certainly was the rashest resolve that an officer, charged with the
command of a most important fortress, could have entertained."
After reading the above, I am
doubtful if many soldiers, at least at the present day, would answer
without hesitation "To be sure," to General Murray’s question. The
critical moment of attack was probably made use of, as Murray, perceiving
the Chevalier advancing in single column, proceeded to attack him before
he could properly form. The disaster of the day may also be attributed to
the action of the right. The ardor of the troops carried them further in
pursuit than prudence should have dictated, and tho’ they succeeded in the
commencement, they met with a severe check. The force taking possession of
the redoubts defended them with great determination, but were eventually
outnumbered and forced to retire. The left also gave way, and Murray,
driven back on both flanks, had no alternative but to seek shelter within
the walls of his fortress. On the whole he seems to have fought his battle
bravely, but the vital mistake lay in fighting at all.
The same night, M. de Levis
commenced his trenches before Quebec, but Murray, by extraordinary
exertions, succeeded in mounting a number of guns, and when the French
batteries opened on the 11th of May, they were silenced by the fire of the
town. On the 15th, the English fleet, which had wintered at Halifax,
arrived at Point Levis, and having captured the French vessels lying in
the river, M. de Levis, in disgust, raised the siege, and retreated again
on Montreal, abandoning his military train and siege artillery. It was now
the turn of the English to take the offensive. General Amherst advanced
from Oswego with 10,000 men, and reached Montreal on the 6th of September;
Murray was already in the vicinity, and the next day Colonel Haviland
arrived from Isle-aux-Noix. The Marquis de Vaudreuil, despairing therefore
of his ability to stand a siege, demanded a capitulation, which was
granted, and this ending the war, Canada became a British Province.
Read in connection with the accounts
of the campaign, I think that these two letters of General Murray add
something to the history of the stirring times in which they were written;
and I trust they may prove acceptable to the Literary and Historical
Society of Quebec, who, I know, are anxious to record and preserve all the
waifs and strays of literature, pertaining to the history of their ancient
town.
General Murray seems to have been a
brave and skilful soldier, and tho’ he committed an error of judgment in
fighting at Sillery, his services, during the campaign, were not only
praiseworthy, but even brilliant. His military talent and fertility in
resource eminently qualified him for the command of a fortress in a state
of siege; and his defence of Fort St. Philip, in Minorca, which he held
six months against the French and Spaniards, entitle him to a
distinguished place amongst the Generals of his day. His personal
character for honor stands no less high ; for when, in 1781, the Duke de
Crillon,