Memorable day, September 9th, at Grand Pre—Four hundred and fifteen adults gathered in the church—Reading the edict of deportation—Usurped powers—Despatch of the Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Robinson, to Lawrence, dated August 13th, in reply to his letter of June 28th—The Secretary of State greatly alarmed at Lawrence’s disguised projects—Either this despatch came too late or Lawrence feigns not to have received it in time—October 18th, he briefly announces the deportation to the Lords of Trade without replying to the despatch of August 13th, to which he replies only on November 30th and then briefly— Letter of March 25th, 1756—The very important despatch of August 13th is passed over in silence by almost all writers— Brown and Parkman.

The memorable fifth of September ig now come. The meeting was fixed for three o’clock in the afternoon. The most anxious person was probably Winslow himself; as yet, indeed, he had noticed no sign of anxiety on the part of the Acadians; the proclamation had given rise to no grouping of loiterers; not the slightest excitement was visible. Everything seemed to favor the full success of his treachery; but the situation was so novel, so strange, the work in hand so barbarous, that he could not help the nervous dread that beset him. He was humbled, ashamed of himself; at the same time he was most desirous that his enterprise should succeed. Should there be refusal to obey and resistance, to what cruel extremities would he not be obliged to resort against a despairing and unarmed people ? He must have run through all the mental struggles that the perpetration of a first crime entails upon a hitherto faithful servant.

The clock was soon about to mark for the Acadian people the end of a century of quiet enjoyment. During the past year the serenity of the olden time had disappeared; clouds had gathered thicker and more numerous above their heads ; the storm was upon them and was growing. In quick succession, their arms, their boats, their archives and their priests had been taken from them; one hundred and fifteen of the principal citizens, simply because they had refused to take the oath, were still languishing in the prisons of Halifax; now their churches were profaned. True, the proclamation implied the intervention of the English Government, which was calculated to give them confidence; but what was the meaning of this deploying of troops, this intrenched camp, this occupation of their church and their presbytery? Evidently the wished-for intervention was a myth; else this armed force would be inexplicable. The occupation of their church clearly meant that their priests would not be restored to them, and, in that case, it was impossible for them to remain, even if they were allowed. To go, they were resolved ; and yet the thought of leaving that dear spot, that beloved country, their property, their herds, in order to begin elsewhere the labor of a century, had made them sad. Joy had flown; the home circle was gloomy and silent. This convocation could only be the sentence of departure; but at least, thought they, the Government would give them the time and the facilities necessary for their transportation into French territory; and perchance, moved by so much misfortune, it would allow them to carry with them their effects and the harvest they had just garnered. On the other hand, -what favors could they hope for if left at Lawrence’s mercy? That man had never known or shown pity. No; unless there was some intervention of the Home Government, this convocation must he a warning of some greater woe. Nevertheless they reached the practical conclusion that obedience to orders was after all the wisest course.

Winslow, too, had his troubles, though very different in kind. So has the cat watching the mouse, so has the wolf waiting for the lamb. His anxious eyes often scanned the dusty roads ending at Grand Pre. Soon, at intervals, he espied afar off light clouds of dust; people on foot were slowly wending their way from neighboring farms; then came well-filled carts from the Rivers Perreau, des Habitants, Canard and Gaspereau; the numbers were increasing; they all passed before the church casting anxious looks on the public square covered with tents and soldiers ; then the village was full; the new-comers had scattered in groups in the houses, on the door-steps, along the fences. All these groups were grave and almost silent. They exchanged a few words on the weather, the harvest, absent friends, or on indifferent subjects; but minds were busy with other thoughts ; concern was to be read on every face; men involuntarily looked in the direction of the church and the presbytery; but, as often happens on such sad and solemn occasions, it was the object of the meeting that they spoke least of. People leaned forward to hear an opinion; there was a questioning look in their eyes; but the ordinary advisers were prisoners at Halifax; nobody seemed to have any settled opinion.

There was a great gathering at Pere Landry's and a still greater one at the house of the old notary Ren4 Leblanc. Besides his twenty children and his many grandchildren, there were a host of relatives and friends. He himself, ever so full of confidence, so partial to the Government, and so zealous in its service, seemed that day anxious and mournful; in answer to questions he had let fall some words of encouragement, but his countenance betrayed his troubled state of mind.

The clock was on the stroke of three; the officers appeared on the threshold of the priest’s house; the groups had begun to move; they had drawn near to the church. They had entered.

Winslow followed closely in full uniform, surrounded by his officers. He took his place at a table set in the middle aisle; his glance rested on that silent crowd, kneeling because, despite the profanation of their temple, it was still the hallowed place, the house of prayer. They had knelt partly through habit perhaps, but also to implore God’s help in their hour of distress. The church was full; there were present four hundred and eighteen men and lads above ten years of age. It was a complete success.

It were idle to attempt to analyze the wild war of inward emotion produced by the reading of this eternally infamous document. Deep grief is dumb.

What Winslow read was as follows:

“Gentlemen,—I have received from His Excellency Governor Lawrence, the King's instructions, which I have in my hand. By his orders you are called together to hear His Majesty's final resolution concerning the French inhabitants of this Province of Nova Scotia, who for more than half a century have had more indulgence granted them than any of his subjects in any part of his dominions. What use you have made of it, you yourselves best know.

“The duty I am now upon, though necessary, is very disagreeable to my natural make and temper, as I "know it must be grievous to you, who are of the same species. But it is not my business to animadvert on the orders I have received, but to obey them; and therefore, without hesitation, I shall deliver to you Hit Majesty's instructions and commands, which are, that your lands and tenements and cattle and live stock of all kinds are forfeited to the crown, with all your other effects, except money and household goods, and that you yourselves are to be removed from this his Province.

“The peremptory orders of His Majesty are, that all the French inhabitants of these Districts be removed, and, through His Majesty's goodness, I am directed to allow you your money and as many of your household goods as you can take without overloading the vessels you go in. I shall do everything in my power that all these goods be secured to you, and that you be not molested in carrying them away, and also that whole families shall go in the same vessel; so that this removal, which I am sensible must give you a great deal of trouble, may be made as easy as Ilis Majesty’s service will admit; and I hope that in whatever part of the world your lot may fall, you may be faithful subjects, and a peaceable and happy people.

“I must also inform you, that it is His Majesty’s pleasure that you remain in security under the inspection and direction of the troops that I have the honor to command.”

They were prisoners. ‘‘They were greatly struck,” says he, “though I believe they did not imagine that they were actually to be removed.”

The church served as a prison for them, and their families were notified to bring them food. “Thus,” says Winslow in his Journal, “ended the memorable 5th of September, a day of great fatigue and trouble.”

Before proceeding further, I will stop to consider one of the important assertions of the Proclamation and of the edict of expulsion. Winslow declares: “I have received” .... “the King's instructions, which I have in mg hand” .... “Hi's Majesty's final resolution _ . . “The peremptory orders of His Majesty are” . . . . Nothing could be more positive. Winslow held in his hand the instructions of His Majesty. And yet nothing could be more false. The falsity of these declarations is proved, beyond the slightest doubt, by an official document, authentic and precise, by a letter from the Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Robinson, to Lawrence, which is in the volume of the Archives.

I have cited, in a preceding chapter, the despatch which Lawrence addressed to the Lords of Trade on June 28th, shortly after the capitulation of Beausejour. In this despatch he informed them that, on taking the fort, he had found therein 150 soldiers and 300 Acadians: “The deserted Acadians,” he said, “delivered up their arms; I gave orders to Colonel Monckton at all events to expel from the country the deserted Acadians, although, if he needed their services to put the troops under cover, lie might first make use of them for that purpose.”

Lawrence had made this passage purposely ambiguous. Did he mean to expel all the Acadians who dwelt in the north of the Peninsula, or the Acadian refugees, or merely the three hundred men found armed at the surrender of the Fort? The most obvious interpretation seemed to be that he meant all the Acadian refugees, who were in considerable numbers. The reply of the Secretary of State shows that these violent measures, which nothing seemed to justify, had thrown himself and the Lords of Trade into great alarm. This letter is dated August 13tli, about six weeks after Lawrence’s : so that it must have been written without any delay. And, to signify the importance which the Lords of Trade attached to it, this reply, by an exceedingly rare exception, was made in the name of the Secretary of State himself ; and, to emphasize it still more, its essential passages were underlined.

Here are its essential parts:

. . . . “Whatever construction may be put upon the word PardonnS in the fourth article of the capitulation of Beausejour, it is observed by your letter of the 28th of June, that you had given orders to Colonel Monckton to drive the deserted French inhabitants at all events out of the country. It does not clearly appear whether you mean to drive away all the Acadians of the Peninsula, which amount to many thousand, or such of them, as you say, as were living in the neighborhood of Beausejour, or, lastly, whether you mean, only such as were found at Beausejour, when evacuated by the garrison ; the latter seems rather to have been your intention, as you add, that if M. Monckton wants the assistanee of the deserted Acadians, in putting the troops-under cover, he might first make them do all the service in their power. Let your intention have been what it will, it is not doubted but that you have considered the pernicious consequences that may arise from, an alarm-which may have been given to the whole body of the French Neutrals and how suddenly an insurrection may follow from despair, or what an additional number of useful subjects may be given by their flight to the French King. It cannot, therefore, be too much recommended to you, to use the greatest caution and prudence in your conduct towards these Neutrals, and to assure such of them, as may be trusted, specially upon their taking the oath, that they may remain in the quiet possession of their settlements under proper regulations. What has led me to a more particular notice of this part of your letter, is the following proposal, that was made no longer ago than in the month of May last by the French ambassador, viz. : That all the French inhabitants of the Peninsula, should have three years allowed them to remove-from thence with their effects, and should be favored with all means of facilitating this removal, which the English would, undoubtedly, look upon as very advantageous to themselves. Whereupon, His Britannic Majesty was pleased to order an answer to be given,, which I now send you for your particular information in the following words, viz.: In regard to the three years transmigration proposed for the Acadians of the Peninsula, it would be depriving Great Britain of a very considerable number of useful subjects, if such, transmigration should extend to those who were inhabitants there at the time of the treaty and to their’ descendants.”

One could scarcely be more explicit. This reply is a formal condemnation, not merely of any such hideous plan as Lawrence’s deportation, but even of expulsion in any form, not merely of the Peninsular Acadians, nor of those who dwelt in the territory lately occupied by the French, but even of those who were found armed an the Fort at the capitulation of Beausejour. The letter also condemns Lawrence’s interpretation of the word pardonne (forgiven) with respect to this last class of Acadians. As will be seen further on, Lawrence pretended that the word pardonne simply meant that '.they would not be put to death. It is easy to see that the Secretary of State did not understand it in that -way. By obvious implication, what he says amounts to Ibis: I do not admit your interpretation of the word j>ardonn4; in virtue of this clause of the capitulation they could not be expelled, nor punished, nor disturbed .for the part they had taken in the siege of Beausejour; but, supposing that your interpretation were allowable, the consequences of an expulsion as to these would be itoo pernicious to allow it to be carried out.

The whole question of the views and responsibility of the Home Government as to the deportation is .summed up in this despatch of the Secretary of State. It formally condemns that cruel deed : for it condemns a partial expulsion that was infinitely less cruel and unjust than the deportation. And this opinion the Secretary of State had formulated after the receipt of Lawrence’s letter of June 28th, after the fall of Beausejour, in spite of false representations. Nor could subsequent ,events have altered his opinion, since, as we have seen, nothing happened after this date that could modify ifiuch a carefully formed opinion; on the contrary, the Acadians showed the most unlimited submissiveness-under intolerable provocations and persecution. And was in the better to accentuate the views of the British' Government, we read, in this letter of the Secretary of State, that His Majesty had just refused to the French Ambassador a permission to depart which the Acadians had solicited, because “it would be depriving Great Britain of a very considerable number of useful subjects.” By the way, it may be proper to remark that this, refusal, as formulated in the above letter, seems to imply leave to depart, within three years with their movable effects, to all those living outside the Peninsula. At any rate, what a difference between the language of wise and enlightened statesmen and that of a wretched upstart, unfeeling aud heartless like Lawrence! And how bitter must have been his oppression, when it drove men that clung so tenaciously to their country and property to implore that they might be-allowed to leave ! Is this the behavior of people prone to resistance?

At the date of this despatch of Sir Thomas Robinson’s, Monckton, Handfield, Murray, and Winslow had already-been ten days in possession of their orders for the deportation, and Lawrence was attending to the preparations therefor with feverish energy. The haste with which lie worked can scarcely be explained except by his fear of receiving a snub that would put an end to his projects.

All the contents of this despatch are a flat contradiction of Lawrence’s conduct at the time. While the one counselled moderation and kindness, the other was doing-his best to drive the Acadians to that despair against which Sir Thomas Robinson warned him. But, in spite of his seizure of arms, of boats, of archives, of -priests, and his imprisoning one hundred and fifteen of the principal citizens, lie was at his wits’ end; he could not drive them to despair. He had gone beyond what he thought would justify resistance unto death, and he had not even provoked the slightest disobedience.

“I beg leave to ask,” says Casgrain, who has written an eloquent comment of this despatch of the English Secretary of State, “what was there in common between the barbarous behavior of Lawrence and the instructions, so humane, so conciliatory, of the British Cabinet? Is it not evident that Lawrence most firmly resolved to rid himself at any cost of the Acadians, the most inveterate enemies to our religion, as he hypocritically said in the despatch wherein he afterwards announced the deportation? What wonder if, after such treatment, they were afraid to take the unqualified oath he required of them with the severity of a Roman proconsul ? And, what is most incredible is that, after all this intimidation, when those of them who finally made up their minds to take an oatli so formidable m their eyes presented themselves before Lawrence, instead of welcoming them with extreme wariness and prudence and ensuring to them the tranquil possession of their lands, as Sir Thomas Robinson enjoined him to do, he rejected their offer with disdain, and told them ‘ that, it was too late, and that henceforth they would be treated as Popish recusants.”’

Was the oath mentioned in this despatch of the Secretary of State? Yes; but not in a way to oblige Lawrence to impose it, since, after the other recommendations I have just commented on, Sir Thomas adds: “and to assure such of them as may be trusted, specially upon their taking the oath, that they may remain in the quiet possession of their settlements under proper regulations.” Was this not equivalent to saying: Allow those who will consent to take the oath the quiet possession of their settlements; and do not molest those who should refuse, but avoid any imprudence towards these latter, so as to induce them to take the oath of their own accord ?

There is no mistaking the drift of this despatch. It breathes the same spirit as all previous dispatches from the same source. Despite the misrepresentations of Lawrence and of some of bis predecessors, the Lords of Trade were pretty accurately informed of the situation; it was not easy to deceive them out and out; besides, they naturally inferred that, since the few refugees who took up arms did so only under threat of death, there was nothing to fear from those who remained quiet on their lands. That scruple about military service on the part of men who, willingly or not, had crossed the frontier, when the -withdrawal of the neutral status they had hitherto enjoyed and bad accepted as a condition of their stay in the country gave them clearly the right to fight for France, was a signal proof of their sincerity and rectitude. Such facts could be appreciated by the Lords of Trade even through the intentional mist of official documents. As against these men expulsion was an injustice, as against the others a crime. Hut when, in lieu of expulsion pure and simple, it becomes a deportation into foreign colonies, depositing them here and there in places far distant from each other, without any effort to keep families together, the act takes on the proportions of an indescribable monstrosity.

“There have been instances, in the annals of the past,” says Philip II. Smith, “in which a country has. been desolated in time of actual war, and where the inhabitants were found in arms; but we defy all past history to produce a parallel case, in which an unarmed and peaceable people have suffered to such an extent as did the French Neutrals of Acadia.”

Bancroft, the eminent historian of the United States, has thus stigmatized the deportation: “These unfortunate Acadians were guilty of no other crime than their attachment to France. I know not if the annals of the human species have preserved the memory of woes inflicted with so much complacency, cruelty and persistence.”

John Clark Ridpath, another well-known American historian, refers to it as follows: “Governor Lawrence and Admiral Boscawen, in conference with the Chief Justice of the Province (Belcher), settled upon the atrocious measure of driving the people into banishment. The first movement was to demand an oath of allegiance which was so framed that they could not take it. The next step on the part of the English was to accuse the Acadians of treason and to demand the surrender of all their firearms and boats. To this measure the broken-hearted people also submitted. They even offered to take the oath, but Lawrence declared that, having once refused, they must now take the consequences. The history of civilized nations furnishes no parallel to this wanton and wicked destruction of an inoffensive colony.”

The Rev. Andrew Brown, who lived at Halifax shortly after the deportation, and who knew better than any one else the extent of this crime and the circumstances that accompanied it, says in the MS. already quoted: “I can take upon me, from a painful examination of the whole matter, to assert that Haynal neither knew nor suspected the tenth part of the distress of the Acadians, and that, excepting the massacre of St. Bartholomew, I know of no act equally reprehensible as the Acadian deportation that can be laid to the charge of the French nation. In their colonies, nothing was ever done that at all approaches to it in cruelty and atrociousness.”

A considerable number of writers might be quoted who have, all condemned the deportation just as severely. Strictly speaking, not one has entirely approved it. He who comes nearest to an approval is Parkman. Some seem to have striven earnestly to extenuate the guilt of the Provincial Government and to throw as much blame as they could on the Acadians. In this there is nothing surprising, nothing that would call for scathing reproof. At most they may be charged with thoughtlessness or want of perspicacity. Unless one had been able to penetrate the interested motives of Lawrence and his councillors, it was natural to suppose that there must have been some excuse, and, as they did not ferret out the true motives, their well-meant efforts and inferences are not blameworthy. Most of those who have related these events are English writers, and it is creditable to them as well as consoling for all, that the great majority of them have had the courage and the candor to condemn an act that seriously affected the honor of their nation. It is a consolation for me, and it must be so for every born British subject, that the Home Government had nothing to do with this infamous project. The despatch of the Secretary of State establishes beyond a doubt that Lawrence was usurping powers that he neither had nor could have had, that Winslow was lying when he affirmed in his edict of expulsion that he held in his hand His Majesty’s instructions ordering the deportation; and it is not surprising that the Acadians, up to the last moment, refused to believe him, as Winslow himself says.

This despatch of the Secretary of State, dated August 18th, could, under ordinary circumstances, reach Halifax about the 15th, or the 20th of September, forty days before the general exodus of the Acadians ; and yet Lawrence did not reply to it till the 30tlx of November, three months and a half after its date. Are we to suppose that Lawrence received it within the usual time, or at least before the embarkation, and that he purposely refrained from answering it till November 30th, with a view to escape the imputation of disobedience, or that the letter was really so long in coming ? Had he received it when, on October 18th, he wrote to the Lords of Trade announcing that the deportation was partly executed, which, by the way, was false ? I am inclined to think he had: for even at that date, two months and five days—much more than the average time for a passage from London to Halifax—had elapsed. Lawrence’s last letter was dated July 18th; so that he had been exactly three months without communicating with the Lords of Trade. As at such an extraordinary juncture be was more than usually bound to keep them well informed of everything that happened, we cannot help concluding that this long silence was intentional. Doubtless, in the case of the Secretary of State’s despatch, the long delay may be attributed to the uncertainties of navigation in those days; but, when we have to deal with so artful a dodger as Lawrence, we are warranted in closely scrutinizing all his actions, and, in suspecting him wherever his interest may give rise to suspicion. And in this connection, it will be advisable to anticipate a little and examine just here all the letters exchanged on this subject between Lawrence and the Lords of Trade.

In his letter of October 18th Lawrence announces the deportation, and does it with the same artfulness and the same want of feeling that mark all his acts. He is laconic as to the details of the deportation; he speaks of it like a merchant writing about a cargo of merchandise, for which time and expense are the only really important considerations:

“Since my last of the 18tli of July, the Acadian deputies have appeared before the council to give their final answer to the proposal about the oath; they have persistently refused, ami though every means were used to point out their interest, and sufficient time given to consider, nothing would induce them to acquiesce in any measures consistent with His Majesty's honour or the security of this Province. Upon this behaviour, the Council came to a resolution to oblige them to quit the colony, and immediately took into consideration what might he the speediest, cheapest and easiest method of giving this resolution its intended effect. We easily foresaw that driving them out by force to Canada, would be attended with difficulty, and would have reinforced those settlements with a very considerable body of men who were ever universally the most inveterate enemies to our religion.

“The only means of preventing their return, or their collecting themselves again into a large body, was distributing them along the colonies from Georgia to New England. Accordingly, the vessels were hired at the cheapest rates ; the embarkation is now in great forwardness, and I am in hopes that there will not be one remaining by the end of next month.

“I have taken all the care in my power to lessen the expense; the vessels were most of them bound to the places where the Acadians were destined, and by that means are hired greatly cheaper. They have hitherto been victualled with their own provisions, and will be supplied for the passage with those taken at Beausejour as far as they will go.

“In order to save as many of the Acadian cattle as possible, I have given some of them among such of the English settlers as have the means of feeding them."

After saying that one of the good results of this exodus will be to afford excellent lands ready for tillage, he adds:

“As the French priests Chauvreulx, Daudin and Le Haire to ere of no further use in this Province, Yice-Admiral Boscawen has been so good as to take them on board his fleet, and is to give them a passage to England.”

The rest of the letter, which is a tolerably long one, treats of the fortifications of Beausejour, of Bay Verte, of the River St. John, etc., just as if these matters were the main object of his letter, and what concerned the deportation were merely an incident of secondary importance among the many details of his administration. The picture would have been incomplete had not Lawrence donned the mantle of religion and patriotism with which to cloak his crime—criminals on a large scale affect this method of self-defence—and so he deemed it good policy to dub the Acadians “the most inveterate enemies to our religion” and to represent them as refusing to acquiesce “in any measures consistent with His Majesty's honour.”

It is easy to imagine the worry and anxiety Lawrence must have have felt at being obliged to inform the Lords of Trade of so portentous an event as the deportation of an entire people. However, it had to be done. To make this announcement before the embarkation, while acknowledging receipt of the Secretary’s despatch were impossible unless Lawrence were prepared to suspend operations. To proceed with the deportation in spite of the Secretary’s known remonstrance were to condemn himself and to close every loophole of excuse. To make the announcement, even after the embarkation, but while acknowledging having received this despatch, were highly impolitic. The safer course would be to ignore the despatch, to pretend to act on his own responsibility as if he had not yet received any reply from England. Such were, I think, the motives that determined Lawrence to announce the deportation on October 1.8th without acknowledging receipt of the despatch of August 13th. Before replying to the latter he wanted to give himself time to prepare the way. Boscawen had left Halifax toward the end of October to return to England. As Lawrence had persuaded him to share the responsibility of his own acts, he had in him an accomplice highly interested in justifying the deportation ; but this accomplice must be allowed all the time needed to circumvent the Lords of Trade. Thus it was not till November 30th that Lawrence finally made up his mind to answer this awkward despatch.

The Compiler, as is his wont, has put asterisks in lieu of the first part of this very important letter. Probably, what is omitted would confirm my view ; but what we have is enough. We are now sufficiently accustomed to these omissions to understand their hidden meaning. In this letter of November 8th Lawrence explains at considerable length what he understood by the “ deserted Acadians.” He applies the term to those who had voluntarily crossed the frontier; it was these he meant in his letter of June 28th. Passing on to that article of the Beausejour capitulation which referred to them, to wit:

“Concerning the Acadians found in the Fort, as they took up arms under pain of death, they are pardoned," he thinks that the word pardoned merely signified that they would not be put to death.

“It was with these inhabitants alone that Lieut.-Col. Monckton had anything to do, for we could not easily at that time/ora any Conjecture what, turn the inhabitants of the Peninsula would take upon the surrender of Beausejour, when it was thought they could entertain no further hopes of assistance from the French. But when we found the Acadians who had not deserted their lands, entertained the same disloyal sentiments with those who had, and positively rejected the oath of allegiance, we thought it high time to resolve, as well for His Majesty's honour as the immediate preservation of the province, that the whole Acadians, as well those who had not deserted as those who had, should be embarked aboard Transports and dispersed among the neighbouring colonies. By much the greater part of them are sailed, and I flatter myself by this time the whole. I will not trouble you with any further account of this measure, having had already the honour to lay it fully before you in my letter of the 18th of October.”

Let us note some of the false statements in this letter. Lawrence’s interpretation of the word pardoned shows that he had no respect for solemn engagements, because that interpretation is altogether inadmissible. When he declares that the Acadians who crossed the frontier did so willingly, he knew that he was lying, for he was aware that the Indians had forced them to do so by burning their houses, and that they had applied for leave to return to their lands, though their situation on the other side of the frontier was perfectly justifiable. His boldest piece of deception, however, is his affirmation that he was obliged to include the Peninsular Acadians in his deportation scheme because, after the taking of Beausejour, they entertained the same disloyal sentiments. Now I have proved that, even while Beausjour was besieged, Lawrence seized a part of tlieir fire-arms by fraud, that they delivered up the remainder of their arms together with their boats 011 a mere order, that, a fortnight later, without insubordination on their part, without any act that might be construed as disloyal, the deportation was virtually decided upon, nay, that it was a settled purpose long before the fall of Beausejour. True, their loyalty, under his government, could scarcely rest on sentiment—man not being made to love chains nor those who rivet them on —but it rested on a sense of duty and of self-interest; which was quite as much as could be required, and far more than could be expected under such oppression.

As may be seen, the details in this letter, as well as in that of October 18th, are very scanty. Lawrence must, indeed, have been loath to dwell upon the facts, since in doing so he would have had to lay bare hateful proceedings of his own followed by a submission so complete as to open the eyes of his superiors ; he would have had to explain that the Acadians had neither arms nor boats, and therefore were incapable of disturbing the peace of the country, had they wished to give trouble. But, a truce to comments; the reader is now sufficiently enlightened to be able to seize, without any help from me, all the craftiness of this letter, which, viewed in all its malignity, contains nothing to justify the deportation or, for that matter, any other measure of expulsion.

The following letter of the Lords of Trade to Lawrence, dated March 25th of the following year (1756), completes the correspondence on this subject, so far as it is known to us:

“We look upon a war between us and France as inevitable. . .

“We have laid that part of your letter which relates to the removal of the Acadians and the steps you took in the execution of this measure before His Majesty’s Secretary of State ; and, as you represent it to have been indispensably necessary for the security and protection of the Province in the present critical situation of our affaire, we doubt not but that your conduct herein vs ill meet with His Majesty's approbation.”

Owing to the importance of the matter, it had been referred to the Secretary of State. Under these circumstances it was fitting that the Lords of Trade should express no opinion, and their reply is but the official intimation that the question had been submitted to the consideration of a higher authority. Lawrence had had time to use the influence of his friends; the war, already existing de facto was about to be officially proclaimed; in the din of battle, amid the anxieties of a long and desperate war this matter was lost sight of, the accomplished fact was accepted or put up with: Lawrence was or seemed to be safe. He felt he had run great risks; but, like a bold and lucky gambler, he had won. The wolf is not always killed for eating the lamb.

These letters save the honor of the British Government from all responsibility ante factum in this crime. They are published in the volume of the Archives ; all those who have written on this subject since 1869 could consult them. How comes it, then, that neither Campbell, nor Hannay, nor Parkman mention them? Rameau, Casgrain and Brown are the only writers who refer to them. Haliburton and Murdoch wrote before the publication of the Archives, at a time when many official documents and certainly Lawrence’s letters in the years 1755 and 1756 had been withdrawn. The Compiler succeeded in procuring in London duplicates of the letters exchanged between Halifax and the Metropolis, among which, I suppose, are those I have reproduced. What, then, can have been the object of Parkman and others in ignoring so completely letters so important? I have sought for some answer to this question, and I must confess that no solution has seemed fully satisfactory in the case of some writers otherwise worthy of respect. There is surely no great difficulty in making out the gist of these letters ; their meaning is perfectly clear and calls for no special exercise of perspicacity. All that is needed is a little patience in order to disentangle and readjust the data scattered through a maze of documents. Xo doubt the historians of this epoch, as a general rule, have not given themselves the trouble to penetrate the true inwardness of events; but this rule must admit of some exceptions. There is, of course, the obvious difficulty that the declarations of Lawrence and Winslow to the Acadians contradict the official documents of the Home Office; but those declarations are valueless if not based on these official documents, and worse than useless if they contradict the latter. Did the historians I allude to fear to ruin their theory of justification which they were attempting to palm off on the public ? They would be sure to save England’s honor by relieving the British Cabinet of all responsibility, so far as a Government can be acquitted of complicity with its officers; but, then, they must expose to view the plot in all its repulsive crudeness, they must sacrifice Lawrence and his council, they must give up trying to defend them. They seem to have preferred saving both Lawrence and the Home Office at the risk of saving neither—a not unprecedented proceeding. However, this explanation cannot apply to Campbell, who, after strenuously striving to magnify the faults of the Acadians and minimize those of Lawrence and his accomplices, probably so as to explain what seemed to him unexplainable otherwise, ends by condemning the deportation in the following terms:

“The transportation of the Acadians in the manner executed was a blunder, and it is' far more manly to acknowledge it as such than vainly to attempt to palliate or to excuse conduct at which, when coolly viewed in relation to its consequences, the moral instincts of mankind shudder.”

I am equally reluctant to include Hannay among the historians who defend both Lawrence and the Home Office, for, in spite of his unjustifiable inferences, he seems impartial as to facts. Parkman’s case is quite other.

When the Rev. Andrew Brown was collecting, at Halifax in 1787, documents for the history that he purposed publishing, the suppression of those that bore on the period of the deportation does not seem to have been as complete as it was later on. He who had had the rare advantage of conversing with the authors and witnesses of this drama, who had sounded and, so to speak, handled the gigantic fraud at the bottom of it all, who sought nothing but the truth and honest excuses if they existed, immediately realized the immense importance of the despatch of the Secretary of State (August 13th). His patriotism had received a rude shock; his heart, one feels, had bled at the humiliation inflicted on the fair fame of his country ; his brain was in a whirl at the recital of the inconceivable misfortunes heaped upon a whole people; and now it is a pleasure to see with what intense satisfaction he notes the discovery of this precious document. lie appends to it this short comment: “This important I ... Government at least innocent!” It was no mere comment, but lather a shout of joy bursting from his breast; his soul was relieved of the weight that was crushing it, the honor of his country was saved or partly saved. Thus does great emotion find vent. This exclamation of his involuntarily recalls that other cry of Archimedes. Brown too had his eureka, and if he did not run shouting through the streets of Halifax, he doubtless gave full play, in the secret of his sanctum, to his transports of delight. Parkman has also read the same document; but the animus of these two men is very different; Parkman utters no cry of relief. What delighted the one, perhaps affrighted the other. The former wished to fasten the guilt on some other than the Government; the latter wanted, it seems, to whitewash both. While the one purposed bringing this document to light and giving it all its importance, the other whispered to himself: I must suppress it; I must put this light under a bushel. That private note: “Government at. least innocent''’ is more telling in praise of Brown’s moral rectitude than whole volumes of polished platitudes. Hitherto he had believed that the Home Office must have ordered the deportation; yet his conviction that it was an iniquity had not faltered; but now, though others of his race were guilty, thank God it was not the Government in London. He understood that if the self-respecting historian can, when hard pressed, grant his country the benefit of the doubt, he is in duty strictly bound to state facts as they are, be they ever so distasteful.

A little further on, Brown interjects this other remark:

“The Lords of Trade extremely guarded!”—“No blame imputable to them oil the subject.”

Considering that Parkman found Brown’s manuscript, from beginning to end, a condemnation of all that he was writing on the deportation, it is not surprising that he maintains with regard to it an absolute silence. Pichon suited him infinitely better.

Before Brown had remarked the usurpation of royal authority, Abbe Le Guerne had done so, soon after the shipping of the Acadians: “Mr. Lawrence,’’ he says, “Governor of Chibouctou (Halifax). . . determined, without consulting the Court of London, to expatriate the Acadians and disperse them in the various countries of New England.”