Lawrence becomes
Lieutenant-Governor—His accusations against the Acadians—Project of
expulsion—The Lords of Trade.
My aim has been to pick
out by preference and relate the facts supposed to tell against the
Acadians, as they are to be found in the volume of the Archives. This I
have faithfully done hitherto and will continue to do. The following
letter from Lawrence to the Lords of Trade, dated August 1st, 1754, is
clearly the document that contains the gravest accusations against them.
I produce it almost entire despite its length :
“Your Lordships well
know, that the Acadians have always affected a neutrality, and as it has
been generally imagined here, that the mildness of an English Government
would by degrees have fixed them in our interest, no violent measures
have ever been taken with them. But I must observe to Your Lordships,
that this lenity has not had the least good effect; on the contrary, I
believe they have at present laid aside all thought of taking the oath
voluntarily, and great numbers of them are at present gone to Beausejour
to work for the French, in order to dyke out the water at the settlement
I informed Your Lordships they were going to make on the north side of
the Bay of Fundy, notwithstanding they were refused passes which they
applied for to go thither. And upon their complaining that they could
get no employment with the English, they were acquainted that as many as
would come to Halifax should be employed, tho' in reality, I had no
employment for them, but I proposed to order them to widen the road to
Shubenecadie, as I very well knew if I could get them once here, it
would put off their journey to Beausejnur, and would be no expense to
the Government, as T was sure they would refuse the work for fear of
disobliging the Indians. But, as they did not come. I have issued a
Proclamation, ordering them to return forthwith to their lands, as they
should answer the contrary to their peril.
“They have not for a
long time brought anything to our markets, but on the other hand have
carried everything to the French and Indians whom they have always
assisted with provisions, quarters and intelligence, and, indeed, while
they remain without taking the oath to His Majesty—which they never will
do till they are forced—and have incendiary French priests among them,
there are no hopes of their amendment.
“they possess the best
and largest tracts of land in this Province, it cannot be settled with
any effect while they remain in this situation, and, though I would be
wry far from attempting such a step without Your Lordships' approbation,
yet 1 cannot help being of opinion that it would be much better, if they
refuse the oath, that they were away."
Why this change of tone
from the pressing invitation to return which he sent to the emigrated
Acadians a few weeks ago? The reason is very plain: Lawrence had just
made up his mind to deport the Acadians, nor does he scruple to let his
intention he known. Up to this time he had been only president of the
Council awaiting Hopson’s return. Now he must be aware that Hopson is
not to return and that his own appointment as lieutenant-governor is
sure; it was, indeed, officially announced a few weeks later.
The better to prepare
the Lords of Trade for his perfidious designs, he had to depict the
conduct of the Acadians in the most sombre colors. The above letter is
tlie result of his efforts in that direction. As the correspondence and
the official acts of the governors for the past four years did not hint
at the slightest infringement of orders throughout the entire
peninsula,, it behooved Lawrence to pave the way for specific
allegations by general complaints, so that his change of tone might seem
to be supported by facts. This is the only explanation that can be
offered of the general accusations contained in the above letter, which
are either false or greatly exaggerated.
My purpose being to
reply to each and every one of Lawrence’s accusations, I now take up
those which are contained in the foregoing letter. He accuses the
Acadians of intercourse with the French and of having assisted the
latter by selling them their produce. This must have been true in
Mascarene’s time, and before, when there was only one fort at the
extremity of the province, and when there was practically no protection
of the frontier line. But no government has a right to complain of such
infractions, when it neglects the necessary precautions against them.
Experience proves that, when breaches of a law are easy and
unaccompanied by risk of punishment, the most virtuous and loyal people
will wink at them. Loyalty and obedience offer no remedy to the greed of
gain. Surely, the Acadians would need to have been endowed with
superhuman perfection, if they had not sometimes taken advantage of a
situation that enabled them to do a good stroke of business without let
or hindrance. Moreover, Mascarene never complained of these business
relations with the French in time of peace; on the contrary, iu one of
his letters he very wisely remarks that this traffic should be ignored,
because the Annapolis garrison could not consume all the produce of the
farmers, and therefore, to stop that traffic was to paralyze farming
interests; besides, he adds, it is a source of profit to everybody
because it brings into the country French money, which otherwise would
go to Canada or elsewhere. When war broke out in 1744, the Acadians, as
we have seen, whether at the Governor’s suggestion or perhaps of their
own accord, formed an association to prevent all such business
relations. They themselves undertook police duty for the Government
against their fellow-countrymen, and, after the war, those of them who
were suspected of infringing the prohibitory decree were arrested on
complaint of the members of this association. The most loyal of subjects
could have (lone no more and would have been justified in doing less.
Since the foundation of
Halifax and the building of forts at Grand Pre, Pigiguit and Beaubassin,
the English Government had the means of preventing all commercial or
other relations between the French and the Acadians; and, in point of
fact, such misdemeanors in this line as eluded the vigilance of the
English must have been few and far between, as the Archives do not
mention one single complaint before the courts. Had there been any
complaints, Lawrence would not have been slow to order an investigation
and severely to punish the guilty.
Granting, however, that
there may have been some breaches of law on this score, they would be
but the veriest trifles, occurring in all times and places and among all
nations, subject to the cognizance of law-courts, and at any rate quite
too unimportant to figure as an argument in a tragic event like the
deportation.
“They have not for a
long time brought anything to our markets,” was Lawrence’s perfidious
assertion, I say perfidious, because he wrote these words to the Lords
of Trade on the 1st of August. At that date it could not well be
otherwise : the preceding harvest must have been sold or consumed long
before, and the coming harvest was still standing. Probably Lawrence’s
implied accusation had no other ground than this ; but this was a
plausible ground for a man that was on the look-out for pretexts to make
his point. He relied upon the Lords of Trade not noticing that the
beginning of August was a date far removed from the usual time for the
sale of last year’s crops. There were also other local conditions which
would no doubt escape their notice. For instance, it cannot be supposed
that the Acadians went one by one to sell their produce at Halifax,
which was so far off. and the road to which was almost impassable on
foot. They must have employed agents to carry their produce by water.
Now the only commercial agents in Acadian centres were English: Blin,
Donnell, Winniet, Jr., at Annapolis; Rogers at Cobequid; Arbuckle at
Fort Lawrence; Dyson and Manger at Pigiguit and Grand Pre. Mauger had
another store at Halifax, and, if I mistake not, Blin, Donnell and
Winniet had other stores either at Grand Pre or Fort Lawrence. To these
men, therefore, must the Acadians have sold their produce, and through
them must all purchases have been made. As in Lawrence’s mind the
smallest things easily usurped the proportions of great ones, or took
their place when the latter could not be found, he has taken the trouble
to enter the following item in his official papers: “Their desiring— the
Acadians—to sell their grain to Mr. Dyson and refusing it to Mr. Mauger
for the same money appears very extraordinary.”
While the public
documents do not contain, to the best of my knowledge, one single
specific case of commercial relations between the Acadians and the
French, attributed by name to one in particular or to several
collectively, they do contain many cases of business transactions
between the French and some English merchants, particularly Arbuckle and
that very Mauger whom Lawrence seems to have taken under his protection.
And as to general charges against Englishmen, many will be found at
pages 630, 638, 640 of the Archives. I will quote one only. Writing to
the Lords of Trade, November 27th, 1750, Cornwallis said: “lam assured
the New England people have this year carried numbers of dollars to
Louisburg. . . . They supply Louisburg with every necessary, and the
advantage upon this traffic is so great, that they go sooner there than
to this Port.” I am almost ashamed to have to weary the reader with
these trifles ; but, as the deportation has no more solid basis than
these, and as its justifiableness must stand or fall with the
accusations of its author, I am forced to discuss these childish charges
with becoming gravity.
In the letter of August
1st, 1754, Lawrence speaks but tentatively and hesitatingly as yet of
his deporting plan, though this is clearly what he means in spite of the
care with which he veils his design. He is content with humbly
submitting to the Lords of Trade his opinion that, if the Acadians, who
have the finest farms of the province, refuse to take the oath, “it
would le much better that they were away, though” he would be very far
from attempting such a .step without” their “Lordships' approbation.”
Doubtless the deportation is already-decided upon; the means thereto and
the date alone remain to be settled. Lawrence's only concern now is to
prepare the Lords of Trade for au approval of the deed beforehand, if
possible, or for an acceptance of accomplished facts which is to be
wrung from them by dint of misrepresentations. This letter is the first
step in the course he has already planned. He cannot hope to bring the
Lords of Trade to approve so cruel a measure as deportation would be so,
as yet, he confines himself to an indefinite suggestion: “it would be
better that they were away;’’ and he submits his will to theirs with the
most humble deference: “I would be very far from attempting such a step
without Your Lordships'’ approbation. For the time being he intends
merely to predispose them against the Acadians. By a skilful renewal of
the dose he hopes to bring them gradually round to his way of thinking.
Besides, has he not full power in his own hands? Can he not, by
continued severity, provoke the Acadians to some acts that will justify
on his part an increase of rigor?
When Lawrence wrote
that the Acadians had better be away, his real intention cannot have
been to let them join the French at Beausjour, since he had, precisely
at that time, issued a proclamation obliging, under severe penalties,
those who had just left the country to return immediately. He knew of
the pressing and reiterated instructions of the Lords of Trade to his
predecessors, and to himself a few’ months ago, urging the governors to
avoid whatever might, by alarming the Acadians, lead to their departure.
The consequences of their voluntary departure must have seemed to him
too disastrous, or at any rate too threatening, to be thought of for a
moment. No; what he had in view was, manifestly, a forced departure to
places chosen by himself, that is to say, a deportation such as he
accomplished twelve months later.
For the past four years
at least the only act of disobedience specified in the volume of the
Archives is mentioned by Lawrence in the letter I am now reviewing.
Three hundred Acadians had gone off to Beausejour, as he tells us, to
assist their emigrated countrymen in the work of dike-building. Had they
or had they not left with the intention of returning no more? It would
be hard to say. What we know, through Lawrence himself, is that they
asked leave to go and were refused. Nor should we forget that, five
years before, Cornwallis, driven to his wits’ end, had promised
passports, as soon as the state of the country would allow, to all who
might wish to quit the province. If the three hundred intended not to
return, then, with or without passports, it was high time to take
advantage of the promises of Cornwallis, whether these were sincere or
not. If, on the other hand, those absentees had left with a mind to come
back, then Lawrence might be justified in taking proper measures to
enforce their return and even to punish their disobedience. Very likely
some of them had left for good, while others intended to decide at
Beausejour whether or not they would return. Lawrence’s increasing
severity was already making people anxious, as this unauthorized
departure shows.
The season for the
building of dikes was a very short one, and tlie present undertaking at
Beausejour was the first serious attempt to secure farms for those who
had emigrated in Cornwallis's time. These refugees were the relatives,
the brothers of the Acadians, who naturally wished to assist them in a
labor that promised to lift them out of poverty and furnish food for
their families. The helpers who had gone to Beausejour were themselves
exposed, at any moment, to be expelled from the province if the
unrestricted oath were exacted. In such a juncture they would be glad to
find beyond the frontier relatives and friends able to help them in
their turn. Thus in a way they were really working for themselves.
They were ordered to
return directly. In all likelihood the order was promptly obeyed by
those who, intending to return, had left their families behind; else the
Archives would certainly mention severe measures against the
disobedient, their families or their property. When Lawrence gave an
order, he was not to be trifled with, as the Acadians knew to their
cost.
That Lawrence had by
this time determined on the deportation is, I think, clear enough. True,
the evidence is still vague and indefinite, though convincing as far as
it goes. Patience will be needed by those who follow my line of proof:
for the chain of evidence is a long one. But every link is there. The
last letter I have quoted from Lawrence is, properly speaking, only the
first link in the chain that constitutes the main strength of this Lost
Chapter. The entire evidence, strong in induction and analysis, will be
equally strong in official documents of undoubted authenticity.
However, before
proceeding further, let me anticipate asi objection which doubtless is
already taking shape in the reader’s miml: viz., the improbability of
such an inhuman purpose based on no grave cause and born of sheer
cruelty. Right here, then, let me affirm that the deportation, iu the
mind of its chief authors, was neither a justifiable act nor a deed of
cruelty pure and simple, but a means of acquiring wealth by despoiling
the Acadians of their cattle and their lands. On this point 1 entertain
the hope that, long before the reader has finished the book, he will be
fully convinced that I ani indulging in no historical fiction.
Forestalling somewhat
the strict chronological sequence of events, I will now give the answer
of the Lords of Trade to Lawrence’s insidious letter:
“We cannot form a
proper judgment or give a final opinion of what measures may be
necessary to be taken with regard to those inhabitants, until ice have
laid the whole state of the case before His Majesty and receive his
instructions upon it.
We were in hopes that
the lenity which hail been shown to those people by indulging them in
the free exercise qf their religion, and the quiet possession of their
lands, would by degrees have gained their friendship and assistance and
weaned their affections from the French, and we are sorry to hear that
this lenity has had so little effect.
“It is certain that by
the Treaty of Utrecht their becoming subjects to Great Britain (which we
apprehend they cannot be but by taking the oath required of subjects) is
made an express condition of their continuance, after the expiration of
a year, and therefore it may be a question well worth considering how
far they can be treated as subjects without taking such oaths, and
whether their refusal to take them will not operate to invalidate the
titles to their lands; it is a question, however, which we will not take
from ourselves absolutely to determine, but could wish that you would
consult the Chief Justice upon this point and take his opinion, which
may serve as a foundation for any future measure it may be thought
advisable to pursue.
“As to those of the
District of Beaubassin who are actually gone over to the French at
Beansejonr, if the Chief Justice should be of opinion that by refusing
to take oaths 'without a reserve or by deserting their settlements to
join the French, they have forfeited their title to their lands, we
could wish that proper measures uvre pursued for carrying such
forfeiture into execution by legal process. . . .”
Lawrence must have
expected something better. Of course he had gained his point in that he
had indisposed the Lords of Trade and prejudiced their minds ; but he
may have hoped that their reply would contain some declaration that
should be a more definite step toward his chosen goal. Unfortunately for
him his proposal, “ it would be better that they were away,” was merely
referred to His Majesty or rather eluded. Politeness forbade the Lords
of Trade expressing doubts about Lawrence’s accusations; but the
difference of tone between him and Hopson in so short an interval must
have struck them, as the tenor of their letter seems to show. However,
they in no way depart from their habitual wisdom and serenity. They seem
to fear that he may act arbitrarily; they strongly advise him to keep to
the rules and traditions of his office, to consult the Chief Justice as
to whether the refusal to take the oath will invalidate the title-deeds
of those who remain in the province, and even to ask his opinion on this
matter with respect to those who have (putted the province. Should the
Chief Justice decide that these latter have by their departure forfeited
their titles, resort should be had to legal process of confiscation.
This letter is a fair
average specimen of all those addressed to the governors of Acadia; and
from one who, like myself, seeks nothing but historic truth,
distributing praise or blame irrespective of persons, though always
finding it more agreeable to praise than to blame, this letter naturally
elicits the remark that the Lords of Trade hardly ever swerved from this
wise and prudent course. If we take into account the circumstances of
time and place, the pressure exercised upon them, the misrepresentations
made to them, their conduct, viewed as a whole, certainly deserves no
very severe censure and is often praiseworthy. I have not the slightest
doubt that they would have treated the Acadians very differently iu the
matter of the oath, had they been aware of all the facts I have recorded
about the hindering of their departure by Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong,
Philipps, and Cornwallis. These hindrances are, for obvious reasons, not
mentioned in the letters of these governors; they could not mention them
without condemning themselves. This important fact must not be
overlooked by those who wish to be just to the Lords of Trade.
Furthermore, this
letter seems to prove conclusively that, when Cornwallis placed the
Acadians in the cruel dilemma of taking the oath or of leaving without
their movables, he must have been going beyond his orders, since the
Lords of Trade here show that they are doubtful even as to the
Government’s right to confiscate the immovables of those who had left
the province. |