War declared between France and England—Acadia invaded fey the French under the command of Duvivier and De Ganne— Efforts to stir up the Acadians to revolt—The expedition withdraws—New expedition by Marin and later by Ramesay—Battle of Grand Pre —Fidelity of the Acadians—Testimonies of Mascarene, etc., etc,—The Compiler—Parkman.

Mascakene’s wise and prudent conduct had produced the happiest results. Not only had he gained the esteem and confidence of all; but lie had in all things established regulations and procedures, which, in his relations with the clergy and the Acadians, ensured harmony and put an end to all the misunderstandings so frequent in Armstrong’s time. On June 28, 1742, he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle:

“The frequent rumors we have had of war being on the point of being declared against France, have not as yet made any alteration in the temper of the Acadians, who appear in a good disposition of keeping to their oath of fidelity, and of submitting to the orders and regulations of this government for maintaining peace.’’

However, he was still very anxious ; he knew that, if the French invaded Nova Scotia, they would not fail to make great efforts to persuade the Acadians to join them. His fort was in ruins; he had only five companies of thirty-one men each, a third of whom were invalids. In his letter of December, 1743, to the Secretary of State, he complained bitterly of his situation:

“The inhabitants are all French Roman Catholics: in case of a rupture with France, it is as much as we can expect if we can keep them from joining with the enemy or being stirred up by them to rebel. To prevent this. I have used the best means I could by making them sensible of the advantage and ease they enjoy under the British Government, whereby to wean them from their old masters, but to do this effectually, a considerable time will be required, this Province in the meantime is in a worse condition for defence than the other American Plantations.”

War was declared on March 15th of the following year (1744). This untoward event was going to submit the fidelity of the Acadians to a hard trial. With a few more years of peace, Mascarene, by following the line of conduct which his tact and benignity dictated to him, would have been able, as he hoped, to give rise to. a solid sentiment of loyalty based on ties of affection and gratitude strong enough to resist all allurements. His methods and his results would have been a safe precedent, from which his successors would not have dared to depart.

France, which had done so little to colonize and preserve Acadia, had never lost the hope of reconquering it; and it is evident, from the documents of French origin, that the authorities' of Canada flattered themselves with the hope that the Acadians would seize on the opportunity about to be offered them of shaking off the English yoke. The course of events will, however, show that the fears of Mascarene and the hopes of the French had no foundation.

If Mascarene had not had time to establish the loyalty of the Acadians on the more lasting basis of affection, this loyalty was none the less really established on the. grounds of interest and of respect for the oath: “Their plea with the French who pressed them to take up arms,” said Mascarene in 1748, when the war had come to an end, was their oath; their living easy under the Government, and their having no complaint to make against it.’’ This was the result of a few years of a just and conciliatory administration.

During four years Acadia was invaded at least four times by the French; Annapolis was besieged three times, always in the hope of taking it with the concurrence of the Acadians, for whom they had brought arms; but they were obliged just so many times to withdraw without this concurrence, and without having made any serious attempt. Every means was tried to overcome the resistance of the Acadians. From flatteries the French passed to threats, and from threats to open force, without shaking their determination, and this happened at Beaubassin as well as at Grand Pre and Annapolis.

The disappointment of the French must have been extreme to induce them to have recourse to such means, since the result could not fail to diminish the sympathy the Acadians must naturally have felt for the French.

After having exhausted all the means of persuasion, Duvivier and de Ganne, who commanded the first expedition, issued the most severe orders:

“We order you to deliver up your arms, ammunitions . . . and those who contravene these orders shall be punished and delivered into the hands of the Indians, as we cannot refuse the demands these savages make for ull those who will not submit themselves.”

Here is one of the replies of the Acadians:

“We, the inhabitants of Mines, Grand Pre, River Canard, Pigi-•init and the surrounding rivers, beg that you will be pleased to consider that while there would be no difficulty, by virtue of the strong force you command, in supplying yourself with the quantity of grain and meat you have ordered, it would be quite impossible for us to furnish you the quantity you demand, or even a smaller, without placing ourselves in great peril.

“We hope, gentlemen, that you will not plunge both ourselves and our families into a state of total loss; and that this consideration will cause you to withdraw your savages and troops from our districts.

“We live under a mild and tranquil Government, and we have all good reason to be faithful to it. We hope therefore, that von will have the goodness not to separate us from it, and that you will grant us the favor not to plunge us into utter misery. This we hope from your goodness, assuring you that we are with much respect.

Your very humble and obedient servants,

Acting for the communities above mentioned, Jacques Le Blanc, Pierre Le Blanc, Francois Le Blanc, Rene X Granger his mark, Claude Le Blanc, Jacques Teriau, Antoine Landry, Joseph X Granger his mark, Pierre Richard, Rene Le. Blanc.

Mines, 14 Oct. 1744.”

“We have remaining,'’ says Murdoch, “as many as twelve orders issued by Duvivier from the French camp, of this nature, commanding theservices of individuals by name—the furnishing horses and men to lead them, the bringing in powder, horns, etc., the swearing allegiance by the deputies and elders, furnishing ladders, pickaxes, shovels, cattle, wheat—baking of bread—to forbid buying arms—the supplying of shirts, furnishing canoes, etc., etc. Disobedience to these, is usually menaced with death, sometimes with corporal punishment. . . I do not know whether we should attribute this to the pride of noblesse, then so predominant, to the harshness of military sentiment at that time, or to personal incapacity on the part of Duvivier; but, from whatever source, I look on it as having been fatal to his cause.”

The hasty retreat of Duvivier can be explained only by the disappointment he must have felt in not being supported by the Acadians. A French squadron was daily expected in Annapolis harbor, and nothing seemed to call for the raising of the siege. This squadron, bearing 75 guns, arrived a few days after his departure. Not finding the troops he had reckoned upon meeting there, unable with his crews alone to reduce the garrison, the commander put out to sea again without having made any attempt. This new hasty departure was as disastrous to the French as had been that of Duvivier, for there came from Boston, four days after this departure, a whole convoy laden with provisions and ammunition for the garrison, which would have unavoidably fallen into the hands of the commander of the French squadron.

Hannay, speaking of the expedition of Duvivier, says: “Duvivier, unsuccessful at Annapolis, returned to Mines, where he proposed to remain for the winter with his soldiers, but the Acadians sent in such a strongly worded remonstrance that he was constrained to withdraw. At Beaubassin he found the people equally averse to his remaining and finally returned to Louisbourg.” -

As soon as war was declared, Mascarene actively employed himself in putting the fort of Annapolis, the only one in the province, ui tit condition to resist a siege. These works were considerable, since the walls had fallen into ruins. For the materials especially, but even for the manual labor, he could count but little on any but the Acadians. Of course in strict justice, they were bound to do this work ; nevertheless the actual doing of it was a great proof of good will. Mascarene had gained such an ascendancy over them that they never made any objection. Writing to Shirley he said: “ The Acadians showed themselves ready, not only to get the timber necessary for that kind of work, but to be employed in the repairs, when, on the 1st of July, the first party of Indians, consisting of about 300, came to interrupt us.”

Later, after the departure of Duvivier, Mascarene resumed the works that had been abandoned and demanded anew the assistance of the Acadians: “I also prevailed witli the deputies of the Acadians of this river,” said he to Shirley, “to furnish the engineer the material requisite for our repairs, which they seemed to undertake and perform cheerfully.”

The fruitless expedition of Duvivier was followed in the succeeding year by that of Captain Marin with the same results.

The moral decadence of France, commenced under Louis XIV., continued and hastened under the regency, was, under Louis XV., about to consummate its degradation and provoke the great catastrophe which would later ruin or regenerate it. This moral degeneracy had its effect on the warlike virtues of the nation, and this war was going to give the measure of the evil. Watchful England was ready to realize this, and to take upon itself, a few years later, the task of completing the humiliation of a too restless rival, by overthrowing its prestige and depriving it of what might yet re-establish its strength and its renown.

England’s apprehensions were greatly relieved when it became evident that the Duke D’Anville’s powerful fleet, dispersed by storms, weakened and demoralized by death, sickness and dissensions, was no longer to be dreaded.

De Ramesay, who had waited under the walls of Annapolis for the co-operation of this fleet, was obliged to withdraw upon Mines and soon after on Beaubassin.

Here comes the only glorious feat of arms for France in this part of the country, and it was accomplished by the Canadians whom de Ramesay commanded. While this officer was at Beaubassin, Mascarene, after having revictualled Annapolis, stationed in the district of Mines a detachment of 470 men commanded by Colonel Noble of Massachusetts. This armed body were billeted for the time being at the village of Grand P re in the houses of the Acadians. De Ramesay conceived the daring project of traversing on snowshoes the long distance that separated him from Grand Pres, and of surprising during the night the troops stationed there; a raid which, though it won renown for the Canadians, produced no practical result.

We have seen, from divers extracts, what was the attitude of the Acadians during these four years of repeated invasion by the French troops; let us now listen to other testimonies gleaned from the correspondence of Governor Mascarene himself.

At different times he bears witness that, during the intervals between these successive expeditions, the Acadians came to inform him of the movements of the French and to work at putting the foundations in a tit state to withstand their attacks.

To Governor Philipps, on June 9th 1744, he writes: “I have done all in my power to keep the Acadians in their fidelity who promise fair and as yet assist us in repairing our breaches.”

To the Lords of Trade on the same date: “These latter (the Acadians) have given me assurances of their resolution to keep in their fidelity to His Majesty, which they seem to justify in having hitherto given us their assistance in the works going on for the repairs of this Fort, which according to my former representations of the nature of these inhabitants is the utmost we can expect from them.”

To the Secretary of War, July 3rd 1744: “The Acadians of this river have kept hitherto in their fidelity, and no ways joined with the enemy, who has killed most of their cattle, and the priest residing amongst them has behaved also as an honest man, though none of them dare come to us at present. They helped in the repairing of our works to the very day preceding the attack.”

To Governor Shirley, July 38th 1744: “The Acadians, as soon as the Indians withdrew from us, brought us provisions and continue to testify their resolution to keep to their fidelity as long as we keep this fort. Two deputies arrived yesterday from Mines, who have brought me a paper containing an association signed Irg most of the inhabitants of that place to prevent cattle being transported to the French, according to the prohibition sent them from hence. These Acadians are certainly in a very perillous situation. Those who pretend to be their friends and old masters having let loose a parcel of banditti to plunder them, whilst on the other hand they see themselves threatened with ruin and destruction if they failed in their allegiance to the British Government.”

To King Gould, on the same date: “The Acadians still keep in their fidelity and have not anyways joined with the enemy, but we have lost their assistance in the repairing of our works, they being in dread of the Indians.’’

To-Dec. 1744 : “To the timely succour received from the

Governor of Massachusetts, and our French inhabitants refusing to take up arms against us ice owe our preservation. If the Acadians had taken up arms they might have brought three or four thousand men against us.”

To dear Ladevese,-1747, at the close of the war: “The great french Armada under Duke D'Anville which would have swallowed us up, was by God’s Providence, weakened and shattered by sickness and storms. . . In these several struggles I used our Acadians with so much mildness, administered justice so impartially and employed all the skill 1 was master of in managing: them to so good purpose, that, though the enemy brought near two thousand men in arms in the midst of them, and used all the means of cajoling and threatening to make them fake up arms, having brought spare ones for that end, they could not prevail upon above twenty to join them.''

To the Duke of Bedford. June 15th 1748, after the war: ‘‘The repeated attempts of the enemy on Nova Scotia have not had the success they expected; and, notwithstanding the means they have used to entice or force into open rebellion the Acadians, who are all of french extraction and papists, they have not been able to prevail except upon a few of them; and, after having entered this province three different times, with forces far superior to what could be opposed to them, they were at last obliged to retire to Quebec."

Two months later, in August, 1748, Mascarene ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Gorham “to proceed to Mines to pay the Acadians for provisions and other necessaries, also for labor and losses incurred by them for houses burnt and fences destroyed to the value of over ten thousand pounds.”

I would have the reader remark, in passing, that none of the letters quoted above are found in the volume of the archives except two, which are the least important. I would also have him remark that, from July 4, 1740 to October 27,1745, this volume contains forty-three documents of divers kinds, while it contains not a single one from October, 1745 to April, 1748.

Why, one naturally asks, this accumulation of forty-three documents within the four years before the war and nothing within the three years during the war, that is, during the most important period? The reason is not far to seek; it is always the same: suppression is so plainly a set plan that one only need open his eyes to detect it. Before the war Mascarene entertained doubts of the fidelity of the Acadians and gave utterance to them; in the first years of his administration he had discussions by letter with the priests before inducing them to accept his regulations concerning themselves and concerning the Acadians. These documents also contained remarks favorable to the Acadians, which the Compiler could not easily separate: he has allowed a few of them to pass. But, to include the documents of the period of the war, was to make known to the public that the Acadians had been faithful to their oath in the most perplexing of situations. Therefore, these documents must not be included. So manifest is this set purpose of his, that, in spite of this gap of three years he found means, before creating the gap, to insert in a note a letter of M. de Beauhamois to the minister at Paris, in which this gentleman expressed the hopes he entertained that, the French would be supported by the Acadians. This document is, clearly, foreign to the archives, but the Compiler, however shortsighted he may sometimes be, has found means to ferret out this one somewhere. Nevertheless, this document had no real importance. Hopes! why, every one has them; M. de Beauharnois was welcome to have his; he was quite free to believe that the Acadians would take up arms against the English. But the real facts were far more important, and they were to be found in the documents of which the Compiler has deprived us just in the very place where he has created a gaping void. History is based on facts, not on the vague hopes of this or that individual.

Both the fears of the English and the hopes of the French had, therefore, no serious foundation, as the above citations abundantly prove. This war had submitted the fidelity of the Acadians to a hard trial, such as ought to give the exact measure of what might be hoped from them under equitable treatment. “When we consider these matters,” says Murdoch, summing up the events of this war, " we see more clearly how it was that the little army from Louisbourg, wliile it was largely reinforced by the Miemac warriors, who had always been taught to believe that the French king had not ceded their territorial rights, received no effective aid from the Acadians. Although there were always a portion of the inhabitants of Beaubassin positively disaffected to English rule, iu the other settlements of Cobequid, Pigiquit, Grand Pro, River Canard, as well on the Annapolis river, there were very few persons who were even suspected of willingly aiding the invasion, and Duvivier received as little support from the Acadians after he crossed the Avon, as Prince Charles Stewart did in the next year after crossing the Tweed.” Mascarene had notified the Acadians that their neutrality did not relieve them from the duty of instructing him with the movements of the French whenever they could; as a result, the latter never moved to another place without having previously guarded the roads, to prevent them from communicating with the English.

It is undoubtedly true, as Mascarene says, that the French had “a few sympathizers amongst them.” He fixes the number at about twenty. This account seems to me exact, considering that it fairly tallies with French reports. Twelve of these sympathizers were arrested upon the denunciations of Acadians. However, it should be carefully noted that no Acadians were arrested for having taken up arms, but only for having advised and assisted the enemy, or for having neglected to give information to the authorities when they were able to do so. The names of those twelve persons are: Louis Gauthier and his two sons, Armand Bugeaud, Joseph Ledlane dit Le Maigre, Charles and Francois Raymond, Charles and Philippe Leroy, Joseph Brassard,

Pierre Guediy (half-bred) and Louis Hebert, former servant to Captain Handheld. Some were condemned; others were released, their explanations having been judged satisfactory.

The wonder is, not that twenty persons thus lent assistance to the enemy, but rather that there were not more, as this war lasted four years, and the province was invaded so many times. There must necessarily have been officious persons giving information to one side or the other. To suppose the contrary would be to be totally ignorant of human nature. The French reports show us that there often came to them soldiers who had escaped from the Annapolis garrison. These deserters informed them of the situation of the English. Such isolated facts belong to all times and places, and no unfavorable conclusion can reasonably be drawn therefrom.

It is useless to insist on this point; the fact remains established, that the Acadians, in this juncture, the most difficult in their history, superabundantly proved the great esteem in which they held their oath of fidelity. “Their plea with the French who pressed them to take up arms, was their oath," said Mascarene. Besides, these facts are not disputed, except by Parkman who dissents only by implication, by making use of expressions that give quite a different impression. This writer, who, in his work “Montcalm and Wolfe,” devotes only three pages to the account of the events that occurred from 1710 to 1749, sums up m three lines the events of the war of which we have just sketched the most important phases: “This,” he says, “restored comparative quiet till the war of 1745, when some of the Acadians remained neutral, while some took arms against the English, and many others aided the enemy with information and supplies.” This sentence, apparently simple and candid, is distinctly insidious and dishonest: latet anguis in herba. It specifies nothing ; but, through crafty insinuation, it leaves the reader under the impression that alxmt one third of the Acadians remained neutral, that another third took np arms, and that the remaining third aided the enemy in different ways. This trick is a great favorite of his; I could quote several examples of it without even going outside this subject. A dodge of this kind might be considered, in common parlance, smart; some people might admire it in a lawyer or a politician driven into a corner; but there is question here of history, the master quality of which is impartiality. However, no Acadian, so far as A know, was ever accused of having taken up arms during this war.

In presence of this fidelity, preserved in spite of all sorts of seductions and threats, what becomes of Paik-man’s accusation that “the influence of the priests was always directed to alienating the Acadians from their allegiance?” an accusation which he repeats in every key and in the most positive terms. If the people remained faithful, then the priests had not the influence which he attributes to them, when he tells us that the Acadians had no will of their own, that they were the docile instruments of these priests. Either these priests, having the great influence which Parkman attributes to them, exercised it in instilling fidelity to the oath, or the Acadians had the firmness and independence necessary to resist them. Surely, the Acadians needed a strong dose of firmness to resist the solicitations and threats of the French, especially if, as Parkman avers, they had likewise to resist those of their priests, pressing them in the same direction.

Parkman, in order to prove brilliantly his theory of the debilitating action of the clergy, had to suppose, firstly, a great influence of this clergy, secondly, a continual exercise of this influence, and, in order to draw conclusions from his theory, true in itself, if taken in the abstract, false or exaggerated in the concrete reality, he had to infer that the Acadians had lost all initiative, all will, all energy; in a word, to make of them, as he does, men who could hardly stand up alone. That was giving free rein to his fancy, and if the conclusions do logically follow from the premises, these latter rested only on one crutch, 'stane pede in uno.

Although I sometimes pass judgment on the character of individuals, I have no inclination to do so in the case of a nation; it is so easy, in such matters, to be too absolute. However, I will venture one such judgment on the Acadians, and it will bear on a defect in their character, and one directly opposed to what Parkman blames in them, namely: “that they wrere weak of purpose.” The most characteristic fault of the Acadians is to be extremely headstrong. Even to this day, in the province of Quebec, when people wish to express in a striking phrase any one’s obstinacy, they say: “He has the head of an Acadian,” which is tantamount to saying: “He has the stubbornness of a mule.” Firmness is a beautiful quality; but stubbornness, which is its first cousin, is a grave defect, and it is the besetting sin of the Acadians. Rut Parkman, who beats the air at random, without seeing anything else than his theory, has, as might have been expected, bit upon the opposite defect. Men rarely make a bull’s eye when they lire with their eyes shut. Was this defect acquired by the Acadians in their struggles on the question of the oath, or was it in them before that? I know not. If Parkman, instead of theorizing in a vacuum, had made a more careful study of their history, he would have become convinced of this fact, which is too evident to escape observation.

The efforts of the French to engage the Acadians to violate their oath of fidelity, merit, in all respects, severe condemnation, and these efforts were continual from the beginning of this war until the taking of Beausejour by the English-. True, with the help of the Acadians, Annapolis would have been taken; but the definitive conquest of Acadia would not have been thereby decided. Even had the taking of Annapolis meant the conquest of Acadia, the French were none the less in honor bound not to urge the Acadians to swerve from duty, and not thus to expose them to the direst calamities. Their lot, till then, had been as favorable as they could have hoped it to be under a military administration, with the intense prejudices that then prevailed. France, for a whole century, had done nothing to people Acadia and to make of it a self-protecting province; she had done nothing to preserve and support it in the moment of danger. If, at the eleventh hour, she wished to repair the errors of her past, she must first reconquer the country with her own troops, and then protect her conquest effectually.

I am convinced that the conduct of France towards the Acadians during this war caused her to lose their sympathy, which she had been able to retain up till that time. If England, 01 rather her representatives, had understood the Acadian character, if they had trusted them and made the most of their faithfulness, we should not have to deplore the misfortunes that ensued. At any rate, these incessant attempts to seduce them, far from being prejudicial to them, should have been an additional proof of their fidelity, a certain pledge for the future. At the same time, their conduct, interpreted with kindliness, should have become for the English authorities an earnest of lasting friendship and practical gratitude: for, as Mascarene said, "without the neutrality of the Acadians, the province would have been lost;” it would likewise have been lost, if they had emigrated to the French possessions of Cape Breton, for then they would have been soldiers of France in the war. But gratitude is a rara avis.