History of New Brunswick

THE surrender of Lord Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown in October 1781 practically brought the war of the American Revolution to an end. There was indeed some fighting in the Southern Colonies after that date, hut no one but the mis-guided King, believed that the Yorktown disaster could be retrieved, aud even the King was forced in the course of a few months, to yield to the logic of events. This dull witted and obstinate monarch had succeeded in the course of a few years, ' 1 reducing his country from the proud position which it occupied under the great Pitt, to a most miserable condition. Having engaged in a quarrel with the colonies which was altogether unnecessary, he had conducted the war in the most unbecile fashion, placing the command of the armies in the hands of court favourites to the neglect of men of ability. The only British General who throughout the war showed energy and ability, was Lord Cornwallis, and he was very far from being a military genius. Howe and Clinton, who held the Chief Command in succession, were total failures, and Sir Guy Carleton, who alone showed any capacity, was neglected and superseded by Burgoyne who led the British army into the surrender at Saratoga, and thus paved the way for France and other European powers to espouse the cause of the rebels.

The fortunes of Great Britain have never been so low as at the time of the surrender of Cornwallis, and during the year that followed it. The nation had met with defeats and losses in every quarter oi the world, except in India. She had lost the command of the seas, and English ships could no longer venture into the Mediterranean. Gibraltar was beseiged by the combined forces of France and Spain, and it seemed as if England herself might he invaded with success. Great Britain had not a single friend in Europe to whom she could look for help or even sympathy. From the beginning of the war France had been secretly assisting the American rebels with arms and money, while all the while professing the greatest friendship for Great Britain. Louis the XVI. who was as dull-witted and deceitful as George the HI., but without his courage, had conceived the idea of destroying the power of England by means of this rebellion in her colonies. This brilliant conception ended *n his blood-stained head being dropped into a basket at the foot of the guillotine a few years later. The dissimulation and dishonesty of this degenerate son of Saint Ixmis had their proper reward. After the surrender at Saratoga, the King of France thought the time had come to throw off the mask and enter into an open alliance with the American rebels. By a treaty made in February 1778, France agreed to give armed support to the Americans and the latter bound themselves never to entertain proposals of peace from Great Britain until theii independence should be acknowledged, and never to conclude a Treaty of peace except with the consent of France. A war with France immediately followed, and from that time until the end of the war, Great Britain had to fight the French as well as her own rebellious subjects. In 1779 Spain entered the lists against Great Britain, and in April of that year, France and Spain concluded a Treaty which had for its principal object the invasion of England, and which also embraced the recovery of Minorca and Gibraltar. The attempt to invade England was actually made in June, but it failed owing to dissentions between the French and Spanish admirals, whose united fleets numbered more than sixty ships of the line. Spain, although foiled .in her invasion project, continued to wage war against Great Britain until the end of the American contest. For nearly four years the fleets of France and Spain besieged Gibraltar, and yet in the end they failed to capture it. The enemies of Great Britain increased in number as the war progressed. The, so called, Armed Neutrality of 1780 which embraced the Northern powers, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia and Holland, was aimed directly at England and was intended to hamper her efforts on the ocean. In the latter part of that year Great Britain declared war against Holland, so that she was now at war with the three leading maritime nations of Continental Europe. The, maintenance of such a struggle imposed a very very severe strain on the resources of the nation, and it was hopeless to expect that America could be conquered while England was fighting a world in arms. The great straits to which she was reduced by having to face so many enemies at once, had an influence on the peace negotiations which was very detrimental to those in America who had stood by the Mother Country during the war. Had it not been for Rodney's great victory over the French fleet in April, 1782, and the overthrow of the Spaniards before Gibraltar, England would have been in a still worse position to conclude a treaty of peace.

The nation was unfortunate in its choice of a commissioner, for Mr. Oswald, the British representative at the peace negotiations, was no match for the men opposed to him. One of the worst effects of his management was in the description of the boundary between the new nation and Nova Scotia, which was of so vague a character that the actual boundary was not settled for more than half a century. Mr. Oswald also gave away the fisheries of the colonies which remained loyal to the Crown, by permitting the fishermen of the Colonies which had become independent to fish in British waters as they had done before the war. But the feature of the treaty for which he was most censured was for consenting to an arrangement by which the Loyalists were not only deprived of any compensation for the losses they had sustained, but exposed to the vengeance of the State Legislatures, which had passed acts of banishment and confiscation against them. All that Oswald obtained by the treaty for the Loyalists was that Congress would recommend to the Legislatures of the States to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights and properties which had been confiscated, belonging to British subjects, and the estates of persons resident in districts in possession of His Majesty's armies who have not home arms against the United. States. Also that there should he no future confiscation on account of the war, and that no person should thereafter suffer loss or damage in his person, liberty or property. Congress made the recommendations mentioned in the Treaty, hut the legislatures of the several states paid no attention to them. No one believed that it was ever intended that they should he carried out in good faith, and Congress sheltered itself behind the plea that it had no authority to control the state legislatures. The same plea has been put forward since to excuse breaches of the law. and of good faith on the part of the States.

As the states would not mitigate the severity of their laws against the Loyalists, and as confiscation of property, banishment and even death were decreed against those who had taken the side of the King, there was nothing for it but that the Loyalists should go into exile. Even if the laws had been modified, in favor of the Loyalists, they would probably have been inoperative, for Whig Committees hail been formed in every town and district, even in Philadelphia itself, the capita) of the Confederation, to harry and distress the Loyalists and drive them out of the country. Sabine, partizan as he is, calls this action on the part of the violent Whigs "a great crime", and he well says, that the people of the United States have paid dearly for it. By that act the Whigs made it impossible that the ambition of the United States to possess the whole continent should ever be realized unless by a war of conquest. The Loyalist, element in Canada will always he strong enough to prevent the annexation of this country to the United States.

The Loyalists had good reason to complain of the manner in which they had been surrendered to their enemies. They truly said that they had stood by the Crown, but the Crown had not stood by them. But allowance must be made for the desperate condition to winch the country had been brought by the policy of this foolish monarch, who was determined to be a King. The loyalists had to be sacrificed or the war continued, and to continue the war, even for a few months, would cost far more than it would to compensate the Loyalists in full for all their losses. Had the war been against a single power, the conduct of the Government in making the peace they did, would have been without excuse, but with all Europe arrayed against Great Britain, a peace on almost any terms appeared to be a necessity.

The great emigration of Loyalists' to Nova Scotia took place from New York. That place was held by Sir Guy Carleton, until late in the year 1783, for the express purpose of enabling the loyalists to be gathered together and shipped beyond the reach of the violent Whigs. Nova Scotia had early been fixed upon as the best place of refuge for the exiled Loyalists, for it had abundance of good land, and its climate was not dissimilar to that of New England. With good management all the Loyalists might have been settled in Nova Scotia, without undergoing great hardships, but as the work was done, it involved a great deal of unnecessary suffering on the part of the exiles. Perhaps an excuse for this may he found in the hope or belief that the articles in the Treaty, in favor of the Loyalists would be respected, and when it was discovered that no regard was being paid to them by the state legislatures, it was too late to make efficient provision for the reception of the Loyalists into Nova Scotia.

The governor of Nova Scotia at this time, was Col. John Parr, an elderly officer of the army, who had seen some service. Winslow describes him as "a man of the most jealous, difficult and impracticable temper," but this, perhaps, is stronger language than the facts warranted. Parr was elderly, he was selfish and he was not a good organizer, so that he was not capable of doing the work that was imposed upon him, and settling 35,000 Loyalists in Nova Scotia, in the course of a few months. Such a task required far more zeal and energy than he possessed, for it was an enormous one, under the most favorable conditions, and rendered doubly difficult by the peculiar circumstances under which it had to be undertaken.

When it became certain that the loyalists would not be permitted to remain in the old colonies, they formed themselves into Associations for the purpose of making arrangements for their removal to Nova Scotia. The first requisite was to obtain land upon which to settle, and exploration committees were* appointed to visit Nova Scotia and ascertain in what localities the Loyalists could best be accommodated. In the Autumn of 1782, Messrs. Amos Botsford, Samuel Cummings, and Frederick Hauser, were sent to Nova Scotia by the New York Loyalists, for the purpose of making settlements. They received full instructions as to the plan they were to follow, and the facts they were to ascertain. Their report is still extant, and it shows that they visited the district about St. Mary's Bay and the lower part of the St. John River. Their report was favorable, and in the Spring as many Loyalists as could get away prepared to take their departure from New York.

The first wave of the vast human tide that was to sweep into Nova Scotia, reached it late in the autumn of 1782. Sir Guy Carleton, who was in command in New York, sent five hundred Loyalists to Annapolis, where they arrived on the 20th of October, in transports. They were followed by five hundred Loyalists from Charleston, who arrived in December in 1782. These poor people were in a very destitute condition and there was some difficulty in providing them with proper shelter. They suffered greatly from the cold, having just come from the South. Their case was like that of many others who afterwards arrived in Nova Scotia, and had to be supported at the public expense. Some of the Loyalists, notwithstanding their losses, had some little means left, white others were wholly destitute, and could do nothing for themselves. The Loyalists embraced many classes, officials who held offices under the Crown in the old Colonies; men who had served as officers or privates in the various Loyalist Corps during the war, and men in civil occupations, who had lived within the British lsles and whose only offence was that they had not become rebels. Among these men, there were, as may be supposed, many degrees of merit with respect to their loyalty, but they had all become obnoxious to the rebels, and were now involved in a common misfortune.

Sir Guy Carleton, who held the command in New York at the close of the war, devoted all his energies to the work of getting the loyalists out of the country. They had every reason to feel grateful to him for his exertions on their behalf, for he was working with very inadequate means, both provisions for their sustenance and transports to carry them away, being difficult to obtain The St. John River early attracted his attention as a suitable place for the settlement of the Loyalists, and the favorable report of Messrs. Botsford, Cunnnings and Hauser, inclined many of them to go there. Yet there were difficulties in the way, ipr all the lands on the lower part of the river below St. Anne's were occupied either by settlers or squatters, or had been granted in large blocks to officers and others many years before. The same difficulty existed in other parts of Nova Scotia, but to a less extent. In April, 1783, a statement was prepared by the governor, showing the extent of the available lands in Nova Scotia. The total area of the province was estimated at 20,000,000 acres, of which 5,410,849 acres had been granted prior to 1773, leaving 20,583,151 unwanted. Of this area, two fifths was estimated to be unfit for cultivation, leaving 12,349,891 acres ungranted that were fit for cultivation. These figures, on their face, did not look so good, but it had to be borne in mind in considering them, that the granted lands included all the valuable marsh lands of the province, nearly all the intervale lands of the St. John and other large rivers, and most of the lands that were easily accessible by water. Under these circumstances it became necessary for the Crow a, by escheat proceedings, to resume possession of these lands which had been granted, where the conditions of the grant had not been complied with. It was only ia this way that land could be obtained for the loyalists.

The first great emigration of Loyalists to the St. John was in the spring of 1783. On the 26th April a large fleet of transports left New York with 7,000 Loyalists bound for various parts of Nova Scotia. Of these, about 3,000, embarked on twenty vessels, were for St. John. The leading ships of the fleet reached their destination on the 10th May and the others speedily followed. They anchored close to the shore in a convenient position to land the people and their effects; some were landed as fast as they arrived. At that time, the peninsula on the east side of the harbour on which the business portion of St. John now stands, was a dense wilderness, covered with cedar trees and bushes. Masses of barren rock were interspersed with swamps and there seemed to be no good soil anywhere. Nothing could be more cheerless than the prospect, and the hearts of the exiles sunk within them as they viewed the scene and contrasted it with the well cultivated country they had left behind them. The government for which they had fought and suffered had undertaken to provide them until the means of beginning life anew in Nova Scotia. They were- to receive grants of land, provisions for one year, allowance of warm clothing, farming implements, medicine, window glass, nails and other articles to enable them to build their houses, and also arms and ammunition. These were liberal arrangements and, if it had been possible to carry them out promptly there would have been no ground for complaint. The first comers fared the best, because they had their choice of the land and a considerable proportion of them were able to go upon their land at once and build themselves houses. Where this was the case the following winter found them well sheltered and comfortable, and in a position to cultivate their land with effect the following year. But all were not so fortunate as this and as the people crowded in, the difficulty of placing them on their lands became greater. In the latter part of .Tune, two thousand more Loyalists arrived at St. John and in September, upwards of three thousand reached St. John from New York, including a large number of provincial regiments, which had served in the war and which were to be disbanded on their arrival. During the year large numbers had arrived at other points in Nova Scotia, many thousands going to Shelburne. On the 4th October, Governor Parr wrote that 20,000 loyalists had arrived in the Province and on the 16th December, he estimated the number at nearly 30,000. A return made out in New York for the information of Sir Guy Carleton and dated October 12th, places the number of loyalists at 29,278, of which 14,102 had gone to St, John. This included 3,396 persons belonging to the British American Regiments, not disbanded, and 384 men who had been previously discharged from the regiments. But at the foot of this return is the statement that it is probable the number who had actually gone, would fall far short of the numbers given. The muster of disbanded troops and other loyalists made a year later showed that there were 9,200 on the St. John River, 1,787 at Passamaquoddy and 850 in the Cumberland district. The total number of Loyalists in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia was 28,347.

The peninsula on the east side of St. John Harbour had been laid out in lots and named Pan-Town, in honor of the governor. The settlers as they arrived drew lots and were supplied each with 500 feet of boards to assist them in building a house. In this way a town was speedily built at St. John, for the people engaged in the work with wonderful industry, but it was soon apparent that it would have been much better if they could have been at once placed on their farms. Any town built at St. John had to depend on the country for its support, and could therefore only be of limited size. It seemed to be forgotten that there would soon be no work for the large population of the town and that the energies of the people were being misdirected. The blame for this must rest on those who, by their dilatory conduct, prevented the settlers from going on their farms. The delay caused a great deal on dissatisfaction among the Loyalists, and another matter became public about this time which was the means of exciting divisions among the loyalists themselves which were not set at rest lor many years to come.

The grants to the Loyalists had been limited in extent, usually 200 acres for each person, which, although sufficient for a man, would not make a large estate. But in .July 1783, Abijah Willard and fifty-four others presented a petition to Sir Guy Carleton, in which they asked for 8,000 acres each, the allowance of a field officer. They put forward this claim on the ground that their position prior to the Revolution had been very respectable, and they had possessed much influence. They desired in fact to be great landlords, and to have the other Loyalists subordinate to them in the capacity oi tenants. Sir Guy Carleton seems to have yielded to their demand at first, for he sent an order to Governor Parr to have the o,000 acre lots surveyed. But a copy of this petition was printed in New York and at once raised a storm. A largely attended meeting of Loyalists was held in Roubelet's tavern to protest against this enormous grant, and a committee was appointed to draw up a memorial to Sir Guy Carleton on the subject. There was equal indignation when the news of this petition reached St. John, for the people already there could feel with even greater intensity than their friends in New York, the injustice of such a demand. The result of the remonstrances addressed to Carleton were, that the petition of fifty-five was refused and they were told that they must be content with one thousand acres each. It ought to be stated to the credit of Governor Parr, that he was opposed to this enormous demand from the first.

Another cause of hard feeling among the Loyalists arose from the manner in which the disbanded Provincial men and officers were disposed of. These men, Laving fought during the wai gallantly, if unsuccessfully, naturally thought that they had a good claim to be well treated in the distribution of land. Nor did they rely altogether on their own merits for they employed agents to look up suitable locations for their expected land grants. Great was their disgust when they learned that the very lands which they had explored in the lower part of the river, were to be given to others, and that the grants of all the provincial regiments were to be above St. Anne's. Lieut.-Col. Stephen De Lancy, who had taken an active part in this matter characterized the arrangement as a notorious forfeiture of the faith of the government. It was carried out nevertheless, and all the disbanded regiments that were settled on the river were placed above St. Anne's with the exception of a few of the 3rd Battalion of De Tjancey's. The indignant Colonel did not then know that the land granted to the Regiments, above St. Anne's, was far more valuable than the land on the lower part of the river, although not so easily reached.

All these circumstances tended to produce ill feeling and dissatisfaction. The improvident grants of the year 1765 and two or three subsequent years, had locked up the land that ought to have been immediately available, and there was a disposition on the part of influential people, not only to hold on to the enormous grants, but to get more land if possible.

Influence was believed to be more potent than merit in the government of Nova Scotia. Governor Parr, of course, did not get credit for his refusal, for it was not known until long afterwards. But he was blamed for whatever went amiss and especially for the delay in locating the grants. It was usual for the St. John people to ascribe their disappointments to the influence of a Council which was composed mainly of men who were natives of New England and who were believed to be disloyal. Joseph Aplin. a lawyer who was afterwards Attorney General of Prince Edward Island, in a letter to Chief Justice Smith of New York describes the difficulties at St. John with a vigorous pen. He had visited the place in the latter part of 1783 and was astonished at what he saw. The settlers had then built 1,500 framed houses and 400 of logs, so that he could scarcely credit his eyes at the sight of such industry. But the people had no legal right to the ground upon which their houses were built, and most of them did not suited to live there but to settle on farms when they could obtain them. Great loss had been incurred by their being compelled to build at the mouth of the river. Policy should have pointed out that the utmost attention should have been paid to the Loyalists, but that had not been the case. The Assembly had lost the confidence of the new settlers, because the bad state of affairs on the St. John arose from its neglect and the delay in granting lands.

These views, which were held by a great majority of the new settlers, soon led to an agitation for the separation of the northern part of Nova Scotia into a separate Province. There was a double motive for this, the general desire of the settlers to be free from the control of Halifax, and the particular interests of a number of leading Loyalists who wished to be employed as officials and who could only obtain offices by the creation of a new province. One of the most active Loyalists, in advocating this measure was Edward Winslow, who was writing on the subject to England, in the latter part ot 1783. It received the support of Sir Guy Carleton. and in the spring of 1784 it was known both in Nova Scotia and in England that a division of the province was likely to take place. On the 7th of July 1784 the Secretary of State wrote to Governor Parr, that the measure, for the division of Nova Scotia had been carried into effect, and that Col. Thomas Carleton had been appointed Captain General. Governor Pari appears to have been in favor of the creation of a new province for in a despatch to the Secretary of State of the 17th of July, he suggests the measure as one that would be likely to make the St. John loyalists more contented. Parr was greatly concerned at the charges which had been made against him, which seemed to reflect on his integrity, but he was informed that they had not prejudiced him in the eyes of the government. Indeed, Governor Parr seems rather to have gained in favor as a result of the attacks made upon him, for he was allowed to continue at the head of the government of Nova Scotia until his death in November 1791.

The commission appointing Col. Carleton Governor of New Brunswick, was issued on 16th. of August, 1784. The Bay of Fundy, the Misseguash River and a line from the source of this river to Baie Verte were the Southern boundaries of the province, so that in territorial extent, New Brunswick was larger than what was left of Nova Scotia. Although inferior in some important respects to the old Province from which it had been separated, New Brunswick had many resources, and ample room for a large population It started upon a new career with but a small body of settlers, living in a country which was as yet a vast wilderness, but its people were energetic and hopeful, they had faith in the future of their chosen land and now, after the lapse of more than a century, their descendants can say that their faith has been amply justified.