MacNAB, Sir ALLAN
NAPIER, politician, businessman, land speculator, lawyer, and soldier;
b. 19 Feb. 1798 at Newark (Niagara-on-the-Lake), Upper Canada, third of
seven children of Allan MacNab and Anne Napier; d. 8 Aug. 1862 at
Hamilton, Canada West.
Allan Napier MacNab’s father had been a lieutenant in John Graves
Simcoe’s 2nd corps of Queen’s Rangers which saw action in the American
revolution. Put on half pay, he settled in York (Toronto) where he was
denied further military preferment and a high civil placement. A
sometime bankrupt, Allan MacNab struggled on the fringe of Upper
Canada’s Tory society. Into this rather unstable atmosphere Allan Napier
MacNab was born. Despite the family’s financial problems, he briefly
attended the Reverend George Okill Stuart’s Home District Grammar School
at York. Contacts established by his father with the York civil and
military establishment would be of use to him in his future career. Even
more important, he absorbed his father’s love of the military, intense
social and economic ambitions, and perseverance under adverse
circumstances.
In the War of 1812 MacNab, 14 years of age at its outbreak, gave full
rein to his martial instincts. He saw action at Sackets Harbor,
Plattsburgh, and Black Rock, N.Y., and at Fort Niagara. In March 1814 he
was promoted ensign in the 49th Foot. His military career curtailed by
regimental cutbacks at war’s end, MacNab searched restlessly for
alternative employment. In 1816 he entered the law office of Judge
D’Arcy Boulton Sr. That MacNab took nearly twice the average time to
qualify at the bar was a result of his inadequate education and his
preference for active work. Thus in his early years he dabbled in
acting, carpentry, and land speculation, and in 1820 renewed his
military connections as captain in the York militia. Even his marriage
in 1821 to Elizabeth Brooke, daughter of a British soldier, failed to
have a settling influence. Not until his wife’s sudden death while
giving birth to their second child in January 1825 did MacNab begin to
exercise some discipline over his life. He was called to the bar in
1826.
He decided against staying at York, where the avenues to advancement
seemed blocked by the Allan, Robinson, Boulton, and Strachan families.
MacNab was always reluctant “to accept a minor part,” and instead set up
office as the first resident lawyer in the small but growing community
of Hamilton, where he hoped advancement would be easier. Capitalizing on
his father’s relations with the Jarvis family, he quickly befriended
William Munson Jarvis, sheriff of the Gore District, whose family
provided crucial business and political support. Law contacts also drew
him close to the important Chisholm family of Oakville and the Hatts of
Ancaster. Moreover, John Beverley Robinson, also a veteran of 1812,
secured for him the position of notary. In August 1827 he successfully
defended several prominent Hamilton Tories charged with tarring and
feathering George Rolph, a Reformer who had been accused of adultery and
whose lawyer was William Warren Baldwin*. MacNab’s legal practice
benefited and within a year he had at least one student articling under
him. He was now able to buy and develop land in the Hamilton area.
Partly through the Chisholms, MacNab was appointed in May 1830
lieutenant-colonel of the 4th Regiment of Gore militia. Dependent on him
at this time were four unmarried sisters, his recently widowed mother,
and his two children. In September 1831 he married Mary Stuart, daughter
of John Stuart, formerly sheriff of the Johnstown District, and niece of
George Okill Stuart and Henry John Boulton. The marriage provided
further links to influential persons and was, as it turned out, a very
compatible union.
MacNab understood well the mechanics of preferment, but it was chance
that propelled him into the public eye. In 1829 he had refused to
testify before a committee of the House of Assembly chaired by the
Reformer W. W. Baldwin, which was investigating the hanging in effigy of
Lieutenant Governor Sir John Colborne at Hamilton by a Tory mob. Prodded
by William Lyon Mackenzie, the house sentenced MacNab to ten days in
jail for contempt. It is doubtful whether MacNab anticipated such an
outcome. But he became a Tory martyr, an image he exploited effectively
in the 1830 election when he and John Willson* defeated the Reformers in
Wentworth County.
MacNab’s first term in the assembly was inauspicious. He was convinced
that it would be unwise to identify with any single group in a political
atmosphere characterized by fluid factionalism. As a first step in
increasing his political influence in the province MacNab sought to
strengthen his ties in the Wentworth region. Political power was only as
strong as one’s regional roots and MacNab’s required much cultivation.
He thus sought, with William Hamilton Merritt of St Catharines, the
Chisholms of Oakville, and the Bethunes and Cartwrights of the
Cobourg-Kingston area, to decentralize and redistribute the commercial
and political power of the York clique. MacNab had to step lightly. Not
only was he faced with stiff political opposition in Wentworth led by
James Durand of Dundas, but also he was indebted both to York’s
financial institution, the Bank of Upper Canada, and to many York
contacts for his current advancement.
W. L. Mackenzie, an ally of the Durands, had first priority. Bested by
Mackenzie both in the assembly and at a political meeting in Hamilton,
MacNab countered by seconding a motion in December 1831 to expel his
rival from the assembly on grounds of libel. It was the first of five
expulsions; in all MacNab was active. The significance of these
expulsions soon transcended personal vengeance and even party strife. By
spearheading the attack against the irascible editor, MacNab was able to
gain power in the assembly and maintain a link with Tory York. This
bridge was sorely needed as, in its shadow, intra-party manoeuvring and
contending over the control of Upper Canada’s commercial and economic
power was occurring. The intra-party struggle was most evident
concerning banks and land speculation.
Initially MacNab avoided direct conflict with York. While supporting
John Solomon Cartwright*’s Commercial Bank at Kingston, in the hopes of
managing its prospective Hamilton “agency,” MacNab continued to give
legislative assistance to the Bank of Upper Canada. In return he
received liberal credit from the latter and, in March 1833, was
appointed its solicitor for the Gore District. Using this credit and his
own limited cash reserves, he increased his speculation in land. By May
1832 he owned some 2,000 acres of wild land in London, Gore, and
Newcastle districts. Of more importance, by 1835 he had cornered much of
the best land in the centre of expanding Hamilton. His holdings
fluctuated dramatically and their total value at any one time is
unknown, but he probably did become, as Sir Charles Bagot* stated in
1842, “a huge proprietor, perhaps the largest in the country.”
Although evidence suggests that MacNab was not scrupulous in liquidating
mortgages before resale, the initial payments on his land purchases
represented a severe drain on his cash resources, especially in the
early 1830s. The Burlington Heights property, on which the symbol of
MacNab’s social aspirations, the resplendent 72-room Dundurn Castle,
would soon sit, had been purchased in November 1832 from J. S.
Cartwright for £2,500, £500 more than MacNab had intended. Tragically,
on the day the sale was completed, fire destroyed his Hamilton building
projects causing between £5,000 and £10,000 damage. Moreover, he was
ousted as president of the Desjardins Canal Company in 1834, after
having mortgaged a large block of his own land as security for a
government loan to the company in 1832. Contacts with the Tory hierarchy
were also wearing thin. Some three years behind in payments to one
important creditor, Samuel Peters Jarvis*, the wily debtor claimed that
Jarvis owed him for past services. In Jarvis’ eyes the brash Hamilton
lawyer was simply a “villain.”
As credit tightened, MacNab faced the prospect of a confrontation with
his creditors in York. But the clash was delayed by the death of
Wentworth’s land registrar. Whoever controlled this office could quietly
acquire choice, undeveloped land in the Wentworth area without the
necessity of a public auction. After a bitter struggle with James
Durand, MacNab in April 1833 secured this appointment for his brother
David Archibald. He had gained a seemingly impregnable hold over
Wentworth’s land development and, as a result, a firm grip on the
county’s commercial and political future.
It was a fleeting victory. Peter Robinson, commissioner of crown lands,
wishing to curb rampant speculation in land and thereby retain York’s
hold over Upper Canada’s development, issued an order in council on 8
Nov. 1833 which tightened and centralized control over land speculation.
This move undermined MacNab’s coup and pushed him into open conflict
with the capital. Interpreting the order in council as an attempt by
York Tories to bypass local “dealers in Land” and monopolize profits,
MacNab was irate. Within a month he sponsored a bill to incorporate the
rival Gore Bank at Hamilton, criticized the excessive power of the Upper
Canada and Commercial banks, and even temporized on supporting the bill
to incorporate York as the city of Toronto.
Repercussions were immediate. The Legislative Council not only rejected
his bank bill but also began to obstruct his real estate affairs by
denying him privileged status at the central registry office and by
ignoring his constant demands and complaints. With construction costs
for Dundurn escalating, MacNab persevered and did realize some return on
his land dealings in 1834. However, ultimate control over land continued
to rest with Toronto.
By contrast, success was his in the field of banking. In this sphere he
gained the support of prominent Hamilton businessmen as well as
assistance from assemblymen who desired local banks for their own
developing metropolitan areas. The Gore Bank was chartered late in 1835
with MacNab controlling a majority of its shares. At this point he
opposed the chartering of further regional banks.
Freed of the financial restraints imposed by Toronto, MacNab continued
both to expand his commercial domain and to consolidate his local
political control. By 1837 he was the operator of a steamship line
running between Rochester, Oswego, and Hamilton, the owner of an
important dock on Burlington Bay, the chief promoter and president of
the Hamilton and Port Dover Railway, an active director of the Great
Western Railway, an insatiable land speculator, a builder, renter, and
seller of houses and stores, and the owner of a tavern in Hamilton. His
railway promotions increased the value of his land and in 1835 and 1837
he sold large blocks at solid profits. But MacNab’s emphasis on his
commercial career helped to split the Wentworth electorate into rural
and urban divisions. With the exception of sponsoring town fairs, MacNab
paid little attention to the rural vote and in the elections of 1834 he
briefly retreated from the county to represent the new seat of Hamilton,
the centre of his commercial affairs.
Although he was identified as a leading Tory, pragmatism rather than
ideology shaped MacNab’s commercial dealings. Tories in Toronto were his
most prominent commercial opponents. Ignoring traditional trade channels
with Britain, he was quite prepared to envisage the projected Great
Western and Hamilton and Port Dover railways (the latter in connection
with his steamship line) as mere links between the eastern and western
United States. Nor was he loath to approach New York capitalists for
financing. In fact, in the year of the Upper Canadian rebellion he made
an impassioned plea for greater immigration of Americans, arguing,
unlike most Tories, that “they were a useful and enterprising people and
if admitted would be of great advantage to the country.” He acknowledged
that he would benefit from the sale of land to immigrants. He also
criticized British interference in Upper Canadian banking affairs and
even argued that British lawyers should be subject to probation before
practising law in Upper Canada, as were Canadian lawyers in England. In
cultivating his local roots, MacNab was prepared to contravene not only
Toronto Tories but also the British Colonial Office.
His pragmatic actions show that MacNab is only partly encompassed by the
term Tory. A supporter of the clergy reserves, he nonetheless believed
that all denominations, including Roman Catholics, should have an equal
share in the proceeds from them. Although an Anglican, he often attended
a Presbyterian church, married a Catholic for his second wife, and
opposed the rising Tory Orangeman Ogle Robert Gowan*, partly because of
Gowan’s strong Protestant stance. In 1836, indeed, he proclaimed his
independence from all parties and partly in this guise was elected
speaker of the house in 1837.
Certain Tory tenets did, however, strongly appeal to MacNab in the
1830s. He wanted class lines extended, not lowered or abolished. Even at
the height of his conflict with Toronto officials, he favoured an
appointed Legislative Council, suggesting only that its membership be
made more representative. To be heard in ruling circles and to advance
the economic and military policies he sought, MacNab attempted with some
success to bypass the council, controlled as it was by Toronto Tories,
and deal directly with Lieutenant Governor Sir Francis Bond Head*. In
1836 MacNab opposed responsible government because it would sever ties
“with the Mother Country.” Love of the military, while not exclusively a
Tory phenomenon, was largely a preoccupation of the ruling group. Also,
by building Dundurn Castle MacNab doubtless hoped to gain admission to
the centre of the colony’s social élite. But by 1837 it remained to be
seen which element in MacNab’s flexible alliance of Tory, commercial,
and somewhat liberal characteristics would dominate.
The tensions in his personality and world view were brought into sharp
focus by Mackenzie’s ill-conceived rebellion in December 1837 and
January 1838. With some 65 “hastily collected” men, MacNab sped by
steamboat to Toronto where, encouraged by Head, he aspired to command
the loyalist forces. Virtually all the British regulars in Toronto had
been sent to Lower Canada to help suppress the rebellion there, but in
Toronto Colonel James FitzGibbon, a retired British regular and the
adjutant-general of militia, refused to play a subordinate role to
MacNab. A compromise was effected. Under FitzGibbon’s nominal command,
with MacNab leading the “Principal body,” over 1,000 men marched north
on 7 December to Montgomery’s Tavern where they routed the rebels.
MacNab paid no heed to the complaints and schemes of the regular
officers at Toronto who felt they had been ill treated by Head and
himself. Following the victory at Montgomery’s Tavern, Head placed
MacNab in sole command of troops sent to the London District to suppress
rebels led by Charles Duncombe. The quality of MacNab’s leadership was
mixed. He faced extreme problems of communication, supply procurement,
and control of raw, if eager, volunteers, but he also ignored certain
basic operational procedures. He must share responsibility with the
Commissariat Department for the hardships and decline in morale
occasioned by delays in payment to militia and suppliers. The
mobilization of over 1,500 men had been unnecessarily chaotic. As early
as 14 December MacNab admitted that he had “at least six times as many
men as I require.” However, he defended the value of his force as a
threat and as evidence of local enthusiasm, maintaining that “the
volunteers joining me in this District [London] would not be pleased to
be dismissed and all left to the men of Gore.” In the resultant
confusion Duncombe, like Mackenzie before him, escaped to the United
States.
In his treatment of rebel prisoners, MacNab acted to belie the image of
himself as a close-minded Tory. He was able to appreciate degrees of
involvement and, on his own initiative, he jailed only rebel leaders and
allowed their “deceived” followers to remain free on their own
recognizances. He even promised clemency to some. His concern for the
common soldier also endeared him to the men under his command. MacNab
believed that officers earned their subordinates’ respect not only
through courage in war but also by tempering strict justice with
kindness and approachability off the battlefield. His relations with the
militia were on the whole excellent, and he adroitly deflected criticism
of mismanagement to the central command at Toronto and Montreal.
Mackenzie left his American sanctuary, re-entered Canadian territory,
and occupied Navy Island on 13 Dec. 1837. Head continued to ignore his
regular officers on staff and on 25 December dispatched the “popular”
MacNab, complete with regular officers and naval support, to command
forces on the Niagara frontier. With the active involvement of American
sympathizers, the lieutenant governor admitted that the revolt had
“assumed a new and different character,” yet both he and MacNab reacted
as they had earlier. Upper Canadian volunteers poured toward the
frontier – some 2,000 by 29 December and over 3,500 by 10 January – yet
supplies and billeting were inadequate and, more important, orders were
vague. Head, while refusing to sanction an attack on the island, failed
to spell out any alternatives such as a blockade of the island and its
American suppliers. Neither MacNab nor Head seemed able to interpret
contradictory reports about the strength or morale of their opponents;
Colonel C. L. L. Foster*, a competent British regular, remained in
Toronto; and Commander-in-Chief Colborne in Montreal was out of touch
with the situation. MacNab alternated between drilling and dining. The
weakness of the line of command became apparent when a dawn sortie on 29
December led by bibulous officers nearly ended in disaster. MacNab and
his militia clearly lacked the discipline necessary for a passive
containment of the rebels. Under MacNab’s orders, on the night of 29
December, Andrew Drew*, a retired Royal Navy officer, led a contingent
against the Caroline, an American boat supplying the rebels, and
destroyed it in American waters.
Reaction was swift. An American citizen had been killed, and MacNab was
indicted for murder in Erie County, N.Y. American newspapers became
increasingly belligerent. Colborne immediately ordered Colonel Foster to
take command of all regular and militia troops in the province, and
Colonel Hughes, a British regular, to replace MacNab as commander at
Niagara. Protesting that Hughes would receive “all the credit,” although
he and the militia had done “all the drudgery,” MacNab finally had to
yield to Colborne’s perseverance. MacNab quit the frontier on 14
January, ironically the same night that Mackenzie and his rebels slipped
unseen off Navy Island. While Colonel Hughes was occupying the nearly
deserted island, the displaced MacNab was lobbying in Toronto for his
lost command.
The intense emotional experience of the rebellion altered MacNab’s
flexible posture of the 1830s. A sense of having proven himself,
strengthened by receiving a knighthood in March 1838, underlay his
belief that the trappings of power and prestige were now rightfully his.
He ignored the criticisms of Chief Justice John Beverley Robinson,
William Henry Draper*, and Governor General Colborne concerning his role
in the rebellion. He was also unaware that fundamental upheavals were
about to occur in Upper Canada’s political and social structure.
The decade of the 1840s was a time of complex political and economic
change. Union of Upper and Lower Canada in 1841, abolition of the Corn
Laws in 1846, and severe financial retrenchment presaged the
establishment of responsible government in 1848. MacNab was not alone in
his inability or reluctance to adjust to a new set of social, economic,
and political priorities. Until the mid 1840s J. S. Cartwright, Henry
Sherwood*, and a few other Tories supported MacNab’s criticisms of
imperial and domestic policy. Because MacNab was, after the retirement
of Christopher Hagerman* early in 1840, the leader of this small group,
many have seen him as a caricature of a fossilized Tory. In fact he was
not so much the advocate of an abstract political and social structure
as he was the defender of his privileged place within the established
structure. The vehemence of his resistance to the changes in the 1840s
varied directly with his failure to procure a suitable placement.
In 1839 the British government and its chief representative in Canada,
Charles Poulett Thomson*, soon to be Lord Sydenham, believed that the
union of Upper and Lower Canada on the basis of equal representation and
moderate, efficient leadership would lead to the assimilation of French
Canadians and a more economical administration of the country. MacNab
supported the economic aims of Thomson’s union bill, but opposed it on
cultural grounds because he felt that French speaking members would
dominate the legislature and that Canada’s traditional ties with Britain
would be diminished. In March 1839 he, Sherwood, and several other
Tories supported Cartwright’s motions designed to secure dominance of
the united legislature by loyal Upper Canadians. With important
conservatives like W. H. Draper voting against them, Cartwright’s
motions were rejected.
After this defeat MacNab was prepared to work within the new union. He
was even willing to accept Lord John Russell’s definition in 1839 of
responsible government: the Executive Council, although representative
of the assembly, was responsible solely to the governor general, who was
to have the right of executive selection and displacement as well as
control of patronage. In this way traditional ties to and ultimate
control by the crown would remain inviolate. In this way, too, MacNab
assumed, the presence of the loyal could not be ignored.
In its relations with Canada during the late 1830s and 1840s the
Colonial Office stressed the need for administrative expertise and
economy, qualities which MacNab lacked. Financial stringency also
directly affected him. His large fees as queen’s counsel (an appointment
he received in 1838) were closely scrutinized and only reluctantly
granted in 1839 and 1840. Despite MacNab’s protests, general command of
the Gore militia was given to a more experienced officer during the
Patriot disturbances of June 1838. Not only were MacNab’s
recommendations ignored in the militia reorganization of 1839–40, but
also, because of cutbacks, he could no longer continue as an active
officer. This loss of position meant a lower public profile, fewer
patronage outlets, and a smaller cash income.
By mid 1841 he had focused his increasing discontent on the governor
general. Sydenham encouraged his provincial secretary, Samuel Bealey
Harrison, whom he considered a talented political moderate, to seek
election in Hamilton because MacNab had indicated he would run in
Wentworth. When MacNab stood in Hamilton and defeated Harrison the
awkward relations between Sydenham and himself became evident. Unable to
agree on the right price for peace, both sides felt “ill-used” and
betrayed. By ignoring the loyal, MacNab concluded, Sydenham was
subverting the crown’s true policy and must, therefore, be resisted.
Unfortunately for MacNab’s credibility, his statement of proper policy
came suspiciously close to special pleading – who, after all, was more
loyal than the gallant knight?
Although Sydenham could not pacify, he could and did isolate MacNab.
Under Sydenham’s tutelage, potential allies of MacNab such as Draper
began to mould instead a party characterized by moderate views and able
administrative talents. Short on support – he could count on six or
seven votes in the legislature after the 1841 election – MacNab sought
an agreement with the French Canadian party whereby the union would be
ended and a dual administration bound by a common economic policy
created instead. In common with Upper Canadian Reformers such as Robert
Baldwin* and Francis Hincks*, MacNab realized that the French Canadians
were the pivotal group within the union and that they could not or would
not be assimilated, as Lord Durham [Lambton*] and Sydenham expected. Cut
off from government preferment by Sydenham, MacNab reacted in a manner
that had been successful in the past; he appealed directly to a higher
authority. Inexplicably, or so it seemed to MacNab, a trip to England
early in 1842 proved fruitless. The colonial secretary, Lord Stanley,
denied him a baronetcy, and when a compromise appointment as
adjutant-general of Canada West was botched by Sydenham’s successor, Sir
Charles Bagot, MacNab’s bitterness knew no bounds. Increasingly isolated
in the assembly – even Sherwood entered Bagot’s government as solicitor
general in July 1842 – MacNab behaved, as Bagot put it, “very factiously
– and very ill.”
In September 1842 MacNab was given his best opportunity to organize an
effective party. The formation of the first Reform government of Baldwin
and Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine was opposed by Tories such as Sherwood
and many moderate Conservatives. Draper withdrew from active politics
and MacNab became leader of the disaffected Tory and moderate
Conservative elements. But when the Reform government resigned in
December 1843 over the question of patronage control, Sir Charles
Metcalfe* called on Draper, the semi-retired moderate, to form a new
administration. As Metcalfe later explained, MacNab, was “so obnoxious
to the Parties at present constituting the Majority in the House of
Assembly . . . I could hardly place him in the Council.”
Late in 1844 MacNab began to take stock. Old allies like Cartwright were
leaving politics. Personal relations between MacNab and Draper had been
strained at least since the Caroline affair. After his disappointments
with colonial authorities, differences with Reformers no longer seemed
so irreconcilable. Even on the crucial issue of loyalty he publicly
admitted that Baldwin passed all tests. In fact he now distrusted
Conservatives like Sherwood, who had deserted him on crucial questions
in the past, more than many Reformers. The supple pragmatism evident
prior to 1837 was beginning to reappear. As he confided to a friend,
“perseverance and industry will soon carry me through all my
misfortunes.” From 1845 to 1847 his quiescent political behaviour can be
attributed to a lucrative involvement in railways.
It was Sir Allan who, in July 1851, after consuming “one or two bottles
of good port,” fathered the famous phrase “all my politics are
railroads.” He was at various times after 1845 president of three
companies, chairman of one, and a director of at least two others,
involving service on the Great Western, 1845–54; Grand Trunk, 1854–56;
Galt and Guelph, 1853–60; Hamilton and Toronto, 1853–56; Hamilton and
Port Dover, 1854–60; North-West Transportation, Navigation, and Railway
Company, 1858–60. He chaired the assembly’s railway committee seven
times between 1848 and 1857. George Brown accused him of having “managed
to make or mar every railroad scheme as he thought proper.” MacNab in
his public speeches and private letters encouraged this judgement. As
was the case with many of MacNab’s activities, however, the reality was
more mundane.
In the pre–1850 exploratory period of railway development MacNab’s
indomitable energy and questionable scruples stood him in good stead. As
the Great Western’s president between 1845 and 1849 he was active at
home and abroad. He tirelessly disarmed his two major competitors, the
Niagara and Detroit Rivers Railway led by John Prince and the Toronto
and Goderich Railway led by the venerable Toronto businessman William
Allan* and championed in the assembly by MacNab’s rival for the Tory
leadership, Henry Sherwood. By branding the former road an arm of
American capitalists and the latter an extension of the Canada Company,
he gained support for the Great Western. He also made a clandestine
arrangement with Prince who, in return for a rumoured emolument,
withdrew his road from direct competition for three years.
Despite his criticisms of Prince’s financing, MacNab, too, sought money
south of the border and for a brief period even employed as an agent
William Hamilton Merritt, the financial and political representative of
the Niagara and Detroit railway. His contacts with British capitalists
reveal a more sordid side of MacNab’s railway career. He unloaded 55,000
Great Western shares to a syndicate headed by the notorious British
railway king, George Hudson, who in turn attempted to sell these shares
at inflated prices before the first call for capital was due. MacNab and
Peter Buchanan* joined the syndicate in selling the as yet worthless
stock. It mattered not to the speculator whether the buyer could supply
capital beyond the initial premium, though the road could not be
constructed if future calls for capital could not be met. Oblivious to
this distinction, MacNab made a profit of £2,500. Because of a slumping
economy, however; the syndicate could not unload all its shares, nor
could it pay the first call. For £5,000 MacNab allowed them to return
all but 10,000 shares. The railway’s interests were secondary to those
of MacNab’s pocketbook. His profiteering, failure to locate secure
sources of capital for the railway, ineptness as a manager, and
declining parliamentary influence led to his being deposed as president
of the Great Western (although he remained a director) in 1849.
For MacNab this was one of a series of setbacks. In 1846 his wife had
died. In 1847 he was again unable to secure the adjutant-general ship.
When Draper resigned in May 1847 Sherwood, from whom MacNab could hope
for little sufferance, took over as government leader. Nor was he able
to effect an alliance with Baldwin because, as one historian has noted,
the Reformers were “strong enough . . . to neglect the knight’s
approaches.” Although MacNab had been speaker since 1844 and expected
re-election in 1848, the new Baldwin-La Fontaine government supported
Augustin-Norbert Morin instead. Having over-speculated in land (late in
1845 he and William Cayley had purchased from George Rolph 145 acres in
the town of Dundas for £7,200) his finances were chaotic, and creditors
were eager “to put on the screws.” Gout was a constant companion.
His frustration and anger were focused by the passage in 1849 of the
Rebellion Losses Bill which MacNab believed rewarded past rebel
activity. He reverted to the factious and bitter stance characteristic
of him in 1843. Sustained by economic discontent in Montreal and
scattered Upper Canadian urban centres, he both harangued and vilified
Lord Elgin [Bruce], the French, and the “disloyal” Reformers. Unlike
some Montreal Tories, however, he did not condone the firing of the
parliament buildings and the signing of the Annexation Manifesto. Rather
he went to London and again made a personal appeal to higher
authorities. Informed by the Colonial Office that British intervention
in Canadian affairs by disallowing the act would be a contravention of
responsible government, he returned home, defeated and somewhat subdued.
The obstreperous, arch-Tory element in MacNab was finally extinguished
late in 1849. The moderate element, visible in the pre-rebellion era,
came gradually to the fore and allowed him to bridge the gap between the
extreme Tory and moderate Conservative factions. His moderate behaviour
during the rebellion losses crisis, compared to that of many Tories,
stood him in good stead. Gradually he became the Tories’ leading
spokesman on major issues. Having eased the leadership from Sherwood in
1849–50, MacNab, in the early 1850s, did his best to keep the high
church, old Tory section in check. Aware in 1852, as he was in the early
1840s, that parliamentary strength ultimately depended on an alliance
with French speaking members, he attempted to undercut the Upper
Canadian Reform section of the Hincks-Morin government formed late in
1851 by approaching Joseph-Édouard Cauchon, an able follower of Morin.
Preliminary agreement on an alliance between them which would aim to
guarantee “each section of the Province . . . the entire control of
their respective legislation and administration” was reached, but the
alliance was not put into practice at that date. A supporter of
sectarian schools, MacNab also allowed the Conservatives he led to leave
the secularization of the clergy reserves, an issue on which he had been
moderate since the 1830s, an open question in the election of 1854.
MacNab’s moderation in part facilitated the formation in September 1854
of a governing alliance between Upper Canadian Conservatives and the
Hincks-Morin Reformers. It was opposed by a few arch-Tories and a larger
group of Clear Grits led by George Brown. With MacNab as premier the
coalition passed important pieces of legislation – restructuring of the
militia, secularization of the clergy reserves, abolition of seigneurial
tenure, and a measure to make the Legislative Council elective – which
placed MacNab in the vanguard of political reform. The coalition of 1854
was possible because for moderate Conservatives and moderate Reformers,
both French and English, economic ties transcended sectarian
differences. A shared desire for economic rationalization was coupled
with the French Canadian moderate Reformers’ fear of the growing power
of the Clear Grits. Like John A. Macdonald*, MacNab would seem to have
been direct heir of Draper’s moderate conservatism of the 1840s.
MacNab’s political conduct in the 1850s, however, cannot be understood
apart from his personal railway affairs. By 1850 specialized talents in
railway management were required which MacNab did not have. As he came
to realize that he could not wield real power, he increasingly began to
covet its trappings. The 1850s were for him a quest for security, an
endeavour, as he put it, “to wind up my distracted affairs – and make my
children comfortable.” The means he used were often unprincipled. For
instance, he had been the Great Western’s president when in 1847 Charles
Stuart, the chief engineer, ran his survey through the laird’s domain.
As a director in 1851 MacNab sold part of his Burlington Heights
property to the railway at an exorbitant price. By 1860 his profits from
railways totalled in modern values around $400,000.
MacNab, privy to the shady manoeuvres of the promoters of a Great
Western subsidiary, also attempted extortion. Peter Buchanan warned
another promoter that “unless [MacNab] has confirmed in a formal way
your acts in the Hamilton and Toronto, he could find little difficulty
in driving a Coach and four through them.” But MacNab could press only
so far; there was also written proof that he himself had an interest in
a construction contract for a road of which he was a director. Although
his worried co-directors were quite willing to deceive shareholders, the
government, and the general public, they drew the line at betraying
their own colleagues. Not so MacNab. His skills obsolete, his reputation
suspect, he was, in the words of an associate, “an excrescence which
cannot be got rid of.”
The Great Western tried to drop MacNab as a director in June 1854, and
tentatively promised him a £5,000 retirement gift. MacNab accepted the
promise and then turned to the Great Western’s arch-rival, the Grand
Trunk Railway, to whose policies concerning rate agreements and general
competitive practices he had been inching closer as his relations with
the Great Western deteriorated. Thus, the coalition government of 1854,
sanctioned by Francis Hincks, a Reformer and long-time Grand Trunk
promoter, and by John Ross*, president of that company, was politically
palatable to MacNab primarily because as premier he could extort money
from the Great Western while extending his influence into Grand Trunk
circles. In 1854 one Great Western director pushed for “some immediate
arrangement . . . with MacNab for £5000 . . . [to] secure his
continuance and support as Head of the Government.” MacNab received the
£5,000 in April 1855, but he was not as fortunate with the Grand Trunk.
His precarious political control began to slip in 1855 and 1856. MacNab
had rarely been in the assembly because he was crippled by gout, and
some of his colleagues felt he had delayed the bill to make the
Legislative Council elective. Objecting to the laird’s narrow use of
patronage, his increasingly weak leadership, and, no doubt, his attempts
to gain power within the Grand Trunk, John Ross resigned from the
coalition government in April 1856. Pleading lack of a sectional
majority, the rest of the government members from Canada West resigned
in May. Carried into the assembly, MacNab denied having opposed any
liberal measures proposed by government. He got no support and resigned,
whereupon John A. Macdonald constructed a new ministry including, with
the exception of MacNab, most of the old. In November he was ousted as a
director of the Grand Trunk. MacNab had played out his options: it
seemed to many people that in politics as well as railways he was now
totally expendable.
One further Great Western payment of 6,000 was given MacNab by its
vice-president John Radcliffe, who in turn sought MacNab’s help in
purchasing a complex of lines collectively known as the Southern route.
MacNab, doubtless amazed a: Radcliffe’s obtuseness, accepted with
alacrity. Buttressed by a baronetcy (secured in July 1856 on the
recommendation of the sympathetic governor general, Sir Edmund Walker
Head and the Great Western’s £6,000 donation, he set sail for England.
Having achieved nothing for the Great Western, he returned briefly to
Canada in 1857 to resign his seat in the legislature, and then went back
to England. In 1859 he unsuccessfully contested the seat of Brighton in
the British House of Commons. Weighted by financial problems and
unsaleable land, he returned again to Hamilton to settle his affairs.
Despite his gout he ran for the Legislative Council for the Western
division in 1860, was elected, and became speaker in 1862. MacNab’s move
to the Legislative Council was eased by the prospect of a substantial
land sale to the Conservative-controlled government. He received
$20,000, but it was not enough to satisfy his many creditors. In August
1862 the laird of Dundurn died, a penniless debtor.
Even his death was controversial. While creditors argued over his
effects, possession of his soul was fought for by the Anglican and Roman
Catholic churches. The latter quarrel was won by his strong-willed Roman
Catholic sister-in-law, Sophia Stuart. Although in 1855 MacNab’s second
daughter Sophia had married an English baron, the Viscount Bury, Sir
Allan was left without a male heir. His only son Robert had died in 1834
and thus his many social distinctions could not be passed on.
Inept at planning and organization but a promoter and enthusiast in many
commercial, military, and political schemes, MacNab cultivated an image
at the expense of substance and his triumphs had about them a hollow
ring. But because he was not completely of the feudal world or a member
of its ruling class, or completely of the world of steam and
entrepreneurial activities, he was able to serve as an unsteady link
between both. In doing so he reflected many of the contradictions
evident in Upper Canada during a period of intense economic, political,
and social change.
Peter Baskerville
Opinions of the Canadian Press
Of the Hon. Sir Allan Napier MacNab, Bart., Late Speker of the House of
Commons in Canada (1859) (pdf) |