June 6th, Lawrence, by a trick, confiscates 400 muskets—He orders the Acadians to give up the remainder of their arms—June 10th, Petition of the Acadians of Grand Pre and Pigiguit begging Lawrence not to oblige them to give up their arms—This Petition is not considered till July 3d; meanwhile, the arms are surrendered—The Petition is deemed insolent—New Petition—Lawrence’s grievances—The Acadian delegates at first refuse the oath —The next day they offer to take it—Lawrence’s refusal—They are put in prison.

The taking of Beausejour was an event of great importance. Though at the time there was a nominal peace, that so-called peace was really a long series of hostilities, which, hitherto smouldering, then burst out with extreme violence all along the frontier, from the Gulf to the Great Lakes, although war was not officially declared till almost a year later The French occupation of the isthmus and of all the northern coast of the Bay of Fundy had been a source of trouble to the English and of broils between the two nations. For the Acadians the situation was still worse; critical as it was of itself, it had been aggravated on the one hand by the exactions and the severity of the English governors, and, on the other, by the conduct of Le Loutre and the French authorities.

Naturally, the fall of Beausejour ought to have removed from the English all motive for fearing the Acadians. if indeed there ever were any cause for such fear. What, indeed, was to be feared from a people who during forty-five years, in spite of all sorts of temptations and difficulties, not only never had recourse to arms, but never even withstood the most arbitrary commands ? Since the majority of those who crossed the frontier did so only in self-defence, forced to fly by the Indians who had burned their houses; since the small number who took up arms for the French at Beausejour did so only on compulsion, what reason was there to fear those who remained in the Peninsula, when the only strategic point that might favor revolt had fallen? To put this question is to answer it. No one knew this better than Lawrence. He had very exactly gauged the dispositions of those who lived on the French side. He knew that it would be impossible, as he himself admitted, except under enormous provocation or circumstances altogether abnormal, to force them to take up arms against the English. Now all these extraordinary conditions were verified all together at the siege of Beaus6-jour—with a result even better than what he had foreseen. Which of my readers is there, who, if he is convinced that the facts I have related are correct, can harbor any doubt as to the fidelity of those who lived in the Peninsula, far from the allurements of the French, surrounded by forts and soldiers to keep them in check, having to protect their families and their property, without any possible assistance from the French, having, in a word, everything to lose and nothing to gain by revolt ? All those conditions which might reasonably lead to the belief that those who lived with the French would take up arms for them, were in this case completely reversed. The Acadians on the other side of the frontier were undeniably French subjects, they had a right to take up arms; they would not, held back by scruples arising from a situation which, clear as it was, left doubts in the minds of simple straightforward people. The Acadians of the Peninsula, on the contrary, were British subjects; they were bound by an oath; they could have no doubt about their duty so long as they remained on English territory. Was there any reason to fear them? Impossible! The others were subjected to enormous pressure, both to convince them that they were French subjects and to force them to light for France. The stubbornness of their resistance is well-nigh incredible, though no one can gainsay it. Can we, then, reasonably suppose that the peninsular Acadians, free from all pressure, without any possible contact with the French, would have resisted or even intended to resist or make mischief? The others were backed, protected by the French; they may have hoped that the French arms would prevail. These were completely dependent on the English; they could hope for neither support nor help from the French, now defeated, humbled and driven from all their strongholds on the Bay of Fundy. And yet, in such a plight, without the prospect of success, they could have been deemed dangerous, they could have been suspected of hatching a disturbance! The thing is impossible, ridiculous in the extreme !

If the above argument does not settle the question, all reasoning by analogy is futile. Lawrence was too well aware of the dispositions of the Acadians to have a moment’s doubt about them. Indisputable proof of this is afforded by that declaration of his to the Lords of Trade, quoted near the end of the last chapter.

But, then, how can we explain his behavior? Very simply: by interested motives, which will be made clear in the sequel; for, conclusive as the foregoing negative argument is, it is only a small part of my plea.

Almost a year had now gone by since Lawrence had made up his mind to a wholesale deportation of the Acadians. He was waiting for a favorable opportunity. That opportunity ho was preparing with the patience of a mole and with all the skill that Clive and Hastings were, about the same time, displaying toward the natives of Hindostan. Imaginations in England were then, greatly excited by the dazzling stories about the treasures of the rajahs, by the princely fortunes brought back from Calcutta, Bombay and Madras by the officers of the East India Company. America presented none of these tempting baits: no gathered treasure, no Nabobs to despoil, no Bengalese to tax unmercifully; but the fertile mind of Lawrence had seen the possibility of a transaction that might lead to similar results. Had he not under his thumb, isolated in this corner of the continent, a small nation of known peaceableness and docility ? Taken one by one, these peasants had nothing that could tempt a man in search of honors and wealth; but their aggregate possessions would make him rich. So long as the French occupied the north of the Bay of Fundy, he could not realize his purpose. The capture of Beausejour, the removal of the French would be necessary to screen him from grave danger. This was the opportunity he had long been preparing for; the obstacle had disappeared; but some pretexts must be invented. The means he chose was oppression : he hoped that, by making the lot of the Acadians intolerable, lie would drive them, through despair, to some acts of insubordination or resistance that should shield him from disgrace, if not from the censure of the Home Government. We are about to see liow all his efforts in this direction failed; yet such was his determination that he deported them in spite of everything.

After careful consideration I am firmly convinced that the more Lawrence persecuted the Acadians, the more submissive were they and the more did they avoid giving him pretexts for severity. They had a vague presentiment that plots were weaving in the dark against their very existence. They saw with dismay how the iron hand laid upon them was drawing closer day by day the links of the chain that was to swathe and crush them. Whithersoever they looked, the}' discerned on all sides the signs of impending, inevitable woe; inevitable if they resisted, inevitable if they submitted, inevitable whether they refused or accepted the oath. Under Cornwallis and Hopson they could at least have hoped that, should they take the oath, their acquiescence would not be made a pretext to force them to fight against the French; under Lawrence no such hope could be indulged in; on the contrary, he would, must they have thought, take advantage of the oath to rivet them to the soil and expel their priests. In this extremity of peril, they deemed complete submission still the safest course toward the staving off or the lessening of theii misfortunes ; and, whether through a mutual understanding, as is likely, or through community of feeling arising from their condition, everything they did bore the impress of the most thorough submissiveness. After all, they thought, the worst that can happen to us w ould be the order to quit the country without taking away any of our property. Painful as this alternative is, we once accepted it; we are ready to accept it again, if need be. Alas ! in their honest simplicity they did not dream of another solution, a terrible solution ; and this was not an alternative.

About the sixth of June, that is to say, during the siege of Beaus6jour, Lawrence carried out the following project. A hundred men from Fort Edward and fifty from the garrison of Halifax were sent to Mines district to seize the arms of the inhabitants.1 The plan was to pretend that these men were indulging in “ a fishing frolic on their way to Annapolis. The soldiers were to reach Grand Prc and the neighborhood in the evening, and, instead of sleeping in the barns as was their custom, were to distribute themselves two by two in the houses of the residents. At midnight they were to seize all arms and ammunition found in each house. It was an easy undertaking and succeeded perfectly without provoking any resistance. The next morning all the soldiers met at Grand Pre with the arms they had seized, put them on board a boat that had been waiting for that very cargo and carried them to Fort Edward.

Immediately or at most a few days after this fine trick, an order was issued commanding all Acadians in the Peninsula to surrender their arms under penalty of being treated as rebels. As may well be imagined, these measures were not likely to please the Acadians, still less to win their affection. Had they afforded any pretext for such arbitrary and irritating conduct? Not the slightest. After what we have seen the Acadians do at Beaus£jour, it is well-nigh impossible to suppose that Lawrence’s motive for this mean trick was the fear of insurrection. Such a supposition would be very strange if not ridiculous. And yet Lawrence undoubtedly had a motive, for everything tends to show that the deportation was not only practically determined on long since, but even arranged for by this time in all its details. It must be done and over during this season. There was no time to lose. The yoke must be made heavier, more galling; some new plan must be adopted to sting the Acadians into discontent and to provoke trouble. This alone can have been Lawrence’s immediate motive in seizing the arms at Grand Prd and in the general order to the same effect. In order to gain time Lawrence did not wait for the capitulation of Beausojour. As soon as he saw that the small garrison of this fort would not be reinforced from Louisburg nor assisted by the majority of the Acadian emigrants, and that the place would surely fall, he set about executing his project. True, besides his immediate motive of making trouble, he may have also intended to preclude, pieced together a part of the story by means of verbal information, and sometimes by copies of the missing documents, obtained from the surviving counsellors of Lawrence as well as from persons who had been witnesses of the deportation by a general disarmament of the Acadians, any danger of an insurrection at the critical moment of the deportation. But I maintain that, had he not also distinctly contemplated the arousing of discontent, this seizure of anus would have been not merely an unwise but an exceedingly perilous move, supposing, as some still believe, that the Acadians were a restless and disaffected people. For this highly provocative proceeding could 'only effect a partial disarmament, as the four hundred guns seized were probably not one-fiftli of the whole number in the hands of the Acadians. Had they been rebellious and ripe for revolt, as Lawrence’s seizure of arms implied, this was an infallible way of making the insurrection break out and become quite dangerous, and it was, moreover, the surest way of inducing them not to give up the remainder, i. e., at least four-fifths of their arms. Now Lawrence was far too deep to commit so dangerous a blunder. The logical conclusion, based on a reductio ad abmrdum, is, therefore, that Lawrence was so confident of the peaceable dispositions of the Acadians as to feel sure he ran no risk in seizing a small part of their arms. The same course of reasoning, however, leads to the further inference that he expected to provoke irritation, disobedience and perhaps local, though not dangerous, disturbances, which would warrant greater severity and thus justify the deportation he had in view. In this latter expectation he was mistaken; he provoked neither disobedience nor disturbance. Incredible as so thorough a submission may appear, it is none the less undeniable.

Mindful of the chastisement inflicted the preceding autumn 011 some of their friends who had momentarily suspended, while awaiting an answer to their representations, the execution of Lawrence’s arbitrary orders about furnishing wood, the Acadians this time unanimously executed the order about yielding up their arms. Directly after this order, they sent a petition to Lawrence, dated June 10th. This petition should have been taken into consideration before the day fixed for the surrender of the arms, since its object was precisely to obtain that the order be revoked. But Lawrence let the interval pass without a reply; it was not till long after the date of the surrender of arms that lie consented to listen to them, on July 3d.

To avoid fresh oppression and fresh misfortunes, the Acadians handed in all their guns on the appointed day, and according to Judge Deschamps, quoted by Dr. Brown, the number of the guns was two thousand nine hundred. "These orders,” says Haliburton, who had made only an approximate guess at the true inwardness of the drama then enacting, “were complied with in a manner which might certainly' have convinced the Government that the Acadians had no serious intention of any insurrection, but, as Papists and Frenchmen, their submissions never gained much credit with their Protestant and English masters, by whom they were both hated and feared.”

Not to speak of all the acts of obedience I have already related, acts which bear such eloquent testimony to the submissiveness of the Acadians, would not this one alone suffice definitely to establish their claim to this virtue? And yet Parkman is not convinced, or rather he makes believe not to be convinced, if, indeed he has taken any real pains to ascertain the tine state of the case—which I very much doubt.

In the whole range of human history it is hard to find such complete submission under such arbitrary despotism. Assuredly nothing like it could be discerned iu the history of New England. In fact, one feels tempted to blame the Acadians for having reached that excess of subjection which is fraught with danger. Perverse men are ever ready to profit by such dispositions. A time comes when the evils of subjection are greater than those which follow from resistance. That time had come for the Acadians as soon as Lawrence was appointed governor of the province. They did not realize this, and how could they, unless they read his inmost thoughts? Could they sound the depths of perversity in the mind of this ferocious brute? They could not help seeing that he seemed to seek pretexts for further oppression in order to obtain, if he could, the Home Government’s approval of an order to quit the country. They were simple enough to think that, on his own responsibility, Lawrence could not or would not dare to proceed to this extremity; and, if he did, well, they would depart. Such was, I am convinced, their mistake and the reason why their submission was so exceedingly disastrous.

Lawrence must have been disappointed by their utter obedience. He had calculated that the seizure of a few hundred guns M ould be the most effectual means of stirring up revolt against the order to surrender the few thousand that remained in their hands. Iiut the surrender was accomplished without affording the slightest pretext for complaint. What was he to do ? He could not be at a loss, he whose power was absolute and whose despotism recognized no check. He found fault with their petition, which I now quote entire, so that the reader may be in a position to judge by himself if its contents or its form deserved the reception it met with.

“To His Excellency Charles Lawrence,

Governor of the Province of Nova Scotia or Acadia, etc., etc. .'

“Sir,—

“We, the inhabitants of Mines, Pigiguit and the river Canard, take the liberty of approaching Your Excellency for the purpose of testifying our sense of the care which the Government exercises over us.

“It appears, sir, that Your Excellency doubts the sincerity with which we have promised to be faithful to His Britannic Majesty.

“We most humbly beg Your Excellency to consider our past conduct. You will see, that, very far from violating the oath we have taken, we have maintained it in its entirety, in spite of the solicitations and the dreadful threats of another power. We still entertain, sir, the same pure and sincere disposition to prove under any circumtances, our unshaken fidelity to His Majesty, provided that His Majesty shall allow us the same liberty that he has granted us. We earnestly beg Your Excellency to have the goodness to inform us of His Majesty’s intentions on this subject, and to give us assurances on his part.

“Permit us, if you please, sir, to make known the annoying circumstances in which we are placed, to the prejudice of the tranquillity we ought to enjoy. Under pretext that we are transporting our corn or other provisions to Bpausejour and the river St. John, we are no longer permitted to carry the least quantity of corn by water from one place to another. We beg Your Excellency to be assured that we have never transported provisions to Beausejour, or to river St. John. If some, refugee inhabitants from Beausejour have been seized with cattle, we are not, on that account, by any means guilty, inasmuch as the. cattle belonged to them as private individuals, and they were driving them to their respective habitations. As to ourselves, sir, we have never offended in that respect; consequently, we ought not, in our opinion, to be punished; on the contrary, we hope that Your Excellency will be pleased to restore to us the same liberty that we enjoyed formerly, in giving us the use of our canoes, either to transport our provisions from one river to another, or for the purpose of fishing; thereby providing for our livelihood. This permission has never been taken from us except at the present time. We hope, sir, that you will be pleased to restore, it, specially in consideration of the number of poor inhabitants who would be very glad to support their families with the fish that they would be able to catch. Moreover, our guns, which we regard as our oik personal property, have been taken from us, notwithstanding the fact that they are absolutely necessary to us, either to defend our cattle which are attacked by the wild beasts, or for the protection of our children and of ourselves. Any inhabitant who may have liis oxen in the woods, and who may need them for purposes of labour, would not dare to expose himself in going for them without being prepared to defend himself. It is certain, sir, that since the Indians have ceased frequenting our parts, the wild beasts have greatly increased, and that our cattle is devoured by them almost every day. Besides, the arms which have been taken from us are but a feeble guarantee of our fidelity. It is not the gun which an inhabitant possesses, that will induce him to revolt„-nor the privation of the same gun that will make him more faithful ; but his conscience alone must induce him to maintain his oath. An order has appeared in Tour Excellency’s name, given at Fort Edward, June 4th, 1755, by which we are commanded to carry guns, pistols, etc., etc., to Fort Edward. It appears to us, sir, that it would be dangerous for us to execute that order, before representing to you the danger to which this order exposes us. The Indians may come and threaten and plunder us, reproaching us for ha\ ing furnished arms to kill them. We hope, sir, that you will be pleased, on the contrary, to order I hat those taken from us be restored to us. By so doing, you will afford us the means of preserving both ourselves and our cattle.

“In the last place, we are grieved, sir, at seeing ourselves declared guilty without being aware of having disobeyed. One of our inhabitants of the river Canard, named Pierre MeIainson, was seized and arrested in charge of his boat, before having heard any order forbidding that sort of transport. We beg Your Excellency, on this subject, to have the goodness to make known to us your good pleasure before confiscating our property and considering us in fault. This is the favor we expect from Your Excellency’s kindness, and we hope you will do us the justice to believe that very far from violating our promises, we will maintain them, assuring you that we are very respectfully,

“Sir, your very humble and obedient servants.”

This petition is, word for word, the translation given by the Compiler of the archives. If, considering the then circumstances, or in fact, any circumstances, this petition is not remarkably respectful, I confess myself ignorant of what is meant by respect. Out of such material, Lawrence, who had been able to create no other grievance or pretext, was going to raise a storm of his own making, a storm without cloud or wind in a clear sky, and yet all the more terrible for that. The average reader, unaware of the faults Lawrence was going to find in this document, would be sorely puzzled to guess beforehand, on a careful perusal of this humble petition breathing submissiveness aiul sincerity, what points the Grovernor would fasten his fangs upon. However, the better to show. the spirit that moved him and his determination to pick a quarrel, I must here add that, before Lawrence had expressed to the Acadians liis view of their petition, the signers thereof learned that it was considered impertinent, and accordingly addressed to him another petition on the 24th of June as follows:—

Grand Pre, June 24th, 17S5.

“To His Excellency ('harles Lawrence, etc., etc.

“Sir,—

“All the inhabitants of Mines, Pigiguit and the river Canard, beg Your Excellency to believe that if, in the Petition which they have had the honor to present to Your Excellency, there shall be found any error or any want of respect towards the Government, it is entirely contrary to their intention; and that in this case, the inhabitants who have signed it; are not more guilty than the others.

“If sometimes they become embarrassed in Your Excellency’s presence, they humbly beg you to excuse their timidity; and if, contrary to our expectation, there is anything hard in the said petition, we beg Your Excellency to do us the favor of allowing us to explain our intention.

We hope that Your Excellency will be pleased to grant us this favor, begging you to believe that we are very respectfully,

“Sir, your very humble and very obedient servants.

“Signed by forty-four of the said inhabitants in the name of the whole.”

This new petition, still humbler than the first, should, in the case of a humane go\ ernor, have sufficed to explain the intention of the first document and to remove all cause of offence, had any such existed. But Lawrence was not going to abate one jot of his fault-finding. On July 3d, the Acadian delegates were admitted to the governor’s presence, and the following resolution was read to them:

“The Council having then taken the contents of the said Memorials into consideration, were unanimously of opinion that the Memorial of the 10th of June is highly arrogant and insidious, and deserved the highest resentment."

To show them what Lawrence called the impudence of the petition, it was read to them clause by clause.

In answer to this sentence: “That they were affected with the proceedings of the Crovemment towards them,'” they were told:

“That they had always been treated with the greatest lenity and tenderness. That they had enjoyed more privileges than English subjects, and had been indulged in the free exercise of their religion. That they had at all times full liberty to consult their priests, and had been protected in their trade and fishery, arid had been for many years permitted to possess their lands (part of the best soil of the province), though they had not complied with the terms, on which the lands were granted, by taking the oath of allegiance to the crown.

"They were then asked whether they could produce an instance that any privilege was denied to them, or that any hardships were ever imposed upon them.

“They acknowledged the justice and lenity of the Government.

“Upon the paragraph where ‘They desire their past conduct might be considered,’

"It was remarked to them that their past conduct was considered, and that the Government were sorry to have occasion to say that their conduct had been undutiful and very ungrateful for the lenity shown them. That they had no returns of loyalty to the crown or respect to His Majesty’s Government in the province. That they had discovered a constant disposition to assist His Majesty’s enemies and to distress his subjects. That they had not only furnished the enemy with provisions and ammunition, but had refused to supply the inhabitants or Government with provisions, and when they did supply they have exacted three times the price for which they were sold at at other markets. That they had been indolent and idle on their lands, had neglected husbandry and the cultivation of the soil, and had been of no use to the province either in husbandry, trade or fishery, but had rather been an obstruction to the king’s intentions in the settlement.

“They were then asked whether they could mention a single instance of service to the Government. To which they’ were incapable of making any reply. ’

Upon reading this paragraph—

"It seems that- Your Excellency is doubtful of the sincerity of those who have promised fidelity. That they have been so far from breaking their oath that they had kept it in spite of terrifying menaces from another power—”

“They were asked what gave them occasion to suppose that the Government was doubtful of their sincerity; and were told that it argued a consciousness in them of insincerity and want of attachment to the interests of His Majesty and his Government. That, as to taking their arms, they had often urged that the Indians would annoy them, and that by taking their arms by act of Government it was put out of the power of the Indians to threaten or force them to their assistance.

Upon reading this paragraph—

*Besides, the arms we carry are a feeble surety for our fidelity. It is not a gun that an inhabitant possesses, which will lead him to revolt, nor the depriving him, of that gun that will make him more faithful, but his conscience alone ought to engage him to maintain his oath.—”

“They were asked what excuse they could make for their presumption in this paragraph, and treating the Government with such indignity and contempt as to expound to them the nature of fidelity, and to prescribe what would be the security proper to be relied on by the Government for their sincerity. That their consciences ought indeed to engage them to fidelity from their oath of allegiance to the king, and that, if they were sincere in their duty to the crown, they would not be so anxious for their arms, when it was the pleasure of the King’s Government to demand them for His Majesty’s service.

“They were then informed that a very fair opportunity now presented itself to them to manifest the reality of their obedience to the Government by immediately taking the oath of allegiance in the common form before the Council. Their reply to his proposal was, that they were not come prepared to resolve the Council on that head. They were then told that they very' well knew for those six years past the same thing had often been proposed to them and had been as often evaded, under various frivolous pretences; that they had been often informed that some time or other it would be requested of them and must be done, and that the Council did not doubt but they knew the sentiments of the inhabitants in general, and had fully considered and determined this point with regard to themselves before now, as they had been already indulged in with six years to form a resolution thereon.

“They then desired they might return home and consult the body of the people upon this subject, as they could not do otherwise than the generality of the inhabitants should determine, for that they were desirous of either refusing or accepting the oath in a body, and could not possibly determine till they knew the sentiments of their constituents.

“Upon this so extraordinary a reply, they were informed they would not be permitted to return for any such purpose, but that it was expected from them to declare on the spot, for their own particulars, as they might very well be expected to do after having had so long a time to consider upon that point. They then asked leave to retire to consult among themselves, which they were permitted to do, when, near after an hour's recess, they returned with the same answer, that they could not consent to the oath as prescribed without consulting the general body, but that they were ready to take it as they had done before; to which they were answered: That His Majesty bad disapproved of the manner of their taking the oath before. That it was not consistent with his honor to make any conditions, nor could the Council accept their taking the oath in any other way than as all other His Majesty’s subjects were obliged by law to do when called upon, and that it was now expected they should do so; which, they still declining, they were allowed till the next morning at ten of the clock to come to a resolution. To which time the Council then adjourned.

"The next day, the Council being met according to adjournment, the Acadian deputies who were yesterday ordered to attend, were brought in, and upon being asked what resolution they were come to in regard to the oath, they declared they could not consent to take the oath in the form required without consulting the body. They were then informed that, as they had now for their own particulars, refused to take the oath as directed by law, and thereby sufficiently evinced the sincerity of their inclination towards the Government, the Council could no longer look on them as subjects to His Britannic Majesty', but as subjects to the king of France, and as such they must hereafter be treated; and they were ordered to withdraw.

“The Council, after consideration, were of opinion that directions should be given to Captain Murray to order the Acadians forthwith to choose and send to Halifax new deputies with the general resolution of the said inhabitants in regard to taking the oath, and that none of them should for the future be admitted to take it after having once refused so to do, but that effectual measures ought to be taken to remove such recusants out of the Province.

“The deputies who had just withdrawn were then called in again, and having been informed of this resolution, and finding they could no longer avail themselves of the disposition of the Government to engage them to dutiful behavior by lenity or persuasion, offered to take the oath, but were informed that, as there was no reason to hope their proposed compliance proceeded from an honest mind, and could be esteemed only the effect of compulsion and force, and is contrary to a clause in an act of Parliament I. George II. chap. 13, whereby persons who have once refused to take oaths cannot be afterwards permitted to take them, but considered as Popish Recusants. Therefore, they would not now be indulged with such permission. And they were thereupon ordered into confinement.”

The foregoing documents 1 have reproduced in their entirety or in their essential parts, in spite of their length, because I consider them as the key to the situation. Far from shirking difficulties, I hunt them up; I am on the look-out for anything that may throw light on this lost chapter; I have a special preference for choosing what the Compiler has deemed unfavorable to the Acadians; and, as far as I can, I endeavor to enable the reader to judge for himself. Almost invariably we have nothing but the Government version of facts. If this version proves Lawrence’s action unjustifiable, it must be emphatically so. What further iniquity might be revealed, were there in existence a plea for the other side, and could we but get at the hidden motives that are forever buried beyond our ken? Although in the above extracts we have the unusual good fortune of reading a petition from the Acadians themselves—a favor which we no doubt owe to the strictures passed upon it—still it is none the less Lawrence’s case stated by himself, drawn up with care and with his own remarkable skill, in view of future self-defence, should such be needed.

Philip II. Smith, in his book, M Acadia—a Lost Chapter in American History,” refers as follows to the matter in hand:

“We open the chapter by allowing this simple people to tell the story of their suffering and wrongs in the following Memorial to Governor Lawrence, under date of June 10th, 1755, previous to the fall of Beausejour and other French reverses on the Peninsula. We mention tjiis, as otherwise it might be said they were disheartened, and came to sue for peace only after having lost all hope. We ask the candid reader to peruse the document carefully, and judge for himself whether the strictures put upon it by Governor Lawrence are just or otherwise.”

The same question is in order here. What can he pleaded in defence of the arbitrary and insulting methods which Lawrence employed in order fraudulently to take away the arms of the Acadians? Had they been guilty, I will not say of insurrection, of taking up arms, of insubordination, of resistance to orders, but of anything whatever that might cast the slightest reasonable doubt on the maintenance of peace? Are there any such facts alleged? If so, let them be recited. On which side was the provocation? Was it not altogether on Lawrence’s part? Who were the insulted parties, if not the Acadians themselves, against whom such deeds of duplicity were done? Where was the danger, since even when thus provoked, they yielded up at the first intimation, without resistance, whatever arms they possessed, at the very moment when expressions .of mistrust seemed to suggest that they should disobey and not throw themselves upon the mercy of a man whose cruelty was notorious? Danger? Was not Lawrence creating it by running the risk of exasperating a peaceful people who had weapons enough, even after this first seizure, to imperil the province ? Can any one believe that he would have acted in this absurdly dangerous fashion, had he entertained anyr doubt of their fidelity? Lawrence was too artful to take such a leap in the dark. He was fully aware that, firm and even stubborn though this people might be, they were peaceable and law-abiding, and that he might harry them with impunity.

Over and over again have I read that petition which Lawrence and his council find so arrogant and so insulting to the King. I cannot for the life of me find in it anything but a clear and precise document, expressed in the humblest and most submissive language. The only fault I am inclined to see in it is that it seems too submissive after the shameful treatment of the Acadians which was the occasion of this petition. Let the reader ask himself if, under such circumstances, he would confine himself to so respectful a document. To my mind it is not the accused, but the accuser, Lawrence himself, on whom the guilt of insolence rests. If the petition was insolent, it was because Lawrence was arrogant and brutal and was seeking his own interest in finding it insolent. He took advantage of his power to divert attention from his own odious conduct by words of seemingly honest indignation which were in very truth applicable to himself alone. Knowing, as we do, with what severity he visited the only case of disobedience —if indeed it was disobedience—which occurred during his administration, we are justified in refusing to accept his vague and general accusations and in insisting on detailed proofs. Had his rebuke been merited, he would undoubtedly have supported it there and then with specific facts; whereas at no time, whether before or after or at this juncture, did he deal in anything but high-sounding generalities.

Before the thunders of his high mightiness, these poor people could only bow their heads and stammer out excuses to him who brooked no discussion nor explanation. What was the use of answering a passionate tyrant who was determined beforehand to find fault with everything they might say? How dare they contradict his assertions when he paused for a reply? They were too prudent to do so. They knew that if they did they would be considered doubly impudent. So they chose to be silent. Hence in the report those passages: “They acknowledged the justice and lenity of the Government; ” “they were incapable of making any reply.'” But, if they could only hung their heads and hold their tongues, history can decide which was the insolent party. The lineal descendant of Lawrence’s victims can, though late, now rend the veil that still hides his infamy, and brand his memory as that of a scoundrel.

Let us examine his accusations one by one. He charges the Acadians with having secretly assisted the Indians, in the face of the fact that, for the past five years, not one group of Indians had resided in the Peninsula or in the neighborhood of the Acadians. Since Cornwallis had set a price on their heads, they all dwelt on the French side at Beausejour, from which the Acadian settlements were separated by long distances. Besides, it is well known that the Acadians near the frontier and at Cobequid had much to suffer from the Indians at a time when Forts Lawrence, Edward and Vieux Logis were not yet built. Under these circumstances it is difficult to understand on what foundation Lawrence’s charge could rest.*

He next charges them with not giving “ timely intelligence” of the movements of the French. This accusation can refer only to the French raids from 1744 to 1748. Although their position as Neutrals might have been interpreted as relieving them from the duty of informing the authorities, nevertheless, they did give valuable information on many occasions. I have mentioned some of these in the course of this work, among others, the French attack on Grand Pre. When they warned Colonel Noble of the project they had wind of, he laughed at them, with the result we know.* There are repeated proofs that, in all these raids, the French, for fear of that “ timely intelligence ” communicated by the Acadians to the English, took the precaution of guarding all the roads. We see that they did so before the Grand Pre fight: “As it was intended,” says Campbell (Hist, of N. S. page 95), “to take the English by surprise, the woods were guarded, so that intelligence might not reach them.” See also Murdoch, vol. II., page 106. Other instances of this timely intelligence furnished by the Acadians to the English authorities, are to be found at pages 133, 138, 147, 152, 155, 157, 177—183, and 605 of the volume of the Archives itself; and in Murdoch, vol. I., page 411; vol. II., pages 18-25, 42, 73-76.

Of course there may, or rather must have been instances of an opposite character. To deny this would argue ignorance of human nature. But the only important juncture where ignorance of the facts was disastrous to the English was the Grand l're raid, and we have just seen that the Acadians deserved thanks, not blame, for their conduct then. If Lawrence had any special charge in view, it must have been this case, which is the only one specified, and on which the Acadians had to offer an explanation. They readily did .so and if we now are certain that they gave information of the designs of the French, we owe that knowledge to this investigation, failing which historians would still go on borrowing from each other, as an unquestionable historical fact, a charge which we know to be false. To find pretexts Lawrence was obliged to go back eight or nine years and condemn the behavior of the Acadians when it had been repeatedly praised by Governor Mascarene, and in spite of the fact that the few culprits during this war were denounced by the Acadians themselves and punished.

“That many of them had even appeared in arms against His Majesty.” This accusation, if true, could only refer to the three hundred Acadians who had just been taken armed at the surrender of Beausejour, and who had been pardoned by Monckton because they had taken up arms under penalty of death; and thus this charge had nothing to do with the men whom Lawrence had before him.

“That they had been indolent and idle on their lands, had neglected husbandry and the cultivation of the soil and have been of no use to the Province, either in husbandry, trade or fishery, but had been rather an obstruction to the King’s intentions in the settlement.”

These accusations are at once childish and false. Even were they true they' were out of place in such a meeting. At any rate they show how difficult it was for him to fabricate grievances. If the Acadians had really been unthrifty the preponderating blame must fall on their Governors. For forty years they were refused titles to their lands as well as the privilege of taking up new homesteads, and were thus condemned to live on small parcels of land which paralyzed their ambition and energy. And yet, in spite of this parcelling out, they produced more than was needed for the whole Province. “Your lands,” Cornwallis said to them, “produce grain and nourish cattle sufficient for the whole Colony. We are well aware of your industry and your temperance, and that you are not addicted to any vice or debauchery.”

“I found it,” Winslow said two months after this meeting, when he was about to proceed to deport the Acadians, “a fine country and full of inhabitants, a beautiful church, abundance of the goods of this world, and provisions of all kinds in great plenty.”

“Mr. Cornwallis can inform your Lordships,” Hopson wrote to the Lords of Trade, “how useful and necessary^ these people are to us, how impossible it is to do without them, or to replace them even if we had other settlers to put into their places.”

Two years had not yet elapsed since the writing of these lines. No change had taken place, save that ,a tyrant had succeeded an upright and honest man. What the one had seen and judged with the noble instincts of a man, the other had seen and judged with the instincts of a brute intensified by low greed. The Acadians had been reproached with a too exclusive devotedness to the fisheries and the fur trade in the beginnings of the colony. Lawrence now finds means to twit them with a too exclusive devotedness to agriculture. We shall see how, later on, the English colonists, who occupied these same lands begged the Governor to allow them to employ the Acadians In rebuilding the dikes which they could not build themselves.

I pass on to the last objection, which seems to have been deemed the gravest, the most insolent. I crave the reader’s pardon for delaying him so long with what he and I must look upon as trifles. My excuse is the importance attached to this petition apparently so humble and so respectful. Harmless as this document may seem, everything is made to turn upon it; Lawrence makes a mountain out of this mole-hill. We are therefore forced to look at it on every side as he does. For any one that will take the trouble to reflect, to penetrate the character and motives of this man and to pass judgment on the events in which he was the prime mover, this particular item holds the mirror up to him with striking fidelity.

Here is the insolent paragraph:

“Besides, the arms we carry are a feeble surety for our fidelity. It is not a gun that an inhabitant possesses, which will lead him to revolt, nor the depriving him, of that gun that will make Mm more faithful, but his conscience alone ought to engage him to maintain his oath.”

“They were asked what excuse they could make for their presumption in this paragraph, and treating the Government with such indignity and contempt as to expound to them the nature of fidelity, and to prescribe what would be the security proper to be relied on by the Government for their sincerity.”

An interpretation such as this supposes no mean exercise of the imagination. Far from presenting any real cause for complaint, this paragraph is a proof of good faith and honesty of purpose. This language of the Acadian petitioners sets forth in a striking way how much they valued their oath of fidelity. This was the impression these poor people had hoped to create. They no doubt flattered themselves that this very paragraph would convince Lawrence that conscience was their guiding star. But they were expostulating with a man who had no conscience. It was the old fable of the wolf and the lamb. In vain did the poor little lamb reply that he could not possibly' make the water muddy, since he was drinking down stream, that lie could not have been guilty of the slander the wolf charged him with, since at the time mentioned he was not yet born ; be was devoured. There is no reasoning with the maw of a famished wolf. Lawrence’s grievances and rage had no more valid motives than the wolf’s. It was a storm in a teapot, but one that was to scatter to the four winds of heaven a gentle and peaceable people, in order that the persecutor might fatten on their spoils.

After having stood the fire of Lawrence’s reproaches, the Acadian delegates were requested to take there and then an unrestricted oath. They begged to be allowed to return to their homes in order to consult with their people and come to a unanimous decision on the question. If Lawrence sincerely wished to obtain this oath, he would have shown wisdom and good policy by granting this easy favor, from which 110 harm could come. Instead of acceding to their prayer, he gave them twenty-four hours for a final answer. The next day their answer was the same: We are, said they, delegates each one from his own district; we cannot, either in our own name or in that of the people, make any pledge without consulting all our fellow-countrymen; we wish to come to a decision, whether for or against, which shall be the same for all. They were told that the Council could no longer consider them as subjects of His Britannic Majesty, but as subjects of the King of France, and as such they must hereafter be treated. Would to God they had been, subsequently, treated as subjects of the King of France!

If, on account of their refusal to swear allegiance in the ordinary way, they were looked upon as French subjects, the Acadians ought to have been allowed to go away as they had begged and implored many a time but always in vain. It was not by their own will they were there, but by the restraint of their governors. And if, on account of that refusal, they became once more French subjects, why had Lawrence himself addressed a proclamation to those who had left the country five years before, declaring that they were not released from their oath of fidelity, that they would be considered as British subjects and treated as rebels if found armed?

In this entire petition there is but one sentence which, malevolently interpreted, might give umbrage to a despot; and even of this sentence we know not if it has been correctly translated. At any rate, we must bear in mind how they had been provoked by the clandestine seizure of their arms. Besides, the second petition, protesting that the first was well meant, ought to have sufficed to convince Lawrence of their sincerity and good intentions. Murdoch say-s of this petition and of those that followed it: “The different Memorials of the Acadians are long and argumentative, and are couched in respectful language.”

On the refusal to take the oath immediately', the Council decided that instructions should be sent to Captain Murray, bidding the Acadians name new delegates, that should they not take the oath, measures should be taken to expel these Popish recusants from the province. The delegates were then called in and informed of this decision. In the face of this threat, indefinite but terrible, they offered to take the oath. “Too late,” replied Lawrence; “your consent is but the offspring of fear; it comes not of a sincere attachment to His Majesty; there is an Act of Parliament against admitting you now to the oath,', you can no longer be looked upon otherwise than as Popish recusants.”

Lawrence had foreseen that nothing short of extraordinary measures could drive the delegates to a decision without first consulting their constituents. Despite his hardihood, he would have been greatly embarrassed if the delegates had immediately accepted his proposals, had he not accurately guessed how they would behave. He was ready for every emergency: should they end by consenting, that Act of Parliament was at hand to checkmate them. His plan would have been endangered by their return to their constituents: for there was reason to fear lest the delegates, having offered to take the oath, should persuade the others to do likewise; and, as the oath was merely a pretext to mask his plan, a general offer to take it would have caught him in his own trap. Therefore, to get out of the difficulty, he put the delegates in prison. “It does not appear,” says Philip H. Smith, “that the men thus summarily imprisoned, were proven guilty of assisting the king’s enemies or refusing to supply the Government with provisions, nor even that they were individually charged with the offence, neither did the Council make any but a general accusation of a constant disposition to distress the English subjects without deigning to support the charge with a single instance circumstantially proven, or ever asserted.”

Had the Acadians taken Lawrence at his word and sworn allegiance without reserve, we must infer that they would have been allowed to remain unmolested on their farms. Would he have acted thus with rebels or people inclined to revolt? Their oath of fidelity bound them just as firmly to loyalty as the oath which he now proposed to them. If they were rebellious and dangerous, what was the use of a new oath? No; it is quite evident that the dispersion of the Acadians and the unspeakable woe brought upon them were not caused by the dread of danger. There remains but one cause, and that merely the semblance of one: the refusal of the oath. Were this a bona fide motive, the deportation would still be a monstrous crime, though without profit for its author. He would have committed it when he had everything to lose and nothing to gain. This cannot be: because all the precautions he took to hide his projects from the Lords of Trade show that he was playing a risky game, where the stake must have been tempting enough to counterbalance the risk he was about to run. Wherefore we are justified in concluding that the oath was but a pretext, and that the true motive of the deportation was some tangible advantage to be gained by Lawrence.

Finally, if the Acadians could have been dangerous when they had arms, what was to be feared now that they were deprived of them and that the surrender of these arms had been effected without resistance, everywhere, upon a mere command? How could they be dangerous when their boats had been confiscated, and when the French had been expelled from all their strong holds on the coast?

Let Mr. Parkman answer this question, he who, in order to prejudge the matter, has not so much as alluded to the seizure of arms and boats, he who has carefully eschewed whatever could throw light on this ignoble tragedy.