Objective of Aubers and Festubert—Allies’ co-operation—Great French offensive—Terrific bombardment—British support —Endless German fortresses—Shortage of munitions —Probable explanation—Effect of Times disclosures— Outcry in England—Coalition Government—After Ypres—The Canadian advance—Disposition of Canadians—Attack on an Orchard—Canadian Scottish—Sapper Harmon’s exploits—Drawback to drill-book tactics—A Canadian ruse —“Sam Slick”—The Orchard won—Arrival of Second Brigade—The attempt on “Bexhill”—In the German trenches—Strathoona’s Horse—King Edward’s Horse— Cavalry fight on foot—Further attack on “Bexhill”— Redoubt taken—“ Bexhill ” captured^—“ Dig in and hang on ”—Attack on the “ Well ”—Heroic efforts repulsed— General Seely assumes command—A critical moment— Heavy officer casualties—The courage of the cavalry— Major Murray’s good work—Gallantry of Sergt. Morris and Corpl. Pym—Death of Sergt. Hickey—Canadian Division withdrawn—Trench warfare till June.

“In records that defy the tooth of time.”—The Statesman’s Creed.

To many minds the battle of Festubert, sometimes called the battle of Aubers, in which the Canadians played so gallant and glorious a part, represents only a vast conflict which raged for a long period without any definite objective, any clearly defined line of attack, and with no decisive result from which clear conclusions can be drawn.

This unfortunate impression is largely due to the fact that it is impossible at the opening of a great battle for the commander to give any indication of his intentions; that newspaper correspondents are debarred from discussing them; and that the official despatches which reveal the purpose and the plan of a battle, are only issued when the engagement has already passed into history and has been lost sight of among newer feats of arms.

As a matter of fact, the battle of Festubert is, in all its aspects, one of the most clearly defined of the war, notwithstanding the length of time that it covered and the numerous and confused individual and sectional engagements fought along its front. Its aim was clear, and it was a portion of a definite scheme on the part of the Allies. The actual fight is perfectly easy to follow, and the results are important, not only from the military point of view (although in this respect Festubert must be counted a failure), but from the political changes they produced in England—changes designed for the better conduct of the war.

As I have already explained, if we had completely broken the German lines at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, we should have gained the Aubers Ridge, which dominates Lille, the retaking of which would have completely altered the whole aspect of the war on the Western front.

General Joffre had determined on a great offensive movement in Artois, in May, for which purpose he concentrated the most overwhelming artillery force up to this time assembled in the West. It was on a par with the terrific masses of guns with which von Mackensen was, about the same time, blasting his way through Galicia. The French made wonderful progress, and only a few of the defences of Lens, the key of the whole French objective, remained in German hands. But the Germans were pouring reinforcements into the south, and it was then that Sir John French, in conjunction with General Joffre, moved his forces to the attack. This British offensive was designed to hold up the German reinforcements destined for Lens, and at the same time to offer the British a second opportunity for gaining the Aubers Ridge, from which Lille and La Bassee could be dominated. If the British could gain the ridge, which they hoped to secure at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, and if the French could win through to Lens, the Allies would then be in a position to sweep on together towards the city which was their common goal.

The attack on the German positions began on May 9th,1 and continued through several days and nights, and waned, only to be renewed with redoubled fury on May 16th. On May 19th, the 2nd and 7th Divisions, which had suffered very severely, were withdrawn, and their places taken by the Canadian Division and the 51st Highland Division (Territorial). With the share of the battle which fell to the lot of the Canadians I will deal in detail directly.

The British attack failed to clear the way to Lille, which still remains in German hands. With the reasons which resulted in our check at Neuve Chapelle I have already dealt, and it is now necessary to consider the two principal reasons which may be assigned for our second failure to secure the all-important Aubers Ridge.

The first reason is definite and explicable. The second reason is debatable.

At various points along this sector of the front, and on many occasions, the German lines were pierced—pierced but not broken. Again and again the British and Canadian troops took the first, the second, and the third line German trenches. This may have destroyed the mathematical precision of the German line, but it only succeeded in splitting it up into a series of absolutely impregnable fortins. It must be remembered that the Germans fought a defensive battle, and in this they were greatly assisted by the nature of the ground, which was dotted with considerable hummocks, cleft with ravines and indented with chalk pits and quarries, and was, moreover, abundantly furnished .with pitheads, mine-works, mills, farms, and the like, all transformed into miniature fortresses, to approach which was certain death. They had constructed trenches reinforced by concrete-lined galleries, and linked them up with underground tunnels. The battle of the miniature fortresses proved the triumph of the machine gun. The Germans employed the machine gun to an extent which turned even a pig-stye into a Sebastopol. Only overwhelming artillery fire could have shattered this chain of forts, bound by barbed wire and everywhere covered by machine guns.

Our artillery fire was not sufficient to reduce them, and the British attack slowly weakened; and finally the battle died out on the 26th, when Sir John French gave orders for the curtailment of our artillery fire.

This brings me to the second reason which has been assigned for our failure to clear the way to Lille at the battle of Festubert, and that is the debatable one of “shortage of munitions.”

The military correspondent of The Times, who had just returned from the front, affirmed in his journal on May 14th that the first part of the battle of Festubert had failed through lack of “high explosives.”

The English public was profoundly disturbed at the failure of an engagement on which it had set high hopes, and, rightly or wrongly, it fastened on this accusation of The Times as an indictment of the Government at home. Both the Press and the public settled down with a grim tenacity to discover what was wrong. They were alike determined that the British Army in the future should lack nothing which it required to achieve success.

Amid the hubbub to which The Times disclosure gave rise, the undercurrent of the reply of officials at home was never heard, and certainly was never understood. Probably the answer of Lord Kitchener was this : that the requirements of those in command in the field, based on the calculations of the artillery experts there, had been faithfully fulfilled so far as our resources permitted.

In any case, Festubert led us to believe that high explosives must determine the issue of similar battles in the future, and the outcry in England against the “shortage of munitions” produced the crisis from which emerged the Coalition Government.

It may therefore be said that the political effects of Festubert were infinitely greater than its military results. The munitions crisis cleared the political atmosphere and gave England a better understanding of the difficulties of the war and a steadier determination to see it through. It paved the way for the War Committee, and, finally, for the Allies’ Grand Council of War in Paris.

I will now proceed to deal with the battle of Festubert as it concerns the fortunes of the Canadians. The record is a bald one of work in the trenches by our own people. It is couched almost in official phrases, but now and then I have interpolated some personal anecdote which may help to show you what triumph and terror and tragedy lie behind the smooth, impersonal stage directions of this war. . .

After the second battle of Ypres the Canadian Division, worn but not shattered, retired into billets and rested until May 14th, when the Headquarters moved to the southern section of the British line in readiness for new operations. During that time reinforcements had poured in from the Canadian base in England, where were gathered the Dominion troops, whose numbers we owe to the large vision and untiring energy of the Minister of Militia and Defence.

On May 17th the remade infantry brigades advanced towards the firing line once more.

It must be understood that on the afternoon of May 18th, the 3rd Brigade occupied reserve trenches, two companies of the 14th (Royal Montreal) Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Meighen, [Lt.-Colonel Meighen led his troops with capacity and judgment. He had already won distinction at Ypres. In accordance with the English custom of recalling men who have acquired experience in the field for training purposes at home, Colonel Meighen has been sent to Canada, and given charge of the instructional scheme of the Canadian Forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.] and two companies of the 16th (Canadian Scottish), under Lieut.-Colonel (now Brig.-General) Leckie, being ordered to make an immediate advance on La Quinque Rue, north-west of an Orchard which had been placed in a state of defence by the enemy. One company of the 16th Canadian Scottish was to make a-flanking movement on the enemy’s position in the Orchard by way of an old German communicating trench, and this attack was to be made, of course, in conjunction with a frontal one.

Little time was available to make dispositions, and as there was no opportunity to reconnoitre the ground, it was very difficult to determine the proper objective. The flanking company of the 16th Battalion reached its allotted position, but after the advance of the remaining company of that regiment, and the 14th, under very heavy shell fire, the proper direction was not maintained. The. detachments reached part of their objective, but owing to the lack of covering fire it was undesirable at the moment to make an attack on the Orchard. The companies were told to dig themselves in and connect up with the Wiltshire Battalion on their right and the Coldstream Guards on their left. They had then gained 500 yards. Lieut.-Colonel Leckie sent up the other two companies of the 16th to assist in the digging and to relieve the original two companies at daybreak. During the night the companies of the 14th Battalion (Royal Montreal) were also withdrawn, and the trench occupied by these was taken over by stretching out the Coldstream Guards on one flank and the 16th Canadian Scottish on the other.

[Our men were very anxious to get to grips with the enemy on this day (May 18th), as it was the birthday of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, who had issued an order that no prisoners were to be taken. Some idea of the efforts made to incite the enemy’s forces to further outrages against the conventions of war may be gathered from the following paragraph extracted from the Lille War News, an official journal issued to the German troops :— “Comrades, if the enemy were to invade our land, do you think he would leave one stone upon another of our fathers’ houses, our churches, and all the works of a thousand years of love and toil? . . . and if your strong arms did not hold back the English (God damn them I) and the French (God annihilate them I) do you think they would spare your homes and your loved ones? What would these pirates from the Isles do to you if they were to set foot on German soil?”]

On the morning of the 20th orders were issued for an attack on the Orchard that night. A reconnaissance of the position was made by Major Leckie, brother of Lieut.-Colonel Leckie, when patrols were sent out, one of which very neatly managed to escape being cut off by the enemy, and another suffered a few casualties. This showed the Germans were in force, and that an attack on the Orchard would be no light work. That night the Canadian Scottish occupied a deserted house close to the German lines, and succeeded in establishing there two machine guns and a garrison of thirty men. The enemy were evidently not aware that we were in possession of this house, for although they bombarded all the British trenches with great severity throughout the whole of the next day, this little garrison was left untouched. The attacking detachment under Major Rae consisted of two companies of the Canadian Scottish, one commanded by Captain Morison, the other by Major Peck. The attack was to take place at 7.45 p.m., and at the same time the 15th Battalion (48th Highlanders) were directed to make an assault on a position several hundred yards to the right. During that afternoon the Orchard was very heavily bombarded by our artillery, the bombardment increasing in severity up to the delivery of the attack. Promptly to the minute, the guns ceased, and the two companies of the 16th Canadians climbed out of their trenches to advance. At the same instant the two machine guns situated in the advanced post opened on the enemy. As the advance was carried out in broad daylight, the movements were at once seen by the Germans, and immediately a torrent of machine gun, rifle fire, and shrapnel was directed upon our troops. Their steadiness and discipline were remarkable, and were greatly praised by the officers of the Coldstream Guards who were on our left.

When they reached the edge of the Orchard an unexpected obstacle presented itself in the form of a deep ditch, and on the further side a wired hedge. Without hesitation, however, the men plunged through the ditch, in some places up to their necks in water, and made for previously reconnoitred gaps in the hedge. Not many Germans had stayed in the Orchard during the bombardment. The bulk of the garrison, according to the usual German method under artillery fire, had evidently retired to the support trenches in the rear. A few had been left behind to man a machine gun redoubt near to the centre of the Orchard with the idea of holding up our advancing infantry till the enemy, withdrawn during the bombardment, could return in full strength; but these machine guns retreated when the Canadians came. On the far side of the Orchard, however, the Germans, following their system indicated above, came up to contest the position, but the onset of the Canadians forced them to beat a hasty retreat. Although double our numbers, they could not be induced to face a hand-to-hand fight. Three platoons cleared the Orchard, while a fourth platoon, advancing towards the north side, were hampered by a very awkward ditch, which forced them to make a wide detour, so that they did not reach the Orchard until its occupation was complete.

One company did not enter the Orchard, but pushed forward and occupied an abandoned German trench running in a south-westerly direction, to prevent any flank counter-attack being made by the enemy. They then found themselves in a very exposed position, and consequently suffered heavily. The casualties, in proportion to the number of men employed in the attack, were heavy for all engaged, but the position was a very important one, and had twice repulsed assault by other regiments.

Had our advance been less rapid the enemy would no doubt have got back into this position, and our task might have been impossible. They argued, as I have said, that any attack might be held up by the machine guns in the redoubt and in the fortified positions on the flank for long enough to enable them to return to the Orchard after our bombardment had ceased, and then throw us back. The speed with which our assault was carried out altogether checkmated this plan.

The 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) included detachments from the 72nd Seaforths of Vancouver, the 79th Camerons of Winnipeg, the 50th Gordons of Victoria, and the 91st Highlanders of Hamilton; so all Canada, from Lake Ontario to the Pacific Ocean, was represented in the Orchard that night.

It was in the course of the struggle in the Orchard that Sapper Harmon, of the ist Field Company, C.E., performed one of those exploits which have made Canadian arms shine-in this war. He was attached to a party of twelve sappers and fifty infantrymen of the 3rd Canadian Battalion which constructed a barricade of sandbags across the road leading to the Orchard, in the face of heavy fire. Later, this barricade was partially demolished by a shell, and Harmon actually repaired it while under fire from a machine gun only sixty yards away ! Of the party, in whose company Harmon first went out, six of the twelve sappers were wounded, and of the fifty infantrymen six were killed and twenty-four wounded. Later, he remained in the Orchard alone for thirty-six hours constructing tunnels under a hedge, with a view to further operations. Sapper B. W. Harmon is a native of Woodstock, New Brunswick, and a graduate of the University of New Brunswick.

The drawback to drill-book tactics is that if one side does not keep the rules the other suffers. And a citizen army will not keep to the rules. For example, not long after the affair of the Orchard, a Canadian battalion put up a little arrangement with the ever-adaptable Canadian artillery in its rear, The artillery opened heavy fire on a section of German trenches while the battalion made ostentatious parade of fixing bayonets, rigging trench ladders and whistling orders, as a prelude to attack the instant the bombardment should cease. The Germans, who are experts in these matters, promptly retired to their supporting trenches and left the storm to rage in front, ready to rush forward the instant it stopped, to meet the Canadian attack. So far all went perfectly. Our guns were lifted from the front trenches and shelled the supporting trench, in the manner laid down by the best authorities, to prevent the Germans coming up. The Germans none the less came, and crowded into the front trenches. But there was no infantry attack whatever. That deceitful Canadian battalion had not moved. Only the guns shortened range once more, and the full blast of their fire fell on the German front trench, now satisfactorily crowded with men. Next day’s German wireless announced that “a desperate attack had been heavily repulsed,” but the general sense of the enemy was more accurately represented by a “hyphenated” voice that cried out peevishly next evening: “Say, Sam Slick, no dirty tricks to-night." But to resume.

At seven o’clock in the evening of the 20th the 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders) of the 3rd Brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Loomis, advanced across the British trenches, under heavy shell fire and with severe losses, in support of the 16th Battalion Canadian Scottish.

The attack on the Orchard having succeeded, three companies of the 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders) immediately marched forward. As four officers of one company, including the officer commanding, had been severely wounded, the command was taken over by Major Buchanan, the second in command of the regiment.

A fourth company marched to a support trench immediately in the rear. The position was then consolidated, and the 16th Battalion, after its hard work and brilliant triumph, withdrew.

Next afternoon the enemy in their trenches made a demonstration fifty yards north of the Orchard, but our heavy fire soon drove them off the parapets. During the night the disputed ground between the trenches was brightly lighted by the enemy’s flares and enlivened by the rattle of continuous musketry. None the less, our working parties went on with their improvements and left the position in good shape for the 3rd (Toronto) Battalion of the 1st Brigade, which relieved the Royal Highlanders on Saturday.

On the night of May 19th, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade took over some trenches which had recently been captured by the 21st Brigade (British), and also a. section of trenches from the 47th Division. The 8th and ioth Battalions occupied the front-line trenches, the 5th Battalion went into Brigade Reserve, with one company near Festubert, and three companies bivouacked in the vicinity of Willow Road; and the 7th Battalion was posted in Divisional Reserve.

On May 20th, at 7.45 p.m., the 10th Canadian Battalion, under Major Guthrie, who joined the Battalion at Ypres as a lieutenant after the regiment had lost most of its officers, made an attempt to secure a position known as “Bexhill.” This attack was a failure, as no previous reconnaissance had been carried out, and the preliminary bombardment had been quite ineffectual. Moreover, our troops were in full view of the enemy when crossing a gap in the fire trench, and as the only approach to “Bexhill” was through an old communicating trench swept by machine guns, the leading men of the front company were all shot down and the 10th Battalion retired. [The casualties of the 10th Battalion during the fighting in April and May were 809. The casualties at Ypres alone were 600 of all ranks.]

During the night a further reconnaissance of the enemy’s position was carried out and repairs were effected in the gap in the fire trenches, which assured covered communication to all parts of our line.

On the evening of May 21st an artillery bombardment opened under direction of Brigadier-General Burstall, and went on intermittently until 8.30, when our attack was launched. The attacking force consisted of the grenade company of the ist Canadian Brigade and two companies of the ioth Canadian Battalion. This attack was met by overwhelming fire from the “ Bexhill ” redoubt, and our force on the left was practically annihilated by machine guns; indeed, against that steady stream of death no man could advance. On the right the attackers succeeded in reaching the enemy’s trench line running south from “ Bexhill,” and, preceded by bombers, drove the enemy 400 paces down the trench and erected a barricade to hold what they had won. During the night the enemy made several attempts to counterattack, but was successfully repulsed. [Coy. Sergt.-Major G. R. Turner (now Lieutenant), of the 3rd Field Company, Canadian Engineers, who served with courage and coolness throughout the second battle of Ypres, and particularly distinguished himself on the nights of April 22nd and 27th by bringing in wounded under severe artillery and rifle fire, again attracted the attention of his superior officers by his courageous conduct at Festubert. From May 18th to 22nd he was in command of detachments of sappers employed in digging advanced lines of trenches, and generally constructing defences. This work was carried through most efficiently, although under fire from field guns, machine guns, and rifles.]

In our attack, which was only partially successful, Major E. J. Ashton, of Saskatoon, who was slightly wounded in the head on the previous night, refused to leave his command. He was again wounded, and Privates Swan and Walpole tried to get him back to safety, and in so doing Swan was also wounded. During the same night Corporal W. R. Brooks, one of the ioth Battalion snipers, went out from our trench under heavy fire and brought in two men of the 4/7th Camerons who had been lying wounded in the open for three days.

At daybreak of May 22nd the enemy opened a terrific bombardment on the captured trench, which continued without ceasing through the whole day and practically wiped the trench out. [It was during this bombardment that Captain McMeans, Lieut. Smith-Rewse, and Lieut. Passmore were killed, and Lieut. Denison was wounded. The fate of Captain McMeans was particularly regrettable as he had on all occasions borne himself most gallantly. Such was the force of his example that, when he himself, and all the other officers, as well as half the men of the Company, had been killed or wounded, the remainder clung doggedly to the position. The conduct of Captain J. M. Prower also calls for mention. He was wounded, but returned to his command as soon as his wounds were dressed, and though again buried under the parapet, continued to do his duty. He is now Brigade Major of the 2nd Infantry Brigade. On the same day Coy. Sergt.-Major John Hay steadied and most ably controlled the men of his Company after all the officers and 70 men out of the 140 had been put out of action.] After very heavy casualties the southern end of the captured trench was abandoned, and a second barricade was erected across the portion that remained in our hands.

In the afternoon the enemy’s infantry prepared for an attack, but retired after coming under our artillery and machine gun fire. During the night the trenches were taken over by a detachment of British troops and a detachment of the ist Canadian Infantry Brigade, and by 2nd King Edward’s Horse and Strathcona’s Horse. These latter served, of course, as infantry, and it was their first introduction to this war, though Strathcona’s Horse took part in the South African campaign.

The 2nd King Edward’s Horse took over the trench held up to that time by the 8th Battalion. [Casualties of 8th Battalion.—About 90 per cent, of the original officers and men of the 8th Battalion have been casualties. Only three of the original officers of the battalion have escaped wounds or death.] On the right of Strathcona’s Horse were the Post Office Rifles, of the 47th Division; but the Post Office Rifles’ machine guns were manned by the machine gun detachment of the Strathconas.

May 23rd passed without incident, although the enemy threatened an attack upon 2nd King Edward’s Horse, but broke back in the face of a heavy artillery fire searchingly directed by the Canadian artillery brigades. [This was an attack made by the 7th Prussian Army Corps which had been very strongly reinforced. The German efforts to break through the Canadian lines were very determined, and they advanced in masses, which, however, melted away before our fire.]

At 11 p.m. on the night of May 23rd the 5th Canadian Battalion received orders from the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade to take the “Bexhill” salient and redoubt, on which our previous attack had failed. The force detailed for the fresh attack then consisted of two companies of the Battalion, numbering about 500 men, under Major Edgar, together with an additional 100 men furnished by the 7th (British Columbia) Battalion, divided into two parties—fifty to construct bridges before the attack, and fifty to consolidate whatever positions were gained. The bridging party was commanded by Lieut, (now Captain) R. Murdie, and he took his men out at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of May 24th. In bright moonlight, and under machine gun and rifle fire, he managed to throw twelve bridges across a ditch 10 ft. in width and full of water, which lay between our line and the objective of the attack. This party naturally Suffered heavy casualties. The attack itself went over at 2.45, and in it many of the bridging party joined; at the same time the battalion bombers under Lieut. Tozer forced their way up a German communication trench leading to the redoubt. Extremely stiff fighting followed, but in the face of heavy machine gun fire the redoubt was occupied shortly after four in the morning. In addition to the redoubt, the attacking party gained and held 200 yards of trenches to the left of it, and a short piece to the right, driving the Germans out and back with heavy losses.

“Bexhill” proper, however, had still to be taken, and to that end the two companies of the 5th Battalion, which were in reality inadequate to capture so strong a position, were reinforced by a company from the 7th Battalion and a squadron of Strathcona’s Horse. [Casualties of 5th Battalion during Ypres, Festubert, and Givenchy about 60 per cent. Casualties at Festubert alone, 380, all ranks.] With this reinforcement the attack was immediately pressed home, and “Bexhill” and 130 yards of trenches towards the north fell into our hands at 5.49 a.m.

Further progress, however, was impossible owing to the unbreakable positions of the enemy. Forty minutes later, at about 6.30 a.m., further reinforcements were received in the form of a platoon from the 5th Battalion, and with their arrival came orders to “dig in and hang on,” but not to attempt the taking of any more ground. It was about this time that Major Odium, commanding the 7th Battalion, took charge of the 5th, as Colonel Tuxford was ill and Major Edgar had been wounded soon after the launching of the attack. The losses among the officers of Major Edgar’s little force had been terrible. Major Tenaille and Captain Hopkins, who commanded the two companies, were killed, as were also Captains Maikle, Currie, McGee, and Mundell, while Major Thornton, Captain S. J. Anderson, Captain Endicott, Major Morris, Lieut. Quinan, and Lieut. Davis were wounded. Matters were made worse by the fact that Major Powley was wounded just as he came up with his reinforcing company from the 7th. All through the morning the enemy’s artillery was exceedingly active, although the Canadian artillery surrounded our troops, who were holding on in the redoubt, with a saving ring of shrapnel, and, at the same time, distracted the enemy’s guns with accurate fire upon their positions. Canada had good reason to be proud of her gunners that day.

The captured trenches were held all day, but only at great cost, by the forces which had won them; and at night the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Brigade arrived, and took them over.

The total losses of the 2nd Brigade amounted to 55 officers and 980 men.

The hostile shelling was the most severe that the Brigade ever experienced, but the ordeal was borne unshakenly.

On the night of May 24th, at 11.30 p.m., while the troops which had taken “Bexhill” were still hanging on to what they had won, the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Rennie, attacked a machine-gun redoubt known as “The Well,” which was a very strongly fortified position. The attacking force gained a section of trench in the position with fine dash; but to take the redoubt, or to hold their line under the pounding of bombs and the pitiless fire of the machine guns in the redoubt, was more than flesh and blood could accomplish. To remain would have been to die to a man—and win nothing. This heroic attack was repulsed with heavy losses.

On the following day (May 25th) at noon, Brigadier-General Seely, M.P., assumed command of the troops which had won “Bexhill.” General Seely had already endeared himself to the Canadians by his personality, and now he was to win their confidence as a leader in the field. He arrived at a perilous and critical moment, and he at once fastened on the situation with understanding and vigour. He remained in command until noon on May 27th, and through two extremely trying and hazardous days and nights, displayed soldierly qualities and a gift for leadership. Some idea of the severity of the fighting may be gathered from the fact that the losses among officers of General Seely’s Brigade included, Lieut. W. G. Tennant, Strathcona’s Horse, killed; Major D. D. Young, Royal Canadian Dragoons, Major J. A. Hesketh, Strathcona’s Horse, Lieuts. A. D. Cameron, D. C. McDonald, J. A. Sparkes, Strathcona’s Horse, Major C. Harding and Lieuts. C. Brook and R. C. Everett, 2nd King Edward’s Horse, wounded. The casualties in other ranks, killed, wounded, and missing, were also very heavy.

An inspiring feature of the fighting at this particular period was the dash, gallantry, and steadiness of the regiments of horse which, to relieve the terrible pressure of the moment, were called on to serve as infantry, without any fighting experience, and flung into the forefront of a desperate and bloody battle.

It is impossible to record all the acts of heroism performed by officers and men, but the narrative would be incomplete without a few of them.

Major Arthur Cecil Murray, M.P., of 2nd King Edward’s Horse, for instance, distinguished himself by the determined and gallant manner in which he led his squadron, held his ground, and worked at the construction of a parapet under heavy machine gun fire. The considerable advance made on the left of the position was in a large measure due to his efforts. Lieut, (now Captain) J. A. Critchley, of Strathcona’s Horse, armed with bombs, led his men in the assault on an enemy machine gun redoubt with notable spirit. Corporal W. Legge, of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, went out on the night of May 25th and located a German machine gun which had been causing us heavy losses during the day, and so enabled his regiment to silence it with converging fire.

It was on May 25th, too, that Sergeant Morris, of 2nd King Edward’s Horse, accompanied the Brigade grenade company, who were sent to assist the Post Office Rifles of the 47th London Division in an attack on a certain position on the evening of that day.

Morris led the attack down the German communication trench, and all the members of his party, with the exception of himself, were either killed or wounded. He got to a point at the end of the trench and there maintained himself—to use the cold official phrase—by throwing bombs and by the work of his single rifle and bayonet. By fighting single-handed he managed to hold out until the extreme left of the Post Office Rifles came up to his relief.

On the following day, the 26th, Corporal Pym, Royal Canadian Dragoons, exhibited a self-sacrifice and contempt for danger which can seldom have been excelled on any battlefield. Hearing cries for help in English between the British and German lines, which were only sixty yards apart, he resolved to go in search of the sufferer. The space between the lines was swept with incessant rifle and machine gun fire, but Pym crept out and found the man, who had been wounded in both thigh-bones and had been lying there for three days and nights. Pym was unable to move him without causing him pain which he was not in a state to bear. Pym therefore called back to the trench for help, and Sergeant Hollowell, Royal Canadian Dragoons, crept out and joined him, but was shot dead just as he reached Pym and the wounded man.

Pym thereupon crept back across the fire-swept space to see if he could get a stretcher, but having regained the trench he came to the conclusion that the ground was too rough to drag the stretcher across it.

Once more, therefore, he recrossed the deadly space between the trenches, and at last, with the utmost difficulty, brought the wounded man in alive.

Those were days of splendid deeds, and this chapter cannot be closed without recording the most splendid of all—that of Sergeant Hickey, of the 4th Canadian Battalion,1 which won for him the recommendation for the Victoria Cross. Hickey had joined the Battalion at Valcartier from the 36th Peel Regiment, and on May 24th he volunteered to go out and recover two trench mortars belonging to the Battalion which had been abandoned in a ditch the previous day. The excursion promised Hickey certain death, but he seemed to consider that rather an inducement than a deterrent. After perilous adventures under hells of fire he found the mortars and brought them in. But he also found what was of infinitely greater value—the shortest and safest route by which to bring up men from the reserve trenches to the firing line. It was a discovery which saved many lives at a moment when every life was of the greatest value, and time and time again, at the risk of his own as he went back and forth, he guided party after party up to the trenches by this route.

[The 4th Canadian Battalion was under continuous fire at Festubert through ten days and eleven nights. On the morning of May 27th all communication wires between the fire-trench and the Battalion and Brigade Headquarters were cut by enemy fire, and at nine o’clock Pte. (now Lieutenant) W. E. F. Hart volunteered to mend the wires. Hart was with Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) M. J. Colquhoun at the time, and they had together twice been partially buried by shell fire earlier in the morning. Pte. Hart mended eleven breaks in the wires, and re-established communication with both Battalion and Brigade Headquarters. He was at work in the Orchard, under shrapnel, machine-gun, and rifle fire, without any cover, for an hour and thirty minutes. Hart, who is now signalling officer of the 4th Battalion, is a young man, and the owner of a farm near Brantford, Ontario. He has been with the. Battalion since August, 1914.]

Hickey’s devotion to duty had been remarkable throughout, and at Pilckem Ridge, on April 23rd, he had voluntarily run forward in front of the line to assist five wounded comrades. How he survived the shell and rifle fire which the enemy, who had an uninterrupted view of his heroic efforts, did not scruple to turn upon him, it is impossible to say; but he succeeded in dressing the wounds of all the five and conveying them back to cover.

Hickey, who was a cheery and a modest soul, and as brave as any of our brave Canadians, did not live to receive the honour for which he had been recommended. On May 30th a stray bullet hit him in the neck and killed him. And so there went home to the God of Battles a man to whom battle had been joy.

On May 31st the Canadian Division was withdrawn from the territory it had seized from the enemy and moved to the extreme south of the British line. Here the routine of ordinary trench warfare was resumed until the middle of June. [1 The following is Sir John French’s official reason for bringing the battle of Festubert to a close:—“I had now reasons to consider that the battle which was commenced by the ist Army on May 9th and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded with. . . .” “In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched and fortified, and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards.”]