CHRONICLES OF CANADA

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Vol. 14.

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CHRONICLES OF CANADA

Edited by George M. Wrong and H. H. Langton

In thirty-two volumes

14

THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES

BY WILLIAM WOOD

Part IV

The Beginnings of British Canada

SIR ISAAC BROCK

From a miniature in possession of Miss Sara Mickle, Toronto

THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES

A Chronicle of *1812*

BY

WILLIAM WOOD



TORONTO
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1920

PRESS OF THE HUNTER-ROSE CO., LIMITED, TORONTO

TO

F. J. COCKBURN

MY VERY GOOD FRIEND

AFLOAT

AND ASHORE

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS


Michilimackinac is 225 miles
N.N.W. of Detroit
RIVER ST CLAIR
DETROIT
2
R. Rouge
R. Huron
Huron Ch Town
LAKE
ST CLAIR
Turkey R.
Maguaga
Grand Marsh
Grosse I.
Raisin
Rauxdanards
Amherstburg
E. Chenaux
Morquian Village
6
R. Thames
Formerly Indian Village
Moravian town
KENT
ESSEX
Frenchtown
4
Loyalist Settlements
Fort Miamis
Miamis Bay
Cedar Pt.
Middle Sister
Pidgeon B.
SUFFOLK
5
Put-in Bay
South Foreland or Pt Pelée
Pt aux Pins or Landguard
Cunningham Pt Pelée I.
Portage
Sandusky I.
Fort Stephenson
4
Portage
LA
Rocky R.
Cayuga R.
R. Shogan
R. Biche
Grand River
N

CHAPTER I

OPPOSING CLAIMS

NTERNATIONAL disputes that end in war are ıot generally questions of absolute right and vrong. They may quite as well be questions f opposing rights. But, when there are rights n both sides, it is usually found that the side vhich takes the initiative is moved by its ıational desires as well as by its claims of ight.

This could hardly be better exemplified than y the vexed questions which brought about he War of 1812. The British were fighting or life and liberty against Napoleon. Napoleon vas fighting to master the whole of Europe. 'he United States wished to make as much as ossible out of unrestricted trade with both elligerents. But Napoleon's Berlin Decree orbade all intercourse whatever with the Brit-h, while the British Orders-in-Council for-ade all intercourse whatever with Napoleon nd his allies, except on condition that the

trade should first pass through British po
Between two such desperate antagonists th
was no safe place for an unarmed, indep
dent, ' free-trading ' neutral. Every one
forced to take sides. The British being ov
whelmingly strong at sea, while the Fre
were correspondingly strong on land, Ameri
shipping was bound to suffer more from
British than from the French. The Fre
seized every American vessel that infrin
the Berlin Decree whenever they could man
to do so. But the British seized so many m
for infringing the Orders-in-Council that
Americans naturally began to take sides w
the French.

Worse still, from the American point
view, was the British Right of Search, wh
meant the right of searching neutral merch
vessels either in British waters or on the h
seas for deserters from the Royal Navy. Ev
other people whose navy could enforce it
always claimed a similar right. But ot
peoples' rights had never clashed with Am
can interests in at all the same way. W
really roused the American government
not the abstract Right of Search, but its
forcement at a time when so many ha
aboard American vessels were British subj

vading service in their own Navy. The merican theory was that the flag covered the rew wherever the ship might be. Such a heory might well have been made a question or friendly debate and settlement at any other me. But it was a new theory, advanced by new nation, whose peculiar and most disrbing entrance on the international scene ould not be suffered to upset the accepted ate of things during the stress of a life-and-eath war. Under existing circumstances the ritish could not possibly give up their long-tablished Right of Search without committing national suicide. Neither could they lax their own blockade so long as Napoleon aintained his. The Right of Search and the ouble blockade of Europe thus became two exed questions which led straight to war.

But the American grievances about these vo questions were not the only motives impelling the United States to take up arms. here were two deeply rooted national desires ging them on in the same direction. A good any Americans were ready to seize any ance of venting their anti-British feeling; d most Americans thought they would only fulfilling their proper 'destiny' by wresting e whole of Canada from the British crown.

These two national desires worked both wa
for war — supporting the government ca
against the British Orders-in-Council a
Right of Search on the one hand, wh
welcoming an alliance with Napoleon on t
other. Americans were far from being una
mous; and the party in favour of peace w
not slow to point out that Napoleon sto
for tyranny, while the British stood for fr
dom. But the adherents of the war party
minded each other, as well as the British a
the French, that Britain had wrested Cana
from France, while France had helped
wrest the Thirteen Colonies from the Brit
Empire.

As usual in all modern wars, there was mu
official verbiage about the national claims a
only unofficial talk about the national desi
But, again as usual, the claims became
more insistent because of the desires, and
desires became the more patriotically respe
able because of the claims of right. 'F
Trade and Sailors' Rights' was the popu
catchword that best describes the two stro
claims of the United States. 'Down with
British' and 'On to Canada' were the phra
that best reveal the two impelling natio
desires.

Both the claims and the desires seem quite mple in themselves. But, in their connection ith American politics, international affairs, nd opposing British claims, they are com- lex to the last degree. Their complexities, ndeed, are so tortuous and so multitudinous hat they baffle description within the limits f the present book. Yet, since nothing can e understood without some reference to its ntecedents, we must take at least a bird's- ye view of the growing entanglement which nally resulted in the War of 1812.

The relations of the British Empire with the nited States passed through four gradually arkening phases between 1783 and 1812— he phases of Accommodation, Unfriendliness, ostility, and War. Accommodation lasted om the recognition of Independence till the d of the century. Unfriendliness then began ith President Jefferson and the Democrats. ostility followed in 1807, during Jefferson's cond term, when Napoleon's Berlin Decree nd the British Orders-in-Council brought merican foreign relations into the five-year isis which ended with the three-year war.

William Pitt, for the British, and John Jay, e first chief justice of the United States, are

the two principal figures in the Accommod
tion period. In 1783 Pitt, who, like his fathe
the great Earl of Chatham, was favourab
disposed towards the Americans, introduc
a temporary measure in the British House
Commons to regulate trade with what w
now a foreign country ' on the most enlarg
principles of reciprocal benefit ' as well as '
terms of most perfect amity with the Unit
States of America.' This bill, which show
the influence of Adam Smith's principles
Pitt's receptive mind, favoured American mo
than any other foreign trade in the moth
country, and favoured it to a still grea
extent in the West Indies. Alone amo
foreigners the Americans were to be grant
the privilege of trading between their o
ports and the West Indies, in their own vess
and with their own goods, on exactly the sa
terms as the British themselves. The
was rejected. But in 1794, when the Fren
Revolution was running its course of w
excesses, and the British government was ev
less inclined to trust republics, Jay succeed
in negotiating a temporary treaty which i
proved the position of American sea-borne tra
with the West Indies. His government urg
him to get explicit statements of princi

nserted, more especially anything that would nake cargoes neutral when under neutral ags. This, however, was not possible, as ay himself pointed out. 'That Britain, 'he aid, 'at this period, and involved in war, hould not admit principles which would im- each the propriety of her conduct in seizing rovisions bound to France, and enemy's roperty on board neutral vessels, does not ppear to me extraordinary.' On the whole, ay did very well to get any treaty through at ich a time; and this mere fact shows that he general attitude of the mother country owards her independent children was far om being unfriendly.

Unfriendliness began with the new century, hen Jefferson first came into power. He eated the British navigation laws as if they ad been invented on purpose to wrong Ameri- ns, though they had been in force for a undred and fifty years, and though they had een originally passed, at the zenith of Crom- ell's career, by the only republican govern- ent that ever held sway in England. Jeffer- n said that British policy was so perverse, hat when he wished to forecast the British he of action on any particular point he would rst consider what it ought to be and then

infer the opposite. His official opinion wa
written in the following words: 'It is not t
the moderation or justice of others we are t
trust for fair and equal access to market wit
our productions, or for our due share in th
transportation of them; but to our own mea
of independence, and the firm will to use them
On the subject of impressment, or 'Sailor
Rights,' he was clearer still: 'The simple
rule will be that the vessel being America
shall be evidence that the seamen on boa
of her are such.' This would have prevent
the impressment of British seamen, even
British harbours, if they were under th
American merchant flag—a principle almo
as preposterous, at that particular time,
Jefferson's suggestion that the whole Gu
Stream should be claimed 'as of our waters
If Jefferson had been backed by a unit
public, or if his actions had been suited to h
words, war would have certainly broken o
during his second presidential term, wh
lasted from 1805 to 1809. But he was a pa
man, with many political opponents, a
without unquestioning support from all
his own side, and he cordially hated armi
navies, and even a mercantile marine.
idea of an American Utopia was a comm

ealth with plenty of commerce, but no more
ipping than could be helped.

> I trust [he said] that the good sense of our country will see that its greatest prosperity depends on a due balance between agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and not on this protuberant navigation, which has kept us in hot water since the commencement of our government. . . . It is essentially necessary for us to have shipping and seamen enough to carry our surplus products to market, but beyond that I do not think we are bound to give it encouragement. . . . This exuberant commerce brings us into collision with other Powers in every sea.

Notwithstanding such opinions, Jefferson
ood firm on the question of ' Sailors' Rights.'
e refused to approve a treaty that had been
gned on the last day of 1806 by his four com-
issioners in London, chiefly because it pro-
ded no precise guarantee against impress-
ent. The British ministers had offered, and
ad sincerely meant, to respect all American
ghts, to issue special instructions against
olesting American citizens under any cir-
mstances, and to redress every case of

wrong. But, with a united nation behind them and an implacable enemy in front, they could not possibly give up the right to take British seamen from neutral vessels which were sailing the high seas. The Right of Search was the acknowledged law of nations all round the world; and surrender on this point meant death to the Empire they were bound to guard.

Their 'no surrender' on this vital point was, of course, anathema to Jefferson. Yet he would not go beyond verbal fulminations. In the following year, however, he was nearly forced to draw the sword by one of those incidents that will happen during strained relations. In June 1807 two French men-of-war were lying off Annapolis, a hundred miles up Chesapeake Bay. Far down the bay in Hampton Roads, the American frigate *Chesapeake* was fitting out for sea. Twelve miles below her anchorage a small British squadron lay just within Cape Henry, waiting to follow the Frenchmen out beyond the three-mile limit. As Jefferson quite justly said, this squadron was 'enjoying the hospitality of the United States.' Presently the *Chesapeake* got under way; whereupon the British frigate *Leopard* made sail and cleared

the land ahead of her. Ten miles out the *Leopard* hailed her, and sent an officer aboard to show the American commodore the orders from Admiral Berkeley at Halifax. These orders named certain British deserters as being among the *Chesapeake's* crew. The American commodore refused to allow a search; but submitted after a fight, during which he lost twenty-one men killed and wounded. Four men were then seized. One was hanged; another died; and the other two were subsequently returned with the apologies of the British government.

James Monroe, of Monroe Doctrine fame, was then American minister in London. Canning, the British foreign minister, who heard the news first, wrote an apology on the spot, and promised to make 'prompt and effectual reparation' if Berkeley had been wrong. Berkeley was wrong. The Right of Search did not include the right to search a foreign man-of-war, though, unlike the modern 'right of search,' which is confined to cargoes, it did include the right to search a neutral merchantman on the high seas for any 'national' who was 'wanted.' Canning, however, distinctly stated that the men's nationality would affect the consideration of

restoring them or not. Monroe now had
good case. But he made the fatal mistake
writing officially to Canning before he kne
the details, and, worse still, of diluting h
argument with other complaints which ha
nothing to do with the affair itself. The r
sult was a long and involved correspondenc
a tardy and ungracious reparation, and muc
justifiable resentment on the American side.

Unfriendliness soon became Hostility aft
the *Chesapeake* affair had sharpened the stin
of the Orders-in-Council, which had bee
issued at the beginning of the same year, 180
These celebrated Orders simply meant that s
long as Napoleon tried to blockade the Britis
Isles by enforcing his Berlin Decree, just s
long would the British Navy be employed i
blockading him and his allies. Such decisiv
action, of course, brought neutral shippin
more than ever under the power of the Britis
Navy, which commanded all the seaways t
the ports of Europe. It accentuated th
differences between the American and Britis
governments, and threw the shadow of th
coming storm over the exposed colony
Canada.

Not having succeeded in his struggle fo
'Sailors' Rights,' Jefferson now took up th

udgels for 'Free Trade'; but still without resort to arms. His chosen means of warfare was an Embargo Act, forbidding the departure of vessels from United States ports. This, although nominally aimed against France as well, was designed to make Great Britain submit by cutting off both her and her colonies from all intercourse with the United States. But its actual effect was to hurt Americans, and even Jefferson's own party, far more than it hurt the British. The Yankee skipper already had two blockades against 'Free Trade.' The Embargo Act added a third. Of course it was evaded; and a good deal of shipping went from the United States and passed into Canadian ports under the Union Jack. Jefferson and his followers, however, persisted in taking their own way. So Canada gained from the embargo much of what the Americans were losing. Quebec and Halifax swarmed with contrabandists, who smuggled back return cargoes into the New England ports, which were Federalist in party allegiance, and only too ready to evade or defy the edicts of the Democratic administration. Jefferson had, it is true, the satisfaction of inflicting much temporary hardship on cotton-spinning Manchester. But the

American cotton-growing South suffered eve more.

The American claims of 'Free Trade an Sailors' Rights' were opposed by the Britis counter-claims of the Orders-in-Council an the Right of Search. But 'Down with th British' and 'On to Canada' were withou exact equivalents on the other side. Th British at home were a good deal irritated b so much unfriendliness and hostility behin them while they were engaged with Napoleo in front. Yet they could hardly be describe as anti-American; and they certainly had n wish to fight, still less to conquer, the Unite States. Canada did contain an anti-America element in the United Empire Loyalists, whom the American Revolution had driven from their homes. But her general wish was to b left in peace. Failing that, she was prepare for defence.

Anti-British feeling probably animated a least two-thirds of the American people o every question that caused international fric tion; and the Jeffersonian Democrats, wh were in power, were anti-British to a man So strong was this feeling among them tha they continued to side with France even whe she was under the military despotism o

Napoleon. He was the arch-enemy of England in Europe. They were the arch-enemy of England in America. This alone was enough to overcome their natural repugnance to his autocratic ways. Their position towards the British was such that they could not draw back from France, whose change of government had made her a more efficient anti-British friend. 'Let us unite with France and stand or fall together' was the cry the Democratic press repeated for years in different forms. It was strangely prophetic. Jefferson's Embargo Act of 1808 began its self-injurious career at the same time that the Peninsular War began to make the first injurious breach in Napoleon's Continental System. Madison's declaration of war in 1812 coincided with the opening of Napoleon's disastrous campaign in Russia.

The Federalists, the party in favour of peace with the British, included many of the men who had done most for Independence; and they were all, of course, above suspicion as patriotic Americans. But they were not unlike transatlantic, self-governing Englishmen. They had been alienated by the excesses of the French Revolution; and they could not condone the tyranny of Napoleon. They

preferred American statesmen of the type o Washington and Hamilton to those of th type of Jefferson and Madison. And the were not inclined to be more anti-British tha the occasion required. They were strongest i New England and New York. The Democrat were strongest throughout the South and i what was then the West. The Federalist had been in power during the Accommodatio period. The Democrats began with Unfriend liness, continued with Hostility, and ende with War.

The Federalists did not hesitate to spea their mind. Their loss of power had sharpene their tongues; and they were often no mor generous to the Democrats and to Franc than the Democrats were to them and to th British. But, on the whole, they made fo goodwill on both sides, as well as for a bette understanding of each other's rights an difficulties; and so they made for peace The general current, however, was agains them, even before the *Chesapeake* affair; an several additional incidents helped to quicke it afterwards. In 1808 the toast of th President of the United States was receive with hisses at a great public dinner in Londor given to the leaders of the Spanish revol

ainst Napoleon by British admirers. In
11 the British sloop-of-war *Little Belt* was
erhauled by the American frigate *President*
ty miles off-shore and forced to strike, after
ing thirty-two men and being reduced to
nere battered hulk. The vessels came into
nge after dark; the British seem to have
ed first; and the Americans had the further
cuse that they were still smarting under
e *Chesapeake* affair. Then, in 1812, an Irish
venturer called Henry, who had been doing
ne secret-service work in the United States
the instance of the Canadian governor-
neral, sold the duplicates of his correspond-
ce to President Madison. These were of
le real importance; but they added fuel
the Democratic fire in Congress just when
ti-British feeling was at its worst.

The fourth cause of war, the desire to con-
er Canada, was by far the oldest of all. It
s older than Independence, older even than
British conquest of Canada. In 1689
ter Schuyler, mayor of Albany, and the
knowledged leader of the frontier districts,
d set forth his 'Glorious Enterprize' for the
quest and annexation of New France.
ips's American invasion next year, carried
in complete independence of the home

government, had been an utter failure. had the second American invasion, led Montgomery and Arnold during the Revo tionary War, nearly a century later. But t Americans had not forgotten their long sire; and the prospect of another war at o revived their hopes. They honestly believ that Canada would be much better off as integral part of the United States than a British colony; and most of them believ that Canadians thought so too. The less of the invasion of the 'Fourteenth Colon during the Revolution had not been lear The alacrity with which Canadians had st to arms after the *Chesapeake* affair was lit heeded. And both the nature and the streng of the union between the colony and Empire were almost entirely misunderstood

Henry Clay, one of the most warlike of Democrats, said: 'It is absurd to suppose t we will not succeed in our enterprise agai the enemy's Provinces. I am not for stopp at Quebec or anywhere else; but I would t the whole continent from them, and ask th no favours. I wish never to see peace till do. God has given us the power and means. We are to blame if we do not them.' Eustis, the American Secretary of W

d : ' We can take Canada without soldiers. e have only to send officers into the Pro- ces, and the people, disaffected towards ir own Government, will rally round our ndard.' And Jefferson summed it all up prophesying that ' the acquisition of Canada s year, as far as the neighbourhood of ebec, will be a mere matter of marching.' hen the leaders talked like this, it was no nder their followers thought that the long- rished dream of a conquered Canada was last about to come true.

CHAPTER II

OPPOSING FORCES

AN armed mob must be very big indeed bef
it has the slightest chance against a small
disciplined army.

So very obvious a statement might well
taken for granted in the history of any ordin
war. But '1812' was not an ordinary w
It was a sprawling and sporadic war; an
was waged over a vast territory by wid
scattered and singularly heterogeneous fo
on both sides. For this reason it is extrem
difficult to view and understand as one c
nected whole. Partisan misrepresentation
never had a better chance. Americans h
dwelt with justifiable pride on the frigate d
out at sea and the two flotilla battles on
Lakes. But they have usually forgotten t
though they won the naval battles, the Bri
won the purely naval war. The mot
country British, on the other hand, have m
too much of their one important victory

a, have passed too lightly over the lessons the other duels there, and have forgotten w long it took to sweep the Stars and Stripes ay from the Atlantic. Canadians have, of urse, devoted most attention to the British ctories won in the frontier campaigns on nd, which the other British have heeded too tle and Americans have been only too xious to forget. Finally, neither the Cana-ans, nor the mother-country British, nor yet e Americans, have often tried to take a mprehensive view of all the operations by nd and sea together.

The character and numbers of the opposing rces have been even less considered and even ore misunderstood. Militia victories have en freely claimed by both sides, in defiance the fact that the regulars were the really cisive factor in every single victory won either side, afloat or ashore. The popu-notions about the numbers concerned are ually wrong. The totals were far greater an is generally known. Counting every man o ever appeared on either side, by land or , within the actual theatre of war, the ited grand total reaches seven hundred usand. This was most unevenly divided tween the two opponents. The Americans

had about 575,000, the British about 125,0
But such a striking difference in numbers w
matched by an equally striking difference
discipline and training. The Americans h
more than four times as many men. T
British had more than four times as mu
discipline and training.

The forces on the American side were a sm
navy and a swarm of privateers, a sm
regular army, a few 'volunteers,' still fe
'rangers,' and a vast conglomeration of r
militia. The British had a detachment fr
the greatest navy in the world, a very sm
'Provincial Marine' on the Lakes and the
Lawrence, besides various little subsidi
services afloat, including privateers. Th
army consisted of a very small but latte
much increased contingent of Imperial regul
a few Canadian regulars, more Canadian mili
and a very few Indians. Let us pass all th
forces in review.

The American Navy. During the Revo
tion the infant Navy had begun a career
brilliant promise; and Paul Jones had b
a name to conjure with. British belittlem
deprived him of his proper place in histo
but he was really the founder of the regu
Navy that fought so gallantly in '1812.'

adition had been created and a service had en formed. Political opinion, however, dis-uraged proper growth. President Jefferson d down the Democratic party's idea of naval licy in his first Inaugural. 'Beyond the all force which will probably be wanted for tual service in the Mediterranean, whatever nual sum you may think proper to appro-iate to naval preparations would perhaps better employed in providing those articles ich may be kept without waste or con-mption, and be in readiness when any igence calls them into use. Progress has en made in providing materials for 74-gun ips.'[1] This 'progress' had been made in 01. But in 1812, when Jefferson's disciple, adison, formally declared war, not a single el had been laid. Meanwhile, another idea naval policy had been worked out into the iculous gunboat system. In 1807, during e crisis which followed the Berlin Decree, e Orders-in-Council, and the *Chesapeake*

[1] A ship-of-the-line, meaning a battleship or man-of-war strong ugh to take a position in the line of battle, was of a different imum size at different periods. The tendency towards in-ase of size existed a century ago as well as to-day. 'Fourth-s,' of 50 and 60 guns, dropped out of the line at the beginning he Seven Years' War. In 1812 the 74-gun three-decker was smallest man-of-war regularly used in the line of battle.

affair, Jefferson wrote to Thomas Paine : ' B
lieving, myself, that gunboats are the on
water defence which can be useful to us, a
protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy,
am pleased with everything which promises
improve them.' Whether ' improved ' or n
these gunboats were found worse than usele
as a substitute for ' the ruinous folly of a navy
They failed egregiously to stop Jefferson's ov
countrymen from breaking his Embargo A
of 1808 ; and their weatherly qualities were
contemptible that they did not dare to lo
sight of land without putting their guns in t
hold. No wonder the practical men of t
Navy called them ' Jeffs.'

When President Madison summoned Co
gress in 1811 war was the main topic of deba
Yet all he had to say about the Navy w
contained in twenty-seven lukewarm word
Congress followed the presidential lead. T
momentous naval vote of 1812 provided for
expenditure of six hundred thousand dolla
which was to be spread over three consecuti
years and strictly limited to buying timbe
Then, on the outbreak of war, the governmen
consistent to the last, decided to lay up t
whole of their sea-going navy lest it should
captured by the British.

But this final indignity was more than the avy could stand in silence. Some senior ficers spoke their minds, and the party poli- cians gave way. The result was a series of ctories which, of their own peculiar kind, ave never been eclipsed. Not one American ip-of-the-line was ever afloat during the ar; and only twenty-two frigates or smaller aval craft put out to sea. In addition, there ere the three little flotillas on Lakes Erie, ntario, and Champlain; and a few minor ssels elsewhere. All the crews together did ot exceed ten thousand men, replacements cluded. Yet, even with these niggard means, e American Navy won the command of two kes completely, held the command of the ird in suspense, won every important duel t at sea, except the famous fight against e *Shannon*, inflicted serious loss on British a-borne trade, and kept a greatly superior ritish naval force employed on constant and arassing duty.

The American Privateers. Besides the little avy, there were 526 privately owned vessels hich were officially authorized to prey on the emy's trade. These were manned by forty ousand excellent seamen and had the chance plundering the richest sea-borne commerce

in the world. They certainly harassed Brit commerce, even in its own home waters ; during the course of the war they captured less than 1344 prizes. But they did pr tically nothing towards reducing the Brit fighting force afloat ; and even at their o work of commerce-destroying they did than one-third as much as the Navy in p portion to their numbers.

The American Army. The Army had co peted with the Navy for the lowest place Jefferson's Inaugural of 1801. 'This is only government where every man will m invasions of the public order as his own p sonal concern. . . . A well-disciplined mil is our best reliance for the first moments war, till regulars may relieve them.' T Army was then reduced to three thousa men. 'Such were the results of Mr Jeff son's low estimate of, or rather contempt f the military character,' said General W field Scott, the best officer the United Sta produced between '1812' and the Civil W In 1808 'an additional military force' w authorized. In January 1812, after war h been virtually decided on, the establishme was raised to thirty-five thousand. But June, when war had been declared, less th

quarter of this total could be called effec-
res, and more than half were still 'wanting
complete.' The grand total of all American
gulars, including those present with the
lours on the outbreak of hostilities as well
those raised during the war, amounted to
ty-six thousand. Yet no general had six
ousand actually in the firing line of any one
gagement.

The United States Volunteers. Ten thou-
nd volunteers were raised, from first to last.
ey differed from the regulars in being en-
ted for shorter terms of service and in being
nerally allowed to elect their own regimental
icers. Theoretically they were furnished in
ed quotas by the different States, according
population. They resembled the regulars
other respects, especially in being directly
der Federal, not State, authority.

The Rangers. Three thousand men with a
al or supposed knowledge of backwoods life
rved in the war. They operated in groups
d formed a very unequal force—good, bad,
d indifferent. Some were under the Federal
thority. Others belonged to the different
ates. As a distinct class they had no appre-
able influence on the major results of the
ar.

The Militia. The vast bulk of the Americ forces, more than three-quarters of the gra total by land and sea, was made up of t militia belonging to the different States of t Union. These militiamen could not be mov outside of their respective States without Sta authority; and individual consent was a necessary to prolong a term of enlistment, ev if the term should come to an end in the mid of a battle. Some enlisted for several month others for no more than one. Very few h any military knowledge whatever; and m of the officers were no better trained than t men. The totals from all the different Sta amounted to 456,463. Not half of these ev got near the front; and not nearly half those who did get there ever came into acti at all. Except at New Orleans, where t conditions were quite abnormal, the mili never really helped to decide the issue of a battle, except, indeed, against their own arm 'The militia thereupon broke and fled' curs with tiresome frequency in numberl dispatches. Yet the consequent charges cowardice are nearly all unjust. The fello countrymen of those sailors who fought t American frigates so magnificently were special kind of cowards. But, as a raw milit

ey simply were to well-trained regulars what ildren are to men.

American Non-Combatant Services. There ere more than fifty thousand deaths reported the American side; yet not ten thousand en were killed or mortally wounded in all e battles put together. The medical de- rtment, like the commissariat and transport, as only organized at the very last minute, en among the regulars, and then in a most phazard way. Among the militia these in- spensable branches of the service were never ally organized at all.

Such disastrous shortcomings were not used by any lack of national resources. The pulation of the United States was about ght millions, as against eighteen millions in e British Isles. Prosperity was general; at events, up to the time that it was checked Jefferson's Embargo Act. The finances re also thought to be most satisfactory. the very eve of war the Secretary of the easury reported that the national debt had en reduced by forty-six million dollars since party had come into power. Had this ar party ' spent those millions on its Army d Navy, the war itself might have had an ding more satisfactory to the United States.

Let us now review the forces on the Brit side.

The eighteen million people in the Brit Isles were naturally anxious to avoid with the eight millions in the United Stat They had enough on their hands as it w The British Navy was being kept at a grea strength than ever before; though it none too strong for the vast amount of w it had to do. The British Army was wag its greatest Peninsular campaign. All other naval and military services of w was already a world-wide empire had be maintained. One of the most mome ous crises in the world's history was approaching; for Napoleon, arch-enemy England and mightiest of modern conquer was marching on Russia with five hund thousand men. Nor was this all. There w troubles at home as well as dangers abro The king had gone mad the year before. prime minister had recently been assas ated. The strain of nearly twenty years war was telling severely on the nation. was no time to take on a new enemy, ei millions strong, especially one who supp so many staple products during peace threatened both the sea flank of the mot

untry and the land flank of Canada during
ır.

Canada was then little more than a long,
ak line of settlements on the northern
ntier of the United States. Counting in
e Maritime Provinces, the population hardly
ceeded five hundred thousand—as many
ople, altogether, as there were soldiers in
e of Napoleon's armies, or Americans en-
ted for service in this very war. Nearly
o-thirds of this half-million were French
nadians in Lower Canada, now the pro-
nce of Quebec. They were loyal to the
itish cause, knowing they could not live a
ench-Canadian life except within the British
npire. The population of Upper Canada,
w Ontario, was less than a hundred thou-
nd. The Anglo-Canadians in it were of two
nds: British immigrants and United Empire
yalists, with sons and grandsons of each.
th kinds were loyal. But the 'U.E.L.'s'
re anti-American through and through,
pecially in regard to the war-and-Demo-
atic party then in power. They could
erefore be depended on to fight to the last
ainst an enemy who, having driven them
o exile once, was now coming to wrest their
cond New-World home from its allegiance

to the British crown. They and their desce
ants in all parts of Canada numbered m
than half the Anglo-Canadian population
1812. The few thousand Indians near
scene of action naturally sided with the Brit
who treated them better and disposses
them less than the Americans did. The o
detrimental part of the population was
twenty-five thousand Americans, who sim
used Canada as a good ground for explo
tion, and who would have preferred to se
under the Stars and Stripes, provided that
change put no restriction on their busi
opportunities.

The British Navy. About thirty thous
men of the British Navy, only a fifth of
whole service, appeared within the Ameri
theatre of war from first to last. This ol
and greatest of all navies had recently emer
triumphant from an age-long struggle for
command of the sea. But, partly becaus
its very numbers and vast heritage of fam
was suffering acutely from several forms
weakness. Almost twenty years of continu
war, with dull blockades during the last se
was enough to make any service 'go st
Owing to the enormous losses recruiting
become exceedingly and increasingly diffic

compulsory recruiting by press-gang. he same time, Nelson's victories had filled ordinary run of naval men with an over- ning confidence in their own invincibility ; this over-confidence had become more usually dangerous because of neglected nery and defective shipbuilding. The Ad- lty had cut down the supply of practice unition and had allowed British ships to ar behind those of other nations in material design. The general inferiority of British building was such an unwelcome truth to British people that they would not believe l the American frigates drove it home with tering broadsides. But it was a very old n, for all that. Nelson's captains, and e of still earlier wars, had always com- d eagerly for the command of the better French prizes, which they managed to only because the superiority of their s was great enough to overcome the in- rity of their ships. There was a different to tell when inferior British vessels with -down crews met superior American els with first-rate crews. In those days ing and discipline were better in the rican mercantile marine than in the sh ; and the American Navy, of course,

shared in the national efficiency at sea. T
with cheap materials, good designs, an
cellent seamen, the Americans started
great advantages over the British for s
ship actions; and it was some time b
their small collection of ships succumb
the grinding pressure of the regularly o
ized British fleet.

The Provincial Marine. Canada had a
local navy on the Lakes called the Prov
Marine. It dated from the Conquest, an
done good service again during the Revol
especially in Carleton's victory over Arn
Lake Champlain in 1776. It had not,
ever, been kept up as a proper naval force
had been placed under the quarterma
general's department of the Army, wh
had been mostly degraded into a mere b
of the transport service. At one tim
effective force had been reduced to 132
though many more were hurriedly added
before the war. Most of its senior of
were too old; and none of the juniors ha
joyed any real training for combatant d
Still, many of the ships and men did w
the war, though they never formed a s
properly organized squadron.

British Privateers. Privateering was

rishing business in the mother country in
2. Prime seamen were scarce, owing to
great number needed in the Navy and
the mercantile marine. Many, too, had
erted to get the higher wages paid in
nkees' — 'dollars for shillings,' as the
ng went. Besides, there was little foreign
le left to prey on. Canadian privateers
better. They were nearly all 'Bluenoses,'
is, they hailed from the Maritime Pro-
es. During the three campaigns the Court
Vice-Admiralty at Halifax issued letters of
que to forty-four privateers, which em-
ed, including replacements, about three
sand men and reported over two hundred
es.

ritish Commissariat and Transport. Trans-
, of course, went chiefly by water. Rein-
ements and supplies from the mother
try came out under convoy, mostly in
mer, to Quebec, where bulk was broken,
whence both men and goods were sent to
front. There were plenty of experts in
da to move goods west in ordinary times.
best of all were the French-Canadian
geurs who manned the boats of the
son's Bay and North-West Companies.
there were not enough of them to carry on

the work of peace and war together. C
and skilful efforts, however, were m
Schooners, bateaux, boats, and canoes
all turned to good account. But the in
line of communications was desperately
and difficult to work. It was more
twelve hundred miles from Quebec to Amh
burg on the river Detroit, even by the sho
route.

The British Army. The British Army,
the Navy, had to maintain an exacting w
wide service, besides large contingents in
field, on resources which had been sev
strained by twenty years of war. It wa
presented in Canada by only a little over
thousand effective men when the war be
Reinforcements at first came slowly an
small numbers. In 1813 some foreign c
in British pay, like the Watteville and
Meuron regiments, came out. But in
more than sixteen thousand men, m
Peninsular veterans, arrived. Altogether
cluding every man present in any par
Canada during the whole war, there were
twenty-five thousand British regulars.
addition to these there were the troop
vading the United States at Washington
Baltimore, with the reinforcements that j

em for the attack on New Orleans—in all, arly nine thousand men. The grand total thin the theatre of war was therefore about rty-four thousand.

The Canadian Regulars. The Canadian regus were about four thousand strong. Anher two thousand took the place of men who re lost to the service, making the total six ousand, from first to last. There were six rps raised for permanent service : the Royal wfoundland Regiment, the New Brunswick giment, the Canadian Fencibles, the Royal terans, the Canadian Voltigeurs, and the engarry Light Infantry. The Glengarries re mostly Highland Roman Catholics who d settled Glengarry county on the Ottawa, ere Ontario marches with Quebec. The ltigeurs were French Canadians under a nch-Canadian officer in the Imperial Army. the other corps there were many United npire Loyalists from the different provinces, luding a good stiffening of old soldiers and ir sons.

The Canadian Embodied Militia. The Canan militia by law comprised every ablelied man except the few specially exempt, the clergy and the judges. A hundred usand adult males were liable for service.

Various causes, however, combined to prev
half of these from getting under arms. Th
who actually did duty were divided i
'Embodied' and 'Sedentary' corps. The e
bodied militia consisted of picked men, draf
for special service; and they often appro
mated so closely to the regulars in discip
and training that they may be classed,
the very least, as semi-regulars. Count
all those who passed into the special rese
during the war, as well as those who wen
fill up the ranks after losses, there were nea
ten thousand of these highly trained, se
regular militiamen engaged in the war.

The Canadian Sedentary Militia. The 'S
entaries' comprised the rest of the mili
The number under arms fluctuated great
so did the length of time on duty. There w
never ten thousand employed at any one t
all over the country. As a rule, the 'Sed
taries' did duty at the base, thus releasing
better trained men for service at the fro
Many had the blood of soldiers in their vei
and nearly all had the priceless advantage
being kept in constant touch with regul
A passionate devotion to the cause also hel
them to acquire, sooner than most other m
both military knowledge and that true sp

discipline which, after all, is nothing but self-crifice in its finest patriotic form.

The Indians. Nearly all the Indians sided th the British or else remained neutral. ıey were, however, a very uncertain force; d the total number that actually served at e front throughout the war certainly fell ort of five thousand.

This completes the estimate of the opposing ces—of the more than half a million Ameri-ns against the hundred and twenty-five ousand British; with these great odds en-ely reversed whenever the comparison is ıde not between mere quantities of men but tween their respective degrees of discipline d training.

But it does not complete the comparison tween the available resources of the two ponents in one most important particular—ance. The Army Bill Act, passed at Quebec August 1, 1812, was the greatest single ancial event in the history of Canada. It s also full of political significance; for the liament of Lower Canada was overwhelm-ly French-Canadian. The million dollars horized for issue, together with interest at per cent, pledged that province to the ivalent of four years' revenue. The risk

was no light one. But it was nobly run a
well rewarded. These Army Bills were
first paper money in the whole New W
that never lost face value for a day, that p
all their statutory interest, and that w
finally redeemed at par. The denominati
ran from one dollar up to four hundred doll
Bills of one, two, three, and four dollars co
always be cashed at the Army Bill Office
Quebec. After due notice the whole issue
redeemed in November 1816. A special
ture well worth noting is the fact that Ar
Bills sometimes commanded a premium of
per cent over gold itself, because, being c
vertible into government bills of exchange
London, they were secure against any fl
tuations in the price of bullion. A spe
comparison well worth making is that betw
their own remarkable stability and the equa
remarkable instability of similar instrume
of finance in the United States, where, a
vainly trying to help the government thro
its difficulties, every bank outside of N
England was forced to suspend specie p
ments in 1814, the year of the Great Blocka

CHAPTER III

1812: OFF TO THE FRONT

RESIDENT MADISON sent his message to Con-
ess on the 1st of June and signed the re-
ltant 'war bill' on the 18th following.
ngress was as much divided as the nation
the question of peace or war. The vote
the House of Representatives was seventy-
ne to forty-nine, while in the Senate it was
neteen to thirteen. The government itself
as 'solid.' But it did little enough to make
for the lack of national whole-heartedness
any efficiency of its own. Madison was
s zealous about the war than most of his
rty. He was no Pitt or Lincoln to ride the
orm, but a respectable lawyer-politician,
ose forte was writing arguments, not wield-
g his country's sword. Nor had he in his
binet a single statesman with a genius for
aking war. His war secretary, William
stis, never grasped the military situation
all, and had to be replaced by John Arm-

strong after the egregious failures of the fi campaign. During the war debate in Ju Eustis was asked to report to Congress h many of the 'additional' twenty-five th sand men authorized in January had alrea been enlisted. The best answer he co make was a purely 'unofficial opinion' th the number was believed to exceed fi thousand.

The first move to the front was made the Navy. Under very strong pressure t Cabinet had given up the original idea putting the ships under a glass case; and fo days after the declaration of war orders we sent to the senior naval officer, Commodo Rodgers, to 'protect our returning commerc by scattering his ships about the Americ coast just where the British squadron at Ha fax would be most likely to defeat them o by one. Happily for the United States, the orders were too late. Rodgers had alread sailed. He was a man of action. His litt squadron of three frigates, one sloop, and o brig lay in the port of New York, all read waiting for the word. And when news of th declaration arrived, he sailed within the hou and set out in pursuit of a British squadron th was convoying a fleet of merchantmen fro

e West Indies to England. He missed the nvoy, which worked into Liverpool, Bristol, id London by getting to the north of him. ut, for all that, his sudden dash into British aters with an active, concentrated squadron oduced an excellent effect. The third day it the British frigate *Belvidera* met him and id to run for her life into Halifax. The ws of this American squadron's being at rge spread alarm all over the routes between nada and the outside world. Rodgers rned south within a few hours' sail of the nglish Channel, turned west off Madeira, ve Halifax a wide berth, and reached Boston n weeks out from Sandy Hook. 'We have en so completely occupied in looking out for mmodore Rodgers,' wrote a British naval ficer, 'that we have taken very few prizes.' ven Madison was constrained to admit that is offensive move had had the defensive sults he had hoped to reach in his own lefensive' way. 'Our Trade has reached ir ports, having been much favoured by a uadron under Commodore Rodgers.'

The policy of squadron cruising was con-nued throughout the autumn and winter of 12. There were no squadron battles. But ere was unity of purpose; and British

convoys were harassed all over the Atla
till well on into the next year. During t
period there were five famous duels, wh
have made the *Constitution* and the *Un*
States, the *Hornet* and the *Wasp*, four na
to conjure with wherever the Stars and Stri
are flown. The *Constitution* fought the fi
when she took the *Guerrière* in August, o
east of Boston and south of Newfoundla
The *Wasp* won the second in September,
taking the *Frolic* half-way between Hali
and Bermuda. The *United States* won t
third in October, by defeating the *Macedoni*
south-west of Madeira. The *Constitution* w
the fourth in December, off Bahia in Bra
by defeating the *Java*. And the *Hornet* w
the fifth in February, by taking the *Peaco*
off Demerara, on the coast of British Guia

This closed the first period of the war
sea. The British government had been
anxious to avoid war, and to patch up pea
again after war had broken out, that th
purposely refrained from putting forth the
full available naval strength till 1813. A
the same time, they would naturally ha
preferred victory to defeat ; and the fact tha
most of the British Navy was engaged els
where, and that what was available wa

tly held in leash, by no means dims the
ry of those four men-of-war which the
ericans fought with so much bravery and
l, and with such well-deserved success.
wonder Wellington said peace with the
ited States would be worth having at any
nourable price, 'if we could only take some
their damned frigates!' Peace was not
come for another eighteen months. But
ugh the Americans won a few more duels
at sea, besides two annihilating flotilla
tories on the Lakes, their coast was block-
ed as completely as Napoleon's, once the
tish Navy had begun its concerted move-
nts on a comprehensive scale. From that
ne forward the British began to win the
val war, although they won no battles and
y one duel that has lived in history. This
amatic duel, fought between the *Shannon*
d the *Chesapeake* on June 1, 1813, was not
elf a more decisive victory for the British
an previous frigate duels had been for the
nericans. But it serves better than any
ner special event to mark the change from
e first period, when the Americans roved
e sea as conquerors, to the second, when
ey were gradually blockaded into utter
potence.

Having now followed the thread of na
events to a point beyond the other limit
this chapter, we must return to the Ameri
movements against the Canadian frontier
the British counter-movements intended
checkmate them.

Quebec and Halifax, the two great Canad
seaports, were safe from immediate Ameri
attack; though Quebec was the ultimate
jective of the Americans all through the w
But the frontier west of Quebec offered seve
tempting chances for a vigorous invasion, if
American naval and military forces could o
be made to work together. The whole life
Canada there depended absolutely on her
land waterways. If the Americans could
the line of the St Lawrence and Great La
at any critical point, the British would l
everything to the west of it; and there we
several critical points of connection along t
line. St Joseph's Island, commanding t
straits between Lake Superior and Lake Huro
was a vital point of contact with all the India
to the west. It was the British counterpoi
to the American post at Michilimackina
which commanded the straits between La
Huron and Lake Michigan. Detroit co
manded the waterway between Lake Hur

Lake Erie; while the command of the gara peninsula ensured the connection be- en Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. At the d of the St Lawrence, guarding the entrance Lake Ontario, stood Kingston. Montreal s an important station midway between ngston and Quebec, besides being an ex- ent base for an army thrown forward inst the American frontier. Quebec was general base from which all the British ces were directed and supplied.

Quick work, by water and land together, s essential for American success before the nter, even if the Canadians were really so xious to change their own flag for the Stars d Stripes. But the American government t the cart before the horse—the Army before e Navy—and weakened the military forces invasion by dividing them into two inde- ndent commands. General Henry Dear- rn was appointed commander-in-chief, but ly with control over the north-eastern untry, that is, New England and New York. irty years earlier Dearborn had served in e War of Independence as a junior officer; d he had been Jefferson's Secretary of War. t he was not much better trained as a der than his raw men were as followers,

and he was now sixty-one. He establi
his headquarters at Greenbush, nearly opp
Albany, so that he could advance on Mon
by the line of the Hudson, Lake Champ
and the Richelieu. The intended adva
however, did not take place this year. Gr
bush was rather a recruiting depot and c
of instruction than the base of an army in
field; and the actual campaign had ha
begun before the troops went into wi
quarters. The commander of the north-w
ern army was General William Hull.
his headquarters were to be Detroit, f
which Upper Canada was to be quickly o
run without troubling about the co-operat
of the Navy. Like Dearborn, Hull had ser
in the War of Independence. But he had b
a civilian ever since; he was now fifty-ni
and his only apparent qualification was
having been governor of Michigan for se
years. Not until September, after two defe
on land, was Commodore Chauncey orde
'to assume command of the naval force
Lakes Erie and Ontario, and use every exerti
to obtain control of them this fall.' Even th
Lake Champlain, an essential link both in t
frontier system and on Dearborn's propos
line of march, was totally forgotten.

To complete the dispersion of force, Eustis rgot all about the military detachments the western forts. Fort Dearborn (now icago) and Michilimackinac, important as ints of connection with the western tribes, re left to the devices of their own inade- ate garrisons. In 1801 Dearborn himself, stis's predecessor as Secretary of War, had ommended a peace strength of two hun- ed men at Michilimackinac, usually known 'Mackinaw.' In 1812 there were not so ny at Mackinaw and Chicago put together. It was not a promising outlook to an Ameri- military eye—the cart before the horse, thick end of the wedge turned towards the my, three incompetent men giving dis- nected orders on the northern frontier, and western posts neglected. But Eustis was of self-confidence. Hull was 'enthusing' militiamen. And Dearborn was for the ment surpassing both, by proposing to erate, with effect, at the same moment, inst Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal.'

From the Canadian side the outlook was dark enough to the trained eye; though for the same reasons. The menace here from an enemy whose general resources

exceeded those in Canada by almost twenty one. The silver lining to the cloud was t ubiquitous British Navy and the super training and discipline of the various lit military forces immediately available defence.

The Maritime Provinces formed a su ordinate command, based on the strong na station of Halifax, where a regular garris was always maintained by the Imperial gove ment. They were never invaded, or ev seriously threatened. It was only in 18 that they came directly into the scene action, and then only as the base from wh the invasion of Maine was carried out.

We must therefore turn to Quebec as t real centre of Canadian defence, which, deed, it was best fitted to be, not only fr its strategical situation, but from the fact th it was the seat of the governor-general a commander-in-chief, Sir George Prevost. Li Sir John Sherbrooke, the governor of No Scotia, Prevost was a professional soldier w an unblemished record in the Army. B though naturally anxious to do well, a though very suavely diplomatic, he was n the man, as we shall often see, either to fa a military crisis or to stop the Americans fr

SIR GEORGE PREVOST

From a painting in the Dominion Archives

aling marches on him by negotiation. On
e outbreak of war he was at headquarters
Quebec, dividing his time between his civil
d military duties, greatly concerned with
ernational diplomacy, and always full of
ıtion.

At York (now Toronto) in Upper Canada a
y different man was meanwhile preparing
checkmate Hull's 'north-western army' of
ıericans, which was threatening to invade
province. Isaac Brock was not only a
lier born and bred, but, alone among the
lers on either side, he had the priceless gift
enius. He was now forty-two, having been
n in Guernsey on October 6, 1769, in the
ıe year as Napoleon and Wellington. Like
Wolfes and the Montcalms, the Brocks
followed the noble profession of arms for
ıy generations. Nor were the De Lisles,
mother's family, less distinguished for the
ıber of soldiers and sailors they had been
ng to England ever since the Norman
quest. Brock himself, when only twenty-
, had commanded the 49th Foot in Holland
er Sir John Moore, the future hero of
ınna, and Sir Ralph Abercromby, who was
oon to fall victorious in Egypt. Two
's after this he had stood beside another

and still greater man at Copenhagen, 'might Nelson,' who there gave a striking instance how a subordinate inspired by genius ca win the day by disregarding the over-cautio of a commonplace superior. We may b sure that when Nelson turned his blind ey on Parker's signal of recall the lesson was n thrown away on Brock.

For ten long years of inglorious peace Broc had now been serving on in Canada, while h comrades in arms were winning distinction o the battlefields of Europe. This was partl due to his own excellence: he was too good man to be spared after his first five years we up in 1807; for the era of American hostili had then begun. He had always been obse vant. But after 1807 he had redoubled h efforts to 'learn Canada,' and learn her tho oughly. People and natural resources, pr ducts and means of transport, armed streng on both sides of the line and the best plan defence, all were studied with unremitti zeal. In 1811 he became the acting lieutenan governor and commander of the forces Upper Canada, where he soon found out th the members of parliament returned by th 'American vote' were bent on thwarti every effort he could make to prepare th

vince against the impending storm. In
2, on the very day he heard that war had
n declared, he wished to strike the unready
ericans hard and instantly at one of their
ee accessible points of assembly — Fort
gara, at the upper end of Lake Ontario,
osite Fort George, which stood on the other
of the Niagara river; Sackett's Harbour,
he lower end of Lake Ontario, thirty-six
s from Kingston; and Ogdensburg, on
upper St Lawrence, opposite Fort Prescott.
Sir George Prevost, the governor-general,
averse from an open act of war against the
thern States, because they were hostile to
oleon and in favour of maintaining peace
the British; while Brock himself was
turned from this purpose by news of
's American invasion farther west, as well
y the necessity of assembling his own
rting little parliament at York.
he nine days' session, from July 27 to
ust 5, yielded the indispensable supplies.
the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act,
necessary war measure, was prevented by
disloyal minority, some of whom wished
e the British defeated and all of whom
ready to break their oath of allegi-
whenever it suited them to do so. The

patriotic majority, returned by the votes United Empire Loyalists and all others w were British born and bred, issued an addr that echoed the appeal made by Brock him in the following words: 'We are engaged an awful and eventful contest. By unanim and despatch in our councils and by vig in our operations we may teach the ene this lesson: That a country defended by f men, enthusiastically devoted to the cause their King and Constitution, can never conquered.'

On August 5, being at last clear of his i mediate duties as a civil governor, Br threw himself ardently into the work defeating Hull, who had crossed over i Canada from Detroit on July 11 and issue proclamation at Sandwich the following d This proclamation shows admirably the s of impression which the invaders wished produce on Canadians.

> The United States are sufficiently pow ful to afford you every security consist with their rights and your expectatio I tender you the invaluable blessings Civil, Political, and Religious Liberty. . The arrival of an army of Friends m

be hailed by you with a cordial welcome. You will be emancipated from Tyranny and Oppression and restored to the dignified station of Freemen. . . . If, contrary to your own interest and the just expectation of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies and the horrors and calamities of war will Stalk before you. If the barbarous and Savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages let loose to murder our Citizens and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The first stroke with the Tomahawk, the first attempt with the Scalping Knife, will be the Signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the Side of an Indian will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his Lot. . . .

This was war with a vengeance. But Hull felt less confidence than his proclamation was intended to display. He knew that, while the American government had been warned in January about the necessity of securing the full command of Lake Erie, no steps had

yet been taken to secure it. Ever since beginning of March, when he had writte report based on his seven years' experie as governor of Michigan, he had been gra ally learning that Eustis was bent on ac in defiance of all sound military advice. April he had accepted his new position much against his will and better judgm In May he had taken command of the ass bling militiamen at Dayton in Ohio. In J he had been joined by a battalion of i perienced regulars. And now, in July, was already feeling the ill effects of ha to carry on what should have been an phibious campaign without the assist of any proper force afloat; for on the ten days before he issued his proclamatio Sandwich, Lieutenant Rolette, an enterpri French-Canadian officer in the Provin Marine, had cut his line of communica along the Detroit and had taken an Ameri schooner which contained his official pla campaign, besides a good deal of baggage stores.

There were barely six hundred British the line of the Detroit when Hull first cros over to Sandwich with twenty-five hund men. These six hundred comprised less t

regulars, about 300 militia, and some 150
ians. Yet Hull made no decisive effort
inst the feeble little fort of Malden, which
the only defence of Amherstburg by land.
distance was nothing, only twelve miles
th from Sandwich. He sent a sort of fly-
column against it. But this force went
farther than half-way, where the Ameri-
s were checked at the bridge over the
mpy little Rivière aux Canards by the
ians under Tecumseh, the great War Chief
vhom we shall soon hear more.

Hull's failure to take Fort Malden was
fatal mistake. His failure to secure his
mmunications southward from Detroit was
ther. Apparently yielding to the preva-
American idea that a safe base could
created among friendly Canadians without
trouble of a regular campaign, he sent off
ing parties up the Thames. According to
own account, these parties 'penetrated
y miles into the settled part of the pro-
ce.' According to Brock, they 'ravaged
country as far as the Moravian Town.'
they gained no permanent foothold.

y the beginning of August Hull's position
already become precarious. The Cana-
is had not proved friendly. The raid up

the Thames and the advance towards Amher
burg had both failed. And the first Brit
reinforcements had already begun to arri
These were very small. But even a few go
regulars helped to discourage Hull; and t
new British commander, Colonel Procter
the 41st, was not yet to be faced by a ta
beyond his strength. Worse yet for t
Americans, Brock might soon be expect
from the east; the Provincial Marine s
held the water line of communication fr
the south; and dire news had just come
from the west.

The moment Brock had heard of the d
claration of war he had sent orders post-ha
to Captain Roberts at St Joseph's Islan
either to attack the Americans at Mich
mackinac or stand on his own defen
Roberts received Brock's orders on the 15
of July. The very next day he started f
Michilimackinac with 45 men of the Roy
Veterans, 180 French-Canadian voyageu
400 Indians, and two 'unwieldy' iron s
pounders. Surprise was essential, to preve
the Americans from destroying their store
and the distance was a good fifty miles. Bu
'by the almost unparalleled exertions of t
Canadians who manned the boats, we arrive

the place of Rendezvous at 3 o'clock the
owing morning.' One of the iron six-
nders was then hauled up the heights,
ch rise to eight hundred feet, and trained
the dumbfounded Americans, while the
le British force took post for storm-
The American commandant, Lieutenant
nks, who had only fifty-seven effective men,
reupon surrendered without firing a shot.
he news of this bold stroke ran like wild-
through the whole North-West. The
ct on the Indians was tremendous, imme-
e, and wholly in favour of the British.
he previous November Tecumseh's brother,
wn far and wide as the 'Prophet,' had
n defeated on the banks of the Tippe-
oe, a river of Indiana, by General Harrison,
hom we shall hear in the next campaign.
s battle, though small in itself, was looked
n as the typical victory of the disposses-
Americans; so the British seizure of
hilimackinac was hailed with great joy as
g a most effective counter-stroke. Nor
this the only reason for rejoicing. Michili-
kinac and St Joseph's commanded the
lines of communication between the
ern wilds and the Great Lakes; so the
ession of both by the British was more

than a single victory, it was a promise of v
tories to come. No wonder Hull lamen
this 'opening of the hive,' which 'let
swarms' loose all over the wilds on his inla
flank and rear.

He would have felt more uneasy still if
had known what was to happen when Capt
Heald received his orders at Fort Dearb
(Chicago) on August 9. Hull had orde
Heald to evacuate the fort as soon as p
sible and rejoin headquarters. Heald h
only sixty-six men, not nearly enough to ov
awe the surrounding Indians. News of t
approaching evacuation spread quickly duri
the six days of preparation. The America
failed to destroy the strong drink in t
fort. The Indians got hold of it, became u
governably drunk, and killed half of Heal
men before they had gone a mile. The re
surrendered and were spared. Heald a
his wife were then sent to Mackinaw, whe
Roberts treated them very kindly and se
them on to Pittsburg. The whole affair w
one between Indians and Americans alon
But it was naturally used by the war par
to inflame American feeling against all thin
British.

While Hull was writing to Fort Dearbo

d hearing bad news from Michilimackinac, was also getting more and more anxious out his own communications to the south. th no safe base in Canada, and no safe line transport by water from Lake Erie to the lage of Detroit, he decided to clear the road ich ran north and south beside the Detroit er. But this was now no easy task for his disciplined forces, as Colonel Procter was nt on blocking the same road by sending ops and Indians across the river. On gust 5, the day Brock prorogued his parlia- nt at York, Tecumseh ambushed Hull's t detachment of two hundred men at ownstown, eighteen miles south of Detroit. the 7th Hull began to withdraw his ces from the Canadian side. On the 8th ordered six hundred men to make a second empt to clear the southern road. But on 9th these men were met at Maguaga, only rteen miles south of Detroit, by a mixed ce of British—regulars, militia, and In- ns. The superior numbers of the Ameri- is enabled them to press the British back first. But, on the 10th, when the British wed a firm front in a new position, the ericans retired discouraged. Next day ll withdrew the last of his men from Cana-

dian soil, exactly one month after they h
first set foot upon it. The following day w
spent in consulting his staff and trying
reorganize his now unruly militia. On t
evening of the 13th he made his final effo
to clear the one line left, by sending o
four hundred picked men under his two be
colonels, M'Arthur and Cass, who were order
to make an inland detour through the wood

That same night Brock stepped ashore
Amherstburg.

CHAPTER IV

1812: BROCK AT DETROIT AND QUEENSTON HEIGHTS

E prorogation which released Brock from parliamentary duties on August 5 had been lowed by eight days of the most strenuous itary work, especially on the part of the le reinforcement which he was taking west Amherstburg. The Upper Canada militia-n, drawn from the United Empire Loyalists l from the British-born, had responded h hearty goodwill, all the way from Glen-ry to Niagara. But the population was scattered and equipment so scarce that attempt had been made to have whole talions of 'Select Embodied Militia' ready the beginning of the war, as in the more ckly peopled province of Lower Canada. e best that could be done was to embody two flank companies — the Light and enadier companies—of the most urgently ded battalions. But as these companies tained all the picked men who were

readiest for immediate service, and as th Americans were very slow in mobilizing the own still more unready army, Brock foun that, for the time being, York could be le and Detroit attacked with nothing more tha his handful of regulars, backed by the flank company militiamen and the Provincial Marin

Leaving York the very day he closed th House there, Brock sailed over to Burlingto Bay, marched across the neck of the Niagar peninsula, and embarked at Long Point wit every man the boats could carry—three hun dred, all told, forty regulars of the 41st an two hundred and sixty flank-company militi men. Then, for the next five days, he fough his way, inch by inch, along the north shore Lake Erie against a persistent westerly storm The news by the way was discouragin Hull's invasion had unsettled the Indian as far east as the Niagara peninsula, whic the local militia were consequently afraid t leave defenceless. But once Brock reache the scene of action, his insight showed hi what bold skill could do to turn the tide feeling all along the western frontier.

It was getting on for one o'clock in th morning of August 14 when Lieutenant Rolett challenged Brock's leading boat from aboar

Provincial Marine schooner *General Hunter*. Brock stepped ashore he ordered all com-ding officers to meet him within an hour. hen read Hull's dispatches, which had been n by Rolette with the captured schooner by Tecumseh at Brownstown. By two ck all the principal officers and Indian s had assembled, not as a council of war, imply to tell Brock everything they knew. Tecumseh and Colonel Nichol, the quarter-er of the little army, thought that Detroit could be attacked with any prospect of ss. Brock listened attentively; made up ind; told his officers to get ready for im-ate attack; asked Tecumseh to assemble he Indians at noon; and dismissed the ing at four. Brock and Tecumseh read other at a glance; and Tecumseh, turn-o the tribal chiefs, said simply, 'This is n,' a commendation approved by them ith laconic, deep 'Ho-ho's!'

cumseh was the last great leader of the n race and perhaps the finest embodiment its better qualities. Like Pontiac, fifty before, but in a nobler way, he tried to the Indians against the exterminating ican advance. He was apparently on ve of forming his Indian alliance when he

returned home to find that his brother
Prophet had just been defeated at Tippecan
The defeat itself was no great thing. Bu
came precisely at a time when it could ex
most influence on the unstable Indian ch
acter and be most effective in breaking
the alliance of the tribes. Tecumseh, divin
this at once, lost no time in vain regrets,
joined the British next year at Amherstbu
He came with only thirty followers.
stray warriors kept on arriving; and ma
of the bolder spirits joined him when
became imminent. At the time of Broc
arrival there were a thousand effective Indi
under arms. Their arming was only auth
ized at the last minute; for Brock's dispa
to Prevost shows how strictly neutral
Canadian government had been through
the recent troubles between the Indians a
Americans. He mentions that the chiefs
Amherstburg had long been trying to obt
the muskets and ammunition 'which for ye
had been withheld, agreeably to the instr
tions received from Sir James Craig, and si
repeated by Your Excellency.'

Precisely at noon Brock took his sta
beneath a giant oak at Amherstburg s
rounded by his officers. Before him

umseh. Behind Tecumseh sat the chiefs; behind the chiefs a thousand Indians in war-paint. Brock then stepped forward ddress them. Erect, alert, broad-shoul-d, and magnificently tall; blue-eyed, fair-ed, with frank and handsome countenance; ooked every inch the champion of a great righteous cause. He said the Long Knives come to take away the land from both the ans and the British whites, and that now would not be content merely to repulse n, but would follow and beat them on own side of the Detroit. After the pause was usual on grave occasions, Tecumseh and answered for all his followers. He there the ideal of an Indian chief: tall, ly, and commanding; yet tense, lithe, vant, and always ready for his spring. he tiger, Brock the lion; and both un-ingly at bay.

xt morning, August 15, an early start was for Sandwich, some twelve miles north, e a five-gun battery was waiting to be asked against Detroit across the river. ed at Sandwich, Brock immediately sent s his aide-de-camp, Colonel Macdonell, a letter summoning Hull to surrender. wrote back to say he was prepared to

stand his ground. Brock at once unmas his battery and made ready to attack n day. With the men on detachment Hull had a total of twenty-five hundred. Br had only fifteen hundred, including the P vincial Marine. But Hull's men were los what discipline they had and were becom distrustful both of their leaders and of the selves; while Brock's men were gaining cipline, zeal, and inspiring confidence w every hour. Besides, the British were effectives; while Hull had over five hund absent from Detroit and as many more effective on the spot; which left him o fifteen hundred actual combatants. He had a thousand non-combatants — m women, and children—all cowering for she from the dangers of battle, and half d with the far more terrifying apprehensio an Indian massacre.

Brock's five-gun battery made excell practice during the afternoon without suffe any material damage in return. One cha shell produced a most dismaying effect Detroit by killing Hanks, the late command of Mackinaw, and three other officers with h At twilight the firing ceased on both sides.

mmediately after dark Tecumseh led six
ndred eager followers down to their canoes
ttle way below Sandwich. These Indians
e told off by tribes, as battalions are by
mpanies. There, in silent, dusky groups,
ving soft-foot on their moccasins through
gloom, were Shawnees and Miamis from
umseh's own lost home beside the Wabash,
es and Sacs from the Iowan valley, Otta-
and Wyandots, Chippewas and Potawa-
is, some braves from the middle prairies
veen the Illinois and the Mississippi, and
n Winnebagoes and Dakotahs from the far
th-West. The flotilla of crowded canoes
ed stealthily across the river, with no
er noise than the rippling current made.
secretly, the Indians crept ashore, stole
nd through the quiet night, and, circling
h, cut off Hull's army from the woods.
le did Hull's anxious sentries think that
e of the familiar cries of night-birds round
fort were signals being passed along from
t to scout.

s the beautiful summer dawn began to
k at four o'clock that fateful Sunday morn-
the British force fell in, only seven hun-
strong, and more than half militia. The
y gunners who had served the Sandwich

battery so well the day before also fell in, wi
five little field-pieces, in case Brock could fo
a battle in the open. Their places in t
battery were ably filled by every man of t
Provincial Marine whom Captain Hall co
spare from the *Queen Charlotte*, the flagsh
of the tiny Canadian flotilla. Brock's m
and his light artillery were soon afloat a
making for Spring Wells, more than thr
miles below Detroit. Then, as the *Que*
Charlotte ran up her sunrise flag, she and t
Sandwich battery roared out a challenge
which the Americans replied with random ai
Brock leaped ashore, formed front towar
Hull, got into touch with Tecumseh's India
on his left, and saw that the British la
and water batteries were protecting his rig
as prearranged with Captain Hall.

He had intended to wait in this positio
hoping that Hull would march out to t
attack. But, even before his men had finish
taking post, the whole problem was sudden
changed by the arrival of an Indian to s
that M'Arthur's four hundred picked me
whom Hull had sent south to bring in t
convoy, were returning to Detroit at on
There was now only a moment to deci
whether to retreat across the river, form fro

inst M'Arthur, or rush Detroit immedi-
y. But, within that fleeting moment,
ck divined the true solution and decided
narch straight on. With Tecumseh riding
ey mustang by his side, he led the way
erson. He wore his full-dress gold-and-
let uniform and rode his charger Alfred,
splendid grey which Governor Craig had
n him the year before, with the recom-
dation that 'the whole continent of
rica could not furnish you with so safe
excellent a horse,' and for the good
on that 'I wish to secure for my old
urite a kind and careful master.'

he seven hundred redcoats made a gallant
, all the more imposing because the
ia were wearing some spare uniforms
owed from the regulars and because the
dent appearance of the whole body led
discouraged Americans to think that these
could only be the vanguard of much
ter numbers. So strong was this belief
Hull, in sudden panic, sent over to Sand-
to treat for terms, and was astounded to
that Brock and Tecumseh were the two
on the big grey horses straight in front
im. While Hull's envoys were crossing
iver and returning, the Indians were be-

ginning to raise their war-whoops in the wo
and Brock was reconnoitring within a
of the fort. This looked formidable enou
if properly defended, as the ditch was six
deep and twelve feet wide, the parapet
twenty feet, the palisades were of twenty-i
cedar, and thirty-three guns were poin
through the embrasures. But Brock corre
estimated the human element inside, and
just on the point of advancing to the assa
when Hull's white flag went up.

The terms were soon agreed upon. Hu
whole army, including all detachments, s
rendered as prisoners of war, while the te
tory of Michigan passed into the milit
possession of King George. Abundance
food and military stores fell into British han
together with the *Adams*, a fine new brig t
had just been completed. She was soon
christened the *Detroit*. The Americans sulle
trooped out. The British elatedly marc
in. The Stars and Stripes came down
feated. The Union Jack went up victori
and was received with a royal salute from
the British ordnance, afloat and ashore.
Indians came out of the woods, yelling w
delight and firing their muskets in the
But, grouped by tribes, they remained o

the fort and settlement, and not a single rage was committed. Tecumseh himself e in with Brock; and the two great leaders d out in front of the British line while the urs were being changed. Then Brock, in v of all his soldiers, presented his sash and ols to Tecumseh. Tecumseh, in turn, gave many-coloured Indian sash to Brock, who e it till the day he died.

he effect of the British success at Detroit exceeded that which had followed the ture of Mackinaw and the evacuation of t Dearborn. Those, however important to West, were regarded as mainly Indian irs. This was a white man's victory and hite man's defeat. Hull's proclamation nceforth became a laughing-stock. The erican invasion had proved a fiasco. The American army to take the field had d at every point. More significant still, Americans were shown to be feeble in nization and egregiously mistaken in their ectations. Canada, on the other hand, already found her champion and men e fit to follow him.

rock left Procter in charge of the West hurried back to the Niagara frontier.

Arrived at Fort Erie on August 23 he w
dismayed to hear of a dangerously one-sid
armistice that had been arranged with t
enemy. This had been first proposed,
even terms, by Prevost, and then eage
accepted by Dearborn, after being modifi
in favour of the Americans. In proposing
armistice Prevost had rightly interpreted t
wishes of the Imperial government. It w
wise to see whether further hostilities cou
not be averted altogether; for the obnoxio
Orders-in-Council had been repealed. B
Prevost was criminally weak in assenting
the condition that all movements of men a
material should continue on the America
side, when he knew that corresponding mov
ments were impossible on the British side f
lack of transport. Dearborn, the America
commander-in-chief, was only a second-ra
general. But he was more than a match f
Prevost at making bargains.

Prevost was one of those men who succe
half-way up and fail at the top. Pure Swi
by blood, he had, like his father, spent his li
in the British Army, and had risen to th
rank of lieutenant-general. He had serve
with some distinction in the West Indies, an
had been made a baronet for defendi

minica in 1805. In 1808 he became vernor of Nova Scotia, and in 1811, at the e of forty-four, governor-general and com- nder-in-chief of Canada. He and his wife re popular both in the West Indies and in nada; and he undoubtedly deserved well the Empire for having conciliated the nch Canadians, who had been irritated by predecessor, the abrupt and masterful ig. The very important Army Bill Act s greatly due to his diplomatic handling the French Canadians, who found him so genial that they stood by him to the end. s native tongue was French. He under- od French ways and manners to perfection; d he consequently had far more than the ial sympathy with a people whose nature d circumstances made them particularly sitive to real or fancied slights. All this more to his credit than his enemies were ling to admit, either then or afterwards. t, in spite of all these good qualities, Pre- t was not the man to safeguard British nour during the supreme ordeal of a war; d if he had lived in earlier times, when nick- nes were more apt to become historic, he ght well have gone down to posterity as evost the Pusillanimous.

Day after day Prevost's armistice kept th British helpless, while supplies and reinforc ments for the Americans poured in at ever advantageous point. Brock was held bac from taking either Sackett's Harbour, whic was meanwhile being strongly reinforced fro Ogdensburg, or Fort Niagara, which was bei reinforced from Oswego. Procter was hel back from taking Fort Wayne, at the point the salient angle south of Lake Michigan an west of Lake Erie—a quite irretrievable los For the moment the British had the comman of all the Lakes. But their golden oppo tunity passed, never to return. By land the chances were also quickly disappearing. O September 1, a week before the armistic ended, there were less than seven hundre Americans directly opposed to Brock, wh commanded in person at Queenston and Fo George. On the day of the battle in Octobe there were nearly ten times as many alon the Niagara frontier.

The very day Brock heard that the disas trous armistice was over he proposed an im mediate attack on Sackett's Harbour. Bu Prevost refused to sanction it. Brock the turned his whole attention to the Niagar frontier, where the Americans were assem



Bartholomew, Edinr.

ng in such numbers that to attack them s out of the question. The British began receive a few supplies and reinforcements. t the Americans had now got such a long rt that, on the fateful 13th of October, they tnumbered Brock's men four to one—4000 1000 along the critical fifteen miles between Falls and Lake Ontario; and 6800 to oo along the whole Niagara river, from lake lake, a distance of thirty-three miles. The tors which helped to redress the adverse lance of these odds were Brock himself, disciplined regulars, the intense loyalty the militia, and the 'telegraph.' This elegraph' was a system of visual signal- g by semaphore, much the same as that ich Wellington had used along the lines of rres Vedras.

The immediate moral effects, however, were en more favourable to the Americans than e mere physical odds; for Prevost's armis- e both galled and chilled the British, who re eager to strike a blow. American con- ence had been much shaken in September the sight of the prisoners from Detroit, o had been marched along the river road full view of the other side. But it in- ased rapidly in October as reinforcements

poured in. On the 8th a council of war de cided to attack Fort George and Queensto Heights simultaneously with every availabl man. But Smyth, the American general com manding above the Falls, refused to co-operate This compelled the adoption of a new plan i which only a feint was to be made agains Fort George, while Queenston Heights wer to be carried by storm. The change entaile a good deal of extra preparation. But whe Lieutenant Elliott, of the American Navy cut out two British vessels at Fort Erie o the 9th, the news made the American troop so clamorous for an immediate invasion tha their general, Van Rensselaer, was afrai either to resist them or to let their ardour cool

In the American camp opposite Queenstor all was bustle on the 10th of October; and at three the next morning the whole army was again astir, waiting till the vanguard had seized the landing on the British side. But a wrong leader had been chosen; mistakes were plentiful; and confusion followed. Nearly all the oars had been put into the first boat, which, having overshot the mark, was made fast on the British side; whereupon its commander disappeared. The troops on the American shore shivered in the drenching

tumn rain till after daylight. Then they nt back to their sodden camp, wet, angry, d disgusted.

While the rain came down in torrents the ncipal officers were busy revising their ns. Smyth was evidently not to be deded on; but it was thought that, with the advantages of the initiative, the four ousand other Americans could overpower e one thousand British and secure a perinent hold on the Queenston Heights just ove the village. These heights ran back m the Niagara river along Lake Ontario r sixty miles west, curving north-eastwards und Burlington Bay to Dundas Street, hich was the one regular land line of comunication running west from York. Therefe, if the Americans could hold both the agara and the Heights, they would cut per Canada in two. This was, of course, ite evident to both sides. The only doubtl questions were, How should the first nerican attack be made and how should it met?

The American general, Stephen Van Rensaer, was a civilian who had been placed at the ad of the New York State militia by Governor mpkins, both to emphasize the fact that

expert regulars were only wanted as subordi
nates and to win a cunning move in the gam
of party politics. Van Rensselaer was no
only one of the greatest of the old 'patroons
who formed the landed aristocracy of Dutc
New York, but he was also a Federalist
Tompkins, who was a Democrat, therefor
hoped to gain his party ends whatever th
result might be. Victory would mean tha
Van Rensselaer had been compelled to advanc
the cause of a war to which he objected; whil
defeat would discredit both him and his party
besides providing Tompkins with the excus
that it would all have happened very differ
ently if a Democrat had been in charge.

Van Rensselaer, a man of sense and honour
took the expert advice of his cousin, Colone
Solomon Van Rensselaer, who was a regula
and the chief of the staff. It was Solomo
Van Rensselaer who had made both plans
the one of the 8th, for attacking Fort George
and the Heights together, and the one of the
10th, for feinting against Fort George while
attacking the Heights. Brock was puzzled
about what was going to happen next. He
knew that the enemy were four to one and
that they could certainly attack both places
if Smyth would co-operate. He also knew

t they had boats and men ready to circle
nd Fort George from the American 'Four
e Creek' on the lake shore behind Fort
gara. Moreover, he was naturally in-
ed to think that when the boats prepared
the 11th were left opposite Queenston all
long, and all the next day too, they were
bably intended to distract his attention
n Fort George, where he had fixed his own
dquarters.

On the 12th the American plan was matured
concentration begun at Lewiston, opposite
enston. Large detachments came in, under
fect cover, from Four Mile Creek behind
t Niagara. A smaller number marched
n from the Falls and from Smyth's com-
nd still higher up. The camps at Lewiston
the neighbouring Tuscarora Village were
tly concealed from every point on the oppo-
bank, so that the British could form no
idea of what the Americans were about.
mon Van Rensselaer was determined that
advance-guard should do its duty this
e; so he took charge of it himself and
ed out 40 gunners, 300 regular infantry,
300 of the best militia to make the
attack. These were to be supported by
n hundred regulars. The rest of the four

thousand men available were to cross ove afterwards. The current was strong; but th river was little more than two hundred yard wide at Queenston and it could be crossed i less than ten minutes. The Queenston Heigh themselves were a more formidable obstacl even if defended by only a few men, as the rose 345 feet above the landing-place.

There were only three hundred British Queenston to meet the first attack of ov thirteen hundred Americans; but they co sisted of the two flank companies of Brock old regiment, the 49th, supported by son excellent militia. A single gun stood on th Heights. Another was at Vrooman's Poi a mile below. Two miles farther, at Brown Point, stood another gun with another d tachment of militia. Four miles farther st was Fort George, with Brock and his secon in-command, Colonel Sheaffe of the 49t About nine miles above the Heights w the little camp at Chippawa, which, as w shall see, managed to spare 150 men for t second phase of the battle. The few hundr British above this had to stand by their ow posts, in case Smyth should try an atta on his own account, somewhere between t Falls and Lake Erie.

t half-past three in the dark morning of 13th of October, Solomon Van Rensselaer n 225 regulars sprang ashore at the Queens- ferry landing and began to climb the bank. hardly had they shown their heads above edge before the grenadier company of 49th, under Captain Dennis, poured in a ging volley which sent them back to cover. Rensselaer was badly wounded and was nediately ferried back. The American sup- s, under Colonel Christie, had trouble in ing across; and the immediate command he invaders devolved upon another regular, tain Wool.

s soon as the rest of the first detachment landed, Wool took some three hundred ntry and a few gunners, half of all who e then present, and led them up-stream, in le file, by a fisherman's path which curved nd and came out on top of the Heights nd the single British gun there. Progress very slow in this direction, though the ance was less than a mile, as it was still h-dark and the path was narrow and gerous. The three hundred left at the ling were soon reinforced, and the crossing t on successfully, though some of the erican boats were carried down-stream to

the British post at Vrooman's, where all t men in them were made prisoners and marche off to Fort George.

Meanwhile, down at Fort George, Bro had been roused by the cannonade only thr hours after he had finished his dispatche Twenty-four American guns were firing ha at Queenston from the opposite shore and tw British guns were replying. Fort Niagar across the river from Fort George, then bega to speak; whereupon Fort George answere back. Thus the sound of musketry, five seven miles away, was drowned; and Bro waited anxiously to learn whether the re attack was being driven home at Queenston, whether the Americans were circling rou from their Four Mile Creek against his ow position at Fort George. Four o'clock passe The roar of battle still came down fro Queenston. But this might be a feint. N even Dennis at Queenston could tell as y whether the main American army was comi against him or not. But he knew they mu be crossing in considerable force, so he se a dragoon galloping down to Brock, who w already in the saddle giving orders to Shea and to the next senior officer, Evans, whe this messenger arrived. Sheaffe was to follo

ards Queenston the very instant the ericans had shown their hand decisively hat direction; while Evans was to stay at t George and keep down the fire from Fort gara.

hen Brock set spurs to Alfred and raced Queenston Heights. It was a race for e than his life, for more, even, than his and his army's honour: it was a race for honour, integrity, and very life of Canada. s ahead he could see the spurting flashes he guns, the British two against the erican twenty-four. Presently his quick caught the fitful running flicker of the sing lines of musketry above the landing- e at Queenston. As he dashed on he met cond messenger, Lieutenant Jarvis, who riding down full-speed to confirm the news brought by the dragoon. Brock did not draw rein; so he beckoned Jarvis to p back beside him. A couple of minutes ced for Brock to understand the whole tion and make his plan accordingly. Then is wheeled back with orders for Sheaffe ing up every available man, circle round d, and get into touch with the Indians. w strides more, and Brock was ordering nen on from Brown's Point. He paused

another moment at Vrooman's, to note th practice made by the single gun there. The urging his gallant grey to one last turn speed, he burst into Queenston through th misty dawn just where the grenadiers of h own old regiment stood at bay.

In his full-dress red and gold, with th arrow-patterned sash Tecumseh had given hi as a badge of honour at Detroit, he looke from plume to spur, a hero who could tu the tide of battle against any odds. A rin ing cheer broke out in greeting. But h paused no longer than just enough to wav a greeting back and take a quick look roun before scaling the Heights to where eigh gunners with their single eighteen-pound were making a desperate effort to check th Americans at the landing-place. Here he di mounted to survey the whole scene of actio The Americans attacking Queenston seeme to be at least twice as strong as the Britis The artillery odds were twelve to one. Ar over two thousand Americans were drawn u on the farther side of the narrow Niaga waiting their turn for the boats. Neverth less, the British seemed to be holding the own. The crucial question was: could the hold it till Sheaffe came up from Fort Georg

Bullock came down from Chippawa, till
h had formed front on the Heights, with
lians on their flanks and artillery support
n below?

Suddenly a loud, exultant cheer sounded
aight behind him, a crackling fire broke
, and he saw Wool's Americans coming
r the crest and making straight for the
. He was astounded; and well he might
since the fisherman's path had been re-
ted impassable by troops. But he in-
ntly changed the order he happened to be
ing from 'Try a longer fuse!' to 'Spike
gun and follow me!' With a sharp clang
spike went home, and the gunners fol-
ed Brock downhill towards Queenston.
ere was no time to mount, and Alfred
ted down beside his swiftly running
ster. The elated Americans fired hard;
their bullets all flew high. Wool's three
ndred then got into position on the Heights;
le Brock in the village below was collect-
the nearest hundred men that could be
red for an assault on the invaders.

Brock rapidly formed his men and led
m out of the village at a fast run to a low
he wall, where he halted and said, 'Take
ath, boys; you'll need it presently!' on

which they cheered. He then dismounte and patted Alfred, whose flanks still heave from his exertions. The men felt the socket of their bayonets; took breath; and the followed Brock, who presently climbed th wall and drew his sword. He first led ther a short distance inland, with the intention o gaining the Heights at the enemy's own leve before turning riverwards for the final charg Wool immediately formed front with his bac to the river; and Brock led the one hundre British straight at the American centre, whic gave way before him. Still he pressed on waving his sword as an encouragement fo the rush that was to drive the enemy dow the cliff. The spiked eighteen-pounder wa recaptured and success seemed certain. But just as his men were closing in, an America stepped out of the trees, only thirty yard away, took deliberate aim, and shot him dead The nearest men at once clustered round t help him, and one of the 49th fell dead acros his body. The Americans made the most o this target and hit several more. Then th remaining British broke their ranks and re tired, carrying Brock's body into a house a Queenston, where it remained throughout th day, while the battle raged all round.

Wool now re-formed his three hundred and
lered his gunners to drill out the eighteen-
under and turn it against Queenston, where
British were themselves re-forming for a
ond attack. This was made by two hun-
d men of the 49th and York militia, led
Colonel John Macdonell, the attorney-
neral of Upper Canada, who was acting as
e-de-camp to Brock. Again the Americans
re driven back. Again the gun was recap-
ed. Again the British leader was shot at
critical moment. Again the attack failed.
d again the British retreated into Queenston.
Wool then hoisted the Stars and Stripes
r the fiercely disputed gun; and several
re boatloads of soldiers at once crossed over
the Canadian side, raising the American
al there to sixteen hundred men. With
s force on the Heights, with a still larger
ce waiting impatiently to cross, with
enty-four guns in action, and with the heart
the whole defence known to be lying dead
Queenston, an American victory seemed to
so well assured that a courier was sent
t-haste to announce the good news both
Albany and at Dearborn's headquarters
t across the Hudson. This done, Stephen
n Rensselaer decided to confirm his success

by going over to the Canadian side of th river himself. Arrived there, he consulte the senior regulars and ordered the troop to entrench the Heights, fronting Queenstor while the rest of his army was crossing.

But, just when the action had reache such an apparently victorious stage, ther was, first, a pause, and then a slightly ad verse change, which soon became decidedl ominous. It was as if the flood tide of in vasion had already passed the full and th ebb was setting in. Far off, down-stream at Fort Niagara, the American fire began t falter and gradually grow dumb. But at th British Fort George opposite the guns wer served as well as ever, till they had silence the enemy completely. While this was hap pening, the main garrison, now free to ac elsewhere, were marching out with swingin step and taking the road for Queensto Heights. Near by, at Lewiston, the America twenty-four-gun battery was slackening it noisy cannonade, which had been compara tively ineffective from the first; while th single British gun at Vrooman's, vigorous an effective as before, was reinforced by tw most accurate field-pieces under Holcroft i Queenston village, where the wounded bu

launted Dennis was rallying his disciplined ulars and Loyalist militiamen for another it. On the Heights themselves the Ameri- musketry had slackened while most of the n were entrenching; but the Indian fire t growing closer and more dangerous. -stream, on the American side of the Falls, half-hearted American detachment had n reluctantly sent down by the egregious yth; while, on the other side, a hundred l fifty eager British were pressing forward join Sheaffe's men from Fort George.

As the converging British drew near them, Americans on the Heights began to feel ebbing of their victory. The least dis- lined soon lost confidence and began to k down to the boats; and very few ts returned when once they had reached ir own side safely. These slinkers natur- made the most of the dangers they l been expecting—a ruthless Indian mas- re included. The boatmen, nearly all ilians, began to desert. Alarming doubts l rumours quickly spread confusion through massed militia, who now perceived that tead of crossing to celebrate a triumph y would have to fight a battle. John vett, who served with credit in the big

American battery, gave a graphic descriptio of the scene: 'The name of Indian, or th sight of the wounded, or the Devil, or som thing else, petrified them. Not a regimen not a company, scarcely a man, would go Van Rensselaer went through the disinte grating ranks and did his utmost to reviv the ardour which had been so impetuous onl an hour before. But he ordered, swore, an begged in vain.

Meanwhile the tide of resolution, hope, an coming triumph was rising fast among th British. They were the attackers now; the had one distinct objective; and their leader were men whose lives had been devoted t the art of war. Sheaffe took his time Arrived near Queenston, he saw that his thre guns and two hundred muskets there coul easily prevent the two thousand disorganize American militia from crossing the river; s he wheeled to his right, marched to St David' and then, wheeling to his left, gained th Heights two miles beyond the enemy. Th men from Chippawa marched in and joine him. The line of attack was formed, wit the Indians spread out on the flanks an curving forward. The British in Queenstor seeing the utter impotence of the American

o refused to cross over, turned their fire ainst the Heights; and the invaders at ce realized that their position had now come desperate.

When Sheaffe struck inland an immediate ange of the American front was required to et him. Hitherto the Americans on the ights had faced down-stream, towards eenston, at right angles to the river. Now y were obliged to face inland, with their cks to the river. Wadsworth, the American itia brigadier, a very gallant member of a y gallant family, immediately waived his k in favour of Colonel Winfield Scott, a l-trained regular. Scott and Wadsworth n did all that men could do in such a dire dicament. But most of the militia became manageable, some of the regulars were com-atively raw; there was confusion in front, ertion in the rear, and no coherent whole to et the rapidly approaching shock.

On came the steady British line, with the ltant Indians thrown well forward on the nks; while the indomitable single gun at oman's Point backed up Holcroft's two ns in Queenston, and the two hundred skets under Dennis joined in this dis-cting fire against the American right till

the very last moment. The American le was in almost as bad a case, because it ha got entangled in the woods beyond the summ and become enveloped by the Indians there The rear was even worse, as men slank o from it at every opportunity. The front stoo fast under Winfield Scott and Wadsworth But not for long. The British brought the bayonets down and charged. The Indian raised the war-whoop and bounded forward The Americans fired a hurried, nervous, strag gling fusillade; then broke and fled in wil confusion. A very few climbed down the cli and swam across. Not a single boat cam over from the 'petrified' militia. Some mor Americans, attempting flight, were killed b falling headlong or by drowning. Most o them clustered among the trees near the edg and surrendered at discretion when Winfiel Scott, seeing all was lost, waved his handker chief on the point of his sword.

The American loss was about a hundre killed, two hundred wounded, and nearly thousand prisoners. The British loss wa trifling by comparison, only a hundred an fifty altogether. But it included Brock; an his irreparable death alone was thought, b friend and foe alike, to have more than re

ssed the balance. This, indeed, was true a much more pregnant sense than those o measure by mere numbers could ever e supposed. For genius is a thing apart n mere addition and subtraction. It is incarnate spirit of great leaders, whose uence raises to its utmost height the th of every follower. So when Brock's stood fast against the invader's many, y had his soaring spirit to uphold them well as the soul and body of their own ciplined strength.

Brock's proper fame may seem to be no re than that which can be won by any spicuously gallant death at some far out- t of a mighty empire. He ruled no rich populous dominions. He commanded no l-marshalled host. He fell, apparently de- ed, just as his first real battle had begun. d yet, despite of this, he was the undoubted iour of a British Canada. Living, he was heart of her preparation during ten long rs of peace. Dead, he became the in- ation of her defence for two momentous rs of war.

CHAPTER V

1813: THE BEAVER DAMS, LAKE ERIE, AND CHÂTEAUGUAY

THE remaining operations of 1812 are quite minor importance. No more than tw are worthy of being mentioned between t greater events before and after them. Bo were abortive attempts at invasion — o across the upper Niagara, the other across t frontier south of Montreal.

After the battle of Queenston Heigh Sheaffe succeeded Brock in command of t British, and Smyth succeeded Van Renssela in command of the Americans. Sheaffe w a harsh martinet and a third-rate commande Smyth, a notorious braggart, was no co mander at all. He did, however, succeed getting Sheaffe to conclude an armistice th fully equalled Prevost's in its disregard British interests. After making the most it for a month he ended it on November and began manœuvring round his headquarte

lack Rock near Buffalo. After another days he decided to attack the British at Red House and Frenchman's Creek, n were respectively two and a half and five from Fort Erie. The whole British line e upper Niagara, from Fort Erie to Chip-, a distance of seventeen miles by the along the river, was under the command excellent young officer, Colonel Bisshopp, had between five and six hundred men ld his seven posts. Fort Erie had the st garrison—only a hundred and thirty Some forty men of the 49th and two guns were stationed at Red House; the light company of the 41st guarded ridge over Frenchman's Creek. About o'clock in the morning of the 28th one of Americans pulled across to the ferry e below Fort Erie, and then, sheering fter being fired at by the Canadian a on guard, made for Red House a mile a half lower down. There they landed ree and fought a most confused and con-g action in the dark. Friend and foe ne mixed up together; but the result success for the Americans. Meanwhile, other party landed near Frenchman's , reached the bridge, damaged it a little,

and had a fight with the 41st, who could drive the invaders back till reinforceme arrived. At daylight the men from Chippa marched into action, Indians began to appe and the whole situation was re-establish The victorious British lost nearly a hundr which was more than a quarter of those gaged. The beaten Americans lost more; b being in superior numbers, they could better afford it.

Smyth was greatly disconcerted. But held a boat review on his own side of the ri and sent over a summons to Bisshopp dema ing the immediate surrender of Fort Erie spare the effusion of blood.' Bisshopp jected the summons. But there was no e sion of blood in consequence. Smyth plann talked, and manœuvred for two days m and then tried to make his real effort on 1st of December. By the time it was l enough for the British to observe him he fifteen hundred men in boats, who all wan to go back, and three thousand on shore, all refused to go forward. He then hel council of war, which advised him to w for a better chance. This closed the c paign with what, according to Porter, on his own generals, was 'a scene of confu

ult to describe: about four thousand without order or restraint discharging muskets in every direction.' Next day Committee of Patriotic Citizens' under- to rebuke Smyth. But he retorted, not out reason, that 'the affair at Queenston caution against relying on crowds who the banks of the Niagara to look at a e as on a theatrical exhibition.'

e other abortive attempt at invasion made by the advance-guard of the com- ler-in-chief's own army. Dearborn had found out that his disorderly masses at nbush were quite unfit to take the field. four months after the declaration of war, all detachment, thrown forward from ew headquarters at Plattsburg on Lake mplain, did manage to reach St Regis, e the frontier first meets the St Law- , near the upper end of Lake St Francis, miles south-west of Montreal. Here mericans killed Lieutenant Rototte and geant, and took the little post, which held by a few voyageurs. Exactly a h later, on November 23, these Americans themselves defeated and driven back . Three days earlier than this a much ger force of Americans had crossed the

frontier at Odelltown, just north of wh
there was a British blockhouse beside
river La Colle, a muddy little western tribut
of the Richelieu, forty-seven miles due so
of Montreal. The Americans fired into e
other in the dark, and afterwards ret
before the British reinforcements. Dearb
then put his army into winter quarters
Plattsburg, thus ending his much-heral
campaign against Montreal before it had
begun.

The American government was much
appointed at the failure of its efforts to m
war without armies. But it found a
venient scapegoat in Hull, who was far
to blame than his superiors in the Cabi
These politicians had been wrong in e
important particular—wrong about the
tude of the Canadians, wrong about the w
plan of campaign, wrong in separating
from Dearborn, wrong in not getting me
war afloat on the Lakes, wrong, above al
trusting to untrained and undisciplined le
To complete their mortification, the ri
lous gunboats, in which they had so fi
believed, had done nothing but divert u
resources into useless channels; while, o
other hand, the frigates, which they had

ed to lay up altogether, so as to save themres from 'the ruinous folly of a Navy,' had ady won a brilliant series of duels out at

here were some searchings of heart at shington when all these military and naval udgments stood revealed. Eustis soon wed Hull into enforced retirement; and t plans were made for the campaign of , which was designed to wipe out the race of its predecessor and to effect the quest of Canada for good and all.

hn Armstrong, the new war secretary, William Henry Harrison, the new general he West, were great improvements on is and Hull. But, even now, the rican commanders could not decide on a e decisive attack supported by subsidiary ations elsewhere. Montreal remained their e objective. But they only struck at it of all. Michilimackinac kept their enemy uch with the West. But they left it comly alone. Their general advance ought ave been secured by winning the comd of the Lakes and by the seizure of suitpositions across the line. But they let irst blows come from the Canadian side;

and they still left Lake Champlain to sh
for itself. Their plan was undoubtedly bet
than that of 1812. But it was still all pa
and no whole.

The various events were so complicated
the overlapping of time and place all alo
the line that we must begin by taking a bird
eye view of them in territorial sequence, sta
ing from the farthest inland flank and wo
ing eastward to the sea. Everything west
Detroit may be left cut altogether, beca
operations did not recommence in that quar
until the campaign of the following year.

In January the British struck successfu
at Frenchtown, more than thirty miles so
of Detroit. They struck unsuccessfully, s
farther south, at Fort Meigs in May and
Fort Stephenson in August; after which t
had to remain on the defensive, all over
Lake Erie region, till their flotilla was a
hilated at Put-in Bay in September and t
army was annihilated at Moravian Town
the Thames in October. In the Lake Ont
region the situation was reversed. Here
British began badly and ended well. T
surrendered York in April and Fort Geo
at the mouth of the Niagara, in May. T
were also repulsed in a grossly mismana

ck on Sackett's Harbour two days after r defeat at Fort George. The opposing llas meanwhile fought several manœu- g actions of an indecisive kind, neither ng to risk battle and possible annihila- . But, as the season advanced, the ish regained their hold on the Niagara nsula by defeating the Americans at ey Creek and the Beaver Dams in June, by clearing both sides of the Niagara r in December. On the upper St Law- e they took Ogdensburg in February. were also completely successful in their nce of Montreal. In June they took the rican gunboats at Isle-aux-Noix on the elieu; in July they raided Lake Cham- ; while in October and November they ated the two divisions of the invading at Châteauguay and Chrystler's Farm. British news from sea also improved as year wore on. The American frigate ries began to stop. The *Shannon* beat *Chesapeake*. And the shadow of the t Blockade began to fall on the coast of Democratic South.

e operations of 1813 are more easily rstood if taken in this purely territorial But in following the progress of the

war we must take them chronologically. N
attempt can be made here to describe t
movements on either side in any detail. A
outline must suffice. Two points, howev
need special emphasis, as they are bo
markedly characteristic of the war in gene
and of this campaign in particular. Fir
the combined effect of the American victor
of Lake Erie and the Thames affords a perf
example of the inseparable connection betwe
the water and the land. Secondly, the Briti
victories at the Beaver Dams and Châtea
guay are striking examples of the inter-rac
connection among the forces that defend
Canada so well. The Indians did all the r
fighting at the Beaver Dams. The Fren
Canadians fought practically alone at Châte
guay.

The first move of the invaders in
West was designed to recover Detroit and
off Mackinaw. Harrison, victorious over
Indians at Tippecanoe in 1811, was now
pected to strike terror into them once mo
both by his reputation and by the size of
forces. In midwinter he had one wing of
army on the Sandusky, under his own co
mand, and the other on the Maumee, un

nchester, a rather commonplace general. Frenchtown stood a little British post ended by fifty Canadians and a hundred ians. Winchester moved north to drive se men away from American soil. But cter crossed the Detroit from Amherst- g on the ice, and defeated Winchester's usand whites with his own five hundred tes and five hundred Indians at dawn on uary 22, making Winchester a prisoner. cter was unable to control the Indians, o ran wild. They hated the Westerners o made up Winchester's force, as the men o had deprived them of their lands, and y now wreaked their vengeance on them some time before they could be again ught within the bounds of civilized warfare. er the battle Procter retired to Amherst- g; Harrison began to build Fort Meigs the Maumee; and a pause of three months owed all over the western scene.

But winter warfare was also going on else- ere. A month after Procter's success, Pre- t, when passing through Prescott, on the er St Lawrence, reluctantly gave Colonel donell of Glengarry provisional leave to ack Ogdensburg, from which the Americans e forwarding supplies to Sackett's Harbour,

sending out raiding parties, and threatenin the British line of communication to the wes No sooner was Prevost clear of Prescott tha Macdonell led his four hundred regulars an one hundred militia over the ice against th American fort. His direct assault failed. Bu when he had carried the village at the poin of the bayonet the garrison ran. Macdone then destroyed the fort, the barracks, an four vessels. He also took seventy prisoner eleven guns, and a large supply of stores.

With the spring came new movements the West. On May 9 Procter broke cam and retired from an unsuccessful siege Fort Meigs (now Toledo) at the south-weste corner of Lake Erie. He had started th siege a fortnight earlier with a thousand whit and a thousand Indians under Tecumseh ; an at first had seemed likely to succeed. Bu after the first encounter the Indians began leave ; while most of the militia had soon be sent home to their farms to prevent the ris of starvation. Thus Procter presently foun himself with only five hundred effectives face of a much superior and constantly in creasing enemy. In the summer he returne to the attack, this time against the America position on the lower Sandusky, nearly thirt

les east of Fort Meigs. There, on August 2, tried to take Fort Stephenson. But his nt guns could make no breach; and he lost undred men in the assault.

Meanwhile Dearborn, having first moved from Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbour, had acked York on April 27 with the help of new American flotilla on Lake Ontario. is flotilla was under the personal orders Commodore Chauncey, an excellent officer, o, in the previous September, had been omoted from superintendent of the New rk Navy Yard to commander-in-chief on Lakes. As Chauncey's forte was building d organization, he found full scope for his culiar talents at Sackett's Harbour. He s also a good leader at sea and thus a midable enemy for the British forces at rk, where the third-rate Sheaffe was now charge, and where Prevost had paved the y for a British defeat by allowing the estab-hment of an exposed navy yard instead of eping all construction safe in Kingston. eaffe began his mistakes by neglecting to unt some of his guns before Dearborn and auncey arrived, though he knew these nerican commanders might come at any oment, and though he also knew how im-

portant it was to save a new British vesse
that was building at York, because the com
mand of the lake might well depend upon her
He then made another mistake by standin
to fight in an untenable position against over
whelming odds. He finally retreated with al
the effective regulars left, less than two hun
dred, burning the ship and yard as he passed
and leaving behind three hundred militia t
make their own terms with the enemy. H
met the light company of the 8th on its way u
from Kingston and turned it back. With thi
retreat he left the front for good and becam
a commandant of bases, a position ofte
occupied by men whose failures are not bad
enough for courts-martial and whose savin
qualities are not good enough for any mor
appointments in the field.

The Americans lost over two hundred me
by an explosion in a British battery at York
just as Sheaffe was marching off. Forty
British had also been blown up in one of the
forts a little while before. Sheaffe appears t
have been a slack inspector of powder-maga-
zines. But the Americans, who naturally
suspected other things than slack inspection,
thought a mine had been sprung on them after
the fight was over. They consequently swore

SACKETT'S HARBOUR AND FORT NIAGARA IN 1812

Drawn on the spot by British army officers
Prints in the John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library

enge, burnt the parliament buildings, looted eral private houses, and carried off books n the public library as well as plate from church. Chauncey, much to his credit, erwards sent back all the books and plate could recover.

Exactly a month later, on May 27, Chauncey Dearborn appeared off Fort George, after un back to Sackett's Harbour in the mean- e. Vincent, Sheaffe's successor in charge Upper Canada, had only a thousand regulars four hundred militia there. Dearborn more than four times as many men; and ry, soon to become famous on Lake Erie, naged the naval part of landing them. e American men-of-war brought the long, , flat ground of Missisauga Point under irresistible cross-fire while three thousand ops were landing on the beach below the vering bluffs. No support could be given the opposing British force by the fire of rt George, as the village of Newark inter- ned. So Vincent had to fight it out in the en. On being threatened with annihila- n he retired towards Burlington, with- awing the garrison of Fort George, and nding orders for all the other troops on the agara to follow by the shortest line. He

had lost a third of the whole force defendi
the Niagara frontier, both sides of whic
were now possessed by the Americans. B
by nightfall on May 29 he was standing
bay, with his remaining sixteen hundred me
in an excellent strategical position on th
Heights, half-way between York and Fo
George, in touch with Dundas Street, th
main road running east and west, and besi
Burlington Bay, where he hoped to meet th
British flotilla commanded by Yeo.

Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo was an ene
getic and capable young naval officer of thirt
whom the Admiralty had sent out with a fe
seamen to take command on the Lakes und
Prevost's orders. He had been only seve
teen days at Kingston when he sailed out wit
Prevost, on May 27, to take advantage
Chauncey's absence at the western end of th
lake. Arrived before Sackett's Harbour, th
attack was planned for the 29th. The land
ing force of seven hundred and fifty men wa
put in charge of Baynes, the adjutant-genera
a man only too well fitted to do the 'dirt
work' of the general staff under a wea
commander-in-chief like Prevost. All wen
wrong at Sackett's Harbour. Prevost wa
'present but not in command'; Bayne

ded at the wrong place. Nevertheless, British regulars scattered the American litiamen, pressed back the American regus, set fire to the barracks, and halted in nt of the fort. The Americans, thinking e day was lost, set fire to their stores and Chauncey's new ships. Then Baynes and evost suddenly decided to retreat. Baynes plained to Prevost, and Prevost explained a covering dispatch to the British governnt, that the fleet could not co-operate, that e fort could not be taken, and that the landg party was not strong enough. But, if is was true, why did they make an attack all; and, if it was not true, why did they aw back when success seemed to be assured? Meanwhile Chauncey, after helping to take ort George, had started back for Sackett's arbour; and Dearborn, left without the et, had moved on slowly and disjointedly, rear of Vincent, with whom he did not regain uch for a week. On June 5 the Amerins camped at Stoney Creek, five miles from e site of Hamilton. The steep zigzagging ank of the creek, which formed their front, as about twenty feet high. Their right sted on a mile-wide swamp, which ran down Lake Ontario. Their left touched the

Heights, which ran from Burlington to Queenston. They were also in superior numbers, and ought to have been quite secure. But they thought so much more of pursuit than of defence that they were completely taken by surprise when '704 firelocks' under Colonel Harvey suddenly attacked them just after midnight. Harvey, chief staff officer to Vincent, was a first-rate leader for such daring work as this, and his men were all well disciplined. But the whole enterprise might have failed, for all that. Some of the men opened fire too soon, and the nearest Americans began to stand to their arms. But, while Harvey ran along re-forming the line, Major Plenderleath, with some of Brock's old regiment, the 49th, charged straight into the American centre, took the guns there, and caused so much confusion that Harvey's following charge carried all before it. Next morning, June 6, the Americans began a retreat which was hastened by Yeo's arrival on their lakeward flank, by the Indians on the Heights, and by Vincent's reinforcements in their rear. Not till they reached the shelter of Fort George did they attempt to make a stand.

The two armies now faced each other astride

SIR JAMES YEO'S FLAGSHIP, 1814

The vessel carried 1000 men and 102 guns. It was 190 feet in the keel and 60 feet in the beam, and had a draught of 23 feet

From the John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library

f the lake-shore road and the Heights. The ritish left advanced post, between Ten and welve Mile Creeks, was under Major de aren of the 104th, a regiment which, in the receding winter, had marched on snow-shoes rough the woods all the way from the middle New Brunswick to Quebec. The corre-onding British post inland, near the Beaver ams, was under Lieutenant FitzGibbon of e 49th, a cool, quick-witted, and adventur-s Irishman, who had risen from the ranks his own good qualities and Brock's recom-endation. Between him and the Americans Queenston and St David's was a picked rce of Indian scouts with a son of the great ief Joseph Brant. These Indians never ve the Americans a minute's rest. They re up at all hours, pressing round the flanks, iping the sentries, worrying the outposts, d keeping four times their own numbers on e perpetual alert. What exasperated the nericans even more was the wonderfully sive way in which the Indians would strike eir blow and then be lost to sight and sound e very next moment, if, indeed, they ever re seen at all. Finally, this endless skirmish th an invisible foe became so harassing that e Americans sent out a flying column of six

hundred picked men under Colonel Boerstler on June 24 to break up FitzGibbon's post at the Beaver Dams and drive the Indians out of the intervening bush altogether.

But the American commanders had not succeeded in hiding their preparations from the vigilant eyes of the Indian scouts or from the equally attentive ears of Laura Secord, the wife of an ardent U. E. Loyalist, James Secord, who was still disabled by the wounds he had received when fighting under Brock's command at Queenston Heights. Early in the morning of the 23rd, while Laura Secord was going out to milk the cows, she overheard some Americans talking about the surprise in store for FitzGibbon next day. Without giving the slightest sign she quietly drove the cattle in behind the nearest fence, hid her milk-pail, and started to thread her perilous way through twenty miles of bewildering bypaths to the Beaver Dams. Keeping off the beaten tracks and always in the shadow of the full-leaved trees, she stole along through the American lines, crossed the no-man's-land between the two desperate enemies, and managed to get inside the ever-shifting fringe of Indian scouts without being seen by friend or foe. The heat was intense

nd the whole forest steamed with it after the opical rain. But she held her course without pause, over the swollen streams on fallen ee-trunks, through the dense underbrush, nd in and out of the mazes of the forest, here a bullet might come from either side ithout a moment's warning. As she neared e end of her journey a savage yell told her e was at last discovered by the Indians. ie and they were on the same side; but she d hard work to persuade them that she ly wished to warn FitzGibbon. Then came nat, to a lesser patriot, would have been a owning disappointment. For when, half ad with fatigue, she told him her story, she und he had already heard it from the scouts. ut just because this forestalment was no real sappointment to her, it makes her the Anglo-nadian heroine whose fame for bravery in ur is worthiest of being remembered with at of her French-Canadian sister, Madeleine Verchères.[1]

Boerstler's six hundred had only ten miles go in a straight line. But all the thickets, oods, creeks, streams, and swamps were sely beset by a body of expert, persistent

[1] For Madeleine de Verchères see *The Fighting Governor* in this ies.

Indians, who gradually increased from two hundred and fifty to four hundred men. The Americans became discouraged and bewildered; and when FitzGibbon rode up at the head of his redcoats they were ready to give in. The British posts were all in excellent touch with each other; and de Haren arrived in time to receive the actual surrender. He was closely followed by the 2nd Lincoln Militia under Colonel Clark, and these again by Colonel Bisshopp with the whole of the advanced guard. But it was the Indians alone who won the fight, as FitzGibbon generously acknowledged: 'Not a shot was fired on our side by any but the Indians. They beat the American detachment into a state of terror, and the only share I claim is taking advantage of a favourable moment to offer protection from the tomahawk and scalping knife.'

June was a lucky month for the British at sea as well as on the land; and its 'Glorious First,' so called after Howe's victory nineteen years before, now became doubly glorious in a way which has a special interest for Canada. The American frigate *Chesapeake* was under orders to attack British supply-ships entering Canadian waters; and the victorious British frigate *Shannon* was taken out of action and

THE *SHANNON* AND THE *CHESAPEAKE* IN HALIFAX HARBOUR, 1813

Drawn under the direction of Lieut. Falkner of the *Shannon*

Print in the John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library

:o a Canadian port by a young Canadian
the Royal Navy.

The *Chesapeake* had a new captain, Law-
ıce, with new young officers. She carried
:y more men than the British frigate *Shan-*
n. But many of her ship's company were
w to her, on recommissioning in May; and
ne were comparatively untrained for ser-
e on board a man-of-war. The frigates
:mselves were practically equal in size and
nament. But Captain Broke had been in
ıtinuous command of the *Shannon* for seven
ırs and had trained his crew into the utmost
fection of naval gunnery. The vessels met
Boston in full view of many thousands of
ctators. Not one British shot flew high.
ery day in the *Shannon's* seven years of pre-
ation told in that fight of only fifteen
ıutes; and when Broke led his boarders
r the *Chesapeake's* side her fate had been
led already. The Stars and Stripes were
n replaced by the Union Jack. Then,
h Broke severely wounded and his first
ıtenant killed, the command fell on Lieu-
ant Wallis, who sailed both vessels into
lifax. This young Canadian, afterwards
own as Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir Provo
llis, lived to become the longest of all

human links between the past and present o the Navy. He was by far the last survivo of those officers who were specially exempte from technical retirement on account of havin held any ship or fleet command during th Great War that ended on the field of Waterlo He was born before Napoleon had been hear of. He went through a battle before th death of Nelson. He outlived Wellington b forty years. His name stood on the Activ List for all but the final decade of th nineteenth century. And, as an honoure centenarian, he is vividly remembered b many who were still called young a centur after the battle that brought him int fame.

The summer campaign on the Niagara fro tier ended with three minor British successe Fort Schlosser was surprised on July 5. O the 11th Bisshopp lost his life in destroyi Black Rock. And on August 24 the Amer cans were driven in under the guns of Fo George. After this there was a lull whi lasted throughout the autumn.

Down by the Montreal frontier there we three corresponding British successes. O June 3 Major Taylor of the 100th capture

vo American gunboats, the *Growler* and the *agle*, which had come to attack Isle-aux-oix in the Richelieu river, and renamed iem the *Broke* and the *Shannon*. Early August Captains Pring and Everard, of ie Navy, and Colonel Murray with nine undred soldiers, raided Lake Champlain. hey destroyed the barracks, yard, and stores Plattsburg and sent the American militia ying home. But a still more effective blow as struck on the opposite side of Lake Cham-ain, at Burlington, where General Hampton as preparing the right wing of his new army invasion. Stores, equipment, barracks, and rmaments were destroyed to such an ex-nt that Hampton's preparations were set ack till late in the autumn. The left wing the same army was at Sackett's Harbour, nder Dearborn's successor, General Wilkin-on, whose plan was to take Kingston, go own the St Lawrence, meet Hampton, who as to come up from the south, and then make joint attack with him on Montreal.

In September the scene of action shifted the West, where the British were trying to eep the command of Lake Erie, while the mericans were trying to wrest it from them. aptain Oliver Perry, a first-rate American

naval officer of only twenty-eight, was at Presqu'isle (now Erie) completing his flotilla. He had his troubles, of course, especially with the militia garrison, who would not do their proper tour of duty. 'I tell the boys to go, but the boys won't go,' was the only report forthcoming from one of several worthless colonels. A still greater trouble for Perry was getting his vessels over the bar. This had to be done without any guns on board, and with the cumbrous aid of 'camels,' which are any kind of air-tanks made fast to the sides low down, in order to raise the hull as much as possible. But, luckily for Perry, his opponent, Captain Barclay of the Royal Navy, an energetic and capable young officer of thirty-two, was called upon to face worse troubles still. Barclay was, indeed, the first to get afloat. But he had to give up the blockade of Presqu'isle, and so let Perry out, because he had the rawest of crews, the scantiest of equipment, and nothing left to eat. Then, when he ran back to Amherstburg, he found Procter also facing a state of semi-starvation, while thousands of Indian families were clamouring for food. Thus there was no other choice but either to fight or starve, for there was not the slightest chance of re-

lenishing stores unless the line of the lake as clear.

So Barclay sailed out with his six little ritish vessels, armed by the odds and ends f whatever ordnance could be spared from mherstburg and manned by almost any ews but sailors. Even the flagship *Detroit* ad only ten real seamen, all told. Ammuni- on was likewise very scarce, and so defective nat the guns had to be fired by the flash of a istol. Perry also had a makeshift flotilla, artly manned by drafts from Harrison's rmy. But, on the whole, the odds in his avour were fairly shown by the number of essels in the respective flotillas, nine American gainst the British six.

Barclay had only thirty miles to make in a irect south-easterly line from Amherstburg o reach Perry at Put-in Bay in the Bass slands, where, on the morning of September o, the opposing forces met. The battle raged or two hours at the very closest quarters till 'erry's flagship *Lawrence* struck to Barclay's wn *Detroit*. But Perry had previously left he *Lawrence* for the fresh *Niagara*; and he ow bore down on the battered *Detroit*, which ad meanwhile fallen foul of the only other izable British vessel, the *Queen Charlotte*.

This was fatal for Barclay. The whole British flotilla surrendered after a desperate resistance and an utterly disabling loss. From that time on to the end of the war Lake Erie remained completely under American control.

Procter could hardly help seeing that he was doomed to give up the whole Lake Erie region. But he lingered and was lost. While Harrison was advancing with overwhelming numbers Procter was still trying to decide when and how to abandon Amherstburg. Then, when he did go, he carried with him an inordinate amount of baggage; and he retired so slowly that Harrison caught and crushed him near Moravian Town, beside the Thames, on the 5th of October. Harrison had three thousand exultant Americans in action; Procter had barely a thousand worn-out, dispirited men, more than half of them Indians under Tecumseh. The redcoats, spread out in single rank at open order, were ridden down by Harrison's cavalry, backed by the mass of his infantry. The Indians on the inland flank stood longer and fought with great determination against five times their numbers till Tecumseh fell. Then they broke and fled. This was their last great fight and Tecumseh was their last great leader.

The scene now shifts once more to the Montreal frontier, which was being threatened by the converging forces of Hampton from the south and Wilkinson from the west. Each had about seven thousand men; and their common objective was the island of Montreal. Hampton crossed the line at Odelltown on September 20. But he presently moved back again; and it was not till October 21 that he began his definite attack by advancing down the left bank of the Châteauguay, after opening communications with Wilkinson, who was still near Sackett's Harbour. Hampton naturally expected to brush aside all the opposition that could be made by the few hundred British between him and the St Lawrence. But de Salaberry, the commander of the British advanced posts, determined to check him near La Fourche, where several little tributaries of the Châteauguay made a succession of good positions, if strengthened by abattis and held by trained defenders.

The British force was very small when Hampton began his slow advance; but 'Red George' Macdonell marched to help it just in time. Macdonell was commanding a crack corps of French Canadians, all picked from the best 'Select Embodied Militia,' and now,

at the end of six months of extra service as good as a battalion of regulars. He had hurried to Kingston when Wilkinson had threatened it from Sackett's Harbour. Now he was urgently needed at Châteauguay. 'When can you start?' asked Prevost, who was himself on the point of leaving Kingston for Châteauguay. 'Directly the men have finished their dinners, sir!' 'Then follow me as quickly as you can!' said Prevost as he stepped on board his vessel. There were 210 miles to go. A day was lost in collecting boats enough for this sudden emergency. Another day was lost *en route* by a gale so terrific that even the French-Canadian voyageurs were unable to face it. The rapids where so many of Amherst's men had been drowned in 1760, were at their very worst and the final forty miles had to be made overland by marching all night through dense forest and along a particularly difficult trail. Yet Macdonell got into touch with de Salaberry long before Prevost, to whom he had the satisfaction of reporting later in the day 'All correct and present, sir; not one man missing!'

The advanced British forces under de Salaberry were now, on October 25, the eve

f battle, occupying the left, or north, bank f the Châteauguay, fifteen miles south of the ascade Rapids of the St Lawrence, twenty- ve miles south-west of Caughnawaga, and hirty-five miles south-west of Montreal. Im- nediately in rear of these men under de Sala- erry stood Macdonell's command; while, in nore distant support, nearer to Montreal, tood various posts under General de Watte- ille, with whom Prevost spent that night nd most of the 26th, the day on which the attle was fought.

As Hampton came on with his cumbrous merican thousands de Salaberry felt justifi- ble confidence in his own well-disciplined rench-Canadian hundreds. He and his rothers were officers in the Imperial Army. His Voltigeurs were regulars. The supporting encibles were also regulars, and of ten years' tanding. Macdonell's men were practically egulars. The so-called 'Select Militia' pre- ent had been permanently embodied for ighteen months; and the only real militia- nen on the scene of action, most of whom ever came under fire at all, had already been wice embodied for service in the field. The British total present was 1590, of whom less han a quarter were militiamen and Indians.

But the whole firing line comprised no mor than 460, of whom only 66 were militiame and only 22 were Indians. The Indian tota was about one-tenth of the whole. The Eng lish-speaking total was about one-twentieth It is therefore perfectly right to say that th battle of Châteauguay was practically fough and won by French-Canadian regulars agains American odds of four to one.

De Salaberry's position was peculiar. Th head of his little column faced the head o Hampton's big column on a narrow front bounded on his own left by the river Châ teauguay and on his own right by woods into which Hampton was afraid to send hi untrained men. But, crossing a right-angle bend of the river, beyond de Salaberry's lef front, was a ford, while in rear of de Sala berry's own column was another ford whic Hampton thought he could easily take wit fifteen hundred men under Purdy, as he ha no idea of Macdonell's march and no doub of being able to crush de Salaberry's othe troops between his own five thousand attack ing from the front and Purdy's fifteen hundre attacking from the rear. Purdy advance overnight, crossed to the right bank of th Châteauguay, by the ford clear of de Sala

CHARLES DE SALABERRY

From a portrait in the Dominion Archives

erry's front, and made towards the ford in e Salaberry's rear. But his men lost their ay in the dark and found themselves, not n rear of, but opposite to, and on the left ank of, de Salaberry's column in the morning. hey drove in two of de Salaberry's companies, hich were protecting his left flank on the ight, or what was now Purdy's, side of the iver; but they were checked by a third, hich Macdonell sent forward, across the rear ord, at the same time that he occupied this ear ford himself. Purdy and Hampton had ow completely lost touch with one another. urdy was astounded to see Macdonell's main ody of redcoats behind the rear ford. He aused, waiting for support from Hampton, ho was still behind the front ford. Hamp- on paused, waiting for him to take the rear ord, now occupied by Macdonell. De Sala- erry mounted a huge tree-stump and at nce saw his opportunity. Holding back Hampton's crowded column with his own ront, which fought under cover of his first battis, he wheeled the rest of his men into ine to the left and thus took Purdy in flank. Macdonell was out of range behind the rear ord; but he played his part by making is buglers sound the advance from several

different quarters, while his men, joined by de Salaberry's militiamen and by the Indians in the bush, cheered vociferously and raised the war-whoop. This was too much for Purdy's fifteen hundred. They broke in confusion ran away from the river into the woods under a storm of bullets, fired into each other, and finally disappeared. Hampton's attack on de Salaberry's first abattis then came to a full stop; after which the whole American army retired beaten from the field.

Ten days after Châteauguay dilatory Wilkinson, tired of waiting for defeated Hampton left the original rendezvous at French Creek fifty miles below Sackett's Harbour. Like Dearborn in 1812, he began his campaign just as the season was closing. But, again like Dearborn, he had the excuse of being obliged to organize his army in the middle of the war. Four days later again, on November 9, Brown, the successful defender of Sackett's Harbour against Prevost's attack in May, was landed at Williamsburg, on the Canadian side, with two thousand men, to clear the twenty miles down to Cornwall opposite the rendezvous at St Regis, where Wilkinson expected to find Hampton ready to join him for the combined attack on Montreal

t Brown had to reckon with Dennis, the
t defender of Queenston, who now com-
nded the little garrison of Cornwall, and
o disputed every inch of the way by
aking the bridges and resisting each suc-
sive advance till Brown was compelled to
loy for attack. Two days were taken up
h these harassing manœuvres, during which
ther two thousand Americans were landed
Villiamsburg under Boyd, who immediately
nd himself still more harassed in rear than
wn had been in front.

his new British force in Boyd's rear was
y a thousand strong; but, as it included
ry human element engaged in the defence
Canada, it has a quite peculiar interest of
own. Afloat, it included bluejackets of the
val Navy, men of the Provincial Marine,
nch-Canadian voyageurs, and Anglo-Cana-
n boatmen from the trading-posts, all under
st-rate fighting seaman, Captain Mulcaster,
I. Ashore, under a good regimental leader,
onel Morrison—whose chief staff officer was
rvey, of Stoney Creek renown—it included
erial regulars, Canadian regulars of both
s, French-Canadian and Anglo-Canadian
tiamen, and a party of Indians.

arly on the 11th Brown had arrived at

Cornwall with his two thousand America
Wilkinson was starting down from Willia
burg in boats with three thousand more,
Boyd was starting down ashore with eight
hundred. But Mulcaster's vessels presse
on Wilkinson's rear, while Morrison presse
on Boyd's. Wilkinson then ordered Boyd
turn about and drive off Morrison, while
hurried his own men out of reach of Mulcas
whose armed vessels could not follow down
rapids. Boyd thereupon attacked Morris
and a stubborn fight ensued at Chrystl
Farm. The field was of the usual type: wo
on one flank, water on the other, and a m
or less flat clearing in the centre. Boyd t
hard to drive his wedge in between the Bri
and the river. But Morrison foiled him
manœuvre; and the eight hundred Bri
stood fast against their eighteen hund
enemies all along the line. Boyd then w
drew, having lost four hundred men;
Morrison's remaining six hundred effect
slept on their hard-won ground.

Next morning the energetic Morrison
sumed his pursuit. But the campaign aga
Montreal was already over. Wilkinson
found that Hampton had started back
Lake Champlain while the battle was in

ss; so he landed at St Regis, just inside
own country, and went into winter quarters
French Mills on the Salmon river.

n December the scene of strife changed
k again to the Niagara, where the American
mmander, M'Clure, decided to evacuate
t George. At dusk on the 10th he ordered
r hundred women and children to be turned
of their homes at Newark into the biting
lwinter cold, and then burnt the whole
lement down to the ground. If he had
nded to hold the position he might have
n justified in burning Newark, under more
nane conditions, because this village un-
btedly interfered with the defensive fire
Fort George. But, as he was giving up Fort
rge, his act was an entirely wanton deed of
me.

Meanwhile the new British general, Gordon
mmond, second in ability to Brock alone,
hurrying to the Niagara frontier. He
preceded by Colonel Murray, who took
session of Fort George on the 12th, the
M'Clure crossed the Niagara river. Murray
nce made a plan to take the American
t Niagara opposite; and Drummond at
e approved it for immediate execution. On

the night of the 18th six hundred men we landed on the American side three miles t the river. At four the next morning Murr led them down to the fort, rushing the sentri and pickets by the way with the bayon in dead silence. He then told off two hu dred men to take a bastion at the sa time that he was to lead the other four hu dred straight through the main gate, whi he knew would soon be opened to let t reliefs pass out. Everything worked to perfe tion. When the reliefs came out they we immediately charged and bayoneted, as we the first astonished men off duty who r out of their quarters to see what the mat was. A stiff hand-to-hand fight followed. B every American attempt to form was instan bróken up; and presently the whole pla surrendered. Drummond, who was delight with such an excellent beginning, took ca to underline the four significant words ref ring to the enemy's killed and wounded *all with the bayonet.* This was done in mere vulgar spirit of bravado, still less abominable bloody-mindedness. It was t soldierly recognition of a particularly galla feat of arms, carried out with such conspi ously good discipline that its memory

SIR GORDON DRUMMOND

From the John Ross Robertson Collection, Toronto Public Library

erished, even to the present day, by the
oth, afterwards raised again as the Royal
nadians, and now known as the Prince of
ales's Leinster regiment. A facsimile of
ummond's underlined order is one of the
st highly honoured souvenirs in the officers'
ss.

Not a moment was lost in following up
s splendid feat of arms. The Indians drove
American militia out of Lewiston, which
advancing redcoats burnt to the ground.
t Schlosser fell next, then Black Rock,
l finally Buffalo. Each was laid in ashes.
us, before 1813 ended, the whole American
e of the Niagara was nothing but one
g, bare line of blackened desolation, with
sole exception of Fort Niagara, which re-
ned secure in British hands until the war
over.

CHAPTER VI

1814: LUNDY'S LANE, PLATTSBURG, AND THE GREAT BLOCKADE

In the closing phase of the struggle by la and sea the fortunes of war may, with t single exception of Plattsburg, be most co veniently followed territorially, from one poi to the next, along the enormous irreg lar curve of five thousand miles which w the scene of operations. This curve begi at Prairie du Chien, where the Wiscons joins the Mississippi, and ends at New Orlea where the Mississippi is about to join the s It runs easterly along the Wisconsin, acr to the Fox, into Lake Michigan, across Mackinaw, eastwards through Lakes Hur Erie, and Ontario, down the St Lawren round to Halifax, round from there to Mai and thence along the whole Atlantic coa south and west-about into the Gulf of Mexi

The blockade of the Gulf of Mexico was integral part of the British plan. But t

attle of New Orleans, which was a complete isaster for the British arms, stands quite utside the actual war, since it was fought on anuary 8, 1815, more than two weeks after ıe terms of peace had been settled by the reaty of Ghent. This peculiarity about its ate, taken in conjunction with its extreme moteness from the Canadian frontier, puts beyond the purview of the present chronicle. All the decisive actions of the campaign oper were fought within two months. They gan at Prairie du Chien in July and ended Plattsburg in September. Plattsburg is the ıe exception to the order of place. The de of war and British fortune flowed east ıd south to reach its height at Washing- n in August. It turned at Plattsburg in ptember.

Neither friend nor foe went west in 1813. ıt in April 1814 Colonel M'Douall set out th ninety men, mostly of the Newfound- nd regiment, to reinforce Mackinaw. He arted from the little depot which had been tablished on the Nottawasaga, a river flow- g into the Georgian Bay and accessible by e overland trail from York.

After surmounting the many difficulties of

the inland route which he had to take
order to avoid the Americans in the Lake E
region, and after much hard work against t
Lake Huron ice, he at last reached Mackin
on the 18th of May. Some good fighti
Indians joined him there; and towards t
end of June he felt strong enough to se
Colonel M'Kay against the American p
at Prairie du Chien. M'Kay arrived at t
post in the middle of July and captured t
whole position—fort, guns, garrison, and
vessel on the Mississippi.

Meanwhile seven hundred Americans un
Croghan, the American officer who had
pulsed Procter at Fort Stephenson the y
before, were making for Mackinaw its
They did some private looting at the Sa
burnt the houses at St Joseph's Island, a
landed in full force at Mackinaw on the 4th
August. M'Douall had less than two hund
men, Indians included. But he at once march
out to the attack and beat the Americ
back to their ships, which immediately sai
away. The British thenceforth comman
the whole three western lakes until the w
was over.

The Lake Erie region remained quite as
cisively commanded by the Americans. Th

tually occupied only the line of the Detroit. ut they had the power to cut any communi- tions which the British might try to estab- h along the north side of the lake. They d suffered a minor reverse at Chatham in e previous December. But in March they ore than turned the tables by defeating asden's attack in the Longwoods at Dela- are, near London; and in October seven ndred of their mounted men raided the line the Thames and only just stopped short of e Grand River, the western boundary of the iagara peninsula.

The Niagara frontier, as before, was the ene of desperate strife. The Americans were termined to wrest it from the British, d they carefully trained their best troops r the effort. Their prospects seemed bright, the whole of Upper Canada was suffer- g from want of men and means, both civil d military. Drummond, the British com- ander-in-chief there, felt very anxious not ly about the line of the Niagara but even out the neck of the whole peninsula, from rlington westward to Lake Erie. He had more than 4400 troops, all told; and he s obliged to place them so as to be ready r an attack either from the Niagara or

from Lake Erie, or from both together. Keeping his base at York with a thousand men, he formed his line with its right on Burlington and its left on Fort Niagara. He had 500 men at Burlington, 1000 at Fort George, and 700 at Fort Niagara. The rest were thrown well forward, so as to get into immediate touch with any Americans advancing from the south. There were 300 men at Queenston, 500 at Chippawa, 150 at Fort Erie, and 250 at Long Point on Lake Erie.

Brown, the American general who had beaten Prevost at Sackett's Harbour and who had now superseded Wilkinson, had made his advanced field base at Buffalo. His total force was not much more than Drummond's. But it was all concentrated into a single striking body which possessed the full initiative of manœuvre and attack. On July 3 Brown crossed the Niagara to the Canadian side. The same day he took Fort Erie from its little garrison; and at once began to make it a really formidable work, as the British found out to their cost later on. Next day he advanced down the river road to Street's Creek. On hearing this, General Riall, Drummond's second-in-command, gathered two thousand men and advanced against Brown, who had

ecommenced his own advance with four housand. They met on the 5th, between treet's Creek and the Chippawa river. Riall t once sent six hundred men, including ll his Indians and militia, against more han twice their number of American militia, vho were in a strong position on the inland lank. The Canadians went forward in excel- ent style and the Americans broke and fled n wild confusion. Seizing such an appar- ntly good chance, Riall then attacked the merican regulars with his own, though the dds he had to face here were more than hree against two. The opposing lines met ace to face unflinchingly. The Americans, vho had now been trained and disciplined y proper leaders, refused to yield an inch. heir two regular brigadiers, Winfield Scott nd Ripley, kept them well in hand, man- euvred their surplus battalions to the best dvantage, overlapped the weaker British lank, and won the day. The British loss was ve hundred, or one in four: the American our hundred, or only one in ten.

Brown then turned Riall's flank, by crossing he Chippawa higher up, and prepared for the rowning triumph of crushing Drummond. Ie proposed a joint attack with Chauncey on

Forts Niagara and George. But Chauncey happened to be ill at the time; he had not yet defeated Yeo; and he strongly resented being made apparently subordinate to Brown. So the proposed combination failed at the critical moment. But, for the eighteen days between the battle of Chippawa on the 5th of July and Brown's receipt of Chauncey's refusal on the 23rd, the Americans carried all before them, right up to the British line that ran along the western end of Lake Ontario, from Fort Niagara to Burlington. During this period no great operations took place. But two minor incidents served to exasperate feelings on both sides. Eight Canadian traitors were tried and hanged at Ancaster near Burlington; and Loyalists openly expressed their regret that Willcocks and others had escaped the same fate. Willcocks had been the ring-leader of the parliamentary opposition to Brock in 1812; and had afterwards been exceedingly active on the American side, harrying every Loyalist he and his raiders could lay their hands on. He ended by cheating the gallows, after all, as he fell in a skirmish towards the end of the present campaign on the Niagara frontier. The other exasperating incident was the burning of St David's on

uly 19 by a Colonel Stone; partly because t was a 'Tory village' and partly because he American militia mistakenly thought that ne of their officers, Brigadier-General Swift, ad been killed by a prisoner to whom he had iven quarter.

When, on the 23rd of July, Brown at last eceived Chauncey's disappointing answer, he nmediately stopped manœuvring along the ower Niagara and prepared to execute an lternative plan of marching diagonally across he Niagara peninsula straight for the British osition at Burlington. To do this he con-entrated at the Chippawa on the 24th. But y the time he was ready to put his plan into xecution, on the morning of the 25th, he ound himself in close touch with the British his immediate front. Their advanced guard f a thousand men, under Colonel Pearson, ad just taken post at Lundy's Lane, near the alls. Their main body, under Riall, was learing both banks of the lower Niagara. nd Drummond himself had just arrived at ort Niagara. Neither side knew the inten-ions of the other. But as the British were learing the whole country up to the Falls, nd as the Americans were bent on striking iagonally inland from a point beside the

Falls, it inevitably happened that each me the other at Lundy's Lane, which runs inland from the Canadian side of the Falls, at right angles to the river, and therefore between the two opposing armies.

When Drummond, hurrying across from York, landed at Fort Niagara in the early morning of the fateful 25th, he found that the orders he had sent over on the 23rd were already being carried out, though in a slightly modified form. Colonel Tucker was marching off from Fort Niagara to Lewiston, which he took without opposition. Then, first making sure that the heights beyond were also clear, he crossed over the Niagara to Queenston, where his men had dinner with those who had marched up on the Canadian side from Fort George. Immediately after dinner half the total sixteen hundred present marched back to garrison Forts George and Niagara, while the other half marched forward, up-stream, on the Canadian side, with Drummond, towards Lundy's Lane, whither Riall had preceded them with reinforcements for the advanced guard under Colonel Pearson. In the meantime Brown had heard about the taking of Lewiston, and, fearing that the British might take Fort Schlosser too, had at once

ven up all idea of his diagonal march on urlington and had decided to advance straight gainst Queenston instead. Thus both the merican and the British main bodies were arching on Lundy's Lane from opposite des and in successive detachments through- ut that long, intensely hot, midsummer after- oon.

Presently Riall got a report saying that the mericans were advancing in one massed rce instead of in successive detachments. le thereupon ordered Pearson to retire from undy's Lane to Queenston, sent back orders hat Colonel Hercules Scott, who was march- g up twelve hundred men from near St atharine's on Twelve Mile Creek, was also go to Queenston, and reported both these hanges to Drummond, who was hurrying long the Queenston road towards Lundy's ane as fast as he could. While the orderly fficers were galloping back to Drummond and Iercules Scott, and while Pearson was getting is men into their order of march, Winfield cott's brigade of American regulars suddenly ppeared on the Chippawa road, deployed for ttack, and halted. There was a pause on oth sides. Winfield Scott thought he might ave Drummond's whole force in front of him.

Riall thought he was faced by the whole of Brown's. But Winfield Scott, presently realizing that Pearson was unsupported, resumed his advance; while Pearson and Riall, not realizing that Winfield Scott was himself unsupported for the time being, immediately began to retire.

At this precise moment Drummond dashed up and drew rein. There was not a minute to lose. The leading Americans were coming on in excellent order, only a musket-shot away; Pearson's thousand were just in the act of giving up the key to the whole position; and Drummond's eight hundred were plodding along a mile or so in rear. But within that fleeting minute Drummond made the plan that brought on the most desperately contested battle of the war. He ordered Pearson's thousand back again. He brought his own eight hundred forward at full speed. He sent post-haste to Colonel Scott to change once more and march on Lundy's Lane. And so, by the time the astonished Americans were about to seize the key themselves, they found him ready to defend it.

Too long for a hillock, too low for a hill, this key to the whole position in that stern fight has never had a special name. But it may

well be known as Battle Rise. It stood a mile from the Niagara river, and just a step inland beyond the crossing of two roads. One of these, Lundy's Lane, ran lengthwise over it, at right angles to the Niagara. The other, which did not quite touch it, ran in the same direction as the river, all the way from Fort Erie to Fort George, and, of course, through both Chippawa and Queenston. The crest of Battle Rise was a few yards on the Chippawa side of Lundy's Lane; and there Drummond placed his seven field-guns. Round these guns the thickest of the battle raged, from first to last. The odds were four thousand Americans against three thousand British, altogether. But the British were in superior force at first; and neither side had its full total in action at any one time, as casualties and reinforcements kept the numbers fluctuating.

It was past six in the evening of that stifling 25th of July when Winfield Scott attacked with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. Though the British outnumbered his splendid brigade, and though they had the choice of ground as well, he still succeeded in driving a wedge through their left flank, a move which threatened to break them away from the road along the river. But they retired in good

order, re-formed, and then drove out his wedge.

By half-past seven the American army had all come into action, and Drummond was having hard work to hold his own. Brown, like Winfield Scott, at once saw the supreme importance of taking Battle Rise; so he sent two complete battalions against it, one of regulars leading, the other, of militia, in support. At the first salvo from Drummond's seven guns the American militia broke and ran away. But Colonel Miller worked some of the American regulars very cleverly along the far side of a creeper-covered fence, while the rest engaged the battery from a distance. In the heat of action the British artillerymen never saw their real danger till, on a given signal, Miller's advanced party all sprang up and fired a point-blank volley which killed or wounded every man beside the guns. Then Miller charged and took the battery. But he only held it for a moment. The British centre charged up their own side of Battle Rise and drove the intruders back, after a terrific struggle with the bayonet. But again success was only for the moment. The Americans rallied and pressed the British back. The British then rallied and returned. And so

the desperate fight swayed back and forth across the coveted position; till finally both sides retired exhausted, and the guns stood dumb between them.

It was now pitch-dark, and the lull that followed seemed almost like the end of the fight. But, after a considerable pause, the Americans—all regulars this time—came on once more. This put the British in the greatest danger. Drummond had lost nearly a third of his men. The effective American regulars were little less than double his present twelve hundred effectives of all kinds and were the fresher army of the two. Miller had taken one of the guns from Battle Rise. The other six could not be served against close-quarter musketry; and the nearest Americans were actually resting between the cross-roads and the deserted Rise. Defeat looked certain for the British. But, just as the attackers and defenders began to stir again, Colonel Hercules Scott's twelve hundred weary reinforcements came plodding along the Queenston road, wheeled round the corner into Lundy's Lane, and stumbled in among these nearest Americans, who, being the more expectant of the two, drove them back in confusion. The officers, however,

rallied the men at once. Drummond told off eight hundred of them, including three hundred militia, to the reserve; prolonged his line to the right with the rest; and thus re-established the defence.

Hardly had the new arrivals taken breath before the final assault began. Again the Americans took the silent battery. Again the British drove them back. Again the opposing lines swayed to and fro across the deadly crest of Battle Rise, with nothing else to guide them through the hot, black night but their own flaming musketry. The Americans could not have been more gallant and persistent in attack: the British could not have been more steadfast in defence. Midnight came; but neither side could keep its hold on Battle Rise. By this time Drummond was wounded; and Riall was both wounded and a prisoner. Among the Americans Brown and Winfield Scott were also wounded, while their men were worn out after being under arms for nearly eighteen hours. A pause of sheer exhaustion followed. Then, slowly and sullenly, as if they knew the one more charge they could not make must carry home, the foiled Americans turned back and felt their way to Chippawa.

The British ranks lay down in the same order as that in which they fought; and a deep hush fell over the whole, black-shrouded battlefield. The immemorial voice of those dread Falls to which no combatant gave heed for six long hours of mortal strife was heard once more. But near at hand there was no other sound than that which came from the whispered queries of a few tired officers on duty; from the busy orderlies and surgeons at their work of mercy; and from the wounded moaning in their pain. So passed the quiet half of that short, momentous, summer night. Within four hours the sun shone down on the living and the dead—on that silent battery whose gunners had fallen to a man—on the unconquered Rise.

The tide of war along the Niagara frontier favoured neither side for some time after Lundy's Lane, though the Americans twice appeared to be regaining the initiative. On August 15 there was a well-earned American victory at Fort Erie, where Drummond's assault was beaten off with great loss to the British. A month later an American sortie was repulsed. On September 21 Drummond retired beaten; and on October 13 he found

himself again on the defensive at Chippawa, with little more than three thousand men, while Izard, who had come with American reinforcements from Lake Champlain and Sackett's Harbour, was facing him with twice as many. But Yeo's fleet had now come up to the mouth of the Niagara, while Chauncey's had remained at Sackett's Harbour. Thus the British had the priceless advantage of a movable naval base at hand, while the Americans had none at all within supporting distance. Every step towards Lake Ontario hampered Izard more and more, while it added corresponding strength to Drummond. An American attempt to work round Drummond's flank, twelve miles inland, was also foiled by a heavy skirmish on October 19 at Cook's Mills; and Izard's definite abandonment of the invasion was announced on November 5 by his blowing up Fort Erie and retiring into winter quarters. This ended the war along the whole Niagara.

The campaign on Lake Ontario was very different. It opened two months earlier. The naval competition consisted rather in building than in fighting. The British built ships in Kingston, the Americans in Sackett's Harbour; and reports of progress soon

travelled across the intervening space of less than forty miles. The initiative of combined operations by land and water was undertaken by the British instead of by the Americans. Yeo and Drummond wished to attack Sackett's Harbour with four thousand men. But Prevost said he could spare them only three thousand; whereupon they changed their objective to Oswego, which they took, in excellent style, on May 6. The British suffered a serious reverse, though on a very much smaller scale, on May 30, at Sandy Creek, between Oswego and Sackett's Harbour, when a party of marines and bluejackets, sent to cut out some vessels with naval stores for Chauncey, was completely lost, every man being either killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.

From Lake Ontario down to the sea the Canadian frontier was never seriously threatened; and the only action of any consequence was fought to the south of Montreal in the early spring. On March 30 the Americans made a last inglorious attempt in this direction. Wilkinson started with four thousand men to follow the line of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu river, the same that was tried by Dearborn in 1812 and by Hampton in 1813. At La Colle, only four miles across the frontier,

he attacked Major Handcock's post of two hundred men. The result was like a second Châteauguay. Handcock drew in three hundred reinforcements and two gunboats from Isle-aux-Noix. Wilkinson's advanced guard lost its way overnight. In the morning he lacked the resolution to press on, even with his overwhelming numbers; and so, after a part of his army had executed some disjointed manœuvres, he withdrew the whole and gave up in despair.

From this point of the Canadian frontier to the very end of the five-thousand-mile loop, that is, from Montreal to Mexico, the theatre of operations was directly based upon the sea, where the British Navy was by this time undisputedly supreme. A very few small American men-of-war were still at large, together with a much greater number of privateers. But they had no power whatever even to mitigate the irresistible blockade of the whole coast-line of the United States. American seaborne commerce simply died away; for no mercantile marine could have any independent life when its trade had to be carried on by a constantly decreasing tonnage, when, too, it could go to sea at all only by furtive evasion,

and when it had to take cargo at risks so great that they could not be covered either by insurance or by any attainable profits. The Atlantic being barred by this Great Blockade, and the Pacific being inaccessible, the only practical way left open to American trade was through the British lines by land or sea. Some American seamen shipped in British vessels. Some American ships sailed under British colours. But the chief external American trade was done illicitly, by 'underground,' with the British West Indies and with Canada itself. This was, of course, in direct defiance of the American government, and to the direct detriment of the United States as a nation. It was equally to the direct benefit of the British colonies in general and of Nova Scotia in particular. American harbours had never been so dull. Quebec and Halifax had never been so prosperous. American money was drained away from the warlike South and West and either concentrated in the Northern States —which were opposed to the war—or paid over into British hands.

Nor was this all. The British Navy harried the coast in every convenient quarter and made effective the work of two most important joint attacks, one on Maine, the other

on Washington itself. The attack on Maine covered two months, altogether, from July 11 to September 11. It began with the taking of Moose Island by Sir Thomas Hardy, Nelson's old flag-captain at Trafalgar, and ended with the surrender, at Machias, of 'about 100 miles of sea-coast,' together with 'that intermediate tract of country which separates the province of New Brunswick from Lower Canada.' On September 21 Sir John Sherbrooke proclaimed at Halifax the formal annexation of 'all the eastern side of the Penobscot river and all the country lying between the same river and the boundary of New Brunswick.'

The attack on Maine was meant, in one sense at least, to create a partial counterpoise to the American preponderance on Lake Erie. The attack on Washington was made in retaliation for the burning of the old and new capitals of Upper Canada, Newark and York.

The naval defence of Washington had been committed to Commodore Barney, a most expert and gallant veteran of the Revolution, who handled his wholly inadequate little force with consummate skill and daring, both afloat and ashore. He was not, strictly speaking, a naval officer, but a privateersman who had made the unique record of taking

eleven prizes in ten consecutive days with his famous Baltimore schooner *Rossie*. The military defence was committed to General Winder, one of the two generals captured by Harvey's '704 firelocks' at Stoney Creek the year before. Winder was a good soldier and did his best in the seven weeks at his disposal. But the American government, which had now enjoyed continuous party power for no less than thirteen years, gave him no more than four hundred regulars, backed by Barney's four hundred excellent seamen and the usual array of militia, with whom to defend the capital in the third campaign of a war they had themselves declared. There were 93,500 militiamen within the threatened area. But only fifteen thousand were got under arms; and only five thousand were brought into action.

In the middle of August the British fleet under Admirals Cochrane and Cockburn sailed into Chesapeake Bay with a detachment of four thousand troops commanded by General Ross. Barney had no choice but to retire before this overwhelming force. As the British advanced up the narrowing waters all chance of escape disappeared; so Barney burnt his boats and little vessels and marched his seamen in to join Winder's army. On August 24

Winder's whole six thousand drew up in an exceedingly strong position at Bladensburg, just north of Washington; and the President rode out with his Cabinet to see a battle which is best described by its derisive title of the Bladensburg Races. Ross's four thousand came on and were received by an accurate checking fire from the regular artillery and from Barney's seamen gunners. But a total loss of 8 killed and 11 wounded was more than the 5000 American militia could stand. All the rest ran for dear life. The deserted handful of regular soldiers and sailors was then overpowered; while Barney was severely wounded and taken prisoner. He and they, however, had saved their honour and won the respect and admiration of both friend and foe. Ross and Cockburn at once congratulated him on the stand he had made against them; and he, with equal magnanimity, reported officially that the British had treated him 'just like a brother.'

That night the little British army of four thousand men burnt governmental Washington, the capital of a country with eight millions of people. Not a man, not a woman, not a child, was in any way molested; nor was one finger laid on any private property.

The four thousand then marched back to the fleet, through an area inhabited by 93,500 militiamen on paper, without having so much as a single musket fired at them.

Now, if ever, was Prevost's golden opportunity to end the war with a victory that would turn the scale decisively in favour of the British cause. With the one exception of Lake Erie, the British had the upper hand over the whole five thousand miles of front. A successful British counter-invasion, across the Montreal frontier, would offset the American hold on Lake Erie, ensure the control of Lake Champlain, and thus bring all the scattered parts of the campaign into their proper relation to a central, crowning triumph.

On the other hand, defeat would mean disaster. But the bare possibility of defeat seemed quite absurd when Prevost set out from his field headquarters opposite Montreal, between La Prairie and Chambly, with eleven thousand seasoned veterans, mostly 'Peninsulars,' to attack Plattsburg, which was no more than twenty-five miles across the frontier, very weakly fortified, and garrisoned only by the fifteen hundred regulars whom Izard had 'culled out' when he started for Niagara.

The naval odds were not so favourable. But, as they could be decisively affected by military action, they naturally depended on Prevost, who, with his overwhelming army, could turn them whichever way he chose. It was true that Commodore Macdonough's American flotilla had more trained seamen than Captain Downie's corresponding British force, and that his crews and vessels possessed the further advantage of having worked together for some time. Downie, a brave and skilful young officer, had arrived to take command of his flotilla at the upper end of Lake Champlain only on September 2, that is, exactly a week before Prevost urged him to attack, and nine days before the battle actually did take place. He had a fair proportion of trained seamen; but they consisted of scratch drafts from different men-of-war, chosen in haste and hurried to the front. Most of the men and officers were complete strangers to one another; and they made such short-handed crews that some soldiers had to be wheeled out of the line of march and put on board at the very last minute. There would have been grave difficulties with such a flotilla under any circumstances. But Prevost had increased them tenfold by giving

no orders and making no preparations while trying his hand at another abortive armistice —one, moreover, which he had no authority even to propose.

Yet, in spite of all this, Prevost still had the means of making Downie superior to Macdonough. Macdonough's vessels were mostly armed with carronades, Downie's with long guns. Carronades fired masses of small projectiles with great effect at very short ranges. Long guns, on the other hand, fired each a single large projectile up to the farthest ranges known. In fact, it was almost as if the Americans had been armed with shot-guns and the British armed with rifles. Therefore the Americans had an overwhelming advantage at close quarters, while the British had a corresponding advantage at long range. Now, Macdonough had anchored in an ideal position for close action inside Plattsburg Bay. He required only a few men to look after his ground tackle;[1] and his springs[2] were out on the landward side for 'winding ship,' that is, for turning his vessels completely round,

[1] Anchors and cables.

[2] Ropes to hold a vessel in position when hauling or swinging in a harbour. Here, ropes from the stern to the anchors on the landward side.

so as to bring their fresh broadsides into action. There was no sea-room for manœuvring round him with any chance of success; so the British would be at a great disadvantage while standing in to the attack, first because they could be raked end-on, next because they could only reply with bow fire —the weakest of all—and, lastly, because their best men would be engaged with the sails and anchors while their ships were taking station.

But Prevost had it fully in his power to prevent Macdonough from fighting in such an ideal position at all. Macdonough's American flotilla was well within range of Macomb's long-range American land batteries; while Prevost's overwhelming British army was easily able to take these land batteries, turn their guns on Macdonough's helpless vessels—whose short-range carronades could not possibly reply—and so either destroy the American flotilla at anchor in the bay or force it out into the open lake, where it would meet Downie's long-range guns at the greatest disadvantage. Prevost, after allowing for all other duties, had at least seven thousand veterans for an assault on Macomb's second-rate regulars and ordinary militia, both of

hom together amounted at most to thirty-
ve hundred, including local militiamen who
ad come in to reinforce the 'culls' whom
ard had left behind. The Americans, though
orking with very creditable zeal, determined
do their best, quite expected to be beaten
ut of their little forts and entrenchments,
hich were just across the fordable Saranac in
ont of Prevost's army. They had tried to
elay the British advance. But, in the words
Macomb's own official report, 'so undaunted
as the enemy that he never deployed in his
hole march, always pressing on in column';
at is, the British veterans simply brushed
e Americans aside without deigning to
ange from their column of march into a line
battle. Prevost's duty was therefore per-
ctly plain. With all the odds in his favour
hore, and with the power of changing the
lds in his favour afloat, he ought to have
ptured Macomb's position in the early morn-
g and turned both his own and Macomb's
tillery on Macdonough, who would then
ave been forced to leave his moorings for
e open lake, where Downie would have
ad eight hours of daylight to fight him at
ng range.

What Prevost actually did was something

disgracefully different. Having first waste time by his attempted armistice, and s hindered preparations at the base, betwee La Prairie and Chambly, he next proceede to cross the frontier too soon. He reporte home that Downie could not be ready befor September 15. But on August 31 he crosse the line himself, only twenty-five miles fro his objective, thus prematurely showing th enemy his hand. Then he began to goa the unhappy Downie to his doom. Downie flagship, the *Confiance*, named after a Frenc prize which Yeo had taken, was launche only on August 25, and hauled out into th stream only on September 7. Her scratc crew could not go to battle quarters till th 8th; and the shipwrights were working madl at her up to the very moment that the firs shot was fired in her fatal action on the 11t Yet Prevost tried to force her into action o the 9th, adding, 'I need not dwell with yo on the evils resulting to both services fro delay,' and warning Downie that he was bei watched: 'Captain Watson is directed t remain at Little Chazy until you are prepa ing to get under way.'

Thus watched and goaded by the governo general and commander-in-chief, whose ow

rvice was the Army, Downie, a compara-
ve junior in the Navy, put forth his utmost
forts, against his better judgment, to sail
at very midnight. A baffling head-wind,
owever, kept him from working out. He
mediately reported to Prevost, giving quite
tisfactory reasons. But Prevost wrote back
patiently: 'The troops have been held in
adiness, since six o'clock this morning [the
th], to storm the enemy's works at nearly
e same time as the naval action begins in
e bay. I ascribe the disappointment I
ve experienced to the unfortunate change
wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my
asonable expectations have been frustrated
no other cause.' '*No other cause.*' The
nuendo, even if unintentional, was there.
ownie, a junior sailor, was perhaps suspected
'shyness' by a very senior soldier. Pre-
st's poison worked quickly. 'I will con-
nce him that the Navy won't be backward,'
id Downie to his second, Pring, who gave
is evidence, under oath, at the subsequent
urt-martial. Pring, whose evidence was
rroborated by that of both the first lieu-
nant and the master of the *Confiance*, then
ged the extreme risk of engaging Mac-
nough inside the bay. But Downie allayed

their anxiety by telling them that Prevo had promised to storm Macomb's indefensib works simultaneously. This was not near so good as if Prevost had promised to defe Macomb first and then drive Macdonough o to sea. But it was better, far better, tha what actually was done.

With Prevost's written promise in h pocket Downie sailed for Plattsburg in t early morning of that fatal 11th of Septembe Punctually to the minute he fired his preco certed signal outside Cumberland Head, whi separated the bay from the lake. He ne waited exactly the prescribed time, duri which he reconnoitred Macdonough's positi from a boat. Then the hour of battle cam The hammering of the shipwrights stopp at last; and the ill-starred *Confiance*, th ship which never had a chance to 'find he self,' led the little squadron into Prevos death-trap in the bay. Every soldier a sailor now realized that the storming of t works on land ought to have been the fi move, and that Prevost's idea of simultaneo action was faulty, because it meant two ind pendent fights, with the chance of a nav disaster preceding the military success. Ho ever, Prevost was the commander-in-chie

SIR JAMES YEO

From a portrait by A. Buck

e had promised co-operation in his own way; nd Downie was determined to show him at the Navy had stopped for '*no other use*' than the head-wind of the day before. Did *no other cause* than mistaken judgment fect Prevost that fatal morning? Did he tend to show Downie that a commander--chief could not suffer the 'disappoint-ent' of 'holding troops in readiness' with-it marking his displeasure by some visible turn in kind? Or was he no worse than iminally weak? His motives will never be nown. But his actions throw a sinister ght upon them. For when Downie sailed to the attack Prevost did nothing what-er to help him. Betrayed, traduced, and oaded to his ruin, Downie fought a losing ttle with the utmost gallantry and skill. he wind flawed and failed inside the bay, so at the *Confiance* could not reach her proper ation. Yet her first broadside struck down rty men aboard the *Saratoga*. Then the *aratoga* fired her carronades, at point-blank nge, cut up the cables aboard the *Confiance*, nd did great execution among the crew. In teen minutes Downie fell.

The battle raged two full hours longer; hile the odds against the British continued

to increase. Four of their little gunboat fought as well as gunboats could. But th other seven simply ran away, like their com mander afterwards when summoned for court-martial that would assuredly have sen tenced him to death. Two of the larger vesse failed to come into action properly; one wen ashore, the other drifted through the America line and then hauled down her colours. Thu the battle was fought to its dire conclusion b the British *Confiance* and *Linnet* against th American *Saratoga*, *Eagle*, and *Ticonderog* The gunboats had little to do with the result though the odds of all those actually engage were greatly in favour of Macdonough. Th fourth American vessel of larger size drifte out of action.

Macdonough, an officer of whom any nav in the world might well be proud, then con centrated on the stricken *Confiance* with h own *Saratoga*, greatly aided by the *Eagl* which swung round so as to rake the *Con fiance* with her fresh broadside. The *Linn* now drifted off a little and so could not hel the *Confiance*, both because the America galleys at once engaged her and becaus her position was bad in any case. Presentl both flagships slackened fire; whereupon Mac

onough took the opportunity of winding hip. His ground tackle was in perfect order n the far, or landward, side; so the *Saratoga* wung round quite easily. The *Confiance* now ad both the *Eagle's* and the *Saratoga's* fresh arronade broadsides deluging her battered, annon-armed broadside with showers of eadly grape. Her one last chance of keeping up a little longer was to wind ship herself. Her tackle had all been cut; but her master ot out his last spare cables and tried to bring er round, while some of his toiling men fell ead at every haul. She began to wind round ery slowly; and, when exactly at right ngles to Macdonough, was raked completely, ore and aft. At the same time an ominous st to port, where her side was torn in over a undred places, showed that she would sink uickly if her guns could not be run across to tarboard. But more than half her mixed cratch crew had been already killed or ounded. The most desperate efforts of her ew surviving officers could not prevent the onfusion that followed the fearful raking she ow received from both her superior opponents; and before her fresh broadside could e brought to bear she was forced to strike er flag. Then every American carronade

and gun was turned upon Pring's undaunte
little *Linnet*, which kept up the hopeless figh
for fifteen minutes longer; so that Prevos
might yet have a chance to carry out his ow
operations without fear of molestation fro
a hostile bay.

But Prevost was in no danger of molesta
tion. He was in perfect safety. He watche
the destruction of his fleet from his secu
headquarters, well inland, marched and cou
termarched his men about, to make a sho
of action; and then, as the *Linnet* fired he
last, despairing gun, he told all ranks to g
to dinner.

That night he broke camp hurriedly, le
all his badly wounded men behind him, an
went back a great deal faster than he cam
His shamed, disgusted veterans deserted i
unprecedented numbers. And Macomb's a
tounded army found themselves the victo
of an unfought field.

The American victory at Plattsburg gav
the United States the absolute control
Lake Champlain; and this, reinforcing the
similar control of Lake Erie, counterbalance
the British military advantages all along th
Canadian frontier. The British command
the sea, the destruction of Washington, an

the occupation of Maine told heavily on the other side. These three British advantages had been won while the mother country was fighting with her right hand tied behind her back; and in all the elements of warlike strength the British Empire was vastly superior to the United States. Thus there cannot be the slightest doubt that if the British had been free to continue the war they must have triumphed. But they were not free. Europe was seething with the profound unrest that made her statesmen feel the volcano heaving under their every step during the portentous year between Napoleon's abdication and return. The mighty British Navy, the veteran British Army, could not now be sent across the sea in overwhelming force. So American diplomacy eagerly seized this chance of profiting by British needs, and took such good advantage of them that the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the war on Christmas Eve, left the two opponents in much the same position towards each other as before. Neither of the main reasons for which the Americans had fought their three campaigns was even mentioned in the articles.

The war had been an unmitigated curse to

the motherland herself; and it brought the usual curses in its train all over the scene of action. But some positive good came out of it as well, both in Canada and in the United States.

The benefits conferred on the United States could not be given in apter words than those used by Gallatin, who, as the finance minister during four presidential terms, saw quite enough of the seamy side to sober his opinions, and who, as a prominent member of the war party, shared the disappointed hopes of his colleagues about the conquest of Canada. His opinion is, of course, that of a partisan. But it contains much truth, for all that

> The war has been productive of evil and of good; but I think the good preponderates. It has laid the foundations of permanent taxes and military establishments, which the Republicans [as the anti-Federalist Democrats were then called] had deemed unfavorable to the happiness and free institutions of the country. Under our former system we were becoming too selfish, too much attached exclusively to the acquisition of wealth, above all, too much confined in our political feelings to

> local and state objects. The war has renewed the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessening. The people are now more American. They feel and act more as a nation. And I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby better secured.

Gallatin did not, of course, foresee that it would take a third conflict to finish what the Revolution had begun. But this sequel only strengthens his argument. For that Union which was born in the throes of the Revolution had to pass through its tumultuous youth in '1812' before reaching full manhood by means of the Civil War.

The benefits conferred on Canada were equally permanent and even greater. How Gallatin would have rejoiced to see in the United States any approach to such a financial triumph as that which was won by the Army Bills in Canada! No public measure was ever more successful at the time or more full of promise for the future. But mightier problems than even those of national finance were brought nearer to their desirable solution by this propitious war. It made Ontario

what Quebec had long since been—historic ground; thus bringing the older and newer provinces together with one exalting touch. It was also the last, as well as the most convincing, defeat of the three American invasions of Canada. The first had been led by Sir William Phips in 1690. This was long before the Revolution. The American Colonies were then still British and Canada still French. But the invasion itself was distinctively American, in men, ships, money, and design. It was undertaken without the consent or knowledge of the home authorities; and its success would probably have destroyed all chance of there being any British Canada to-day. The second American invasion had been that of Montgomery and Arnold in 1775, during the Revolution, when the very diverse elements of a new Canadian life first began to defend their common heritage against a common foe. The third invasion—the War of 1812—united all these elements once more, just when Canada stood most in need of mutual confidence between them. So there could not have been a better bond of union than the blood then shed so willingly by her different races in a single righteous cause.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

ENOUGH books to fill a small library have been written about the 'sprawling and sporadic' War of 1812. Most of them deal with particular phases, localities, or events; and most of them are distinctly partisan. This is unfortunate, but not surprising. The war was waged over an immense area, by various forces, and with remarkably various results. The Americans were victorious on the Lakes and in all but one of the naval duels fought at sea. Yet their coast was completely sealed up by the Great Blockade in the last campaign. The balance of victory inclined towards the British side on land. Yet the annihilating American victories on the Lakes nullified most of the general military advantages gained by the British along the Canadian frontier. The fortunes of each campaign were followed with great interest on both sides of the line. But on the other side of the Atlantic the British home public had Napoleon to think of at their very doors; and so, for the most part, they regarded the war with the States as an untoward and regrettable annoyance, which diverted too much

force and attention from the life-and-death affairs of Europe.

All these peculiar influences are reflected in the different patriotic annals. Americans are voluble about the Lakes and the naval duels out at sea. But the completely effective British blockade of their coast-line is a too depressingly scientific factor in the problem to be welcomed by a general public which would not understand how Yankee ships could win so many duels while the British Navy won the war. Canadians are equally voluble about the battles on Canadian soil, where Americans had decidedly the worst of it. As a rule, Canadian writers have been quite as controversial as Americans, and not any readier to study their special subjects as parts of a greater whole. The British Isles have never had an interested public anxious to read about this remote, distasteful, and subsidiary war; and books about it there have consequently been very few.

The two chief authors who have appealed directly to the readers of the mother country are William James and Sir Charles Lucas. James was an industrious naval historian; but he was quite as anti-American as the earlier American writers were anti-British. Owing to this perverting bias his two books, the *Naval* and the *Military Occurrences of the late War between Great Britain and the United States*, are not to be relied upon. Their appendices, however, give a great many documents which are of much assistance in study-

ing the real history of the war. James wrote only a few years after the peace. Nearly a century later Sir Charles Lucas wrote *The Canadian War of 1812,* which is the work of a man whose life-long service in the Colonial Office and intimate acquaintance with Canadian history have both been turned to the best account. The two chief Canadian authors are Colonel Cruikshank and James Hannay. Colonel Cruikshank deserves the greatest credit for being a real pioneer with his *Documentary History of the Campaigns upon the Niagara Frontier.* Hannay's *History of the War of 1812* shows careful study of the Canadian aspects of the operations; but its generally sound arguments are weakened by its controversial tone.

The four chief American authors to reckon with are, Lossing, Upton, Roosevelt, and Mahan. They complement rather than correspond with the four British authors. The best known American work dealing with the military campaigns is Lossing's *Field-Book of the War of 1812.* It is an industrious compilation; but quite uncritical and most misleading. General Upton's *Military Policy of the United States* incidentally pricks all the absurd American militia bubbles with an incontrovertible array of hard and pointed facts. *The Naval War of 1812,* by Theodore Roosevelt, is an excellent sketch which shows a genuine wish to be fair to both sides. But the best naval work, and the most thorough work of any kind on either

side, is Admiral Mahan's *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812.*

A good deal of original evidence on the American side is given in Brannan's *Official Letters of the Military and Naval Officers of the United States during the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812 to 1815.* The original British evidence about the campaigns in Canada is given in William Wood's *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812.* Students who wish to see the actual documents must go to Washington, London, and Ottawa. The Dominion Archives are of exceptional interest to all concerned.

The present work is based entirely on original evidence, both American and British.

INDEX

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