were taxed to the utmost. The enemy's demolition had been very well planned and thoroughly carried out, all bridges over the canals and streams being destroyed, every cross road and road junction rendered impassable by the blowing of large mines, and the railways, light and standard, blown up at frequent intervals. The enemy also considerably impeded our progress by his clever manipulation of the water levels in the canals which he controlled..

Foot-bridges were first thrown across the Canal, and these were quickly followed by heavier types of bridges to carry Battalion transport and Artillery, and in addition eight heavy traffic bridges, ranging in length from 90 to 160 feet, were at once put under way. On the Front of the 1st Canadian Division on the left the enemy drained the Canal, and it was found impossible to complete, and use the pontoon bridges first commenced.

The Engineers in the forward area concentrated their efforts on road repair, craters being quickly filled in, for the most part with material gathered on the spot and found in enemy dumps. In addition, the whole areas were searched immediately after their occupation, many "booby traps" and delayed action mines being discovered and rendered harmless, and all water supply sources being tested.

It was clear from the wholesale destruction of roads and railways that the reconstruction of communications would be very slow and that it would be difficult to keep our troops

supplied. Canadian Railway Troops were brought up, and, as soon as the enemy had been cleared away from the Canal, work was commenced on the repairing of the standard gauge railway forward from Sauchy Lestree. The construction of a railway bridge over the Canal at Aubencheul-au-Bac was immediately commenced.

The enemy retirement now extended considerably north of our front, and the VIII. Corps on our left began to move forward. During October 18th rapid and fairly easy progress was made, and the following towns and villages were liberated from the enemy:—Dechy, Sin-le-Noble, Guesnain, Montigny, Pecquencourt, Loffre, Lewarde, Erchin, Masny, Ecaillon, Marquette, Wasnes-au-Bac and the western portions of Auberchicourt and Monchecourt.

During the day the advance had carried us into a large industrial area, and well-built towns became more frequent. It also liberated the first of a host of civilians, 2,000 being found in Pecquencourt and a few in Auberchicourt. These people had been left by the retiring enemy without food, and faced as we were with an ever lengthening line of communication, and with only one bridge yet available for anything but horse transport, the work of the supply services was greatly increased. This additional burden was, however, cheerfully accepted, and the liberated civilians, whose numbers exceeded 70,000 before Valenciennes was reached, as well as our rapidly advancing troops, were at no time without a regular supply of food.

On October 19th the advance was continued on the whole Corps' front, nearly 40 towns and villages being wrested from the enemy, including the large town of Denain.

The XXII. Corps, advancing on our right from the south, gained touch with the 4th Canadian Division just east of Denain on the evening of October 19th, pinching out the 2nd Canadian Division, which was then concentrated in the Auberchicourt area, where good billets were available.

In spite of bad weather and increased resistance more ground was gained on the 20th, and the villages of Hasnon, Les Faux, Wallers and Haveluy, with a large population, were freed.

During the day resistance had stiffened all along the line. The ground over which we were advancing was very flat, and there was no tactical advantage to be gained by pushing forward, and a further advance would also increase the difficulties

of supply. In addition, on the left, the VIII. Corps had not been able to cope with the supply question and had not advanced in conformity with our progress. In view of these considerations, orders were issued that Divisions were to maintain touch with the enemy without becoming involved in heavy fighting.

For a time on the 20th the 4th Canadian Division was held up just east of Denain by machine gun and artillery fire, and it was not until late in the afternoon that our troops could make progress there.

Continuing the advance on the 21st, a footing was gained in the Foret-de-Vicoigne, and the following villages were captured:—Aremberg, Oisy, Herin, Rouvignes, Aubry, Petite Foret, Anzin, Prouvy, Bellaing and Wavrechain. As on the previous day, all these villages contained civilians, who subsequently suffered considerably from deliberate hostile shelling.

The 1st Canadian Division had now been in the line for two weeks without having an opportunity to rest and refit since the hard-fought battle of the Canal du Nord, and orders were issued for its relief by the 3rd Canadian Division. At dawn on the 22nd, in order that touch with the enemy be maintained, the 1st Canadian Division pushed forward. Following closely, the 3rd Canadian Division passed through the 1st Canadian Division during the forenoon, on the left Brigade front, about 9.00 a.m., on the line of the St. Amand-Raismes Road, and on the right about 12 noon on the line of the St. Amand-Raismes railway, the Foret de Vicoigne having been cleared of the enemy. On relief, the 1st Canadian Division came into rest billets in the Somain-Pequencourt-Masny area.

The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions pushed on during the 22nd, and by nightfall Trith St. Leger, La Vignoble, La Sentinelle, Waast-le-Haut, Beauvrages, Bruay, and practically the whole of the large forest of Raismes, were in our hands. On the left Brigade front of the 4th Canadian Division the Canal de l'Escaut had been reached in places. A very large area north-east of Valenciennes and a smaller area to the south-west had been flooded, and to the west of the city the Canal itself provided a serious obstacle. To the south-west, beyond the flooded area, Mont Houy and the Famars Ridge made a natural line of defence.

The XXII. Corps on our right had been held up along the Ecaillon River, and the VIII. Corps on our left had not been able to make any considerable advance, chiefly owing to supply difficulties, and were still some distance behind us.

The Divisions continued to push forward in the face of steadily increasing opposition, and by the 25th had reached the Canal and the western edge of the inundated area along the whole Corps front.

Our troops had had a very arduous pursuit, and the rail-head for supplies and ammunition was still very far to the rear. It was therefore decided that we should make good the west bank of the Canal and stand fast until the flanking Corps had made progress.

Attempts to cross the Canal proved that the enemy was holding in strength a naturally strong position, and it was ordered that no crossing in force would be attempted without reference to Corps Headquarters. The Engineers established dumps of material well forward on selected sites so that the bridges necessary to cross the Canal on the resumption of our advance could be constructed without delay.

It had become apparent that, unless the enemy withdrew, Valenciennes could only be taken from the south. The XXII. Corps on the right, had meanwhile succeeded in crossing the Ecaillon River after a hard fight and captured the Famars Ridge. They had, however, been unable to take Mont Houy, which commanded Valenciennes from the south.

On October 27th the First Army Commander outlined the plans for operations to be carried out in conjunction with attacks on a large scale by the Third and Fourth Armies to the south as follows:—

The First Army was to capture Valenciennes. The operation to be carried out in three phases as follows:—

- (a) The capture of Mont Houy and Aulnoy—to be carried out by the XXII. Corps on the morning of October 28th.
- (b) The capture of the high ground overlooking Valenciennes from the south—to be carried out by the Canadian Corps on a subsequent date, probably October 30th.
- (c) The capture of the high ground east of Valenciennes—to be carried out after (b) above, probably on November 1st.

Valenciennes would thus be outflanked from the south. The Canadian Corps would take over, probably on the night of October 28th-29th, the left Brigade frontage of the XXII. Corps (approximately 2,500 yards in order to carry out phase (b) and (c) of this operation. The above attacks were to be carried

out simultaneously with the attacks of the Third and Fourth Armies.

In accordance with the above, instructions were issued to the 3rd Canadian Division to take over the frontage of the left Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division. The 4th Canadian Division was, in turn, ordered to relieve the left Brigade of the XXII. Corps (51st Division), both side-slips to take place on the night of October 28th-29th, subsequent to the capture of Mont Houy by the XXII. Corps.

The attack of the 51st Division on Mont Houy on October 28th was not successful. In the first rush the troops succeeded in gaining a foothold on the objective, but were subsequently driven out by repeated counter-attacks. In view of this, the relief of the left Brigade of that Division by the 4th Canadian Division was postponed. During the night of October 28th-29th, however, the 3rd Canadian Division relieved the left Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division.

**Capture of Mont Huoy and Valenciennes.**—Orders were received that the Canadian Corps was to carry out all three phases of the operation against Valenciennes in conjunction with attacks of the XXII. Corps. Accordingly, the 4th Canadian Division was ordered to relieve the left Brigade of the 51st Division during the night of October 29th-30th on the line then held, and to be prepared to carry out the attack on the morning of November 1st.

In conjunction with the attack the 3rd Canadian Division was ordered to cross the Canal and the inundated area on its front, and establish a bridge-head to enable the Engineers to reconstruct the bridges leading to the city.

In the short period available elaborate preparations were made for the support of the attack. The position was eminently suitable for the use of enfilade as well as frontal fire, the general direction of the attack on Mont Houy being parallel to our front, and full advantage of this was taken in arranging the Artillery and Machine Gun barrages.

The application of Heavy Artillery fire was restricted because the enemy had retained many civilians in Valenciennes and the adjoining villages. Strict orders were issued that the city and villages were not to be bombarded, with the exception of a row of houses on the eastern side of the Canal which were occupied by a large number of machine guns. To hinder the good observation which the enemy would otherwise have been able to enjoy from the city and villages, very elaborate arrange-

ments were made to place heavy smoke screens along certain areas.

Despite great difficulties of transport, the supplies of ammunition, bridging material, etc., moved forward were sufficient, and before dawn on November 1st all preparations were completed.

The time for the assault was fixed for 5.15 a.m., November 1st. The plan of attack was as follows:—

“The right Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division (10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General J. M. Ross), south-east of the Canal, was to carry out the attack at zero hour under a co-ordinated barrage in a northerly direction and capture Mont Huoy, Aulnoy, and the high ground south of Valenciennes, and then to exploit the success by pushing on to the high ground east of the city.

“Subsequently, the troops north-west of the Canal (left Brigade)—4th Canadian Division and the 3rd Canadian Division) were to force crossings north of the city and encircle it from that side.”

At 5.15 a.m., November 1st, the attack was launched, and from the first went entirely according to plan on the Canadian Corps front. The enemy barrage dropped quickly and was very heavy, but shortly afterwards slackened down under the influence of our efficient counter-battery fire. In the meantime the attacking Infantry got well away, advancing under a most excellent barrage, and reached their objective, the line of the Valenciennes-Mauberge railway, on time right behind the barrage.

The fighting during the advance was heavy, especially around the houses along the Famars-Valenciennes Road and in Aulnoy.

The thoroughness of the preparations made for this small but important battle is better illustrated by the following striking figures:—

Number of enemy dead buried .. ..	over 800
Prisoners captured .. ..	over 1,300
(exceeding the number of assaulting troops).	

Our casualties (approx.) .. 80 killed and 300 wounded

On the left, the left Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division and the 3rd Canadian Division had, in the meantime, succeeded in crossing the Canal. Bridge-heads were established north of

the city, the station and railway yards were seized, and the Engineers commenced the construction of bridges.

The enemy did not counter-attack against the Canadian Corps during the day, but continued to hold out strongly in the southern outskirts of Valenciennes and Marly, and in the steel works to the south-east until dark. Two counter-attacks against the XXII. Corps front on the right caused some anxiety, but that flank was strengthened and no trouble developed.

During the night the 4th Canadian Division took over an additional Brigade frontage from the 49th Division (XXII. Corps) on the right preparatory to the capture of the high ground east of Marly.

Patrols of the 4th Canadian Division pushed forward during the night and ascertained that the enemy was withdrawing. In the early morning our troops had completely cleared Valenciennes and Marly, and patrols had entered St. Saulve.

The advance was continued in the face of stubborn resistance from enemy rearguards throughout November 2nd on the whole Corps front, and by nightfall had reached the line Marly-St. Saulve-Bas Amaraïs-Raucourt Chateau, all inclusive. On the front of the 3rd Canadian Division the advance was particularly difficult, the country being under water except where railway embankments, slag-heaps, and houses stood up out of the flood and afforded excellent cover for enemy machine gunners and riflemen.

Some stiff fighting took place when the advance was continued on November 3rd, but in spite of this good progress was made, especially on the right on the front of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General V. W. Odum), where the line was advanced 3,000 yards and the village of Estreux captured. Progress on the left was necessarily slower owing to the flooded nature of the ground.

The front of the 3rd Canadian Division had now become very extended, and on the night of the 3rd-4th a portion of it, from Odomez to Fresnes—about a mile in extent—was handed over to the 52nd Division of the VIII. Corps.

On November 4th the line was carried forward about two miles on the front of the 4th Canadian Division. The 3rd Canadian Division was still forcing its way through marsh and water, and made good the Vicq-Thiers railway. On the extreme left of the 3rd Canadian Division a strong point east

of the Canal de l'Escaut was captured and the Escaupont-Quievrechain railway bridge was taken. The village of Onnaing and the western part of Rombies fell into our hands during the day.

During the early hours of November 5th the 3rd Canadian Division entered the town of Vicq, following the capture of two points of local tactical importance west of the town. A large portion of the line of the Escaupont-Quievrechain railway was also made good, and the northern part of Quarouble captured during the day.

The 4th Canadian Division attacked on November 5th, and, clearing Rombies and the southern part of Quarouble, crossed the River Aunelle between Rombies and Marchipont, the enemy fighting very stubbornly to prevent our crossing. By this advance the first troops of the Canadian Corps crossed into Belgian territory, the Aunelle River being the boundary at that point.

The advance was resumed on November 6th and important progress made. The villages of Marchipont, Baisieux, and the southern portion of Quievrechain were taken by the 4th Canadian Division, while the 3rd Canadian Division took the railway station and glassworks at Quievrechain and the northern part of the village, and also captured Crespin further north.

The enemy's resistance was very stubborn. The XXII. Corps on the right were forced to give up a portion of the ground gained and to withdraw to the west bank of Honelle River at Angre, in the face of severe counter-attacks.

The 2nd Canadian Division relieved the 4th Canadian Division during the night 6th-7th, and the latter was withdrawn to rest in the Anzin-Aubry area, just west of Valenciennes.

On our right we were now getting into the heart of the Belgian coal district—a thickly populated area, where the numerous towns and villages, the coal mines, and the commanding slag-heaps complicated the task.

The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions attacked on the morning of the 7th and, although by this time the weather had broken and the country was rapidly becoming thoroughly water-logged, good progress was made during the day, the enemy showing increasing signs of demoralisation.

The 2nd Canadian Division, on the right, cleared the remainder of Baisieux, captured the sugar refinery north-east of that town, the town of Elouges, and the many small settlements

that surrounded it. In conjunction with the 3rd Canadian Division Quiévrain was taken, and an advance of about two and a-half miles made. On the left the 3rd Canadian Division in addition to co-operating with the 2nd Canadian Division in the capture of Quiévrain, pushed along the Mons road for about 4,000 yards and took La Croix and Hensies, north of the road.

The VIII. Corps on our left had still been unable to negotiate the Canal de l'Escaut. In order to better protect our rapidly lengthening left flank the 3rd Canadian Division was ordered to extend its attacks to the north, and, in addition to clearing the country south of the Conde-Mons Canal, to secure the crossings of the Canal.

When the advance was continued on the 8th, the 3rd Canadian Division pushed troops to the north, and by noon had secured the villages of Thievincelle and St. Aybert. Later in the day a foot-bridge was constructed across the Conde-Mons Canal, and under cover of darkness patrols crossed and a bridge-head was established.

Further south the 3rd Canadian Division had surprised the enemy in the villages of Montreuil-sur-Haine and Thulin at an early hour, and these towns were quickly captured. Pushing on from here the village of Hamin was taken, and by nightfall our troops were on the western outskirts of Boussu.

The 2nd Canadian Division met with strong opposition. Good progress was, however, made, and by midnight the important village of Dour and the smaller villages of Bois-de-Boussu, Petit Hornu, Bois-de-Epinois, and a portion of the Bois-de-Leveque were cleared.

Resuming the advance on the 9th, the 2nd Canadian Division captured Warquignies, Champ-des-Sait, Petit Wasmes, Wasmes-Paturages, La Bouverie, Lugies, Frameries, and Genly with little opposition. The advance made by this Division was over four miles through densely populated areas, the twin towns of Wasmes-Paturages combined having a population of about 30,000. By nightfall the 2nd Canadian Division was clear of the main mining district.

The 3rd Canadian Division had on its left front crossed the River Haine during the night, north of Montreuil-sur-Haine, and later secured a further hold on the north bank of

the Conde-Mons Canal near Le Petit Crepin. During the afternoon, further troops were sent across the Canal, and the villages of Petit Crepin, Ville Pommerœuil, Hautrage and Terte were taken. Further west, the patrols which had crossed the Canal on the previous day entered Pommerœuil and Bernissart.

The 3rd Canadian Division had also occupied Boussu, on its right, before daylight on the 9th, and rapid progress eastward was made during the day towards Mons, the villages of Cuesmes, Jemappes, Flenu, Hornu, Wasmes, Quaregnon, Wasmuel and St. Ghislain all being captured. The rapidity of our advance had evidently surprised and disorganised the enemy, although some opposition was met.

By the morning of November 10th, the 52nd Division (VIII. Corps) had advanced and relieved that part of the 3rd Canadian Division operating north of the left boundary of the Canadian Corps.

The 3rd Canadian Division's advance on the 10th brought our troops to the south-western outskirts of Mons, while the 2nd Canadian Division had reached the Mons-Givry Road, outflanking the city from the south, but owing to the large number of civilians still in the city, it was not possible for us to bombard the town. To the north of the Conde-Mons Canal, a further advance was made and the village and Fosse of Ghlin secured.

During the night November 10th-11th the Divisions resumed their advance, and immediately after dark the troops of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General J. A. Clark) commenced to close in. The villages of Nimy and Petit Nimy were quickly captured and an entry into Mons by way of the Railway Station was effected before midnight. By 6.00 a.m. on November 11th the stubborn machine-gun resistance had been broken and the town cleared of the enemy.

The 2nd Canadian Division had, during the night, taken the Bois-le-Haut, a wood crowning a large hill on the south-eastern outskirts of Mons, thus securing the right flank of the 3rd Canadian Division. The capture of this high ground forced upon the enemy a further retirement, and our troops, still pressing on, reached and captured St. Symphorien and Fbg. Barthelmy by 8.00 a.m.

In the meantime, word had been received through First

Army that hostilities would cease at 11.00 a.m. on November 11th, the Armistice having been signed in acceptance of our terms.

To secure a satisfactory line for the defence of Mons, our line was further advanced, and the Bois-d'Havre, Bois-du-Rapois and the town and villages of Havre, Bon Vouloir, La Bruyere, Maisieres, St. Denis and Obourg were captured before hostilities ceased.

Between October 11th and November 11th the Canadian Corps had advanced to a total depth exceeding ninety-one thousand yards (91,000 yards), through a country in which the enemy had destroyed railways, bridges and roads, and flooded large areas to further impede our progress.

To the normal difficulties of moving and supplying a large number of men in a comparatively restricted area were added the necessity of feeding several hundred thousand people, chiefly women and children, left in a starving condition by the enemy. Several deaths by starvation, or through suffering consecutive to privation, were experienced in villages or towns which, being kept under hostile shell fire and defended by machine guns, could not be captured rapidly by our troops.

The fighting was light up to the Canal de l'Escaut, but stiffened perceptibly from there on until the capture of Mons, and added a great deal to the physical exertion caused by such a long advance in adverse weather. The table hereunder shows the average daily advances made by the Canadian Corps in that period:—

<i>From</i>		<i>To</i>		<i>Yards.</i>
Oct. 11	.. ..	Oct. 12	.. ..	4,000
Oct. 12	.. ..	Oct. 17	.. ..	7,000
Oct. 17	.. ..	Oct. 18	.. ..	5,000
Oct. 18	.. ..	Oct. 19	.. ..	12,000
Oct. 19	.. ..	Oct. 20	.. ..	2,500
Oct. 20	.. ..	Oct. 21	.. ..	5,000
Oct. 21	.. ..	Oct. 22	.. ..	6,000
Oct. 22	.. ..	Oct. 23	.. ..	3,000
Oct. 23	.. ..	Oct. 24	.. ..	1,000
Oct. 24	.. ..	Nov. 1	.. ..	3,500*
Nov. 1	.. ..	Nov. 2	.. ..	3,000

\* Held up in front of Valenciennes till after the capture of Mont Houy.

<i>From</i>		<i>To</i>	<i>Yards.</i>
Nov. 2	.. ..	Nov. 3	2,000
Nov. 3	.. ..	Nov. 4	3,000
Nov. 4	.. ..	Nov. 5	1,500
Nov. 5	.. ..	Nov. 6	4,000
Nov. 6	.. ..	Nov. 7	4,000
Nov. 7	.. ..	Nov. 8	3,500
Nov. 8	.. ..	Nov. 9	11,000
Nov. 9	.. ..	Nov. 10	1,500
Nov. 10	.. ..	Nov. 11	9,000
		Total	91,500

When it is recalled that since August 8th the Canadian Corps had fought battles of the first magnitude, having a direct bearing on the general situation, and contributing to an extent difficult to realise to the defeat of the German Armies in the field, this advance under most difficult conditions constitutes a decisive test of the superior energy and power of endurance of our men.

It is befitting that the capture of Mons should close the fighting records of the Canadian Troops, in which every battle they fought is a resplendent page of glory.

The Canadian Corps was deeply appreciative of the honour of having been selected amongst the first for the task of establishing and occupying the bridge-heads east of the Rhine.

A long march of 170 miles under difficult conditions was ahead of them, but they ungrudgingly looked forward to what had always been their ultimate objective—the occupation of German soil.

Between August 8th and November 11th the following had been captured:—

Prisoners	.. ..	31,537
Guns (Heavy and Field)	.. ..	623
Machine Guns	.. ..	2,842
Trench Mortars (Heavy and Light)		336

Over 500 square miles of territory and 228 cities, towns and villages had been liberated, including the cities of Cambrai, Denain, Valenciennes and Mons.

From August 8th to October 11th not less than 47 German Divisions had been engaged and defeated by the Canadian

Corps, that is, nearly a quarter of the total German Forces on the Western Front.

After October 11th the disorganisation of the German Troops on our front was such that it was difficult to determine with exactitude the importance of the elements of many Divisions engaged.

In the performance of these mighty achievements all arms of the Corps have bent their purposeful energy, working one for all and all for one. The dash and magnificent bravery of our incomparable Infantry have at all times been devotedly seconded with great skill and daring by our Machine Gunners, while the Artillery lent them their powerful and never-failing support. The initiative and resourcefulness displayed by the Engineers contributed materially to the depth and rapidity of our advances. The devotion of the Medical personnel has been, as always, worthy of every praise. The Administrative Services, working at all times under very great pressure and adverse conditions, surpassed their usual efficiency. The Chaplain Services, by their continued devotion to the spiritual welfare of the troops and their utter disregard of personal risk, have endeared themselves to the hearts of everyone. The incessant efforts of the Y.M.C.A. and their initiative in bringing comforts right up to the front line in battle were warmly appreciated by all.

I desire to record here my deep appreciation of the services of Brigadier-General N. W. Webber, B.G.G.S., Canadian Corps, and of the generous efforts and untiring zeal of the General Officers, Regimental Officers, the heads of all Arms, Services and Branches, and the members of the various Staffs.

### PART III.

#### Fifth Period. November 12th to December 31st.

Upon the cessation of hostilities and in accordance with the terms of the Armistice the leading troops of the Canadian Corps stood fast on the line reached, and examining posts were placed on all roads.

Generally speaking, the policy adopted was as follows:—

1. Our own troops were not to advance east of the line reached, and our aeroplanes were to keep at a distance of not less than one mile behind that line.

2. No intercourse or fraternisation with the enemy was to be allowed, and he was not to be permitted to approach our lines.

In order to maintain the highest state of efficiency throughout the Corps, I ordered commanders to pay the strictest attention to discipline and smartness, and especially the well-being of their men. All troops not on duty were given every opportunity for rest and recreation.

The general outline of the plan for the advance of the British Armies to the Rhine provided that the Second and Fourth British Armies would advance, and that the Canadian Corps would form part of the Second Army.

The advance was to commence on November 17th and continue for 30 days. The Second Army would advance on a two-Corps front, the Canadian Corps to lead on the right.

It was decided that the Corps would march on a front of two Divisions, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions leading, and the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions following.

At the time of cessation of hostilities the Canadian Corps was disposed as follows:—

Corps Headquarters ..	Valenciennes.
1st Canadian Division ..	Masny-Montigny-Somain area.
2nd Canadian Division ..	In the line on the right south-east of Mons.
3rd Canadian Division ..	In the line on the left and in Mons.
4th Canadian Division ..	Valenciennes-Anzin-St. Vaast area.

In order to concentrate the Corps as far forward as possible prior to commencing the march to the Rhine, the following moves were carried out prior to the night November 15th-16th:—

2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions .. ..	Closed up in the eastern ends of their respective areas.
1st Canadian Division ..	Concentrated in the area Thulin-Boussu-Hornu-Jemappes (west of Mons).

4th Canadian Division	..	Concentrated in the area La Bouverie-Patur- ages-Wasmes (south-west of Mons).
Corps Troops	.. ..	Jemappes area.

The instruction for the carrying out of the advance to the Rhine were issued during this period. The conditions generally were as follows:—

1. The country through which we were to advance was divided into zones, from each of which the enemy was to withdraw on the day before our entry.
2. The advance was to be carried out under active service conditions, and all military precautions against surprise were to be taken. During the march each column was to be covered by an Advanced Guard, and on arrival at destinations, outposts were to be established in accordance with "Field Service Regulations." Troops were to be billeted in sufficient depth to facilitate supply, but adequate forces would be kept ready on 48 hours' notice to overcome any attempted resistance by the enemy should he oppose our advance.
3. The advance would be covered by a Cavalry Screen, one day's march ahead of the leading Infantry.

At 10.00 a.m., November 16th, Headquarters Canadian Corps moved from Valenciennes to Mons, and on the 16th and 17th, the concentration being completed, the troops of the Corps stood fast, completing the final arrangements for the advance.

On November 18th, 1918, the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions commenced the march to the Rhine (See Sketch No. 13), the heads of the columns crossing the outpost line at 9.00 a.m. on that day.

The 2nd Canadian Division advanced on the right and the 1st Canadian Division on the left, each in three columns. Each column found its own close protection, assisted by Cavalry and Cyclists attached from the Corps Troops.

No enemy troops were encountered during the march, and the following line was reached by dusk: Haine St. Pierre-

**Houdeng-Aimeries-Rœulx-Haute Folie-Soignies-Horrues.**

The examining posts and outpost line of the 3rd Canadian Division were relieved and withdrawn as soon as the Advanced Guard of the 1st Canadian Division passed through.

The Corps halted on November 19th and 20th, the 4th Canadian Division closing up into the area south and south-west of Mons, vacated by the 2nd Canadian Division, and the Corps Troops concentrating in and around Jemappes.

The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions resumed the advance on November 21st, the heads of main bodies crossing the outpost line at 9.00 a.m., and the following line was reached by nightfall—Gosselies-Nivelles-Lillois Road.

The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions and Canadian Corps Troops did not move, as was previously intended, owing to supply difficulties.

The Corps stood fast on November 22nd and 23rd, all Units resting and smartening up.

For some time past the question of the demobilisation of the Canadian Corps had been frequently discussed. Having often conferred on this subject, not only with the General Officers and Staffs, but also with the men themselves, I had represented from time to time that there was a strong feeling in the Corps that demobilisation should be carried out by Units.

I now wished, before taking any further step, to ascertain definitely the desires of the Corps. To that end, a conference was held on November 23rd, 1918, at Mons, at which all available Divisional and Brigade Commanders, Heads of Services and Branches, were asked to be present.

The following took part in this conference:—

Maj.-Gen. A. C. Macdonell, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding 1st Canadian Division.

Maj.-Gen. Sir H. E. Burstall, K.C.B., Commanding 2nd Canadian Division.

Brig.-Gen. W. A. Griesbach, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. R. P. Clark, D.S.O., M.C., Commanding 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. G. S. Tuxford, C.B., C.M.G., Commanding 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. G. E. McCuaig, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. T. L. Tremblay, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. A. Ross, D.S.O., Commanding 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. J. A. Clark, D.S.O., Commanding 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. D. C. Draper, D.S.O., Commanding 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. D. M. Ormond, D.S.O., Commanding 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. J. M. Ross, D.S.O., Commanding 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. V. W. Odlum, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Brig.-Gen. J. H. McBrien, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

Colonel A. Macphail, D.S.O., C.R.E., 1st Canadian Division.

Lt.-Col. S. H. Osler, D.S.O., C.R.E., 2nd Canadian Division.

Colonel H. F. H. Hertzberg, D.S.O., M.C., C.R.E., 3rd Canadian Division.

Colonel H. T. Hughes, C.M.G., C.R.E., 4th Canadian Division.

Maj.-Gen. W. B. Lindsay, C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.C.E.

Brig.-Gen. G. J. Farmar, C.B., C.M.G., D.A. and Q.M.G., Canadian Corps.

Brig.-Gen. R. Brutinel, C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C., Canadian Machine Gun Corps.

Lt.-Col. The Hon. C. M. Hore-Ruthven, C.M.G., D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, 3rd Canadian Division.

Lt.-Col. M. C. Festing, D.S.O., G.S.O. 1, Canadian Corps.

The question of demobilization was fully and freely discussed, every individual present being asked to express his definite opinion on the subject.

All present were unanimous in the opinion that from every point of view it was most desirable to demobilise the Corps by Units and not by categories.

As the outcome of this consultation, a letter was sent to the Minister, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, embodying the sentiments of the Canadian Corps.

On November 23rd instructions were received that the Canadian Corps would be composed as under for the purposes of the advance to the Rhine:—

Corps Headquarters.  
1st Canadian Division.  
2nd Canadian Division.  
Corps Troops.

The 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions, with the 8th Army Brigade, C.F.A., and the 126th Army Brigade, R.F.A. (attached to 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions), together with the 1st and 3rd Brigades C.G.A., were transferred to the IV. Corps, Fourth Army. These two Divisions remained billeted in Belgium for the rest of the year.

The general plans for the advance were amended, it being decided that only the Second Army would cross the Rhine and establish bridge-heads. This amendment was made necessary by the difficulty of bringing forward the necessary supplies owing to the thorough destruction of railways and roads in the battle areas, and the immense amount of work required to effect temporary repairs sufficient to take care of the needs of the Army and of the Belgian population.

On November 24th the leading Divisions continued the march without incident, reaching the line Velaine-Sombreffe-Mellery, and Corps Headquarters moved to Gosselies at noon.

On November 25th the march was continued, the leading Divisions halting on the line Namur-Meux-Grand Leez.

The Corps halted on November 26th. The weather, which had continued generally good up to this time, now broke, and the daily rains, coupled with the heavy traffic, greatly damaged the surface of the roads. During the fine weather it had been possible to use side roads to a great extent for the Infantry, reserving the first-class roads for heavy guns and motor transport. All traffic being now compelled to use the first-class

roads, the two Divisions had to move each in two columns for the march on the 25th.

On the 27th each Division again moved forward in two columns. The dirty weather, very muddy roads, and the heavy traffic encountered—accentuated by the overturned lorries left inconveniently by the enemy—made the march that day a real hardship for the men; even the first-class roads were now in a very bad condition.

The general direction of the Corps advance was now changed half right, and the boundaries between Divisions were rearranged so that each would have one first-class road as follows:—

2nd Canadian Division—Namur-Andenne-Chey-Havelange-Maffe-Barvaux-Villers St. Gertrude-Grand Menil-Hebronval-Bovigny-Beho.

1st Canadian Division—Lauze-Solieres-Modave-Hamoir - Werbomont - Basse Bodeux - Grand Halleux-Vielsalm-Petit Thier.

Commencing with the march of November 28th, each Division moved in one column in depth, owing to lack of billeting accommodation in the sparsely inhabited hills of the Ardennes and Eifel. The three Brigade groups of each Division usually moved one day's march apart.

By nightfall on November 27th the leading troops of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had reached Seilles and Coutisse respectively, and on the 28th reached Clavier and Mean respectively.

The difficulties of bringing forward supplies had meanwhile become more and more serious. Railhead was still west of Valenciennes, necessitating a haul of over 100 miles by road to the leading troops, and mention has already been made of the congestion of traffic on the roads. As a result, supplies had been reaching the Units later each day, and the safety margin ordinarily maintained, of one day's rations in hand, had been lost. The climax was reached on November 28th, when the rations for that day were received just as the day's march was commencing—in fact some of the Units of the 1st Canadian Division had already passed the starting-point. As the same situation recurred on the 29th, it was necessary

to cancel the march of the 1st Canadian Division for that day.

The rations of the 2nd Canadian Division were, however, received in time, and the leading troops reached Villers St. Gertrude by nightfall.

By securing extra lorries and utilising the lorries of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps for supply work the situation was improved sufficiently to permit of the continuation of the march on November 30th, the leading troops of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions reaching Ferrieres and Regne by nightfall.

On December 1st the 1st Cavalry Brigade (1st Cavalry Division) came under my orders, and I assumed command of the Cavalry screen on the Canadian Corps front. The 2nd Canadian Division resumed the march that day, the head of the leading troops reaching Beho, and Corps Headquarters moved forward to Vielsalm. The 1st Canadian Division stood fast, owing to the situation as regards supplies being still acute.

The leading troops of the Canadian Corps crossed the German frontier on the morning of December 4th at 9.00 a.m., the 1st Canadian Division at Petit Thier and the 2nd Canadian Division at Beho, with flags flying and bands playing. No advance had been carried out on December 2nd and 3rd, but the marching Divisions had moved forward and concentrated prior to the subsequent crossing of the frontier. I personally entered Germany, with the Divisional Commander of the 1st Canadian Division, at the head of the main body at Petit Thier at noon that day.

The completion of the march to the bridge-head at Cologne was carried out during the subsequent eight days, in weather that was generally very bad, without incident or trouble other than that of supplies. By the night of December 10th the 1st Cavalry Brigade had reached the west bank of the Rhine and posted guards at all the crossings and the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had reached points just west of Cologne and Bonn respectively.

The German people have been well schooled regarding the attitude to be adopted towards conquering troops, and our presence was marked by a quietness approaching indifference on the part of the inhabitants. Whatever apprehensions they may have entertained were quickly set at rest by the exemplary conduct of the men of the Corps.

December 13th was set as the date on which the Allies would cross the Rhine at all points to be occupied, and on the 11th and 12th the leading Divisions concentrated as far forward as possible in their respective areas prior to crossing.

On December 12th, the 1st Cavalry Brigade crossed the Rhine at Bonn, and reached the line Obercassel-Moholz-Sieburg-Altenrath-Rosarth-Lustheide (exclusive), establishing control posts on that line, and on the following morning the Canadian Corps crossed and took their place, while the Cavalry pushed on to take up positions on the perimeter of the bridge-head.

The 1st Canadian Division crossed by the southern bridge at Cologne, the passage being witnessed and the salute taken by General Sir Herbert Plumer, Commanding the Second British Army; and the 2nd Canadian Division crossed by the Bonn Bridge, where I took the salute. The leading troops of the respective Divisions crossed at 9.30 a.m.

The weather was bad, the day being dark, and a steady rain, poured down throughout. In spite of this the spectacle was magnificent. The smart, sturdy Infantry, with bayonets fixed, marching perfectly, with colours flying and bands playing our national airs, was an impressive sight, which did not fail to bring home to the German population the great potential strength of our Army.

On December 14th and 15th the Canadian Corps moved forward and relieved the Cavalry screen on the southern half of the perimeter of the Cologne bridge-head, taking over control of the roads and railways leading into the occupied territory, and being disposed in depth for its defence. I moved my Headquarters to Bonn, the Headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division being at Cologne and those of the 2nd Canadian Division at Bonn.

During the remainder of the year nothing of great moment occurred. The time was employed in preparing the men for the resumption of their duties as citizens. Great stress was laid on the educational work of the Khaki University of Canada and on the professional re-education carried out under arrangements made by General Headquarters. Each Unit found teachers from their own ranks, and lecturers from both Britain and Canada addressed large audiences on varied subjects.

A wholesome interest was fostered and maintained in all forms of sport.

The greatest possible freedom from duty was allowed all ranks, and everything was done to brighten what all hoped would be their last Christmas spent away from Canada.

A. W. CURRIE,

Lieut.-General,

Commanding Canadian Corps.

Joidoigne, Belgium.

15th April, 1919.







**SKETCH**

**Nº 1**

SHOWING SECTORS HELD BY  
**CANADIAN CORPS**  
JAN 1<sup>st</sup> - MAR 24<sup>th</sup> 1918.




SKETCH  
CANADIAN CORPS  
No. 1  
SHOWING SETBACKS MADE BY  
JAN. 1918 - FEB. 24, 1918



SKETCH No.2.  
 SHOWING NORTHERN COAL FIELDS  
 AND COMMUNICATIONS.

COALFIELDS

← THUS





**BRITISH DEFENCES**  
 OF  
**HILL 70, VIMY RIDGE & ARRAS**  
 Previous to March 1918.

**LEGEND**  
 Machine Gun Emplacements  
 Wire Entanglements  
 Main Trench Lines











SKETCH No 5.  
SITUATION OF CANADIAN TROOPS

AT NOON - 30.3.18.


British Front Line - 20.3.18. ---  
" " " 30.3.18. ==




SHEET IV C.  
 SOUTHERN CANADIAN TROOPS  
 IN WOODS, 20.2.18  
 (Scale 1:50,000)



SKETCH N° 6.  
 SITUATION OF CANADIAN TROOPS  
 8. 4. 18.  
 British Front Line 20. 3. 18.   
 " " " 30. 3. 18. 






CAROLINA CO. N.C.


HOLDSVILLE

1900

# SKETCH N<sup>o</sup> 7. SITUATION ON WESTERN FRONT


ALLIED LINE 20-3-18 ----- ALLIED LINE 15-7-18





# SKETCH N° 8

MOVE OF CANADIAN CORPS  
TO AMIENS FRONT




MAP OF CALIFORNIA COAST  
TO AND FROM FRONT  
SHEET NO. 8



# ADVANCES MADE BY CANADIAN CORPS, AMIENS BATTLE.—Aug. 8th to Aug. 17th, 1918.


Area Captured, 67 sq. miles. Greatest Depth Penetrated, 14 miles. Villages Captured, 27. Prisoners, 9,131 (all ranks). Guns, 190. M.G.s & T.M.s, 1,040. Steam Rly. Engines, 11. Pigeon Lofts, 5. Divisions Directly Engaged, 11. Divisions Partially Engaged, 4, or Total 15.





# SKETCH No. 9A.

SHOWING GENERAL SITUATION  
FOLLOWING  
THE ADVANCE TOWARD ROYE







# SKETCH N°10.

ALLIED LINE 15-7-18 ---  
" " " 3-9-18 ■■■■

HINDENBURG DEFENCE SYSTEM  
ATTACKS OF CANADIAN CORPS







# SKETCH. No 11.

ADVANCES MADE BY CANADIAN  
CORPS Aug 26<sup>th</sup> TO Oct. 11<sup>th</sup> 1918.

1 <sup>st</sup> CAN DIV.		51 <sup>st</sup> DIV.	
2 <sup>nd</sup> "		4 <sup>th</sup> "	
3 <sup>rd</sup> "		11 <sup>th</sup> "	
4 <sup>th</sup> "		49 <sup>th</sup> "	
BRITISH PDE			







**SKETCH No 12.**  
**ADVANCES MADE BY THE CANADIAN CORPS**  
 FROM OCT 11<sup>th</sup> 1918 - NOV 11<sup>th</sup> 1918

ADVANCE BY	REFERENCE
1st CAN. DIV.	(diagonal hatching)
2nd CAN. DIV.	(horizontal hatching)
3rd CAN. DIV.	(vertical hatching)
4th CAN. DIV.	(cross-hatching)
56th DIV.	(stippled)



# SKETCH No 13.

