|
 John
Hillyard Cameron was regarded by most contemporaries as the most
formidable rival of John A. Macdonald for the leadership of the
Upper Canadian Conservative Party during the vital mid-century
decades which cover the years of Confederation. It is significant
that both men were Scots, and both joined the Orange Lodges,
Macdonald at the outset of his career in the mid-1840’s and Cameron
at the height of his influence in 1856. Macdonald remained a nominal
Orangeman, keeping an eye on the internal politics of the Order,
with the next election in mind. Yet Cameron, the latecomer and more
conventional politician, was made Grand Master three years after
becoming an Orangeman.
Acceptance of this office appeared at first to make Cameron more
formidable in the struggle for power. Yet the great question in mid
nineteenth century politics was who was to occupy the middle of the
road, and under what conditions. By becoming Orange Grand Master,
Cameron moved further from the centre, and was, like George Brown,
to remain a regional personality, unable to displace politicians
like Francis Hincks and John A. Macdonald, whose first thoughts were
for combinations of men and who never permitted themselves to become
prisoners of platforms or slogans.
Cameron was born in Beaucaire, Languedoc, France, in 1817, where his
father, Angus Cameron, quartermaster of the 79th Cameron
Highlanders, was stationed during the post-Waterloo occupation which
ended in 1818. His mother was the daughter of Samuel Hillyard of
Saint Ives, Huntingdonshire, apparently a gentleman of substance.
Later, Angus Cameron became paymaster of the Royal Canadian Rifles,
raised by the Imperial government for services in Canada.
After leaving France, the Camerons went to Ireland where John
Hillyard attended Kilkenny College until 1825 when his father was
posted to Kingston in Upper Canada. Here young Cameron went to
Kingston Grammar School, which was run by the Reverend John
Cruikshank. Among his schoolmates were John A. Macdonald, Oliver
Mowat, the future premier of Ontario, and Henry Scadding, the future
historian of Toronto. At school Cameron shone among his
contemporaries, being diligent, and acquiring with relative ease the
kind of intellectual polish which wins early recognition from
teachers, while the less attentive Macdonald give no hint of his
latent talent for political combinations.
In 1831, when his father was transferred to York, John Hillyard was
able to display his abilities at Upper Canada College where they
soon attracted the notice of leading families of the capital, and of
Archdeacon John Strachan, who was a connoisseur of talent. On
leaving school, he studied law under the guidance of John Henry
Boulton, whose third daughter, Elizabeth, he married in 1847. During
the troubles of 1837-38, he served in Toronto and on the Niagara
frontier as a captain in the Queen’s Rangers.
Admitted to the bar in 1838, Cameron played a leading role on the
Commission appointed to revise the statutes of Upper Canada in 1840,
edited the Upper Canadian Law Reports in 1841, and became Queen’s
Counsel in 1846.
During these years Cameron demonstrated mastery of precise and
dignified prose, which demands skill and patience rather than
creative imagination. Apart from this talent, much prized among
legislators, Cameron demonstrated outstanding ability by his
performance at the bar. Here his capacity for close reasoning and
precise language was supported by a theatrical talent which excited
ridicule at times, but undoubtedly made him the best lawyer in the
province.
In the early forties, while Macdonald was displaying his less
spectacular gifts on the smaller stage of Kingston, his former
classmate had demonstrated remarkable ability and acquired excellent
connections. Cameron’s political future seemed assured, as his
demonstrated ability at the bar would make him a commanding figure
in the Assembly.
The Toronto Compact families were anxious to acquire the services of
talented young men whom they considered to be socially and
politically respectable. John Beverly Robinson was himself a protege
of Archdeacon Strachan’s, and in turn had recognized the ability of
William Henry Draper, who by the mid-1840’s had become the
recognized leader of Upper Canadian Conservatism.
After the Lafontaine-Baldwin ministry had been dismissed, Draper, at
the request of the governor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, had formed a
government and had gone to the country. He won the election of 1844
by a Loyalist coalition which included Compact Tories like Sir Allan
MacNab, the Orange Grand Master Ogle Gowan, the Methodist Egerton
Ryerson, and independent Conservatives like John A. Macdonald.
Although the coalition had a majority, it failed to secure
French-Canadian support and was weakened by internal divisions. By
1846 Draper, as a moderate Conservative, sought to strengthen his
position within the government by dismissing Solicitor-General Henry
Sherwood, a Compact Tory, and offered the post to John Hillyard
Cameron. The offer was accepted and Draper acquired the services of
a more able and manageable young man, who was nevertheless linked to
Compact Tories.
Although Cameron’s appointment strengthened Draper’s influence, it
was seen by Ogle Gowan, the Orange leader, who was an occasional
ally of Henry Sherwood, as a victory for Compact interests. Gowan
insisted that Draper and his moderate colleagues, William Morris and
John A. Macdonald, who had also accepted office, would become a
facade for Compact government. In his view, the Cabinet would be
managed by “Henry John Bolton, the father-in-law, William L.
Robinson, the brother-in-law, John Hillyard Cameron, the son-in-law,
William Cayley, another Bolton son-in-law, with Sir Allan MacNab,
whose wife is Mr. Bolton’s niece, to direct the family.” This view
is interesting only as a reflection of Gowan’s reaction to the
appearance of the future Orange Grand Master in provincial politics,
for Cameron, whatever his connections, was prepared to support
Draper.
As there was no general election at the time of Cameron’s
appointment, a seat had to be found for him in a Cornwall byelection,
where he was returned by party influence, although the name Cameron
was an advantage in an area which had been settled by Scots. Draper
seems to have regarded Cameron as his successor, but there was no
time for an adequate apprenticeship. In May, 1847, a year after
Cameron had accepted office, Draper retired from politics, accepting
an appointment as judge. He invited Cameron to take over his post as
attorney-general which, in effect, meant accepting the leadership of
the ministry. it was an offer to take command of a sinking ship.
Even if Cameron had been able to put together a ministry, the
absence of French-Canadian support, and the impossibility of getting
it, ensured defeat in the next election. By making an effort to form
a ministry, Cameron would have established his position as the
leading representative of moderate Conservatism. However, he
preferred to let Henry Sherwood make the effort, while he himself
remained aboard the sinking ship, accepting a position on the
Executive Council. Sherwood’s ministry was swept away in the winter
election of 1847-48, although Cameron was able to retain his seat.
His refusal to accept office as attorney-general had left moderate
Conservatism without a recognized leader, though Cameron might still
assert his claim by playing a leading role in the opposition.
Cameron understood that a future Conservative success depended on
winning French-Canadian support and he sought to accomplish this by
an alliance of Catholics and Anglicans on the question of separate
schools. Had he succeeded, he would have occupied a more central
position in politics, which was the key to the effective exercise of
power. Cameron made a beginning but Francis Hincks, who had already
pre-empted the middle of the road, was able to dissolve the emerging
alliance between Anglicans and Catholics by giving concessions to
Catholics, but none to Anglicans.
If Cameron had remained in provincial politics and accepted the
necessary but tedious task of bringing fragments and factions into
temporary alliances, he might still have become the great
Conservative leader of the century. It was not to his taste and in
what he probably regarded as a strategic retreat, he decided not to
contest his Cornwall seat in 1851. Instead he devoted his energies
to municipal politics in Toronto, and to building up a financial
empire.
In so doing, he became one of the leading figures in Toronto, but
Toronto was not a good political base because it was tied to
regional interests, and because of the diversity of its politics, it
could never become a safe seat. Cornwall was not a safe seat,
either, but Cameron might have secured his position there over the
years, as the town had the advantage of being in that eastern
section of Upper Canada which profited by the union of provinces and
was consequently less susceptible to the pull of regional interests.
In 1851 Cameron, a Torontonian with many talents, yielded to the
temptation of Toronto, and without realizing it, placed himself in a
position where he could only remain in politics as the champion of
regional causes. Kingston, which offered less social and financial
opportunities than Toronto, provided Macdonald with a safe seat. As
representative of his smaller and less demanding community,
Macdonald was free to play the part of mediator between the
French-Canadian Bleus and Upper Canadian Tories, which after 1851
was no longer open to Cameron.
The return of Cameron to provincial politics in 1854 as
representative of Toronto coincided with the formation of the
Conservative MacNab-Morin coalition. As a representative of Toronto
and a Conservative of demonstrated ability, he had an obvious claim
to a place in the government, but it was easy to find reasons for
leaving him out. The coalition was committed to secularization of
clergy reserves, a measure Cameron was committed to oppose. He would
be acceptable to French-Canadians, but not to Hincksite Liberals in
the coalition. These were sufficient reasons for leaving him out of
the ministry as long as clergy reserves remained an issue.
As a consistent defender of Anglican interests, Cameron was, by
1854, the most representative of that line of Tories that began with
Strachan’s pupils and was continued by their sons. He consequently
had little choice but to fight a rearguard action in defence of a
lost cause that had been abandoned even by Sir Allan MacNab. Cameron
did the best he could, arguing that secularization of clergy
reserves would undermine the special position of the Catholic Church
in Lower Canada. Although he aroused the anxieties of
French-Canadian members of the government, the measure went through.
Yet by his stand Cameron secured the best possible terms for the
Anglican community.
Cameron was a moderate by temperament, more so than Macdonald who
frequently became involved in sterile personal quarrels. When the
reserves ceased to be an issue, there were no serious political
differences between the two men. Yet Macdonald could not join a
partnership with Cameron without the risk of becoming a junior
partner. Cameron was thus left to employ his talents as an
independent back bencher. Under these circumstances, he could hardly
avoid becoming the champion of popular causes which in turn would
lead to association with popular movements.
Protestantism was the great popular cause in Toronto, championed
both by Liberal George Brown and the largely Conservative Orange
Lodges. Cameron had not yet become an Orangeman by 1854 and, as
noted above, was regarded by Ogle Gowan as an agent of the Family
Compact. Gowan was an Irish gentleman of precarious means and
insecure social status, but a gifted demagogue and a tireless
organizer. Cameron, who had entered politics from the top, could
hardly appreciate his value. Macdonald, on the other hand, had to
make his own way in politics. He therefore had bonds of sympathy
with Gowan and carefully cultivated his friendship. On his return to
politics, Cameron affronted Gowan by acquiring control of the
British Colonist and providing it with a subsidy of $5,000 a year,
thus supporting a Conservative journal critical of the ministry and
in competition with Gowan’s Patriot.
It was against this background that Cameron became a champion of
Protestant rights by making a political issue out of the Corrigan
affair. Robert Corrigan was an Irish Protestant who had been beaten
by a group of Irish Roman Catholics at a cattle show in the small
village of St. Sylvestre on 18 October 1855 and died the following
day. The men accused of his murder were acquitted with the apparent
approval of Judge Jean-Francois-Joseph Duval who presided at the
trial. There was an outburst of indignation in the press and
Cameron, assuming the role of public-spirited legal expert,
introduced and carried a motion asking that Duval’s charges to the
jury be made available to the Provincial Assembly. This move was an
obvious threat to the unity of a Cabinet composed of Upper Canadian
Conservatives and French-Canadians. The government met the challenge
by asking for and receiving a vote of confidence which was given by
Cameron along with the others. It then persuaded Conservatives,
including Cameron, to rescind the motion. Cameron emerged from this
issue as the concerned but responsible defender of the Protestant
minority in Lower Canada, exposing the devices of opportunist
politicians. In so doing, he laid the foundation of his career as
Orange Grand Master. At the same time, by alienating the
French-Canadian ministers, he made it easier for Macdonald to keep
him out of the government.
Shortly after this incident, Cameron was presented with what
appeared to be an opportunity to challenge Macdonald’s leadership of
the Upper Canadian Conservatives. Sir Allan MacNab was considered to
be a political handicap by many of the ministry. To force his
resignation, Macdonald and the Upper Canadian ministers resigned on
the pretext that they did not have a majority in Upper Canada. Left
virtually alone, MacNab resigned, whereupon Macdonald and his
colleagues resumed office.
This dubious manoeuvre won wide-spread sympathy for MacNab, and
there had already been considerable speculation in the press about a
new ministry which would include Cameron. It has been assumed by
most recent historians that Cameron was prepared to challenge
Macdonald’s leadership at this time because it was the obvious thing
to do. Yet Foster Griezic, after investigating the matter in detail,
could find no evidence to support this assumption. Cameron
apparently did not even interrupt his plans for a trip to England.
It is unlikely that an effort to challenge Macdonald’s leadership
would have succeeded, but it was not in Cameron’s nature to make the
attempt. He had been brought into politics by adoption and was not
inclined to fight for power. He remained an influential and able
man, but the following year his financial empire, which was one of
the pillars of his influence, became a casualty of the financial
collapse of 1857. Faced with heavy debts, he scorned bankruptcy and
sought through his remaining property and law practice to meet the
claims of his creditors.
He could no longer support the Colonist and could not contest his
Toronto seat in the general election of 1857. When he announced his
withdrawal from politics, an article in the Leader, which was
associated with Gowan’s Patriot, referred to Cameron as “the last
rose of the past summer of Toryism - the solitary member of a once
powerful party.” Gowan, who probably wrote these lines, was
referring to a brother Orangeman, as Cameron appears to have joined
a Toronto Lodge in 1856.
This was not an unusual step for a Conservative to take. Some, like
George Strange Boulton, had taken it as early as 1832, and John A.
Macdonald became an Orangeman in 1844 at the time he became a
candidate for the Provincial Assembly. At the outset of his career
Cameron probably took the Orange vote for granted and assumed
membership in the Lodge would be a handicap when seeking Catholic
support. At the time of the Corrigan affair, which apparently was
the occasion for his joining the Lodge in 1856, the Orange Order was
divided. The schism began in 1853 when Ogle Gowan, the founder of
the movement, deposed his successor, George Benjamin, by packing the
Grand Lodge which was meeting in Kingston. Benjamin in turn founded
a rival Grand Lodge which by 1855 was recognized by 180 out of a
total of 712 Lodges. Benjamin soon renounced leadership of the
schismatic Grand Lodge and was replaced briefly by G.W. Whitebend,
and then by John Flanagan, a former mayor of Kingston and foe of
John A. Macdonald.
The principal cause of the schism had been Gowan’s adherence to
Macdonald’s policy of alliance with the French-Canadian “Bleus.”
Many adherents of the schismatic lodges, like John Holland of
Toronto, openly supported George Brown, but Benjamin remained an
anti-ministerial Conservative. Cameron joined Toronto Number 507
which supported the schismatic Grand Lodge, but used his influence
to heal the schism. As a conciliatory gesture he presented a
petition to the Legislature, drawn up by Gowan, for the
incorporation of the Orange movement, which was opposed by Flanagan,
the schismatic leader. The petition was unsuccessful, but the need
for incorporation provided an incentive for re-unification.
The schism was finally healed in 1856 when George Lyttleton Allen, a
Gowan supporter, became Grand Master. Mutual suspicion remained and
Cameron, as the only eminent Orangeman not involved in the original
schism, was a strong candidate for Grand Master. Yet when he was
nominated by former supporters of the Benjaminite faction, his
nomination was rejected on technical grounds. As Gowan’s son, Nassau
C. Gowan, explained: . it was soon discovered that he (Cameron) had
not advanced to those degrees which constitute eligibility, and that
some accident ensued to prevent a dispensation being made in his
favour.” Cameron, it seems, had not yet received the order of the
Purple, which would have made him eligible for office. This degree
was normally granted to Orangemen within two years of their original
initiation. As Cameron had been initiated sometime in 1856, he had
yet to receive the Purple.
This move, sponsored by former Benjaminites, to make Cameron Grand
Master, explains the hesitant support Cameron received from the
Patriot and the Leader during the Toronto by-election of 1858.
George Brown, having been Premier for forty-eight hours, had to
return to his constituents for re-election. Macdonald and the
Cabinet ministers who had been out of office for forty-eight hours
took advantage of a new rule which enabled ministers to change
portfolios without standing for re-election. By shifting portfolios
and shifting them back again in what was called the “Double Shuffle”
they were able to resume office without the need for re-election.
This device won sympathy for Brown and he would probably have been
re-elected by acclamation had not Cameron acted as a loyal party man
by agreeing to run against him. Cameron deserved administration
support but the election began in late August, just six weeks after
the Grand Lodge meeting when Cameron’s bid for the Orange leadership
had been blocked. Consequently the Patriot and the Leader, by
attacking Brown and McGee, and offering Cameron sympathy, moved by
way of benevolent neutrality to conditional support. Left without
the support of his party, Cameron still made a good showing, polling
144 votes short of victory in an election in which over 5,000 voted.
This suited Macdonald’s purpose. It forced Brown to fight but left
Cameron without a seat.
Cameron’s defeat made him more acceptable as Orange Grand Master,
but there was still resistance. He was elected Grand Master by a
narrow margin of twelve votes at the Grand Lodge meeting held in
Hamilton on 22 June 1859. Even Gowan had to accept the fact that he
was the candidate who divided Orangemen least. The Patriot
announced, “No gentleman in the body could bring a greater amount of
influence and sterling ability to bear upon the councils of the
Order.”
The Canadian Lodges needed an eminent Conservative, not too closely
associated with ministerial politics, who could provide the kind of
dignity and prestige which in Ireland was found by appointing a Peer
as Grand Master. Ogle Gowan’s perpetual involvement in political and
personal disputes made it impossible for him to supply that need,
and his successors, George Benjamin and George Lyttleton Allen,
although more conciliatory, were minor political figures who brought
no prestige to the office of Grand Master. Cameron regarded the
office as yet another position of honour and influence, like
becoming chairman of the board of directors of a college or a
corporation. He intended to act as a mediator among Orangemen and to
use his influence to keep the Lodges from creating tensions in the
community.
Although he was identified with Protestant rather than Conservative
Party interests, Cameron had no intention of leading a Protestant
crusade or making the Lodges a base for opposition to the ministry.
He nevertheless felt the need to balance Gowan’s influence in the
movement. Yet, having neither the ability nor the inclination to
meet Gowan on his own ground of factional politics, he sought to
outmanoeuvre him by a re-organization of the Grand Lodges.
In any growing organization there is always a case for creating new
sub-divisions, and Cameron merely adopted a plan which had been
proposed for some time. Under the existing system there were several
Provincial Grand Lodges, but the Upper Canadian Orangemen, who were
the most numerous, met under the direct authority of the Grand Lodge
of British North America. This had suited Gowan’s needs as most of
his influence was in Toronto, in the eastern counties of Upper
Canada, and in the Maritimes.
After assuming office as Grand Master, Cameron, in what seems to
have been a coup, adjourned the June meeting of Grand Lodge in
Hamilton, and re-opened it in August at Cobourg where Gowan could
not be present and many of his supporters would have difficulty in
attending. Here Cameron introduced the new system, the main feature
of which was the creation of two Grand Lodges in Upper Canada: a
Western Grand Lodge which included Toronto, and a central Grand
Lodge, which would provide for the rest of the province. Lower
Canada was placed under an Eastern Grand Lodge. All the provincial
Grand Lodges would be under the Grand Lodge of British North America
over which Cameron presided. This system forced Gowan, who was in
Toronto, to confine most of his efforts to the Western Grand Lodge,
and made it difficult for him to make effective use of his influence
east of Toronto.
Evidence of Gowan’s first reaction to this new order appears in an
article in the Omsmee Warder, which was quoted with approval in the
Patriot. The new system was described as “. . . a ridiculous,
uncalled-for piece of useless and expensive machinery - a death blow
to the welfare of the Order.” For the next five years Gowan
continued to fight the new system, passing resolutions against it in
the Western Grand Lodge, but he made no effort to challenge
Cameron’s position as Grand Master. Policy might be changed but
Cameron was not only Grand Master: at the time of the
re-organization of the Lodges, he was also acting as counsel for the
ministry, defending them in court against charges that the ‘‘Double
Shuffle” was unconstitutional. Gowan dedicated his ‘‘History and
Mystery of Orangeism,” which came out in 1859, to Cameron, and when
Cameron was named Grand Master a second time in June 1860, the
Patriot announced that differences among Orangemen had ceased to
exist since Cameron had become Grand Master. Nevertheless it
expressed the hope that ‘‘Mr. Cameron has weighed all possible
consequences” and reminded him that because half of the province was
Catholic, no Grand Master could become a Cabinet minister.
In this manner Cameron was warned that although his success as a
mediator among Orangemen was recognized, he was not welcome in the
Conservative ministry. His value to the ministry was soon
demonstrated in the late summer of 1860 when a crisis involving
Orangemen arose out of the visit of the Prince of Wales. The Grand
Lodge anticipated trouble. As Orange processions had been banned in
Ireland, it was evident that the Duke of Newcastle, who in his
capacity as Colonel Secretary accompanied the Prince on his visit,
would be embarrassed by contact with the Orangemen.
Cameron, as a lawyer, understood that as a society legal in Canada
the Orangemen had a right to display their loyalty and their
numbers. As a politician, he felt that it should not be exercised.
There was a precedent for such restraint. Irish Orangemen had
refrained from any display of insignia during the visit of George IV
to Dublin in 1821.
The first difficulty Cameron faced involved the presentation of a
Loyal Address by Orangemen to the royal party. As the
Governor-General, Sir Edmund Head, had accepted such an address in
1857, Cameron wrote to him on the subject and was told that the
presentation of an Orange address would be embarrassing to
Newcastle. The Grand Master informed the county Masters and no
Orange addresses were prepared. There was no discussion, however, of
the display of Orange Insignia, but the Orangemen between Quebec
City and Kingston assumed correctly that a display of any kind would
be unwelcome.
The Kingston Orangemen, under the influence of the former schismatic
Grand Master John Flanagan, decided to make a distinction between
presentation of addresses and a display of Orange insignia. Kingston
Orangemen were ordered to turn out in full regalia and their example
was followed in Belleville and Toronto. Cameron, following protocol,
made no public effort to restrain this move, but he wrote to
Newcastle and received no immediate reply. Nothing was heard from
the royal party until Newcastle wrote to the mayor of Toronto on 30
August making it clear that Orange displays would be unacceptable.
Cameron then advised Kingston Orangemen to comply with Newcastle’s
wishes. Meanwhile, Flanagan had assembled the Orangemen in full
regalia and emphasized the anti-Catholic aspects of Orangeism by
including in their display portraits of Garibaldi who was then
invading the Papal States. Although the royal party was already
aware of this, it received a delegation of Catholics who explained
what the Orangemen were doing. This made it easier for Flanagan to
encourage defiance as he could claim that Newcastle was coming under
Catholic influence.
Negotiations broke down and the royal party did not land at
Kingston. John A. Macdonald, however, thought it best to conciliate
his Orange supporters. He remained behind at Kingston and wisely did
not rejoin the royal party until it reached Hamilton. Thus Cameron
was left to manage the Orangemen as best he could. Belleville
Orangemen were inclined to defer to Newcastle, but the arrival of
Flanagan and a party of Kingston Orangemen induced them to assume an
attitude of defiance and the Prince moved on without landing.
There were no difficulties at Cobourg but Toronto was the real test
of Cameron’s influence as failure to visit the metropolis would
endanger the success of the royal tour. A public meeting was called
at Clarence Square, attended by a thousand Orangemen, including
Flanagan, who had arrived with a party from Kingston. Here Cameron
and Gowan asserted the right of Orangemen to greet their Prince in
their own way, but the Grand Master declared that he would resign if
they prevented the royal party from landing. He then led the
Orangemen in full regalia under various Orange arches which had been
erected, but the procession ended several hours before the landing
of the royal party. That evening, Mrs. Cameron was escorted by the
Prince to the head table at a banquet organized by the Law Society
of Toronto.
Cameron had been unable to save Macdonald from personal disaster at
Kingston, but he had ensured the success of the royal tour, and left
the impression that the Orangemen had acted with admirable restraint
in the face of provocation. As the injured party, the Orangemen
received a great deal of sympathy and the opposition was prepared to
exploit this for the purpose of embarrassing the ministry.
Against this background, the Lodges, with Cameron’s support, were
able to collect 100,000 signatures protesting against the treatment
the Orangemen had received. These were taken by Cameron to England
and presented to the Queen in the presence of the Duke of Newcastle.
This personal triumph for Cameron, which enormously increased the
prestige of the Lodges, set the stage for his return to provincial
politics in the election of 1861. He could have easily been returned
for Toronto, but agreed to stand for Peel County, where he faced
James Aikins, an Orangeman from an Orange family who was also a
local man. Aikins was a strong contender but might be defeated by a
popular Grand Master, providing the Grand Master was an unequivocal
champion of regional interest.
Cameron had accepted representation by population, or “rep. by
pop.’’ in the early 1850’s, but was content to let George Brown
remain as the leading champion of that dangerous cause. In Peel
County in 1861, it was impossible to win the election without taking
a strong and clear stand on the question. Cameron did so, yet won by
only a narrow margin, 1,633 to 1,145.
Macdonald by this time was prepared to make “rep. by pop.” an open
question, permitting Cabinet ministers to vote for it and remain in
his government. This policy enabled Conservatives, particularly
those west of Toronto, to face their constituents while remaining
champions of regional interests. Macdonald still had difficulties in
finding Conservatives willing to serve in his Cabinet. Cameron,
however, placed his influence at Macdonald’s disposal, which proved
useful in negotiations with T.C. Street, a Niagara millionaire who
supported “rep. by pop.” Most contemporaries still saw Cameron as a
rival of Macdonald for the Conservative leadership, and Macdonald
himself shared this view. Cameron may have received an offer to
enter the government at this time and probably discussed the
question with leading Conservatives. Yet Cameron was not the man to
press his claims. He might accept, if strongly urged by Macdonald to
serve, but Macdonald could not take the risk.
Cameron’s prominence as Orange Grand Master and his continuing ties
with the Compact families were more evident than his precarious
financial position. Yet whatever his real influence, by his presence
in the Cabinet, he would appear to be displacing Macdonald.
Moreover, Cameron was still too strong to be managed by Macdonald,
and would be dangerous even as a junior partner.
Consequently, Cameron remained a back bencher and at the opening
session demonstrated his capacity for embarrassing the government as
he had at the time of the Corrigan affair. “Rep. by pop.” was no
longer a question of confidence, but the survival of the government
depended on the measure being defeated by a combination of
French-Canadians, Upper Canadians from the eastern region of the
province, and Conservatives with safe seats.
When William McDougall, a radical Grit, raised the question by
introducing a “rep. by pop.” motion as an amendment to the address,
Cameron introduced a similar but milder amendment. The amendments
were defeated by the usual combinations but there was a majority for
the measure in Upper Canada. This was damaging to Macdonald’s
prestige and Cameron had done most of the damage. The Orange Grand
Master might protest that he could be satisfied with a mere token
change in representation, but “rep. by pop.” had become a symbol of
anti-French-Canadian sentiment in Upper Canada and was consequently
unacceptable in any form to French-Canadian Conservatives. With the
failure of Brown to secure a seat in the election of 1861, Cameron
was by far the most prestigious advocate of “rep. by pop.” and
consequently the leading representative of regional interests.
In 1862 he created difficulties for Macdonald during the debate of
the Militia Bill which ended in the defeat of the government.
Cameron declared he would support the Bill if the Attorney-General
West (Macdonald) would “come down boldly for a definite number of
men . . . and that the ways and means of meeting the expense should
be stated.” If the government “could not carry their point,” Cameron
insisted, “they should leave it to the opposition.”
Cameron was not happy about his role as an independent Conservative,
which offered no opportunities for constructive statesmanship, but
he had little reason to envy Macdonald whose main preoccupation had
to be staying in power. With the fall of the ministry Macdonald,
once more in the opposition, no longer saw Cameron as a threat. A
formal rapprochement between the two men was announced at a dinner
held in February 1863. When Macdonald returned to power Cameron
remained a back bencher but found a means of serving the ministry by
blunting the edge of the regionalism he represented. This was
noticeable in the case of Scott School Bill, which was designed to
improve the position of Roman Catholic separate schools. Consistent
with his earlier attitude he offered to support the Bill, if rights
were extended to Anglican separate schools. When this was refused,
he voted against the Bill, which was passed by a government
majority. By finally voting against the Bill, Cameron was still able
to maintain his influence over the Orangemen.
Cameron’s influence was put to the test when the Scott Bill was
discussed in the Grand Lodge, and in Peel County ten Orangemen who
opposed his re-election were expelled from the movement. By making
full and at times heavy-handed use of his prestige as Grand Master,
he secured most of the Orange votes for the Conservatives in the
election of 1864 when he himself was returned by a slim majority in
Peel County.
By 1864 Macdonald had concluded that Cameron’s fortunes had declined
to a point where he was no longer a rival and he understood the
advantage of acquiring the services of a talented and loyal ally.
Cameron was offered a place in the Cabinet, but refused on the
grounds that the post in which his talents could possibly be
employed was attorney-general, a position held by Macdonald, which
he could not give up.
Perhaps it was pride which induced Cameron to refuse a belated offer
of a junior partnership in the Cabinet with Macdonald. Moreover, his
financial affairs remained precarious as he fought a losing battle
to pay his debts. He had borrowed money from funds under control of
the Anglican Church and was charged by the Globe with doing so on
insufficient security. The charge could not be proven, but his
reputation suffered.
Having given up his chances of becoming a Father of Confederation by
refusing to enter the Cabinet, Cameron still supported
Confederation. Yet he preserved his character as an independent but
conscientious back bencher by stating his preference for a
legislative union, and expressing the opinion that the people should
be given a chance to vote on the question. The last suggestion was
not helpful but seems to be designed to divide Confederation
supporters at the eleventh hour and create new obstacles for the
ministry.
During the excitement created by the Fenians, Cameron adopted a tone
of dignified indignation at Fenian audacity, and at the same time
expressed doubts about Fenian strength and determination. These
efforts may have discouraged the more belligerent Orangemen from
using Fenianism as a pretext for provoking quarrels with the
Catholic community. Yet Cameron had little understanding of Irish
quarrels, and on the one occasion - March 17, 1866 - when there was
serious danger of a clash between Orangemen and Fenian sympathizers,
the burden of controlling the Orangemen was assumed by Ogle Gowan.
After the raid he agreed to undertake prosecution of captured
Fenians. As Orange Grand Master, Cameron was not the obvious person
to undertake this task, but the purpose of the trials was to appease
Canadian indignation while avoiding future entanglement by
convicting as few Fenians as possible. In the end all the convicted
Fenians were pardoned and there were no executions. In these show
trials Cameron played his part admirably, thus enhancing his status
as Orange Grand Master.
After this it was appropriate for Cameron to accept an offer to
undertake the defense of Patrick Whelan, the man accused of the
assassination of D’Arcy McGee. In what was clearly going to be the
most spectacular trial in Canadian history, Cameron played his part
well. He demolished the testimony of Crown witnesses who sought to
prove direct evidence of Whelan’s connection with the crime. Whelan
was convicted on circumstantial evidence, but before his execution
he admitted that he had been present at the assassination and was
thus accessory to the fact.
Cameron may have lost a few votes among Peel County Orangemen as a
result of his efforts on behalf of Whelan, but he was able to
demonstrate his enthusiasm for Orangemen by attending the meeting of
the Imperial Grand Lodge in Belfast in the summer of 1866. His
delayed return from this meeting, the first convention of Orangemen
throughout the Empire, threw the main burden of his election to the
post-Confederation Parliament on John A. Macdonald, who worked
loyally in his cause and secured Cameron’s return.
By 1868 Cameron was clearly a useful agent of Macdonald’s. He could
remain in the public eye but the decline in his influence was
obvious. He sought but failed to secure the speakership in the first
Dominion Parliament. By 1870 he was replaced as Orange Grand Master
by Mackenzie Bowell, a lesser but younger man. Bo well was a protege
of George Benjamin whose politics differed little from Cameron’s.
Cameron had brought prestige to the Order when prestige was needed.
He had assumed office as a mediator free of association with past
controversies. By 1870 his prestige was failing, and the price he
paid for serving Macdonald within the Lodges made him a
controversial figure. Yet the Lodges would never again find the
Grand Master of Cameron’s status. Though Mackenzie Bowell became
Prime Minister, he was far from being an impressive personality.
Cameron continued to take an active part in politics during the
remaining six years of his life. In 1872 he lost his seat in Peel
County but was provided with a safe seat in Cardwell which he held
until his death. In 1873 he was accused by Edward Blake of being a
tool of the ministry, and there was substance to this accusation.
Cameron was appointed chairman of the committee investigating the
contribution of Hugh Allan, the railway magnate, to Conservative
election funds. Cameron himself had benefitted from these donations,
receiving $4,000 from Allan through Macdonald. By delaying the
investigation until the end of the Parliamentary session,50 he aided
Macdonald considerably.
Exhausted by the efforts to meet his financial obligations and by
the humiliations he had to accept in order to remain in politics,
Cameron died 17 November 1876, still $200,000 in debt. It was not a
happy ending to what had been a useful and, on the whole, a
successful career. Cameron had suffered personal tragedy in 1844
when his first wife had died in childbirth, but his second marriage
in 1849 restored balance to his life. His financial disaster in 1857
was a serious, but not fatal, blow to his political career.
The tragedy in Cameron’s life was that he possessed potentialities
as a statesman which were never realized. One of the reasons for
Cameron’s relative failure in politics was that he did not have to
fight during the early part of his career and learned to fight too
late. He was adopted first by the Compact families, then by Draper,
and in a sense, by the Orange Lodges. In each case his self-evident
ability and respectability were sufficient recommendations.
Macdonald, on the other hand, had had to fight his way up from local
politics with little help from those in positions of power and
influence.
Macdonald’s abilities were more difficult to recognize because they
were less conventional. In 1854 Macdonald commented that Cameron
lacked general intelligence and was deficient in political reading.
What he perhaps sensed in Cameron was a lack of imagination and want
of interest in general ideas. Macdonald was not a man to be mastered
by dreams, but had an awareness of larger schemes, like
Confederation, keeping them in reserve in the hope that they might
prove useful.
Cameron was the master of technicalities of the law and of those
moral technicalities which Macdonald ignored, but which were useful
in acquiring and sustaining a reputation for integrity. Devices such
as the “Double Shuffle” aroused distrust, and distrust is a serious
handicap in politics. Cameron, on his part, could convincingly
assume that attitude of a public-spirited man acting according to
conscience, even when he was taking unfair advantage of an adversary
or an ally. At the time of the Corrigan affair and the “rep. by
pop.” debate of 1862, he struck hard with a well-timed blow at the
most sensitive point in the ministerial armour, and gained
popularity at the government’s expense. Moreover, in out-manoeuvring
Gowan at the Cobourg meeting of the Grand Lodge in 1859, Cameron
demonstrated a dexterity which would have done credit to the author
of the “Double Shuffle.” It is difficult to see Cameron as a man
defeated by his own moral superiority.
If Macdonald had departed from politics anytime between 1854 and
1862, Cameron’s gifts for conciliation and the confidence he
inspired would probably have given him the Conservative leadership.
His want of concern for general ideas would have been a handicap but
not a fatal one. Though Cameron was different in personality and
background from Macdonald and could not work in the same way, he
was, nevertheless, an ambitious and gifted Scot capable of taking
Macdonald’s place. Macdonald understood this. He also realized that
there was no room for two captains on the Conservative quarterdeck.
And Macdonald was right.
John Hillyard Cameron, standing as he does on the borderline of
history, may never have a full-length biography. Donald Swainton’s
article in volume ten of the Dictionary of Canadian Biography
provides a concise account of his life with details on the financial
aspects of his career. Foster Griezic’s M.A. thesis (Carleton
University 1965) and his article "John Hillyard Cameron and the
Question of the Conservative Leadership,” (Ontario History, December
1974) provide thoroughly researched and well argued accounts of his
career, which present a different view of Cameron than Swainton’s.
Yet Griezic’s interpretation of Cameron as the gentleman in politics
defeated by his virtue is debatable and the account given by both
authors of Cameron’s role as an Orangeman needs elaboration. W.P.
Bull’s From Boyne to Brampton (Toronto 1936) presents material on
Cameron’s role in Peel County. Original material can be found on
Cameron in the papers of nearly all contemporary politicians,
principally the John A. Macdonald papers in the Public Archives of
Canada and the T.C. Street papers in the Ontario Archives. There are
also some Cameron papers in the Public Reference Library of Toronto,
and there is an abundance of material in contemporary Toronto
newspapers. Fragments of his role as an Orangeman can be found in
the T.R. Ferguson Papers at the P.A.C. and in Loyal Orange
Association Annual Proceedings during the 1860’s. |
