The following are extracts from the official despatches of Field-Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in France, dealing with the battles and other fighting in which the Canadian troops have taken part:—

PRINCESS PATRICIA’S REGIMENT

With regard to these inspections, I may mention in particular the fine appearance presented by the 27th and 28th Divisions, composed principally of battalions which had come from India.

Included in the former Division was the Princess Patricia’s Royal Canadian Regiment. They are a magnificent set of men, and have since done excellent work in the trenches.

Sir John French’s Despatch, February 2nd, 1915.

PRINCESS PATRICIAS’ ATTACK AT ST. ELOI, FEBRUARY 28th, 1915.

On February 28th a successful minor attack was made on the enemy’s trenches near St. Eloi by small parties of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. The attack was divided into three small groups, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Crabbe: No. 1 group under Lieutenant Papineau, No. 2 group under Sergeant Patterson, and No. 3 group under Company Sergeant-Major Lloyd.

The head of the party got within fifteen or twenty yards of the German trench and charged; it was dark at the time (about 5.15 a.m.).

Lieutenant Crabbe, who showed the greatest dash and elan, took his party over everything in the trench until they had gone down it about eighty yards, when they were stopped by a barricade of sandbags and timber. This party, as well as the others, then pulled down the front face of the German parapet. A number of Germans were killed and wounded, and a few prisoners were taken.

The services performed by this distinguished corps have continued to be very valuable since I had occasion to refer to them in my last despatch. They have been most ably organised, trained, and commanded by Lieut.-Colonel F. D. Farquhar, D.S.O., who, I deeply regret to say, was killed while superintending some trench work on March 20th. His loss will be deeply felt.

Sir John French’s Despatch, April 5th, 1915.

PRINCESS PATRICIA’S REGIMENT —ATTACK ON ST. ELOI, MARCH 14th, 1915.

It is satisfactory to be able to record that, though the troops occupying the first line of trenches were at first overwhelmed, they afterwards behaved very gallantly in the counter-attack for the recovery of the lost ground, and the following units earned and received the special commendation of the Army Commander. The 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers, the 2nd Duke of Cornwairs Light Infantry, the 1st Leinster Regiment, the 4th Rifle Brigade, and the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.

Sir John French’s Despatch, April 5th, 1915.

ARRIVAL OF CANADIAN DIVISION— NEUVE CHAPELLE.

On February 15th the Canadian Division began to arrive in this country. I inspected the Division, which was under the command of Lieut.-General

E. A. H. Alderson, C.B., on February 20th.

They presented a splendid and most soldier-like appearance on parade. The men were of good physique, hard, and fit. I judged by what I saw of them that they were well trained, and quite able to take their places in the line of battle.

Since then the Division has thoroughly justified the good opinion I formed of it.

The troops of the Canadian Division were first attached for a few days by brigades for training in the 3rd Corps trenches under Lieut.-General Sir William Pulteney, who gave me such an excellent report of their efficiency that I was able to employ them in the trenches early in March.

During the battle of Neuve Chapelle they held a part of the line allotted to the 1st Army, and although they were not actually engaged in the main attack, they rendered valuable help by keeping the enemy actively employed in front of their trenches

All the soldiers of Canada serving in the army under my command have so far splendidly upheld the traditions of the Empire, and will, I feel sure, prove to be a great source of additional strength to the forces in this country.

Sir John French’s Despatch, April 5th, 1915.

SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES.

It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres, on the evening of April 22nd, referred to in Paragraph 1 of this report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre’s request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the line east of Ypres were posted as follows :—

From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle road, a French division.

Thence, in a south-easterly direction towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in divisional reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in divisional reserve, and the ist Canadian Brigade in army reserve. An infantry brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What followed almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realise what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about fifty guns,

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign, it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east.

In spite of the danger to which they were exposed, the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage; and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences.

They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the Divisions holding the salient and by a Brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy’s attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right, and a new line was formed.

# # #

The 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division, and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy’s hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counterattack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General

Officer Commanding the 2nd Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the 3rd Corps and the ist Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steen-straate and some works south of Lizerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point.

I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about ten o’clock on the morning of the 23rd connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about eight hundred yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserves available for counter-attack until reinforcements which were ordered up from the Second Army were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

# # #

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lest. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the north had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General’s wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to cooperate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy’s artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counterattacks made by the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed two Brigades of the 3rd Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the 2nd Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division, and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy’s advance at all costs, led to a mixing-up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command, which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the south, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire, which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot.

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieut.-General Alderson, organised a powerful counter-attack—on the 24th—with his own Brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his Brigade Staff, parts of battalions from six separate Divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien, it effectually checked the enemy’s further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line.

During the night and the early morning of the 25th the enemy directed a heavy attack against the Division at Broodseiende cross-roads, which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the east and west were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.

On May 15th I moved the Canadian Division into the 1st Corps area and placed them at the disposal of Sir Douglas Haig.

# # #

On May 19th the 7th and 2nd Divisions were drawn out of the line to rest. The 7th Division was relieved by the Canadian Division and the 2nd Division by the 51st (Highland) Division.

Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian and 51st Divisions, together with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, under the command of Lieut.-General Alderson, whom he directed to conduct the operations which had hitherto been carried on by the General Officer Commanding 1st Corps; and he directed the 7th Division to remain in Army Reserve.

During the night of the i9th-2oth a small post of the enemy in front of La Quinque Rue was captured.

During the night of the 20th-2ist the Canadian Division brilliantly carried on the excellent progress made by the 7th Division by seizing several of the enemy’s trenches and pushing forward their whole line several hundred yards. A number of prisoners and some machine-guns were captured.

On the 22nd instant the 51st (Highland) Division was attached to the Indian Corps, and the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps took charge of the operations at La Quinque Rue, Lieut.-General Alderson with the Canadians conducting the operations to the north of that place.

On this day the Canadian Division extended their line slightly to the right and repulsed three very severe hostile counter-attacks.

GIVENCHY.

After the conclusion of the battle of Festubert the troops of the ist Army were engaged in several minor operations. By an attack delivered on the evening of June 15th, after a prolonged bombardment, the 1st Canadian Brigade obtained possession of the German front-line trenches north-east of Givenchy, but were unable to retain them owing to their flanks being too much exposed.

Sir John French’s Despatch, October 15th.