SINCE
the manuscript of the Abbé Casgrain's contribution to the "Makers of
Canada" series was received, several works bearing on the subject-matter
of this volume have been published which throw a new light upon the
campaign around which has gathered such great debate.
Copies of documents which were either scattered through many published
works, or which were practically hidden or inaccessible to the general
public, have lately been arranged and rendered available for research
and discussion. The interest in this notable campaign can never cease,
and it is probable that although the general opinion may become settled
as years go by, historical students may, for all time, continue to
differ.
In
justice, therefore, to the memory of the late Abbé, who had not an
opportunity of consulting all these works before his death, it becomes
our duty to direct attention to several points at issue, which briefly
are as follows: (1) What credit does Wolfe deserve for the successful
operations of September 13th? (2) Which official, upon the French side,
whether Montcalm, Vaudreuil or Bougainville, must bear the onus and
responsibility of defeat? And in this connection it is important to
investigate the relations which existed throughout the siege between
Montcalm and Vaudreuil, and to attach, likewise, due importance to the
statements of those who defend Bougainville's conduct on the day of
defeat.
We
are assured that the readers of this book will find their interest in
the narrative deepened by very reason of the strength of the author's
convictions, and it is in order that these strong convictions may not
give the book an undue tincture of prejudice that we have thought it
proper to embody in the introduction views that are not infrequently at
variance with those which the Abbé Casgrain has so ably expressed.
Disputed matters which admit of brief reference are treated in the notes
at the end of the volume.
DID
WOLFE ORIGINATE THE FINAL PLAN?
A
brief survey of the facts will assist our inquiry. Before the actual
siege began, Wolfe had imagined that he could effect a landing on the
Beauport shore, and force a crossing of the St. Charles River (pp. 77
and 96). Montcalm, however, forestalled this movement by erecting
powerful defences between the St. Charles and the Montmorency.
Consequently xiv
Wolfe first made his position secure in the Island of Orleans, then
established siege batteries at Pointe Levis, and, on July 9th, with the
remainder of his forces, occupied in strength the left bank of the
Montmorency at its mouth. He has been criticized for thus dividing his
forces, but the disposition was a wise one, at least until it had been
discovered that ships could pass above the town. The Island of Orleans
was a convenient position for a hospital and stores; from the Levis
batteries he could perpetually harass the town ; and from his
Montmorency camp he was in a position to threaten the enemy's left.
Moreover Wolfe's avowed object was to tempt his enemy to assume the
offensive, and in a conversation with some French prisoners he expressed
his surprise that Montcalm, in spite of the opportunities afforded, had
not attacked him.
On
July 18th Wolfe reconnoitred the north shore above Quebec, and some
vessels succeeded in forcing their way up the river in spite of the town
batteries. These movements so alarmed the French that they anticipated
an attack from above the town, and Dumas, with five hundred Canadians,
was despatched to L'Anse du Foulon to oppose a landing there.
Wolfe had such a capacity for keeping his own counsel that it is
impossible to determine whether at this early date he contemplated
extensive operations above the town. Suffice it to say that in spite of
various reconnaissances up the river, and in spite of the further fact
that a considerable; portion of the fleet succeeded in passing the town
batteries without serious damage, Wolfe persisted in occupying his
position at the Montmorency for a whole month after the disastrous
affair of July 31st. Must we not infer that his reconnaissances above
the town, of July 18th and July 21st, convinced him of the almost
insuperable difficulty of effecting a landing in force in that direction
? This is clearly borne out by reference to Wolfe's despatch to Pitt
under date of September 2nd, in which he details the operations of his
forces between June 26th and the battle of Montmorency (July 31st). "The
18th of July two men-of-war, two armed sloops, and two transports with
some troops on board, passed by the town without any loss, and got into
the upper river. This enabled me to reconnoitre the country above, where
I found the same attention on the enemy's side, and great difficulties
on ours, arising from the nature of the ground, and the obstacles to our
communication with the fleet. But what I feared most was that, if we
should land between the town and the river Cap Rouge, the body first
landed could not be reinforced before they were attacked by the enemy's
whole army. Notwithstanding these difficulties, I thought once of
attempting it at St. Michael's, about three miles above the town; but,
perceiving that the enemy, jealous of this design, were preparing
against it, and had actually brought artillery and a mortar, which,
being so near to Quebec, they could increase as they pleased, to play
upon the shipping, and as it must have been many hours before we could
attack them, even supposing a favourable night for the boats to pass the
town unhurt, it seemed so hazardous that I thought it best to desist."
Wolfe's defeat at Montmorency again turned his thoughts above the town.
On August 5th Murray was placed in charge of twelve hundred men to
operate up the river, and Bougainville was detached by Montcalm to watch
his movements. Murray was only partially successful in his expedition,
and returned to the main army on the twenty-fifth. On August 20th Wolfe
wrote to Monckton commenting adversely upon Murray's prolonged stay
above Quebec: " Murray, by his long stay above and by detaining all our
boats, is actually master of the operations, or rather puts an entire
stop to them." These complaints were reiterated on August 22nd, and on
the twenty-fourth he ordered rockets to be thrown up as a signal for
Murray's recall.
Due
weight should be given (in dealing with the evidence) to the letter to
Admiral Saunders (see "Siege of Quebec," vol. ii, p. 154): "My ill state
of health," writes Wolfe, "hinders me from executing my own plan; it is
of too desperate a nature to order others to execute. The generals seem
to think alike as to the operations. I, therefore, join with them, and
perhaps we may find some opportunity to strike a blow." What was his own
desperate plan? Probably that carried out on the thirteenth.
We
now come to Wolfe's famous letter of August 29th to the brigadiers (pp.
154-5). In this letter no suggestion is made as to the possibility of an
attack above the town. Of the three alternatives suggested all were
concerned with operations in the neighbourhood of Beauport and the
Montmorency, and the brigadiers, in their reply of August 30th, firmly
rejected each proposal. After stating their objections the brigadiers
continue: "We, therefore, are of opinion that the most probable method
of striking an effectual blow is by bringing the troops to the south
shore, and directing our operations above the town. When we have
established ourselves on the north shore, of which there is very little
doubt, the Marquis de Montcalm must fight us upon our own terms, we are
between him and his provisions, and betwixt him and the French army
opposing General Amherst. If he gives us battle, and we defeat him,
Quebec must be ours, and, which is more, all Canada must submit to His
Majesty's arms."
The
matter now resolves itself into a mere question of fact. Wolfe had
recognized the seeming impracticability of a descent in force above the
town. When the brigadiers made their forceful recommendation he accepted
their proposal, and then vigorously formulated his own plans
independently of all advice. The brigadiers had in view a landing at
some spot about twelve miles above the town, and on September 8th
expected that Pointe-aux-Trem-bles, twenty miles above Quebec, would be
selected. Wolfe, in his reconnaissance of September 10th, decided for
valid reasons that the Anse du Foulon (less than two miles- from Quebec)
was the only suitable place, and with extraordinary ability he planned
every detail of the subsequent operations. Surely there is enough glory
in this to satisfy his most exacting admirers!
Dr.
Doughty and Major Wood accord the whole merit of the enterprise to Wolfe
and the cooperating fleet which was really acting under his orders. The
Abbd Casgrain inclines to attribute the successful issue of the
operations to sheer good luck, abetted by the incompetency of
Bougainville. Wolfe had good luck, it is true, but the good luck which
accompanies excellent strategy. His knowledge was complete on several
points, thanks in part to the information gleaned from deserters, and
partly to his own skilled observation. He knew that the Anse du Foulon
was guarded by an incompetent officer with an inefficient force. He
appears to have known that the Guyenne regiment was not on the Heights
of Abraham. He knew that Bougainville, with the flower of the French
army, had been detached to watch the movements of the fleet as far as
Jacques Cartier if necessary. And finally he knew that Montcalm in the
Beauport camp was in hourly expectation of attack. With these trumps in
his hands he played his cards to perfection. Montcalm and the town were
kept in constant suspense by the operations of Saunders; and Holmes's
squadron was employed to keep Bougainville beyond striking distance.
Dr.
Doughty attaches much importance to two letters of September 12th as
establishing Wolfe's claim to the initiative in the battle of the
following day. The first is from the three brigadiers requesting precise
information as to the place or places they were expected to attack on
the morrow. They say: "We must beg leave to request of you as distinct
orders as the nature of the thing will admit of,
particularly of the
place or places, we are to attack. This
circumstance (perhaps very decisive) we cannot learn from the public
orders, neither may it be in the power of the naval officer who leads
the troops to instruct us." Wolfe replies at half-past eight on the same
day from the
Sutherland. There is some asperity in the
communication: "It is not a usual thing to point out in the public
orders the direct spot of our attack, nor for any inferior officers not
charged with a particular duty to ask instructions upon that point. I
had the honour to inform you to-day that it is my duty to attack the
French army. To the best of my knowledge and abilities I have fixed upon
that spot where we can act with the most force, and are most likely to
succeed. If I am mistaken I am sorry for it, and must be answerable to
His Majesty and the public for the consequence."
Taking this letter into consideration with the remainder of the evidence
the conclusion to be drawn is obvious—namely, that from the moment when
he selected the Foulon as the objective point of his attack (September
10th) Wolfe organized and executed the operations upon his own
initiative and upon his own responsibility. Before the receipt of the
letter from the brigadiers (August 30th) he had abandoned all hope of a
successful landing in force above the town. The subsequent conduct of
the campaign is stamped with the outstanding and singular qualities of
his marvellous genius.
THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN MONTCALM AND VAUDREUIL
Granted two temperaments so opposed, a conflict of opinion was probable;
and granted the anomalous conditions under which Montcalm and Vaudreuil
held office, a clash of authority was inevitable. Montcalm was impulsive
and irascible, Vaudreuil was vacillating and suspicious; Montcalm had
all the knowledge and Vaudreuil all the power. With such discord within
and a watchful enemy at her gates, the doom of Canada was sealed. Wolfe
might have failed, but another year must have seen the passing of
France's dominion in the New World.
The
author has given sufficient indication of Montcalm's brilliant
qualities, and has not concealed altogether the unfavourable aspects of
Vaudreuil's character (see pp. 28, 29, 81, 215, 227, 228).
But, like all French-Canadian writers, he is loyal to the province, and
seeks when possible to shield Vaudreuil, the Canadian-born governor,
behind the alleged errors of Montcalm, the French commander. A careful
examination of the material that has come to light within the brief
interval which has elapsed since the present book was written has
convinced the editors that it is no longer possible to defend Vaudreuil
at the expense of Montcalm and Bougainville, and we are persuaded that
if the Abbé Casgrain had been spared to study the evidence now available
he would have been led to modify the views of which he was so
conspicuous an advocate.
Vaudreuil in spite of his tolerance of Bigot and his crew of bandits has
never been accused of personal dishonesty. He was at the worst a
meddlesome blunderer, a
Polonius redivivus thrust into a position of
authority at a crisis when his country required all the qualities of
firmness, tact, and moderation in which he was wanting. Like all weak
men he was eager to display his strength, and it was a jealous regard
for his own reputation which constantly led him to belittle and even to
malign Montcalm to the home authorities. Parkman, with the incomplete
evidence at his disposal had already divined Vaudreuil's character with
his customary discernment: "He had not the force of character which his
position demanded, lacked decision in times of crisis; and though
tenacious of authority was more jealous in asserting than self-reliant
in exercising it. One of his traits was a sensitive egotism, which made
him forward to proclaim his own part in every success, and to throw on
others the burden of every failure."
Vaudreuil's instructions to Montcalm throughout the campaign were so
formulated as to forestall all possibility of blame directed against
himself in case of disaster, and his reports after the event usually
implied that all the credit of victory was his. Thus, - after the
capture of Oswego, to whose fall he had at least contributed by
initiating the design, he writes in his accustomed strain: "The measures
I took assured our victory in spite of opposition. If I had been less
vigilant and firm, Oswego would still be in the hands of the English."
The contemptuous tone which Montcalm habitually assumed in his
references to the colonial troops affords some palliation for
Vaudreuil's excessive praise of the Canadians in which no small measure
of self-laudation was involved. Montcalm, in detailing the events,
writes on August 28th, 1756: "I have usefully employed them (the
colonial officers) anjl the militia of the country, not, however, at any
work exposed to the enemy's fire. It is a troop knowing neither
discipline nor subordination."
It
does not require a close reading between the lines to understand how a
man of Vaudreuil's suspicious temper would resent Montcalm's unaffected
contempt of the Canadians, and, on the other hand, the source of
Montcalm's grievance is no less apparent. But Vaudreuil's weakness shows
itself most glaringly when we consider the events of the siege, and more
especially the episode of the final battle and the subsequent
evacuation.
If
blame can be attached either to Montcalm or Vaudreuil for not defending
the Traverse, through which Saunders' fleet was permitted to sail
unopposed, it probably may be equally divided. But it should be
remembered that for many years the French had considered the channel
impassable for vessels of two hundred tons and over, and to this false
confidence in natural obstructions might be attributed what now seems a
serious oversight.
But
it was in spite of Montcalm's vigorous protest that Vaudreuil neglected
to occupy the heights of Levis, with such disastrous results to the
town. Passing now to the complicated events of the final Battle of the
Plains an unprejudiced interpretation of the facts must compel us to
attach to Vaudreuil no small share of the responsibility for defeat. His
advocates, and these include both the Abb£ Cas-grain and Vaudreuil
himself, hold that the day was lost owing chiefly to the precipitancy of
Montcalm's attack. To this main cause our author adds Bougainville's
dilatoriness, the withdrawal of the Guy-enne regiment from the Heights
of Abraham and the worthlessness of Vergor, for whose appointment he
seems inclined to blame de Bougainville. We wish to present within brief
compass the important evidence on these points.
I-The Precipitancy of
Montcalm's Attack
Vaudreuil's letter to Lévis in which he blames Montcalm for the
precipitancy of his attack is given on pp. 212, 213 of the present
volume, and on p. 194 the author comments upon the same matter. His
argument has much force, but it is in a measure offset by the following
facts: (1) Montcalm held a council of war before attacking, and no
officer proposed deferring the attack, (p. 195); (2) His troops were
full of enthusiasm, and would brook no delay; (3) The English would
utilize every moment to strengthen their position ; (4) Montcalm was
unaware that Wolfe had such a large force ready to engage, and feared
that each hour would add to his numbers. We may state here that Montcalm
did not feel that he could rely upon any aid from the direction of the
Beauport camp. He had sent there to summon the whole left wing to the
front, but Vaudreuil had countermanded his order.
II—Bougainville's
Dilatoriness
It
will be remembered that when Vaudreuil received from Bernetz a
confirmatory report of the English landing he despatched Montcalm with
one hundred men to resist the attack, and sat down to compose a letter
to Bougainville, under the impression that the latter was at Cap Rouge.
The truth is that Bougainville, in pursuance of his instructions always
to keep above the English fleet, had followed the ships on the night of
September 12th as far as Pointe-aux-Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec.
It was when Bougainville was returning towards Cap Rouge at nine o'clock
in the morning that he received word from Vaudreuil's courier of the
landing of the British troops. The Abbé Casgrain says that according to
Bougainville's own admission in his letter to Bourlamaque he learned the
news as early as eight o'clock. M. Rend de Kerallain in " La Jeunesse de
Bougainville" says that in a memoir written in the camp at Lorette on
September 21st Bougainville substitutes nine o'clock as the hour. With
this estimate Dr. Doughty and Major Wood, with the memoir before them,
concur. Bougainville then made a forced march from Cap Rouge over bad
roads to the scene of action, seven miles distant. His advance guard
reached the battle-ground in about two hours, and Bougainville sent a
detachment to take the Samos battery. Here he was repulsed, and after
attacking Townshend's rear was forced to retreat, though in good order,
to L'An-cienne Lorette. The main battle had long since been decided.
III-THE WITHDRAWAL OF
THE GUYENNE REGIMENT FROM THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM
Neither Bougainville nor Montcalm, but Vaudreuil alone, must bear the
responsibility for this action. Dr. Doughty and M. Kerallain
(op. cit.) both argue successfully to
establish the fact, but Major Wood has advanced the documentary evidence
which we take the liberty of quoting: "The documentary evidence proving
that Montcalm was thwarted by Vaudreuil in his attempt to protect the
Heights and Plains of Abraham by posting this regiment there on the
fifth is to be found in Mr. Doughty's work. But the evidence for
Montcalm's order on the twelfth (namely for the regiment to proceed to
the Foulon) is to be found in a journal discovered in the archbishop's
palace in Quebec— and printed in the April and May numbers of the
Bulletin des Recherches
Historiques, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 139. It is a
verbatim reprint of the entry for September 12th, 1759, in the journal
of Jean Fdlix Recher, curd of Quebec: "Order given by M. de Montcalm to
the battalion of Guyenne to go and camp at the Foulon, afterwards
revoked by M. de Vaudreuil, saying,
we shall see about that tomorrow"
IV-VERGOR
AT L'ANSE DU FOULON
No
one disputes the worthlessness of Vergor. His treachery even has been
hinted at. The Abbé Casgrain implies (p. 178) that Bougainville was
partially responsible for his presence at the Foulon as commanding
officer, and takes Bougainville to task for neglecting Vaudreuil's order
to reinforce the post by fifty of Repentigny's men. However, we are
certain that Vergor was in command at the Foulon with the full knowledge
of both Vaudreuil and Montcalm. With reference to' the second point we
need only say that Vaudreuil had intended to despatch five hundred of
Repentigny's men to the assistance of Bougainville. The latter was to
despatch fifty of these to reinforce the Foulon. The men were not sent
owing to the scarcity of provisions.
THE
EDITORS. |